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This thesis explores how socio-economic environments influence Neighbourhood 
Policing reform processes in the austerity era. After the fiscal crisis and the following 
austerity measures in England and Wales, police institutions are faced with 
unprecedented cuts to their central funding (Brain 2011) and other shifts in the policing 
field (Loader 2014; Holdaway 2017; College of Policing 2015). Significant external 
shocks can trigger ambitious policy agendas and the socio-economic conditions for 
policing reforms (Reiner 2013; Loader 2014). This can place pressure on police 
institutions to swing from one set of policing functions to another, especially for 
policing models that are resource–intensive and emphasise less coercive functions 
(Innes 2005; Punch 2012).  
Reforming police institutions, however, is difficult due to the cultural resistance from 
the street-level operatives and the complexities involved in translating policy ideas 
and decisions into actions (Crank 2003; Skogan 2008). This thesis contends that these 
complex and dynamic reform processes are played out across the different levels of an 
institution. To demonstrate this, the study focuses on cultural narratives transmitted 
through storytelling, as well as group interactions and negotiations involved in police 
work. This analysis draws upon the interactionist perspective and the work of Strauss 
(1978), Goffman (1983), and Fine (2012), to explore how group dynamics and culture 
can mediate reform and shape interactions. 
Employing a mixed-methods research design, this study explores both the general 
trends in the neighbourhood policing team workforce and the reform processes and 
policing delivery in West Midlands Police. The first phase analyses secondary data from 
the Home Office and describes the extent and distribution of changes to the 
neighbourhood policing workforce in England and Wales. In the second phase, 
observations of police-community meetings and interviews with members of 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams, explore police cultural narratives and interactions and 
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1 Introduction: Austerity and Police Reform 
1.1 Neighbourhood Policing in the Austerity Era 
In December 2013, the Telegraph online newspaper published an article with the 
headline, ‘Don't turn police into social workers, says minister’ (Barrett 2013). This 
article was written in the aftermath of ‘the Stevens report’, or Policing for a Better 
Britain: Report of the Independent Police Commission (IPC 2013). In this report, former 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner Lord Stevens expressed concerns that the impact of 
austerity would encourage police forces to retreat away from ‘responsive’ 
Neighbourhood Policing (NP) and to “a discredited model of reactive policing” (Ibid., 
26). Dismissing the idea that the police can be narrowly conceived as ‘crime fighters’ 
– an idea forwarded by the then Home Secretary Theresa May to explain the direction 
of the government’s police reforms (Home Office 2011) – Stevens’ promoted the idea 
that the police have a broad social mission and ‘civic purpose’, namely, improving 
“safety and well-being within communities and promoting measures to prevent crime, 
harm and disorder” (IPC 2013, 14). The Telegraph article reported that the then 
Policing Minister Damian Green criticised this characterisation of a broader police role: 
“What most worried me about it was the suggestion that police need 
to do community work. I want the police to be out there preventing 
crime and catching criminals, and not acting as community workers.  
“What has happened in the past is they have sent [sic] too much time 
chairing liaison committees with local councils and not enough time 
out on the street stopping criminals.” (Green; cited in Barrett 2013, 
no page) 
The debate about the role of police in modern societies is not a new one, and the 
academic consensus is that law enforcement is only a small part of police work and 
that police have limited capabilities to prevent or reduce crime (Waddington 1999; 
Reiner 2000). Nevertheless, the difference in opinion between Stevens and Green 
illustrates the competing ideas and narratives relating to the purpose and tactics of 
policing. Green, for example, drew a distinction between police collaboration with 
communities and the local council on one hand, and preventing crime on the streets 
on the other. This is striking coming from a government minister in (or perhaps after) 
an era that has been largely dominated by the Community Policing (CP) organisational 
philosophy (Herbert 2000; Tilley 2003) that encourages collaboration and partnerships, 
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which themselves may have the goal of crime prevention (Fielding 1995, 26-31). 
Indeed, American CP especially was based on the promise of crime reduction in an era 
of rising crime (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Manning 1984). 
The political and socio-economic context of these debates is important. The rhetoric 
from the Home Secretary and Policing Minister during the 2010-2015 Parliament was 
part of a narrative about how to reform police institutions to make them more efficient 
in the face of police disinvestment. The following two excerpts are examples of this 
rhetoric during official speeches: 
In the Home Office, I will be ruthless in cutting out waste, 
streamlining structures and improving efficiency.  But these practical 
measures can only go so far, and together we have to make sure that 
- despite the cuts - policing must remain visible and available to the 
public… In scrapping the confidence target and the policing pledge, I 
couldn’t be any clearer about your mission: it isn’t a thirty-point 
plan; it is to cut crime.  No more, and no less. (May 2010, no page) 
The government’s police reforms are clearly working, helping 
officers do more for less; helping them speed up justice by trusting 
their professional discretion; helping them focus on their real 
purpose of crime-fighting. (Green 2013, no page) 
Whatever the primary purpose of these reforms – fiscal prudence in public service 
provision or policing transformation – UK politicians endeavouring to redefine the ‘real 
purpose’ or ‘core’ mission of policing as crime-fighting in a time of austerity has a 
recent precedent. In the early 1990s, the police were perceived to be expensive, 
ineffective, and, with an increasing number of other actors involved in policing, just 
one agency in an increasingly plural field of security provision. This led to a similar 
discussion about whether core policing tasks could be separated from ancillary tasks, 
and whether the latter could be dropped or undertaken by other agencies (Mawby 
2000). 
Come the twenty-first century, the political agenda had changed substantially. The 
preference for policing approaches that prioritised crime management functions 
receded and the emerging models of policing – first Reassurance Policing (RP) and then 
Neighbourhood Policing (NP) – prioritised neighbourhood security functions. These new 
models were updated manifestations of CP, mixing both the so-called ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
aspects of policing – respectively, activities that rely on communication, negotiation, 
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and persuasion to achieve social control on the one hand, and activities that rely on 
the threat or application of coercion on the other (Innes 2005a). As a model conceived 
and funded by central government, NP also provided a somewhat standardised 
approach to hyper-local and responsive policing provision. Neighbourhood Policing 
Teams (NPTs), were rolled out nationally in 2008, and were to include Police 
Community Support Officers (PCSOs) as the main delivery agents of NP. The NP model’s 
purpose was to trigger three delivery mechanisms - visible foot patrol, community 
engagement, and problem-solving activities – in order to increase confidence and 
reduce crime (Quinton and Morris 2008). 
This thesis investigates NP delivery and reforms in the aftermath of the international 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. If NP still exists at all as a programme, it is widely agreed 
that NP delivery as envisioned during the New Labour era is threatened by the new 
economic conditions and the post-2010 policing reform agenda (Barker and Crawford 
2013; O’Neill 2016; Higgins 2018; HMIC 2014). Indeed, CP programmes have historically 
been dogged by implementation problems: 
…despite successive police and government attempts to promote 
‘community policing’, modern pressures on police have largely 
served to pull officers away from locally based, proactive activities 
into demand-led, reactive duties. Burgeoning public demand on the 
police has left little time for non-incident-based interaction between 
police officers and the communities that they serve. Organisational 
pressures to measure performance in the name of efficiency require 
the police to prioritise easily measurable activities. Consequently, 
public reassurance through locally tied patrols has lost out in the 
process. (Crawford and Lister 2004, 54) 
If NP delivery is changing due to a mixture of changing external and internal conditions, 
as well as shifting ideas about the role and organisation of police work, what does this 
mean for the CP movement and the trajectory of community-focused policing models?  
This chapter will first describe the challenges of the austerity era for police institutions 
and describe the contemporary policing reforms and changes to the policing field that 
are relevant to NP. Following this is a discussion of theories of institutional change, 
which identifies a number of concepts that are useful in analysing change at the 
different levels of institutions. This fits with the broader aim of this study to provide 
a more comprehensive overview of police change processes in the austerity era. To 
reveal current knowledge of how police institutions change, the next section will 
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review the literature on the different processes of police institutional reform. The 
chapter finishes by outlining the research design and the main aims of this thesis.  
1.2 The Politics of Post-Crash Policing 
1.2.1 The Financial Crash and the Austerity Era 
Police institutions operate within their respective socio-political settings (Manning 
2008), and in the years following the financial crisis of 2007-2008 the imposition of 
budgetary restraints on the Home Office (HO) led to gradual reductions in police 
funding. This culminated in a 20% real terms cut to policing across England and Wales 
by 2014-2015, ending decades of funding growth and favourable political conditions 
for police funding (Brain 2011; also see Mills et al. 2010). The central government grant 
represents the main source of police funding in England and Wales (Johnston and 
Politowski 2016) and the impact of austerity on this source of revenue has been higher 
than the average reduction to the budgets of other public services (Horton and Reed 
2011). At the time of writing, public sector net borrowing (the deficit) has fallen by 
£6.3 billion in the most recent year (April 2017-March 2018) to £39.4 billion (ONS 2018) 
and the real terms cuts to central funding of the police persist (BBC 2018). Police 
funding is also distributed unevenly due to different levels of local funding through 
council taxation, so the impact of cuts also fall unevenly between police forces (Brain 
2011). 
The idea of austerity in the context of this study refers most plainly to public sector 
cuts, especially those that fall directly on police institutions. Understanding austerity 
in this narrow and formulaic sense, however, limits discussion to what austerity does 
to material resources and the direct impact of falling resources in the public sector on 
service delivery. Consequently, this omits the logic (Blyth 2013), wider processes, and 
rhetoric of austerity politics (Bramall et al. 2016). For the purposes of this study, these 
elements will be subsumed into the phrase ‘the austerity era’, which is broadly defined 
as a political and socio-economic backdrop to, and potentially influential variable in, 
policing reforms and change. Manning (2008, 87) dubs this domain of socio-economic 
influence as the ‘surround’, which is the ‘larger political forces in a city or a nation’ 
and encircles the Bourdieusian notion of the ‘field’. 




Austerity is a form of voluntary deflation in which the economy 
adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, and public spending 
to restore competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by 
cutting the state’s budget, debts and deficits. Doing so, its advocates 
believe, will inspire business confidence since the government will 
neither be crowding out the market for investment by sucking up all 
the available capital through the issuance of debt, nor adding to the 
nations already “too big debt”. (Blyth 2013, 2) 
Although austerity is sometimes presented as the only viable way of reducing national 
debt – as it has been by the UK government (Afoko and Vockins 2013) and certain media 
organisations (M. Berry 2016) in recent years, as well as being accepted as such by the 
public (Stanley 2015) – Blyth (2013) argues that this premise is both reasonable1 and 
questionable for a number of reasons and dependent on context. While reducing 
spending is one way to escape debt, the application of austerity can become politically 
unsustainable due to the unequal distribution of its social and economic effects. This 
is partly to do with the impact on public services, as:  
‘[t]hose at the bottom of the income distribution lose more than 
those at the top for the simple reason that those at the top rely far 
less on government-produced services and can afford to lose more 
because they have more wealth to start with’ (Blyth 2013, 8).  
Further implications of this are that reductions to public service budgets, including 
local government, may exacerbate other inequalities in the austerity era (Stuckler et 
al. 2017; Donald et al. 2014; Penny 2013), and that the public becomes more reliant 
on the most easily accessible public services, such as the police, to fill the gaps in 
service provision left by other receding agencies (HMIC 2017).   
Since the 1970s the dominance of neoliberal economics and practices across 
economically developed countries has been cited as the basis for a number of market-
oriented reform programmes in the public sector (Peck 2010) and beyond (C. Berry 
2016), and the politics of public finances play a role in how these reforms are justified 
(Grimshaw and Rubery 2012; 2015; Grimshaw 2013a; 2013b). In contrast to these 
trajectories, the police were exempted from funding reductions and ‘new public 
management’ reforms by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative administration, as the 
                                            
1 There is evidence from the field of economics that fiscal contraction can, combined with 
other reforms, lead to economic recovery through increasing private consumption and 
aggregate output (e.g. Bergman and Hutchison 2010). 
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institution acquired considerable political capital through the Conservative party’s 
adoption of ‘law and order’ rhetoric (Reiner 2016; Morgan and Smith 1989). However, 
this favourable status was temporary and eventually the Audit Commission was given 
access to police forces in order to increase efficiencies, culminating in extensive 
reform efforts in the early 1990s (Brain 2010; Savage 2007a; Mawby 2000).  
While neoliberal reform agendas may be an ideological rather than pragmatic reaction 
to economic shocks and public sector deficits, fiscal crises can provide the political 
justification for these reforms and ideological agendas (Reiner 2013). For example, the 
current austerity era has been described as a deliberate attempt to fundamentally 
change the social model of the UK from ‘liberal collectivism’ to a ‘market society’ 
(Grimshaw and Rubery 2015; 2012; Grimshaw 2015; 2013). This change is accompanied 
by public sector reforms that “impose a downwards quantitative adjustment in 
activity, involve transferring activity to the private sector and… the ending of [some] 
service provision” (Grimshaw 2013, 576). This is not to reduce all policy actors to a 
single and coherent ideology, as the reform programmes of the Conservative-led 
Coalition government – such as David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ and Theresa May’s 
localism – are less ideologically coherent and form an ‘eclectic mix’ of traditions 
(Lowndes and Pratchett 2011; see also Loader 2014). In contrast, Morgan (2012) 
maintains that the overall policy programme of the Conservatives, the more powerful 
partner in the coalition, used both ideas of the big society and localism to justify the 
same policies, which are broadly commensurate with neoliberal logic.  
In light of the significant changes to the surround, it is important to understand how 
this complex environment influences policing reform and through what processes. 
Furthermore, what impact do these changes have on the police role in society? If such 
socio-economic change does have specific effects on policing delivery, this has 
important implications for deliberate police reforms and the extent to which they can 
be ‘structured in’. 
1.2.2 Contemporary Reforms and Issues in Policing 
Additional to the financial crisis, police organisations and reformers may also react to 
social contexts beyond austerity politics. A fuller range of contemporary issues in 
policing in England and Wales include the official fall in overall crime, the changing 
nature of crime and police demand (College of Policing 2015; Hales and Higgins 2016), 
policing of and for vulnerable populations (Bartkowiak-Théron and Asquith, 2012; Keay 
and Kirby 2017), policing (de)specialisation (Innes 2014a), policing in the digital era 
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(Wall 2003; Wall and Williams 2007; Wessels 2007), new governance and accountability 
arrangements (Loader 2014; Turner 2014; Lister and Rowe 2015), and the evidence-
based policing and professionalization movements (Sherman 2011; Holdaway 2017). 
While not all directly related to NP change, many of these recent reforms and issues 
relate to the role of the police and organisation of policing (Reiner 2013), and 
therefore have the potential to impact police institutions and policing delivery 
significantly enough to indirectly alter NP.  
Whether the political reform programme since 2010 can be wholly separated from 
austerity politics is debatable. Loader (2014) suggests that the austerity era has 
provided political conditions for an ambitious reform agenda to a public body that has 
until recently avoided the enforced changes to other public services, including the 
‘unfinished business’ of attempted police reform in the 1990s. These conditions include 
a lack of strong organised opposition from police bodies, a stronger government, and 
bad publicity from the Leveson press enquiry (Ibid.) and other public scandals (Innes 
2014a). Furthermore, disinvestment in the police has been an easier political choice 
in an era when government can annually cite falling crime rates, as has largely been 
the case in England and Wales since 1996 (Innes 2014a). As numerous studies have 
shown, portraying the role of the police as ‘crime-fighters’ is empirically inaccurate 
and does not convey the broadness and complexity of police work (Banton 1964; Bittner 
1970; Cain 1973; Clarke and Hough 1984; Bayley 1994; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; 
Manning 1997; Waddington 1999; Flanagan 2008; Charman 2018), yet in 2011 the 
police’s only objective was defined as crime reduction by the then Home Secretary 
Theresa May, which manifested itself in the removal of all other central targets for 
police organisations in England and Wales (Loader 2014). Redefining the (core) police 
role as crime reduction has meant that the government can claim that police 
disinvestment, resulting in reduced police resources and fewer police officers, are 
justified while the overall crime rate falls, while simultaneously attempting to sate 
the public desire for ever more ‘bobbies on the beat’ through claims that a higher 
proportion of police now work on the so-called ‘front line’ and that the Neighbourhood 
Policing workforce increased by 3,800 officers – even though these claims are 
potentially misleading (Millie 2014; Greig-Midlane 2015). 
Additional to these more assertive moves, post-2010 policing has also seen the creation 
of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and the accompanying move from a 
tripartite to quadripartite structure (Lister and Rowe 2015). In contrast to the New 
Labour government’s attempts to radically influence police performance and practice 
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through the Home Office (McLaughlin 2005; Savage 2007a; 2007b; Gilling 2008), the 
2011 Policing and Social Responsibility Act diminished the HO’s governance and 
accountability role. Although PCCs have no direct powers to influence police 
operations – these are still the domain of Chief Constables – they do have the powers 
to hold the Chief Constable to account through suspension and termination of 
employment and to set force priorities. This makes PCCs potential change agents of 
NP by virtue of these new governance arrangements and democratic processes (Lister 
2013), and thus another important part of austerity-era policing in England and Wales. 
In particular and in light of debates around the efficacy of the PCSO role (O’Neill 2016; 
cf. Loveday and Smith 2015), PCCs have had to make decisions not only regarding their 
support of the NP model and ‘bobbies on the beat’, but also on the question of the 
provision and retention of PCSOs as part of existing or future local policing 
arrangements. 
The question of what will happen to police visibility and in turn public confidence is 
particularly keen when the police workforce is falling or is likely to fall due to 
disinvestment (Barker and Crawford 2013), but the NP architecture is also threatened 
in other ways. NP is in one sense a policing specialisation, created in an era where 
public policing was organised into a number of specialist domains – such as response, 
detection, drugs enforcement, and neighbourhood – and this way of organising policing 
is under threat from the need for stretched police organisations to deploy resources 
more flexibly. This could lead to a new era of de-specialisation and the fostering of a 
broader range of policing skills (Innes 2014a), which represents a shift away from the 
‘reinvention of the constable’ as a ‘community leader’ back to an ‘omni-functional 
generalist’ (Savage 2007c). PCSOs, on the other hand, are one manifestation of 
pluralisation and hybridity, where the policing division of labour is divided by a host of 
different agencies, actors and police roles (Johnston 2003; Crawford and Lister 2004; 
Manning 2014; Brodeur 2010). Reforms made in the austerity era could impact the 
direction of these trends, particularly if a cheaper patrolling option, public or private, 
can replace the PCSO without resistance (Loveday and Smith 2015; Barker and 
Crawford 2013). 
Internal police reforms are also influenced by austerity, as organisations must make 
operational decisions within the constraints of changing financial environments as well 
as the range of contemporary political pressures. The main regulatory bodies of public 
policing in England and Wales – Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & 
Rescue Services (HMICFRS – formerly HMIC) and the College of Policing (CoP) – have 
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had the challenge of identifying and analysing challenges for the delivery of policing 
in the context of disinvestment and shrinking police resources. One of these challenges 
is the change in demand for police services, both in terms of overall increases and the 
changing character of demand, which is currently seen as the increase in complex cases 
and sexual offences. This had led to the pronouncement of two crucial problems for 
police organisations: managing demand (CoP 2015) and dealing with vulnerability 
(HMIC 2016).   
The idea of ‘managing demand’– or ‘reducing demand’ – refers to the process of police 
organisations prioritising declining resources in order to cover the areas of police work 
that are deemed to be most important to fulfilling their mandate (Hales and Higgins 
2016). In essence, the austerity era, with fewer police resources and diminished 
centralised governance, has catalysed urgent debates about the police role in 
contemporary society. This also evokes the debates from the 1990s about the idea that 
police organisations can retreat to ‘core tasks’ (Mawby 2000). In some cases, demand 
may be generated by high public expectations of the capacity of public services to deal 
with a growing range of issues (Fleming and Grabosky 2009). The New Labour reform 
agenda can be seen as an example of this, as the police remit was broadened through 
antisocial behaviour legislation (Millie 2008) and the encouragement of a customer 
service ethos as part of new public management reforms (Fleming and Grabosky 2009) 
– though this ethos likely had a limited impact on police attitudes and practice 
(Westmarland 2010). This idea of an excessive remit relates to one obvious method of 
reducing demand; redefining what demands are reasonable for police with finite 
resources. There is, however, an alternative (or complementary) method; 
understanding how to prevent crime and intervene in the lives of those who are 
considered to be at risk of offending/being victimised. This can be conceptualised as 
reducing ‘failure demand’, which is any demand that is caused by an earlier failure. In 
the case of policing, this would include not preventing crime from taking place or not 
dealing with other criminogenic or other demand-producing risks – currently referred 
to collectively as ‘upstream’ (Walley and Jennison-Phillips 2017). 
The importance placed on vulnerability - which relates to areas such as mental health, 
youth, child sexual exploitation, victims of trafficking, and intimate partner and 
honour based violence (Asquith et al. 2017) – was evident when in 2016 the CoP 
conference was themed ‘Vulnerability – new approaches, better outcomes’ (CoP 2016), 
in which the then Home Secretary Amber Rudd said that vulnerability was “one of the 
most pressing issues facing policing today, and… one of my priorities” (Rudd 2016, no 
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page). Vulnerability appears to be high on the policing agenda in the austerity era as 
there is a concern that vulnerable people increasingly face a lack of police service 
provision (HMIC 2017).  In keeping with the dominant reform agendas, HMIC made the 
following claim:  
This state of affairs strengthens the case for more efficient ways of 
working; by working more efficiently, forces will be able to do more 
to protect people, even in the face of reduced resources. (HMIC 2017, 
18) 
New delivery methods for policing of and with vulnerable people often revolve around 
spatial analysis (Williamson et al. 2007; Chainey 2008; Haining 2009). That is, to 
implement practical responses to vulnerability, police organisations attempt to 
ascertain who is vulnerable, divide populations and places into categories of risk, and 
guide police practitioners (Bartkowiak-Théron and Asquith 2012). The idea of 
vulnerability is important to NP delivery as these issues and the way police 
organisations deal with them can affect the prioritisation of resources across different 
spaces (Bartkowiak-Théron and Asquith 2015). In other words, different 
neighbourhoods or other geographical areas can be designated as places of higher risk, 
NP resources distributed accordingly, and differential policing of neighbourhoods 
based on vulnerability risk factors encouraged, just as with crime (Williamson et al. 
2007).  
These approaches fit with the recent developments that Holdaway (2017) refers to as 
the ‘re-professionalization’ of policing, which involves integrating scientific principles 
and ‘a body of authoritative knowledge’ (Neyroud 2011, 44) into police practice and 
the creation of a new regulatory system and an independent yet accountable 
professional policing body, the CoP. Traditionally, the philosophy of CP had been 
presented as an antithesis to the professionalised, bureaucratic model of policing 
(Manning 1984), so there are some elements of these approaches that are in tension 
with some of the symbolic functions of policing that are valued by CP and its 
manifestations, such as social closeness and reassurance, and this new environment 
could present NP operatives with new challenges in delivering NP. 
This section has outlined the contemporary political and socio-economic environments 
within which police reform must take place. These contexts, it will be argued, provide 
the rhetorical frameworks and stories through which new reforms are communicated. 
This requires a deeper understanding of institutional change processes in police 
organisations to understand the link between external change and reforms, as well as 
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how reforms are justified, resisted, and enacted by different actors and groups within 
the institution. 
1.3 Levels of Police Institutional Change 
With a topic of study so broad as reform and change in NP delivery there are numerous 
ways for a researcher to investigate these phenomena. Institutional change in policing 
occurs at multiple levels and involves numerous actors and networks (Savage 2007; 
Leishman et al. 1995), providing a range of units of analysis, each with an existing body 
of theoretical literature. Furthermore, police institutions are large and complex 
entities, where reform does not just occur within separate ‘levels’ of the organisation 
but must necessarily interact through a broader reform process that links the causes 
and effects of institutional reform. This section will briefly review these theories of 
police reform, exploring what is understood about when, why, and how reform and 
change happens. This will include a consideration of the role of exogenous shocks in 
reform processes to reflect this study’s focus on change to NP delivery in the post-
financial crash austerity era.  
Reform refers to new policy directions that attempt to redirect, alter, or extend 
existing policy, and is a perpetual component of any institution (McMahon and Ericson 
1984). Institutional change, on the other hand, will be referred to here as the result 
of any deliberate policy or reform and organic adaptation. The connection between 
the reform and change, then, is when reform leads to a desired change or indeed any 
meaningful change at all in institutional structure, culture, and practice. Change in 
policing delivery is also a separate matter, as it can take place not only because of 
reform, but also despite reform or independently of any top-down policy (Lipsky 1980). 
Therefore, a guiding question for this discussion is: when do reforms precipitate 
change in policing, and which of these changes can be considered to be meaningful? 
To consider how this question can be answered, it is useful to first outline some general 
principles of (the new) institutionalism and related theories of broad institutional 
change.  
1.3.1 Institutional Perspectives 
Police institutions are public bodies that are, in the current historical era, an essential 
part of the modern state apparatus. These bodies contain structures and formal rules 
that attempt to guide behaviour and produce defined outcomes, but they are also 
socially organised by the actions of individuals and groups. Institutionalism seeks to 
study and theorise the “relations between institutional characteristics and political 
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agency, performance, and change” (March and Olsen 2011, 160), as the structural 
components of institutions are intended to be translated into political action. Some 
other fundamental premises of institutional theory are that: 
…institutions create elements of order and predictability. They 
fashion, enable, and constrain political actors as they act within a 
logic of appropriate action. Institutions are carriers of identities and 
roles and they are markers of a polity’s character, history, and 
visions. (March and Olsen 2011, 160)  
Accordingly, police institutions are often resistant to reform (Skogan 2008), such as 
those that attempt to redesign organisations in the image of a profit-making business 
and apply economic concepts to a public service institution (Crank 2003; Manning 
2001). This is because the police are institutionalised organisations that perform ‘value 
work’, and police organisations and officers (and other staff) must embody the 
institutional values within the design of the organisation and the tasks they perform, 
respectively (Crank 2003). Crank argues that values are “foundational to the police. 
Organizational behavior, culture, and structure become sensible in terms of the values 
of members and constituencies” (2003, 187). The external and internal constituents of 
the police help shape the institution because public bodies seek both internal and 
external support for their values and goals. Bouma’s (1998) view is that this normative 
context is the essential feature of an institution, distinguishing the broader institution 
from the subordinate organisation, which itself is shaped by and helps to reproduce 
the institution by conforming to these norms.  
Firstly, this tells us that, theoretically, meaningful change in police organisations is 
difficult and attempts at reform are limited by institutional values. This does not 
mean, however, that change is impossible or does not take place (Marks 2000), but 
rather that there are stabilising features of public institutions in stable societies.2 
Secondly, it suggests that meaningful institutional change, rather than during technical 
changes to the organisation, is when the normative context of the institution is altered. 
This then relates to the potential for organisational change because an institutionalised 
organisation attempts to work within this normative context, influencing which types 
of reforms can be successful according to their history and social goals. 
                                            
2 The opposite may be true for unstable societies. Through studying police change in the 
transitional society of post-apartheid South Africa, Marks argues that police transformation is 
constant precisely because “police organisations are under constant pressure to realign 
themselves to changing political, social and economic environments” (2000, 146). 
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1.3.1.1 Institutional Change Processes 
Institutional theory has in the past3 been good at explaining institutional stability but 
not change, and as such there is perceived to be a ‘conservative bias’ in much of the 
institutional change literature (Baumgartner and Jones 2012; Streeck and Thelen 
2005). There are two broad models that attempt to account for both change and 
stability in institutions: the gradualist (or incrementalist) model and the punctuated 
equilibrium model (PE). 
In PE, the idea of institutional inertia revolves around an understanding that 
institutional change is often episodic, sudden and unpredictable (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2012), such as when the institution experiences 
an exogenous shock and an ensuing crisis. After such events institutions may face a 
critical juncture at which a number of different pathways may be taken, each tied to 
decisions about its future direction (Hogan and Doyle 2009). PE explains how 
institutions can dramatically and abruptly change in exceptional circumstances despite 
their inherent stabilising features. Figure 1 provides a basic visual representation of 
how general institutional change is expected to take place under PE. It is important to 
note that PE does not preclude incremental change (Prindle 2012) but, according to 
Streeck and Thelen, tends to “conceive of this as fundamentally reactive and adaptive 
                                            
3 There is contention as to which perspectives present this conservative view of stability. 
Baumgartner and Jones (2012) suggest that the incrementalists of the 1960s had a conservative 
outlook and that the punctuated equilibrium model would correct this. Streeck and Thelen 
(2005) on the other hand suggest that it is the punctuated equilibrium theorists since the 1990s 
who over-emphasise stability and ‘downplay’ more regular change. 
Figure 1 Punctuated Equilibrium model 
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and serving to protect institutional continuity” (2005, 8). The main alternative to 
punctuated equilibrium is the gradualist model of institutional change, which suggests 
that institutions in advanced political economies are constantly and incrementally 
adapting to new conditions (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Rather than the abrupt and 
transformative changes theorised by PE, his perspective largely refers to the “slow and 
piecemeal changes [that] can be equally consequential for patterning human behavior 
and for shaping substantive political outcomes” (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, 1). Figure 
2 is a basic visual representation of this process.  
 
Figure 2 Gradualist model 
Streeck and Thelen (2005) add that many studies have shown continuity by focusing on 
the elements of institutions that are continuous. They further argue that change and 
continuity exist alongside each other in institutions, and that there may be 
contradiction between, for example, continuity in institutional structures and change 
in institutional behaviour. This points towards the importance of understanding policy 
at different levels of an institution (Pollitt 2001). 
1.3.1.2 Connecting the Levels (1): from Ideas to Action 
Whether change is considered to be gradual or punctuated can hinge on how change 
and transformation are conceptualised.  One answer is that fundamental change 
happens when a new logic of action is accepted by a multitude of actors within the 
institution (Deeg 2005; Carstensen 2017). This notion connects the ideas from those 
who have reform ideas and the capability to transmit those ideas to others in the 
institution. In a public service, new logics and ideas from policy ‘visionaries’ or 
‘entrepreneurs’ (Savage 2007), politicians or managers, must therefore gain broad 
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acceptance for a significant shift in policy action, or street-level service delivery, to 
take place. This acceptance is given by individuals who make sense of new rules and 
environments and act accordingly (Weick 1995; Chan 2007), but this acceptance is also 
mediated by cultural processes (Fine 2012). The idea of accepting new ideas and logics 
of action implies that delivery agents are rational and can proactively change their 
behaviour to create new street-level policy.  
While this may be a useful way to conceptualise conscious acceptance of reforms and 
participation in new policy action, it does not emphasise the street-level delivery that 
is spontaneous and culturally constituted. That is, the art and craft of policing adds 
layers of complexity to police action, where experience and ‘ways of seeing’ are drawn 
upon for improvisation (Shearing and Ericson 1991); improvisation being necessary for 
police who perform complex and unpredictable work (Bittner 1980; Klinger 1997). 
Furthermore, there is a danger in seeing gradualism as an evolutionary – or adaptive – 
process, as change does not have to go in a linear and progressive fashion but instead 
could be perceived as regressive, especially in states with authoritarian policy agendas 
(Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Consequently, conceiving of rational action that is removed 
from political and cultural contexts can give an incomplete picture of the dynamics of 
institutional change. These barriers to institutional change are also evident from 
studies of policy transfer (Pollitt 2001; Jones and Newburn 2007; Brogden and Nijhar 
2005). 
Carstensen (2017) notes that gradualism has been successfully applied recently in 
financial institutions in the austerity era; a time when more sudden changes would be 
expected. However, the issue remains that gradualists have not explained the impact 
of exogenous shocks and times of crisis on gradual reform processes (Ibid.). This 
provides an alternative perspective to PE that still takes the impact of trigger events 
seriously. Instead of these events leading to sudden change, they can instead create 
new directions or pathways for gradual change processes. The mechanism for this is, 
according to Carstensen, ‘institutional bricolage’. This refers to the ability of rule-
makers to rearrange and redeploy institutional elements, and to (re)frame ideas that 
resonate within all levels of the institution, where policymakers attempt to “reapply 
the existing logic of action” (Carstensen 2017, 140). For Carstensen, this explains the 
slower, more gradual process of change in times of crisis and sudden shocks. 
Although Carstensen uses institutional bricolage to refer to rule-making and rule-
taking, it is possible to adapt this idea to account for processes of cultural change 
within police institutions, and indeed some police change literature has referred to 
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similar processes (for example, Chan 1996). Where this concept, or an adaption of it, 
could be useful to theories of police change, is within the bricolage analogy. This 
alludes to an active and pragmatic approach of taking ‘whatever is at hand’, suggesting 
that reforms do not necessarily have to be new and novel. Indeed, in order to resonate 
with existing logics of action/institutional cultures, it is expedient for policymakers to 
draw upon existing institutional elements – policies, for example, that seem familiar 
in their objectives and values. The (re)framing process should also include not just the 
decisions of policymakers, but also the way that reform is communicated within 
institutions – through, for example, rhetorically framed stories (Schön and Rein 1994) 
– and policy implementation, or how these new policies, guidelines, and stories are 
negotiated at the street level (Klinger 1997). All constituents of an institution are 
involved in policy (re)framing and negotiation. These constituents tell old and refined 
stories to make sense of new events and make “on-going reinterpretations of culturally 
sacred storylines” (Boje 1995, 106). Stories of these new events are in competition for 
recognition as an accepted, or dominant, narrative, and these discursive struggles can 
influence how reforms are enacted. 
Understanding these debates in the institutional change literature is important for 
policing studies as it draws attention to the nature, complexity, and difficulties of 
change at various levels of police institutions. Certain types of policing change are 
demonstrably incremental (Savage 2007), but these more easily reformable features 
of policing exist alongside enduring and tenacious characteristics (Loftus 2009; 
Manning 1997; 2003; 2008; 2010; Marenin 1998). Social and political instability 
surrounding an institution can also affect the potential for more transformational 
change, in which the more stable elements of policing can be challenged and 
potentially changed (Marks 2000; Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Finally, there must be an 
awareness of how exogenous shocks impacts policing reform processes as well as the 
more likely avenues of, and impediments to, policing change.  
1.3.2 Levels of Change in Police Institutions 
This section reviews the literature on processes of police reform, change and 
transformation and separates these into ‘levels of change’. This refers to the different 
locations where change takes place – macro-structural, meso, cultural, interactional, 
and micro processes – and the studies that refer to and explain change within and 
between these levels. This will also build on the concepts used to describe processes 
of institutional change that will inform the analysis and discussion of this thesis. Of 
course, sites of change can also be sites of resistance, and during times of crisis and 
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consequent top-down reform efforts there are still a number of internal and external 
impediments to real change (Skogan 2008). Therefore, these ‘levels of change’ refer 
to contentious debates about how real change happens and the likely sources and 
catalysts of change and resistance. 
1.3.2.1 Political Economy  
Macro-structural perspectives of change in policing vary in the level of determinism 
factored into the relationship between macro-structural and policing change. The 
more deterministic of these is the political economy perspective, which emphasises 
how the police function is tied to the overall social structure and therefore is about 
maintaining the dominant order (Reiner 2000) or even fabricating it (Neocleous 2000). 
From this perspective, the police role is relatively inert in the dominant and tenacious 
social order produced by capitalist systems, and where changes do occur this is due to 
paradigm shifts in social relations and political ideology. For Reiner (2007; 2013), 
legislative change and reforms in the UK since the 1970s reflects the dominant political 
ideology changing from a welfarist to neo-liberal model, affecting policy agendas and 
styles of institutional management. This can be seen not only in the ‘politics of law 
and order’ and the associated policing and criminal justice policies and reforms, but 
also more broadly in other reform agendas and social context, which itself can impact 
the policing field.  
Through ideational change, existing institutional arrangements can be challenged by 
the construction of issues, problems, and solutions (Béland 2009). Manning (2013) 
suggests that politicians have in recent decades devised ‘rhetorical frameworks’ to 
transform the idea of police from a public service to a marketised organisation, and 
this highlights how stories about policing can be devised and passed down from above 
the institution with variable results (Lyon 1999). However, these rhetorical shifts are 
not certain to lead to significant change, in part because economic terms like 
effectiveness and efficiency are in tension with concepts such as legitimacy and 
justice, which are about the public good regardless of the cost (see also White 2014). 
1.3.2.2 Trigger Events 
The effect of sudden shocks to police institutions have been theorised by Sherman 
(1978) in his study of police corruption, scandals, and reform. The main proposition is 
that public scandals in cases of police deviance produce processes of reform – a scandal 
is an ‘agent of change’. The structure of a scandal, according to Sherman, is as follows: 
public revelation of deviant act(s); wider publication of the scandal by media; police 
defend themselves against accusations and labels; the facts of the case are 
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dramatized, usually by politicians and reformers; deviant actors are prosecuted, and; 
the deviant label is successfully applied by the audience. Although Sherman is 
interested in scandals after police corruption, this framework can be applied more 
broadly to other institutional scandals or crises and resultant reform, such as recent 
ASB scandals and their impact on the ‘policy profile’ of ASB victims (Donoghue 2013), 
political rhetoric, and policy agendas (Millie 2010). Savage (2007a) summarises these 
events as ‘system failures’, in which the trigger event or ‘scandal’ can be any number 
of things, including flawed strategies or operations. This opens up the possibility that 
expensive or ‘inefficient’ models of policing can be labelled as a system failure when 
(inevitable) financial crashes occur, leading to charges of organisational extravagance 
or profligacy that is unsustainable in times of fiscal crisis. It also alludes to how crisis 
is constructed and the rhetorical struggle between a number of constituents and actors 
to define the problem and its solution. 
1.3.2.3 Paradigm Shifts and Transformation 
Either by sudden trigger events or large macro shifts, some observe that police 
institutions change significantly when external conditions make previous structures or 
operations less desirable or impossible. Kelling and Moore (1988) present an historical 
account of policing in the US that resonates with the paradigm-swing thesis. They 
describe how police institutions would change their overarching ‘organizational 
strategy’, or values and mission, in order to adapt to new social, economic, and 
technological conditions and react to political pressure. These organisational 
strategies are relatively stable for long periods, until external conditions change so 
much that police values and mission need to adapt. The authors liken this to corporate 
strategies that evolve to meet new demands and expectations and assume that top-
down programmatic changes can change police practices effectively.  
The idea that macro forces lead to sudden and significant police change took shape in 
Bayley and Shearing’s (1996) transformation thesis. They argued that in the context of 
a more plural provision of policing and security services and rising crime, the public 
police lost its monopoly on policing services and faced an identity crisis. Consequently, 
new strategies and organisational structures emerged that accepted the limits of the 
patrol function and the need for more community involvement4. A more recent 
example of the paradigm swing thesis in community policing was forwarded by Punch 
(2012), who, writing in the austerity era, identifies eleven macro features that shift 
                                            
4 Jones and Newburn (1998) contradict certain aspects of this account, arguing that the idea of 
a police monopoly is overstated and ahistorical. 
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and cause police practices and organisational rhetoric to oscillate. These features 
include neo-liberalism, managerialism, technology and specialisation. The cumulative 
effect of the eleven features, Punch argues, is to push policing towards a ‘crime 
control’ and ‘high policing’ (Brodeur 1983) approach, and away from the ‘service-
oriented’ policing of CP. These ideas draw attention to the broader shifts in policing 
that occur due to a shifting external environment, and the space these changes create 
for ideational change and resulting paradigm swings in policing strategies and styles.  
1.3.2.4  ‘Structuring in’  
CP programmes are examples of top-down reform policies that aspire to change police 
culture, behaviour and practices and ultimately the effective delivery of policing 
services (Bayley 2008). Successful reorientation of policing delivery is largely measured 
by demonstrable change to the outcomes or performance measures that are prioritised 
by the institutions or politicians who produce the reforms (Fielding and Innes 2006). 
However, in order to be successful reform must not ignore the lessons of past 
implementation failures (Skogan 2008). CP programmes, therefore, must be 
‘structured in’ correctly to effectively change police behaviour and policing delivery 
(Skogan and Wycoff 2004; Williams 2003). In other words, effective reform is not just 
the talk and decisions of policy-makers and managers, but a process that takes into 
account the usual avenues of resistance to change. Furthermore, some claim that in 
order to succeed CP must become the “operating philosophy of the entire organisation” 
(Williams 2003, 123) rather than an array of specialist units, but doing this successfully 
is not guaranteed (Maguire 1997). Furthermore, these changes may be largely 
rhetorical in nature, being designed to manage impressions of the legitimacy of police 
work rather than changing it (Manning 1997). Overall, ‘Structuring in’ highlights the 
importance of top-down reform processes that take account of resistance but does not 
fully describe the cultural and micro processes of mediation and negotiation that affect 
policy implementation.  
1.3.2.5 Micro perspectives: Discretion, Sense-making, and Change Agents 
Individual policing actors may be either impediments to or drivers of change. Within 
police institutions there are a variety of actors of different roles and ranks who have 
opportunities to contribute towards reform and change or attempt to block it (Skogan 
2008). In top-down accounts, senior managers and policy visionaries are the most 
effective change agents who can change institutional rules, tactics, strategies, and 
values (Savage 2007a). Many other studies locate change agents lower down in the rank 
structure, where implementation will succeed, fail, or morph into something different 
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from the intended outcome (Toch et al. 1975; Toch 2008; Sklansky and Marks 2008; 
Skogan 2008).  
Wilson (1968) was critical of the impact of the organisational management of police 
work through rule-making and effective supervision, arguing that organisational 
directives have a limited effect on police behaviour due to other constraints on 
individual action, such as legal and organisational constraints. For Wilson, police 
discretion exists due to ambiguity and situational limits to law enforcement action 
(such as the cooperation of the victim or community) and the lack of capability to 
supervise patrol officers’ actions. Officers therefore make decisions to arrest based on 
individual, and potentially moral, judgements of a situation. This reflects the idea of 
police as ‘streetcorner politicians’ who draw upon ‘moral and intellectual 
perspectives’ as a basis for action (Muir 1977). Wilson (1968) claims that reforms that 
aim to change negative behaviour are met with hostility at the street level and this 
makes resistance more likely. Skogan (2008) observed resistance amongst police 
middle and top managers to reforms that diminish their ability to supervise street-
level officers. Furthermore, sergeants have regular contact with and influence over 
street level officers and have to “interpret the operational meaning of official policies 
at the street level” (Skogan 2008, 25), and this makes them powerful change agents. 
Reform that challenges the routine practices of individuals in public institutions may 
not succeed because these routines are created by street-level bureaucrats precisely 
to cope with the pressures and dilemmas of their work (Lipsky 1980). For CP 
practitioners, members of the community influence how individual officers make 
decisions about how to perform their work (Fielding 1995). 
CP programmes and strategies are often vague (Waddington 1999), broad, and 
ambitious, and therefore police must interpret and make sense of these reforms in 
order to implement them (Maguire and Katz 1997). Chan (2007) also notes that 
sensemaking – the processes by which practitioners make sense of the policing field – 
occurs in police institutions, where police “translate changes in the field into shared 
understandings and values that inform the occupational habitus” (323). This connects 
the individual processes of sensemaking to wider cultural processes and mediation in 
police institutions, which will be addressed more fully below. 
1.3.2.6 Cultural Perspectives 
Police culture is often portrayed in studies of police reform as an impediment to 
change, as features of an occupational culture endure throughout generations 
(Skolnick 2008). In this account, culture is constituted through experiences of the 
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structural realities of police work, both external and internal, that encourage a set of 
informal occupational norms, form identity, and inform action (Skolnick 1966; 
Holdaway 1983; Manning 1997; Reiner 2000; Loftus 2009; Shiner 2010; Reiner 2017). 
However, these traditional accounts of culture tend to emphasise negative traits, such 
as suspicion, that make police disinclined to implement policy that is inimical to their 
understanding of how police work should be done (Chan 1996). Chan (Ibid.) argues that 
instead a “theory of police culture should recognize the interpretive and active role of 
officers in structuring their understanding of the organization and its environment” 
and understand that culture is situated in the “political and social context of policing” 
(112). Ways of seeing the policing world and lessons about how to act in it are 
transmitted through stories, and this allows for improvisation, daring and the 
retrospective constitution of culture (Shearing and Ericson 1991; also see Shiner 2010). 
For Chan (1996), this means that police culture can both resist and produce change in 
police institutions. Institutional change comes in times of changes to the policing field 
– “a social space of conflict and division” (Chan 1996, 115) – and habitus – dispositions, 
cultural knowledge – which occur either individually or together: 
Changes in the field (e.g. in the formal rules governing policing) 
inevitably alter the way the game is played, since habitus interacts 
with the field, but the resulting practice may or may not be 
substantially or even discernibly changed. Once again the analogy of 
sports may be useful here. If the rules of a game or the physical 
markings on the field have been changed, an experienced player may 
be able to adjust quickly to the new rules and hence shows no sign 
of changing his/her performance. Conversely, changes to habitus 
(e.g. in the objectives of policing) also affect practice, but unless the 
field is changed in a way that reinforces the new habitus, habitus 
itself may revert to its old dispositions. (Chan 1996, 131) 
Holdaway (1984) notes that police in his study had resisted CP because it did not reflect 
their occupational values, but more recent studies suggest that police cultures are 
shifting and diversifying away from the traditional cultural characteristics of the past, 
at least for some groups in the police (Charman 2018; Loftus 2009; O’Neill and 
McCarthy 2013). The theoretical perspectives of Chan (1996) and Shearing and Ericson 
(1991) reveal how these inconsistencies can exist and alterations can occur in police 
culture, and how what was once seen as purely an impediment to change is actually a 
site of mediation (see also Fine 2012). 
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1.3.2.7 Connecting the Levels (2): Concluding Thoughts 
The previous discussion has highlighted how policing change has been theorised at a 
number of different levels, where complex and varied processes of change impact both 
structure and action. The impact of ideational and structural change should not be 
ignored in favour of a rich yet limited view of micro processes, but instead integrated 
into a wider institutional understanding of policing change; one that appreciates how 
rhetoric, stories, culture, and interaction are arenas of mediation, negotiation, and 
resistance. These arenas are embedded in the structural and are sites of both 
deliberate and unintentional policy implementation. For policymakers, an integrated 
understanding is useful to understand the potential for and limits of change, and an 
institutional perspective highlights the importance of institutional values, which 
include both internal and external constituents. However, even these categories – 
internal and external – potentially contain further divisions; institutions are sites of 
both conflict and consensus. These rhetorical and interactional struggles are part of 
the negotiation of social change (Lyons 1999).  
1.4 Aims and Research Design  
For this study, applying a wider institutional understanding to change processes in NP 
is enhanced by a mixed methods research design. Researching change processes that 
operate both within these levels and between them requires a choice of methods and 
analytical approach that captures and explores these processes. This allows for a more 
complete account of NP delivery reform and change in the austerity era, emphasising 
the roles of both structural change and micro processes and encompassing national and 
local changes. The initial quantitative phase of this study will analyse secondary data 
from the Home Office and other sources in order to describe the nature of the changes 
to the police workforce in England and Wales and the implications this has for the 
structure and delivery of NP. In the second stage, qualitative interviews with members 
of Neighbourhood Policing Teams will be used to investigate the practitioner 
understandings of recent and coming organisational reforms as well as the organisation 
of local policing work. Observations of community engagement work at police-
community meetings will explore how police understandings of organisational changes 
and community interactions affect the delivery of neighbourhood policing. This mixed 
methods approach is fully explicated in chapter three. 
The principal aim of the study is to explore how NP delivery is changing in the era of 
austerity; that is, how the shock of the fiscal crisis and resulting austerity policies 
impact change processes within police institutions. To understand this broad notion of 
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NP delivery change, the study will also consider the internal and external drivers of NP 
reforms, and how these reforms are understood and negotiated throughout the 
institution, from management to the street-level. Therefore, these three primary 
research questions are used as a tool to frame and shape the current study: 
1. How is Neighbourhood Policing being reformed in the austerity era? 
2. What is the role of cultural narratives and stories in explaining and justifying 
reform processes?  
3. How does the socio-economic environment impact the police role? 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This introductory chapter has outlined the main focus and aims of this thesis, as well 
as reviewing the relevant theoretical perspectives on the socio-economic change of 
the austerity era, the contemporary policing field, general institutional change 
processes, and police change processes. Contextualising what change in contemporary 
police institutions means requires engagement with police institutional history, and 
Chapter 2 continues to review the policing literature to explore the historical functions 
of the police and the impact this history has on contemporary community policing 
approaches. The developments in Anglo-American community policing in the late 
twentieth century are then explored to further show how and why change happens. 
Chapter 3 deals with the research settings and methods and describes how the 
empirical elements of this mixed method study were designed and performed in order 
to explore the main research themes. Further to this, there is a discussion of the 
Neighbourhood Policing Team as a unit of analysis and local group (Fine 2012). The 
chapter also addresses issues of ethics and access that were raised by the qualitative 
phase of the study. 
In the next three chapters the empirical data is analysed. Chapter 4 investigates how 
the NP workforce is changing in the austerity era by analysing police workforce data. 
The main focus is on the change to the numbers, proportion, and distribution of the 
Police Community Support Officer workforce in England and Wales between 2004 and 
2013. After analysing these trends, the chapter explores the implications for the 
neighbourhood security function and the delivery of NP and other local policing 
models. After this quantitative phase, the next two chapters represent the qualitative 
phase of research that focuses on NP reforms and delivery in the West Midlands. 
Through an analysis of the data generated through interviews with NPT operatives and 
other actors from West Midlands Police, Chapter 5 explores police narratives and 
stories about the delivery and organisation of NP as well as the impact of austerity and 
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internal reform programmes. Through observational fieldwork of community 
engagement processes at police-community meetings, Chapter 6 then looks at how NP 
is being performed at the street level in the context of the austerity era, internal 
reforms, and the police cultural reactions to these new environments. Together these 
empirical chapters provide a deep account of NP delivery and change across different 
institutional levels of the police. 
Finally, in chapter 7, the research findings are discussed in relation to the concepts 
and theory presented in chapters 1 and 2, and how these findings contribute to the 
main research themes of the study and the policing literature is considered. The 
chapter finishes with a section on the overall conclusions of the study. This includes a 




2 The Origins and Development of Neighbourhood Policing  
2.1 Introduction 
Neighbourhood Policing (NP) is the current manifestation of Community Policing (CP) 
in England and Wales (Innes 2005; Hughes and Rowe 2009), and this chapter will 
explore the origins of these policing approaches – the assumptions and motivations on 
which CP and NP are respectively based. The concept and current theoretical 
underpinnings of CP emerged in the 1970s and still have influence today in many 
countries. Although CP has been adopted by police organisations in many states 
internationally, its origins are found mainly in policing and political movements in the 
United Kingdom and United States (Brogden 1999; Brogden and Nijhar 2005), and 
therefore any history of CP as the origin of NP should focus largely on these nations. 
The first section of this chapter, through exploring the origins and development of CP, 
will illustrate the reforms that led to the creation of NP in England and Wales at the 
beginning of the 21st century by asking ‘what has changed and why has it changed?’ in 
such a way that NP was an eventual policy response to earlier forms of policing. 
Although the investigation of CP will be largely based on the events and literature of 
the period from 1970 to 2010, taking in the beginnings of the so-called ‘community 
policing era’ (Kelling and Moore 1988) up until the early austerity era, there will be a 
brief discussion of the origins of modern police organisations. The purpose of studying 
these foundations of modern, organised state policing is to provide depth to the 
account of the social functions of the police and policing and to avoid an ahistorical 
account of CP as excessively distinct from earlier policing forms (Emsley 2007).  Asking 
‘what happened and why?’ is a prelude to the discussion of how reform happens in 
police organisations that follows this section.  
2.2 Origins: The Functions of the Modern Police Institution 
In England and Wales, “the police” broadly refers to a body of organisational entities 
that receive state funding and were created by the Home Office in order to formalise, 
professionalise, and eventually, to some extent, centralise older localised policing 
systems (Emsley 1991). These large and complex organisations are both bureaucratic 
and operational, employing a range of staff to perform tasks that contribute to 
achieving organisational objectives that are related to public order and security, the 
prevention and detection of criminal acts, and the initiation of, and contribution to, 
criminal justice proceedings (Emsley 1991, 1; Manning 2010, 44).  
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According to Manning, policing itself is a ‘traditional occupation, essentially unchanged 
in form since the early nineteenth century’ and therefore understanding this early 
historical context can uncover ‘the assumptions by which modern policing is governed’ 
(1997, 47). Emsley makes a similar point about the enduring police functions and 
tactics that form the modern-day basis of CP: 
An awareness of local communities, an understanding of their 
concerns and of their expectations of policing, together with 
negotiated relationships and policies between those communities 
and their police to meet those expectations are not new. (2007, 242) 
In the context of British policing5, CP is not a completely new and unique form of 
policing; it is rooted in previous and enduring beliefs about some desirable functions 
and methods of policing. Of course, British police organisations have changed in a 
number of ways since their formation in England, as will be demonstrated later in this 
chapter. Nonetheless, recognising these enduring characteristics suggests that police 
reforms are possible only within certain parameters, and historical changes to policing 
have been overstated in academic, official, and lay narratives. In other words, 
narratives about paradigmatic change and ‘golden eras’ of policing are sometimes 
steeped in myth (Fielding 1991; Emsley 1991; 2007; Loader and Mulcahy 2003). The 
notion of a golden era of policing in England and Wales, a police force of the 
imagination (Loader and Mulcahy 2003, 96), is imbued with beliefs about what policing 
and police ought to be in comparison to other periods, past or present. This normative 
vision of policing arrangements does not necessarily reflect the reality of policing in 
any period, and neither does it reflect the internal police organisational logics that 
prioritise other functions and tactics than those imagined. 
Recent and current manifestations of CP, then, and the development of the modern 
police, illuminate the contested and essential functions and philosophies of public 
policing as well as the nature of and possibilities for reforming policing delivery. 
Different perspectives on police functional priorities reveal a number of tensions 
between what police organisations are for, and how they should achieve their 
objectives. Do these organisations have broad functions that contribute to or produce 
order, or are they primarily concerned with the enforcement of laws and the 
scientifically-informed control of crime? In terms of the relationship with the public, 
                                            
5 Brogden and Nijhar (2005) note that even though contemporary CP can be viewed as an Anglo-
American model, motivations for CP reforms and the historical context of American policing 
are distinct from England and Wales. 
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are the police a coercive, militarised force to be feared and obeyed, or a democratic 
organisation that achieves order through consensual service, largely unarmed? These 
debates perhaps deal in simple dichotomies more than the complex realities of the 
character of police work (Bittner 1970), but they do reveal the principles and 
assumptions of public policing in England and Wales that largely still hold today.  
2.2.1 Reforming the Principles of Policing 
The orthodox histories of the new police largely focus on reform through developments 
in the philosophy of policing, parliamentary legislation, and organisational policy, 
whereas critical or ‘revisionist’ histories emphasise the influence of class, power 
structures, and political economy on these reform processes and police actions 
(Brogden 1982; Reiner 2000). The nature of the principles and functions of the new 
police are thus contentious, due to the different perspectives on the motivations of 
reformers and consequences of reform. The following will present a general summary 
of the principles and functions relevant to the later development of CP, drawing on 
different perspectives to illuminate the contentions and contradictions in the functions 
of the police. 
In the formative years of the new police, the well-known handbook instructions given 
to new Metropolitan Police recruits stated that the principle objective of the police is 
the ‘prevention of crime’. Rather than reacting to crime through ‘detection and 
punishment’ alone, the new police was to further achieve the ‘security of person and 
property, the preservation of the public tranquillity, and all the other objects of a 
police establishment’ (quoted in Reith 1948, 62). One implication of these guidelines 
is that the function of the police relates primarily to crime prevention and order 
maintenance, the latter suggested by the terms ‘security’ and ‘public tranquillity’. 
These important functions suggest a future-oriented organisation, which attempts to 
both predict and change future conditions through methods such as patrol to deter 
crimes, deployment to protest and other social unrest to inhibit violence and political 
change through non-military means (e.g. Fielding 1991) and pre-emptive arrest and 
conviction on the basis of criminal intent (Lawrence 2017). Proactivity has arguably 
increased in practice since the late twentieth century amidst the adoption of more 
sophisticated analysis of intelligence data, models of prediction, methods of disruption 
(Innes and Sheptycki 2004), and the ‘preventive turn’ in criminal justice (Edwards and 
Hughes 2009), but the early police organisations and pre-1829 police were certainly 
involved in preventative and pre-emptive action to a larger extent than is 
characterised in some recent literature (Lawrence 2017). 
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2.2.2 The Doctrine and Drama Of Consent 
In establishing a new system of policing in the face of objections from various groups, 
social and political, Peel realised the benefits of distinguishing the characteristics and 
methods of the new police from the French model of police as well as the coercive 
control and sometimes deadly methods of the army. Peel thus argued for a “civilian 
force, with minimal distinguishing uniforms and no arms, and with limited arrest 
powers” (Manning 1997, 77). These characteristics were the early roots of the 
doctrines of policing by consent and minimum force, which are intended to produce 
public support and cooperation through a democratically-inclined police system 
(Alderson 1979, 49-50), bolstered by a democratic political system in which political 
accountability and the police mandate are periodically ‘refreshed’ (Morgan 1989, 218). 
An important and related part of the British police doctrine from the so-called ‘Peelian 
principles’6 conveys the idea that the “police are the public and the public are the 
police” (Reith 1956, 187, cited in Reiner 2000, 21), presented by orthodox police 
histories to demonstrate the consensual style of British policing or the representation 
of the police being ‘the crystalized power of the people’ (Reiner 2000, 21). Whether 
or not this representation is accepted by the public, early efforts were certainly made 
to make the new police more palatable to British sceptics of the French example of a 
centralised and militarised police force, by focusing on ‘general security’ and arguing 
for police compatibility with the ‘unwritten British constitution’ (Manning 1997, 49).  
The supposedly unique British style of policing came to involve police officers in local 
community work, such as running soup kitchens, helping to organise local sporting 
events (Taylor 1997, 95-96), and organising a number of other outreach activities 
(Critchley 1967, 263-264). Rather than these functions being a natural manifestation 
of officers being engaged with social activities in their beat areas, Taylor (1997) argues 
that police involvement in these activities, along with a drive to improve officer 
conduct and professionalism, were pursued by Metropolitan Police commissioners 
Rowan and Mayne as the keys to reducing suspicion and hostility of the public and 
improving relations. This runs parallel to the notion that the public perceptions of 
police legitimacy are central to the effective practice and even the existence and 
preservation of the police in a democratic society (Alderson 1979). Without the 
resources to deal with the majority of offences and indiscretions nor the ability to 
                                            
6 The “Peelian Principles” were most likely adapted from the ideas of the commissioners of the 
Metropolitan Police, Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne. These ideas were summarised by 
Charles Reith in 1952, though with unclear citation, and in later textbooks credited to Robert 
Peel (Lentz and Chaires 2007). 
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carry out surveillance on all sections of “risky” communities – largely ‘working-class 
districts and activities’ (Taylor 1997, 95) – gaining trust and tacit support of the public 
became an accepted method of effective policing. 
While police may rely on public cooperation and trust to carry out particular duties 
and achieve certain goals, some doubt the idea that these tactics amount to a general 
approach that relies on consent. Emsley (1999, 2007) criticised the claims of Reith7 
that the ‘British model’ of policing was comparable to ‘kin policing’ – alluding to 
familial and communal forms of social control, where force comes from below rather 
than above and is sanctioned by ‘the people’ – and therefore superior to the 
authoritarian model of continental Europe, such as France, in which force was 
exercised from above, non-consensually. Emsley views this English exceptionalism as 
exaggerated at best, due to others in European countries also viewing their own 
policing systems as consensual, and to the existence of multiple police organisations 
within each European nation, including Britain, with varying types of control, 
practices, functions, and accountability. Emsley (2007) also questions the Reithian 
claims8 that the new police were somehow more effective since 1829 due to the 
‘Peelian principle’ of social closeness between police and community, citing evidence 
that Parish constables and watchmen often worked in the areas from which they 
hailed. Furthermore, the new system did not end the partiality and corruption 
associated with this level of social closeness to the community (Emsley 2007), and 
other claims of immediate improvement in the effectiveness of constables due to 
reform was generally exaggerated (Emsley 1991).  
In support of the doctrines of consensus and minimum force, some police histories have 
pointed to a public acceptance of police authority after a period of general opposition 
(Brogden 1982, 172-180). This growing consent and public support were considered to 
bring a ‘golden age of policing’ in the early to mid-twentieth century, in which there 
was general social consensus, ‘neighbourly trust’, stoicism, and safety (Alderson 1979; 
Fielding 1991). In these ‘static’ conditions the police’s authority was considered to be 
welcomed by most and respected by all, including deviant sections of communities 
who feared this authority (Fielding 1991). A number of accounts presented the police 
during the ‘golden age’ as a sacred institution (Loader and Mulcahy 2003), providing 
                                            
7 Claims that appeared in Reith’s 1952 publication, The Blind Eye of History. 
8 The Reithian label is applied to those historians, like Charles Reith, who viewed the new police 




the ‘archetypal English hero’ of the Bobby (Gorer 1955, 310) and in general as a source 
of national identity (Reiner 2000; Loader and Mulcahy 2003).  
Although this period, according to various opinion surveys and interviews, represented 
“the high point of police legitimation” in Britain (Reiner 2000, 58), it was not free from 
opposition and conflict and for some communities this ‘golden age’ was not 
experienced as such. The police often acted in violent opposition to a variety of 
interests, especially the economic and cultural life of some working-class communities 
and the troubled youth – essentially those seen as deviating from the respectable, 
upper-class morality (Fielding 1991, 40-46; Brogden 1982) – just as they had in the 
Victorian era (Neocleous 2000; Taylor 1997; Storch 1975). Although the police came to 
have better relations with some working-class communities, there were still pockets 
of intense opposition and a general ‘grumbling dissent’, which Brogden (1982) claims 
was ignored by conservative historians in their claims of a new consensus. Neither was 
it clear how responsible the functions and doctrines of the new police system were for 
the general public acceptance or effective pacification of sections of the working-
class, as the changing social context of the twentieth century, such as increasing 
affluence and the incorporation of the working-class “as citizens of the political 
institutions of Britain” (Reiner 2000, 58), helped create a general reduction in class 
conflict and increased respect for, trust, and confidence in, social institutions. In the 
early twentieth century, the police were arguably increasingly viewed as one of many 
state services, taking responsibility for social control away from the individual 
(Brogden 1982, 178-179). 
A more general critique of the idea of consensual policing comes from Bittner (1970, 
8-9), who points out that policing is always for somebody’s interests and against 
someone else’s due to the occupational structuring that compels police officers to 
disregard complexity in human conflict: 
In sum, the fact that policemen are required to deal with matters 
involving subtle human conflicts and profound legal and moral 
questions, without being allowed to give the subtleties and 
profundities anywhere near the consideration they deserve, invests 
their activities with the character of crudeness. (Bittner 1970, 9) 
Whose side the police take in conflicts is not only influenced by the quick decisions in 
exigent situations referred to by Bittner, it also reflects the social conflicts built into 
legislation, especially the prohibition of particular leisurely pursuits (Taylor 1997; 
Storch 1975). Along with the establishment of the new police, the British government 
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introduced a range of new laws in an attempt to control a range of immoral behaviours – many 
of these common cultural pursuits of the lower-classes – though these too were enforced with 
discretion and not as a matter of course by constables (Taylor 1997). The desire for new powers 
to be used or particular private behaviours or business practices to be controlled were shaped 
by concerns ranging from police capabilities to morality, and thus “the thrust of policing in a 
particular place and time could be fundamentally altered by the determination of people with a 
specific view of police priorities” (Ibid., 94); concerns that continue in the current era in relation 
to CP’s promises of democratic representation through responsive partnerships and 
consultation (Bullock and Leeney 2013; Sklansky 2008; Crawford 1999; Loader 1994; McLaughlin 
1994; Fyfe et al. 1992).  
2.2.3 Symbolic Functions 
More broadly, the police in Anglo-American societies symbolises state authority 
through the mechanism of law enforcement. This includes “the appearance of a 
consensual, unitary moral order, under which all citizens stand and deserve equitable 
protection” (Manning 1997, 106). However, the police also represents any criminal law 
that is targeted against certain populations and thus reflects the dominant social 
order. Police officers selectively enforce laws against particular groups in society, and 
the law can be seen as a tool of legitimation for specific organisational decisions that 
lead to discretionary use of powers and force. Manning argues that these 
contradictions, among many others, of being under and above the law, of being for the 
state/dominant social order and for the people/equitable provision of security 
services, stem from “both the problem of police discretion and inherent tensions 
between the maintenance of order and individual rights” (1997, 107). Loader similarly 
focuses on another communicative function of the police in Britain (and especially 
England): 
Policing, it seems, can provide an interpretive lens through which 
people make sense of, and give order to, their world; the source of 
a set of plausible stories about the world which help people sustain 
‘ontological security’” (Loader 1997, 3) 
Loader claims that this cultural arrangement provides popular police institutions with 
‘symbolic power’ to speak about and define with authority matters of crime, crime 
control and order, as they communicate notions of cultural, even national, identity. 
This power is not actively generated by the police in the same way that police attempt 
to produce public consent. It is a wider cultural construction of the police, whose 
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dispositions are ‘re-articulated’ through police iconography, such as the uniform, 
handcuffs and ‘cop shows’ (Ibid., 4). For Loader, this symbolic power creates a 
mystique around policing that makes technocratic reform difficult where such reforms 
jar with historically grounded sentiments and police definitions of solutions to 
problems of crime and disorder. For Manning (1997) and Loader (1997), then, effective 
police authority is built on notions of national identity and nationhood, where public 
institutions have high levels of the symbolic resources that connect and reaffirm 
cultural sentiments. In Britain, the historic and popular ideals of policing by consent 
and its manifestations through the figure of the local English Bobby symbolise the 
sacred aspects of policing, and current policing reforms are culturally judged against 
these standards (Loader and Mulcahy 2003). 
The history of modern police institutions in England and Wales reveals the contested 
nature of the police role. Culturally, the doctrine of policing by consent positions the 
police as an institution that should be socially close and accountable to the public and 
responsive to their needs. This closeness is intended to foster public trust in the police 
and consequentially legitimise their functions of law enforcement and maintaining 
order through largely coercive techniques, and also to make the police a democratic 
institution (Alderson 1979). Additionally, as a social institution, the police is rooted in 
the continuities of the social order (Fielding 1991). The social and economic 
development that created the conditions for the establishment of modern police 
institutions shaped the priorities and targets of policing, but the history and symbolism 
of the police impacted upon public dispositions of what policing is and should be. This 
attention to the importance of the establishment of modern police and its functions 
and cultural understandings of policing underlines the existence of socially, 
economically, and culturally embedded realities of policing, in which some reform 
efforts may be more easily enacted or even desired than others. 
2.3 Community Policing: Remoulding or Decorating the Police Monolith?  
Before the idea of CP as a separate policing paradigm, either in terms of an 
organisational structure or an approach to policing mechanisms or practices, the 
development of the modern police in Britain led to the introduction of a mode of 
policing that emphasised the importance of widespread public confidence and trust in 
the police to fulfil their various functions, alluded to in the doctrine of consent. These 
themes were important foundations for the development of policing, and this section 
will explore the emergence of CP as a policing philosophy in the late twentieth century 
and the various policing approaches that were either compatible with the CP paradigm 
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or direct manifestations of it. CP is most associated with US and UK reform movements, 
and both of these are significant to the development of CP manifestations in England 
and Wales in the twenty-first century. Therefore, this section will explore CP’s lineage 
in both jurisdictions. 
To understand the political, organisational, and theoretical bases of NP as a 
programme of local policing delivery, this section will ask the following questions: 
1. Why did Community Policing and its various manifestations, including NP, 
emerge in the late 20th and early 21st century? 
2. How does policing delivery differ under CP and its manifestations compared 
with earlier and other parallel forms of policing?  
By answering these broad questions about the development of CP and its 
manifestations, the establishment of NP can be appropriately situated in the broader 
context of police organisational changes and the socio-economic climate. 
Understanding the development and principles of these policing approaches also allows 
an exploration of the different definitions of CP and the motivations and outcomes of 
(attempted) reforms. As a very recent development that is more temporally and 
geographically limited than CP in general, NP has a smaller body of literature relevant 
to this thesis, and this will be explored at the end of this section in order to emphasise 
the more prominent and enduring questions around police reform and delivery. 
2.3.1 The Development of Community Policing 
The CP reform movement has had a significant impact on the rhetoric, symbolisation 
and organisation of policing. CP has been described as the “national mantra of the 
American police” (Greene 2000, 301), the “new orthodoxy for cops” in the US (Eck and 
Rosenbaum 1994, 3) and English-speaking countries in general (Weatheritt 1988), and 
the ‘altar’ at which police organisations must ‘genuflect’ if they are to maintain 
legitimacy (Herbert 2000, 114). This illustrates the view that, for a time, CP was the 
dominant philosophy of police organisation and delivery in Anglophone nations. In 
policing, as in many other areas of policy reform and organisational innovations, the 
US experiences are germane to those in England and Wales. Some of the foundations 
of new policing philosophies and movements were forged in the US but became 
influential to policing movements internationally (Brogden and Nijhar 2005), and 
therefore a discussion of reforms that adjust police functions and practice must refer 
to this jurisdiction. There are important differences between the British and American 
policing styles, broadly speaking, due to factors ranging from differences in legal 
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systems, history, politics, technology and weaponry. Nevertheless, the ‘English 
mandate’ was itself influential in the formation of police organisations in the US, 
making it possible to refer to Anglo-American police characteristics (Manning 1997; 
Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Moreover, the changes that occur in the US criminal justice 
system are considered to be influential to criminal justice policy in England and Wales 
(Jones and Newburn 2002), and this may also be illustrated in the development of 
policing approaches in these two jurisdictions. 
Police organisations in both England and Wales and the US faced similar challenges in 
the post-war era: crime rates and populations continued to grow (Reiner 2007, 63); 
the relationship between police and public and the status of the police were 
considered to be worsening due to police deviance, corruption, and scandal (Critchley 
1967; Fogelson 1977; Reiner 2000); conflict between police and communities in multi-
racial societies led to flashpoints of urban disorder (Brown 1982; Scarman 1982); new 
technologies were available to both the police and public (Rubinstein 1973; Goldstein 
1990; Emsley 1991); and industries were changing, contributing to fluctuations in rates 
of unemployment (Kollmeyer and Pichler 2013). The consequent insecurities, emerging 
‘fluidity’ and uncertainty of mid-to-late-twentieth-century life alongside falling trust 
in institutions (Barlow and Barlow 1999; Bauman 2000) was the background to a number 
of reform projects to adjust the functions, processes and organisational design of 
police forces to bring the police closer to the community (Kelling and Moore 1988). As 
symptoms of these professionalization reforms, the efficiency of motorized transport 
and telephone communication technologies increased the reactive capacity of police 
forces, however the extent of their use had consequences. The creation of free 
emergency-service phone-lines was burdensome on police time and resources and 
increased the pressure, and desire, to respond to incidents swiftly (Walker 1984). 
Goldstein (1990) suggests that police organisations increasingly focused on reactive 
tactics over time spent on patrol and the proactive activities that would better fulfil 
the police’s preventative function.  
In England and Wales, community policing reforms in the 1980s sought to not only 
reduce social distance between the police and public in general, but also to heal 
divisions between police and particular groups – multi-racial communities in particular 
– that had been building up in the post-war period (Reiner 1992). There were a number 
of urban disorders in multi-racial neighbourhoods - such as Brixton, Toxteth, St Pauls, 
Handsworth, and Tottenham – that were triggered by both poor relations and police 
overuse and abuse of powers (Scarman 1981; Savage and Wilson 1987). Although a 
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British vision of CP had already been devised (Alderson 1979), it took these external 
shocks and scandals to catalyse a series of reforms to police powers and tactics that 
partially coincided with CP ideals (Dixon 1999). The Scarman report (1981), for 
instance, advocated for more police community consultation, and this led to a 
statutory provision for police-community liaison in the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 (Savage and Wilson 1987). While these reforms were welcomed by some as 
an effective solution to urban disorders and social distance, confidence in the reforms 
was shaken by further rioting in 1985 (Cumberbatch and Tadesse 1987). Cumberbatch 
and Tadesse (Ibid.) suggest that there may have been too much expectation on the 
police to reform in such a short space of time and to have such influence on complex 
urban problems. Reiner (1992) is more critical, suggesting that the Scarman backed 
reforms amounted to an ‘iron fist in a velvet glove’, with these reforms overlaying the 
more coercive and continuous aspects of urban policing.  
The social and technological changes in the twentieth century also raised more 
technical concerns about the effectiveness of policing tactics after considerable 
reform efforts. Increasing reliance on motorized patrol from the late 1930s reduced 
the amount of officers on foot in many police departments (Walker 1984). Quite apart 
from failing to meet the expectations of increased crime reduction, this type of patrol 
was an unpopular approach with citizens due to the increased social distance between 
police and communities (Kelling and Coles 1996). Alongside this, early ethnographies 
of urban policing demonstrated that police maintain a social distance from the people 
they policed (or anyone who does not share their role) in part due to an occupational-
cultural tendency for suspicion (Skolnick 1966; Rubinstein 1973). The public desire for 
a visible presence of beat officers, responsive to community concerns regarding all 
types of local disorder, is understood by some police researchers as symptomatic of 
neighbourhood insecurities, a perceived breakdown in social norms, and the new 
policing approaches and activities that distanced the police from communities (Wilson 
and Kelling 1982; Moore and Kelling 1983). These two respective critiques of reactive 
police work in the twentieth century – the basis of Goldstein’s “Problem-Oriented 
Policing” (POP) and Wilson and Kelling’s “Broken Windows Theory” (BWT) – gave rise 
to new arguments about what the functions of the police should be. 
2.3.2 Organisational Adaptation 
In order to emphasise the significant difference between the function of CP and other 
forms of policing, Rosenbaum highlights four broad police functions: crime control 
(“considered the highest priority under the traditional model”); “providing emergency 
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services”; “administering justice by means of arrest”; and “offering a wide range of 
non-emergency services” (1998, 8). Rosenbaum describes that in police forces that 
have initiated CP programmes or reforms “priorities have been rearranged to give 
greater attention to some functions and less to others”, new functions are added and 
“the manner in which [all] these functions are executed is entirely different under CP” 
(Ibid., 8). More attention is given to performing non-emergency services due to this 
kind of service making up the majority of public demand, the previous ineffectiveness 
of police in dealing with these incidents, and, most importantly, the general idea (in 
its various forms) that dealing with the problems associated with neighbourhood 
decline will indirectly lead to lower rates of crime and disorder (for example, Alderson 
1979; Wilson and Kelling 1982; Skogan 1990; Sampson and Raudenbush 1997). 
Rosenbaum sums up the CP ‘paradigm’ as follows: 
The community policing model does not call for different policing 
goals (e.g., reducing crime is still a major police goal), but rather, it 
suggests that alternative means of achieving these goals should be 
given more attention (e.g. indirect strategies involving other police 
functions). (1998, 9; original emphasis) 
To make sense of historical progress in policing from the rise of the modern police to 
the emergence of CP in the late-twentieth century, Kelling and Moore (1988) 
emphasise the role of top-down organisational structuring in reacting to social and 
economic changes by highlighting three ‘strategic eras’ of policing reform. This 
perspective is influenced by Miles et al.’s (1978) concept of ‘organisational 
adaptation’, which views organisations as “integrated and dynamic wholes” (Ibid., 
561) that can be steered by managers to successfully adapt to environmental change. 
For Kelling and Moore (1988) each strategic era – political, reform, and community – 
is characterised by primary strategic elements as well as the dominant values and 
missions of policing as a whole. The shift of interest here is the reform era to the 
community era. The ‘reform era’ of roughly the 1920s to 1970s was characterised by a 
crime control orientation, centralisation of command and control, professional 
remoteness, and a focus on motorised preventative patrol and rapid response tactics. 
The ‘community era’ emerged in the 1970s and had a number of characteristics distinct 
from the reform era: more community and political authorisation than professional and 
bureaucratic; a broad definition of the policing function, including order maintenance, 
conflict resolution, the provision of service through problem solving and other tactics, 
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and an indirect, lesser emphasis on crime control; decentralisation of operational and 
tactical decision making to the beat level, and a return to officer discretion. 
By using the concept of ‘strategic eras’ to highlight the general consensus in policing 
at a specific time, Kelling and Moore (1988) attempt to show how the emergence of 
CP in the US was a deliberate and rational reaction to the changing economic and social 
environment of the time. They also claim that shifting policing strategies are important 
because each element can impact upon another. They highlight the ‘perplexing’ failure 
of early ‘team policing’ programmes in the 1960s and 1970s to support the claim that 
some programmes are better suited in particular organisational structures. In this case 
the failure was because team policing should have been viewed as a strategy itself 
rather than merely a tactic, as it contained strategic implications that were in 
competition with those of the reform era (Ibid., 23). Some findings of Sherman et al. 
(1973) support this interpretation, as poorly planned shifts in decision-making from 
middle management to patrol officers and sergeants, as well as the separation of team 
policing operatives from others in the same division, bred discontent and opposition to 
the initiative. Additionally, the occupational role of, and pressures on, radio 
dispatchers in large cities meant that new neighbourhood boundaries of team policing 
were often ignored, and team policing operatives were abstracted from their areas for 
emergency response. 
Looking more closely at tactics, the development of CP delivery was also influenced 
by academic theory and empirical research. Starting with the latter, the Kansas City 
patrol experiment (Kelling et al. 1974) provided evidence of the failure of motorised 
patrol to prevent crime(?) and increase safety, feelings of safety, and awareness of 
police presence, whereas the Newark foot patrol experiment (Police Foundation 1981) 
showed that foot patrol could increase awareness of police presence and increase 
feelings of security among residents, if not have a significant impact upon crime rates. 
Some consequentially claimed that foot patrol represented a more proactive tactic 
than motorised patrol due to the increased level of community interaction (Wilson and 
Kelling 1982; Esbensen and Taylor 1984), and this came to be influential in informing 
Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) BWT. For these authors, the efficacy of foot patrol and the 
specific types of interaction that it enables is connected to the notion that 
communities are strengthened by the police maintenance of order, and these more 
secure communities can deter serious criminal activity: 
Our experience is that most citizens like to talk to a police officer. 
Such exchanges give them a sense of importance, provide them with 
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the basis for gossip, and allow them to explain to the authorities what 
is worrying them (whereby they gain a modest but significant sense 
of having "done something" about the problem). You approach a 
person on foot more easily, and talk to him more readily, than you 
do a person in a car… The essence of the police role in maintaining 
order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the 
community itself. The police cannot, without committing 
extraordinary resources, provide a substitute for that informal 
control. (Wilson and Kelling 1982, no page) 
In spite of criticism of the impact of ‘broken windows policing’ – or, ‘order 
maintenance policing’ (Bayley and Shearing 1996) – on serious crime and thus the 
causal link between disorder and more serious crime (Harcourt 2002; Harcourt and 
Ludwig 2006), the BWT has been particularly influential for the development of later 
CP manifestations in both the US and England and Wales, especially in regard to its 
emphasis of the police role in enhancing informal social controls (Skogan 1990; 
Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Innes and Fielding 2002).  
Before moving on, it should be noted that Goldstein’s (1979; 1990) POP, which also 
arose in response to similar changes in policing strategies and tactics, is influential in 
the development of CP programmes9. Goldstein (1979) critiques the mode of reform 
proposed by those that focuses on the means (e.g. processes, administrative 
competence) over the ends (outcomes). He advocates systematic processes for 
identifying, examining, and addressing ‘problems’ of crime and disorder, which is what 
the public expect the police to prioritise and deal with in the most effective way: 
It is sufficient, for our purposes here, simply to acknowledge that the 
police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral 
and social problems that arise in a community – that the end product 
of policing consists of dealing with these problems. …By problems, I 
mean the incredibly broad range of troublesome situations that 
prompt citizens to turn to the police, such as street robberies, 
residential burglaries, battered wives, vandalism, speeding cars, 
runaway children, accidents, acts of terrorism, even fear. These and 
other similar problems are the essence of police work. They are the 
reason for having a police agency. (242) 
                                            
9 To be discussed below. 
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Although POP is distinct from CP due to its focus on the specifics of how police deal 
with problems in order to achieve the outcomes expected by the public, the general 
philosophy of analysing and solving problems, and consequentially the tactics 
prescribed by proponents of POP – such as the SARA10 model – are compatible with the 
CP and BWT focus on ‘quality of life’ issues (Vitale 2005) and have been integrated 
within a number of CP models (e.g. Cordner 1988; Goldstein 1987; Skogan and Hartnett 
1997). Attempting to effectively implement these problem-solving processes, 
however, brings challenges, as: 
…the capacity for problems to be identified through formal analysis 
within police organizations is limited by data quality and systemic 
pressures associated with the volume of issues brought to police 
attention and the diverse nature of the issues to which the police 
must respond. (Innes 2005a, 190) 
Innes notes that another issue with POP in practice is that police tend to define 
‘community problems’ somewhat differently to the community, and police-recorded 
crime statistics “are to a significant extent an artefact of police practice and tend to 
reflect patterns of policing activity” (Ibid., 191). This highlights how problem-solving 
strategies can be implemented in CP models that emphasise community engagement 
and involvement in police decisions, whilst acknowledging differences between police 
and community priorities exist. 
2.3.3 Counter-narratives and the Drama of Reform 
In contrast to Kelling and Moore’s (1988) account of CP development and the related 
assumptions of the BWT, Walker (1984) claims that this historical analysis, which 
repeats some of the assumptions of Wilson and Kelling (1982), is flawed for a number 
of reasons.  The analysis exaggerates the social distancing of the police from the 
community, the crime control orientation of the police, and the previous level of 
legitimacy of the police in the ‘reform era’, and it fails to acknowledge that the 
‘watchman’ style of policing is also inefficient and corrupt (Walker 1984). In particular, 
Walker questions the notion that motorised patrol contributed to social distance, or 
the ‘depersonalization’ of policing, as broadly conceived. He argues that, instead, the 
technological revolution that brought patrol cars, telephones, and the two-way radio 
made it possible for people to summon the police and the police to respond quickly, 
                                            
10 Developed by Spelman and Eck (1987), SARA stands for Scanning, Analysis, Response and 
Assessment and describes a problem-solving process for routine use by police. 
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and therefore increased contact between the police and the community. What was 
distinct about these contacts, however, was that these technologies discouraged 
casual contacts with ‘ordinary people’ in public spaces and increased contacts with 
‘problem people’ – those with multiple social problems – in private spaces. The 
implication is that the historical analysis by the proponents of the BWT employs a 
narrow conceptualisation of social distance, and is concerned with the experiences 
and views of the ‘ordinary’ – those who would have less problematic and more ‘casual’ 
contacts with the police – and therefore is, inequitably, for the benefit of particular 
social groups and to the detriment of others (see also Dixon 1999; Manning 2010).  
Crank (1994) largely agrees with Walker’s analysis, and adds that the myths of 
community and the ‘watchman’ style of policing propagated by the proponents of CP 
– both conservative (e.g. Wilson and Kelling 1982) and liberal (e.g. Skolnick and Bayley 
1986) – were deployed to re-legitimise the policing mandate by evoking “powerful 
metaphors of democracy, small-town morality, and local autonomy” (Crank 1994, 335; 
see also Crank and Langworthy 1992). Many others (Weatheritt 1988; Zedner and Lacey 
1995; Lynes 1996; Crawford 1999; Lyons 1999) have argued that the deployment of the 
term ‘community’ in criminal justice more generally is a conscious attempt by certain 
actors to evoke the idea of orderly, moral communities that are supported by criminal 
justice agencies with similarly desirable traits, and indeed can support these agencies 
to perform a more effective service. According to some, this communitarian 
positioning effectively downplays or ignores the plurality of values that coexist within 
urban geographical communities (Lynes 1996; Lyons 1999; Thacher 2001a; Thacher 
2001b; Sklansky 2008).  
More generally, the institutionalist view of CP reform, in which CP is fundamentally 
based on rhetoric and the deployment of myths for the legitimation of police 
organisations, is in part forwarding the view that the orthodox/conservative history of 
CP ignores the continuities of policing, and that these continuities are masked by the 
dramatic elements of CP (Walker 1984; Reiner 1992; Crank 1994; Manning 1997; Lyons 
1999; Emsley 2007). Manning makes this position explicit when he argues that: 
…community policing is a dramaturgical revision of themes found in 
policing over the last 75 years in the United States… Historical 
policing practices coexist in variable amounts with “community 
policing.” This suggests that it is not a definitive logical entity but a 
collection of ideas and concepts already present to some degree in 
many police departments. (1997, 13) 
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Manning claims that because CP is ideological and in part designed to mask the realities 
of policing. CP reforms, which are often tactical rather than strategic, often do not 
deliver on the overall promises of the CP movement (1984; 1997; 2010). In terms of 
crime, this is consistent with the idea that the police also present themselves as an 
agency of crime control, but in reality have little capacity to have a significant impact 
on crime rates (Banton 1964; Manning 1997; Reiner 2000). 
Some of these critical perspectives have been described as overly pessimistic in their 
evaluation of CP as an approach with capacity for improving outcomes (Thacher 
2001a). Moreover, CP is not merely rhetoric, as the CP rhetoric has important 
ramifications for real-world practice. The distinction between the rhetoric and reality 
of CP 
…cannot be made. The rhetoric of community policing – rarely, the 
persuasive devices deployed on its behalf – has come to be an 
important part of its reality: Its presentational aspects and its 
potency as a metaphor are as important (maybe more so) as its actual 
program. (Weatheritt 1988, 155) 
For Weatheritt, then, CP is neither simply rhetoric nor just reality. It involves a 
pragmatic focus on ‘small-scale’ tactics and an ethos that emphasises “notions of 
service, flexibility, consumer responsiveness, conciliation, consultation, and 
negotiation” (Weatheritt 1988, 154). As the professional model of policing has little 
symbolic currency, pursuing these tactics and ethos is popular with the public and 
evoking them through rhetoric, alongside focused attempts to improve police-
community relations, is intended to legitimate the police institution and consequently 
enhance police effectiveness. Similarly, Mastrofski et al. define CP as a counter-
movement to the professionalised perspective of policing functions limited to law 
enforcement, rather than a single, coherent policing approach: 
There is no consensus on what community policing is, but one has 
emerged regarding what it is not. It rejects law enforcement as the 
single, core function of police. (1995, 541) 
In the same study, the authors showed how the values of police organisations, if 
internalised by officers, could lead to different decision-making processes at the 
street-level. Officers with positive views towards the community policing values of 
their institution were less likely to make arrests for most offenses and especially minor 
ones. The importance here is that rhetoric and ethos have the potential to mediate 
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action, and this has implications for how police organisations can change policing 
practice by instilling values through rhetoric or organisational philosophy. 
The rhetoric of CP and in particular the appeals to community not only mask the 
realities of policing, but can also be consequential to the way police engage with 
communities. Lyons argues that CP uses community as a ‘state-centred story’ that 
focuses on “how police departments can use or appease communities” (1999, 16), and 
in the process stifles collective action capacity that can ‘empower’ communities. For 
Lyons, what is promising about CP’s potential is how it can generate social capital 
through truly reciprocal relations between police and community: 
Reciprocity is a structural precondition for the generation of social 
capital. The structures and agency supported by community policing, 
to take community seriously, must take into account the importance 
of intracommunity reciprocity for the effective cooperation of 
effective social controls that police seek to mobilize. (Lyons 1999, 
29) 
In Lyons’ study, however, the focus on coercive order-maintenance of the BWT 
approach may reduce disorder, but it does not necessarily address the absence of 
reciprocity and social capital in a neighbourhood that has been weakened by disorder 
and decay (Ibid.).  
Thacher (2001a) describes another of CP’s engagement dilemmas; to be responsive to 
community concerns, police must engage with the concerns of the whole community 
in order to provide an equitable service to all segments of the community. However, 
community engagement usually takes the form of public meetings, and only specific 
groups tend to continuously turn up to those meetings – dubbed the ‘usual suspects’ 
(Myhill 2006). This would be a significant problem if community groups could ‘demand’ 
police take action that forwards their interests over other social groups. Nevertheless, 
Thacher says this is not necessarily the case:  
…community partnerships are not simply vehicles for individual 
groups to make their interests known. Instead, they are sites of 
public deliberation about the common good. At their best, they 
generate new information about social problems and about the 
capabilities of government and the community to solve them, and 
they serve as places where citizens and officials learn about the 
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proper constraints of their own roles as well as those of their 
partners. (2001a, 5) 
For Thacher, police collaboration and community engagement can achieve ‘just 
outcomes’ when it encourages deliberation about the ‘common good’ and represents 
groups that do not actively participate. Furthermore, Jones-Brown (2000) argues that 
the rise in police resources encouraged by BWT approach to CP can increase tensions 
between police and African American males. She suggests ‘service’ interactions 
increasing familiarity between police and African American males may improve 
attitudes towards and respect for police, rather than a focus on positive interactions 
in enforcement situations. Reisig and Park (2004) found police-community 
collaboration increases higher aggregate quality of life assessments amongst those in 
areas of concentrated disadvantage, showing that the principles of social closeness can 
have positive effects for disadvantaged groups in general. 
The organisational adaptation approach appreciates that organisations are impacted 
by externalities, and reform is a way to reduce the impact of these externalities on 
the legitimacy and performance of the organisation. The institutionalists, however, 
point out these adaptations are to some extent rhetorical, obscuring the reality of how 
the organisation really operates. This is partially due to organisational adaptation 
proponent’s conceptualisation of an organisation as an integrated whole that can be 
deliberately reformed by management, rather than as a social entity that is negotiated 
collectively by its members (Manning 1982). Nevertheless, rhetoric and reality are 
difficult to separate, as the former can have an impact on the latter (Weatheritt 1988), 
meaning that analysis of the rhetoric of change and reform may provide a 
multidimensional insight into police change processes, connecting the rhetorical 
responses to externalities to the eventual reform of policing delivery.  
2.4 Manifestations of Community Policing 
To understand how a concept like CP is put into practice, it is first useful to briefly 
consider how it is most concisely or accurately defined in the programmatic sense. 
Thus far this chapter has attempted to elucidate rather than enumerate – it has not 
yet provided a programmatic definition, and this is because on one level the concept 
can lack precision required for integrating CP into a single policing delivery system 
(Weatheritt 1988). The broader, high-level concept of CP as a philosophy, 
organisational strategy, or rhetorical strategy has been elucidated above, but the way 
in which it is implemented as a policing programme is not so easily generalised. Due in 
part to the various environments in which policing activities take place, “[t]here is no 
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prospect of a uniform blueprint for community policing” (Fielding 1995, 33). 
Nevertheless, CP encourages particular tactics and delivery mechanisms, and therefore 
enumeration provides criteria against which programmes can be understood and 
judged as manifestations of the broader CP philosophy. Table 1 synthesises a number 
of exemplary characteristics of CP programmes from several sources. With 
programmatic characteristics tentatively identified, this section will review the 
implementation, successes, and failures of a number of programs that can be 
considered as manifestations of the CP philosophy and forerunners of contemporary 
NP. 
Exemplary Characteristics of Community Policing Programmes 
Community Engagement This is a broad category that covers all forms of police-
community communication, consultation, and deliberation. 
Most agree that the community’s participation should go 
beyond police communication of, for example, crime levels, 
police tactics, local incidents, and crime prevention advice 
(Bayley 1994; Skogan 2006). The community should be in 
some way involved in contributing to policing efforts in their 
neighbourhood, and the police should be prepared to be more 
accountable to the public (Skolnick and Bayley 1988; Lyons 
1999). 
Coproduction of security The community should be encouraged to participate in the 
delivery of police services and the production of safety, or 
‘community-based crime prevention’ (Skolnick and Bayley 
1988). This can involve neighbourhood watch programmes 
and civilian street patrols with some police input, as well as 
the sharing of relevant information. 
Decentralisation Local police on the beat should be empowered to make 
decisions that are right for the particular circumstances of 
the community (Skolnick and Bayley 1988). 
Foot Patrol The public desires visible police on foot, and research shows 
that visible foot patrol can be reassuring (Bahn 1974), 
reducing feelings of insecurity (Kelling et al.1974). Officers 
on foot can also build relationships and employ discretion in 
order to maintain order (Wilson and Kelling 1982).  
Geographical designation To be responsive to community concerns, programmes 
designate resources, such as ‘Community Police Officers’ 
(Friedmann 1992), to particular areas for building stronger 
links (Sherman et al. 1973). This should enable police to 
produce familiarity and build long-term relationships for 
solving problems. 
Information-oriented Building community relationships and being designated to 
communities should allow police to gather information and 
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build local knowledge through their local experience and 
networks (Fielding 1995). 
Partnership working Partners provide skills, powers, and knowledge to help solve 
local problems. There are a number of ways partners can be 
involved, but often regular meetings bring police and 
partners together. The police officer can be a mobilizer of 
community resources (Skogan and Hartnett 1997; Savage 
2007a) 
Proactivity Policing activities should go beyond reacting to calls for 
service. Problem-solving, community engagement and foot 
patrol should be geared towards anticipating and preventing 




Crime and non-crime problems that can damage communities 
should be addressed rather than a narrow focus on law 
enforcement. Problem Oriented-Policing methods can be 
used to identify and solve community problems (Cordner 
1988). 
Table 1 Exemplary Characteristics of Community Policing Programmes 
2.4.1 Unit Beat, Team, and Sector Policing 
There have been a number of policing programmes that emphasised the importance of 
the ‘beat’ – or the geographical designation of policing resources for routine police 
work. An early team policing programme was set up in Aberdeen in 1948, lasting until 
1963, in which a team of one sergeant and five to ten constables were given 
responsibility for one geographical area (Sherman et al.1973). The motivations for this 
programme were stated to be improving the flexible and effective deployment of 
officers – judged at the time to be too low in number – and police working conditions 
and morale (The Scotsman 2012; Sherman et al. 1973). To achieve this the programme 
made use of foot and motorised patrol to adequately cover the areas of highest need, 
according to the “concentration of crimes and calls for service” (Sherman et al. 1973, 
xiv). The 1967 President’s Crime Commission then recommended that American forces 
experiment with the model and a number of ‘reform-minded police chiefs’ installed 
team policing, though not all of these projects were thought to follow the central 
characteristics of the model (Walker 1993, 34-35). Similar to CP, the reform 
motivations for team policing identified in the American context was public 
dissatisfaction with socially distant, unresponsive policing and increasing crime 
(Sherman et al. 1973). 
Although not consistently implemented, Sherman et al. (1973, 3), who evaluated team 
policing programmes in American forces, identified three basic operational elements: 
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‘geographic stability of patrol’, in which teams were permanently assigned to 
neighbourhoods; ‘maximum interaction among team members’, with an emphasis on 
cooperative working, information sharing, and a sense of togetherness encouraged by 
the team leader, and; ‘maximum interaction among team members and the 
community’, which involved regular police-community meetings. It is notable that 
these are enduring elements of CP programmes, and thus the failure of team policing 
to survive in various forces should have been an early warning to proponents of CP, 
though this history was rarely cited in the early CP literature (Walker 1993). Regardless 
of mixed and uncertain evidence for the reported benefits of team policing (Sherman 
et al. 1973; Gay et al. 1977; Talarico and Swanson 1980), the failure of these 
programmes was attributed largely to incompatibility with the wider force ethos and 
priorities, which themselves exacerbated the most ‘direct cause’ for the 
implementation failure; team leaders failing to organise their teams appropriately 
(Sherman et al. 1973).  
In the UK, unit beat policing was another local policing model that was introduced in 
Lancashire in the 1950s and was more widely implemented from 1967. With identical 
reform motivations and similar programmatic elements – geographically fixed 
resources to sub-divisions and smaller ‘home beats’, local foot patrol in home beats, 
an emphasis on motorised patrol with two-way radio systems for efficiency, 
supervision, and professionalism (Holdaway 1977) – the model was effectively imposed 
on forces by the Home Office, who offered loans to fund new equipment (Weatheritt 
1988). However, the model was judged to have failed due to its lack of regard for and 
inflexibility towards local circumstances, the lack of integration of police into the team 
structure, and the relative absence of the symbolically important and accessible foot 
patrolling officer (Ibid.), which itself was due to insufficient numbers of officers 
available for the programme (Brain 2010, 4). Holdaway (1977) also observed a cultural 
aversion to foot patrol and other specialist functions of unit beat policing, such as 
community liaison, which were shunned in favour of motorised patrolling, violence, 
hedonism, and ‘easing behaviour’ at the station.  
Another model later introduced in England, ‘sector policing’, again aimed to embed 
small teams in geographical ‘sectors’, where they had geographic responsibility for 
crime and other problems. The model emphasised tactics associated with problem-
solving and the doctrine of consent (Dixon 1999), following on from the post-Scarman 
era emphasis on rebuilding trust through the government-led, widespread 
implementation of Police Consultation Committees (Savage and Wilson 1987; Morgan 
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1989). To deliver ‘consensual policing’, the teams were expected to be visible and 
accessible through foot patrol, achieve the approval of communities and become more 
publicly accountable through the use of community consultation (Dixon 1999). The 
reasons for sector policing’s failure to survive are again familiar; officers did not 
integrate into the teams and did not manage to be responsive to community concerns 
(Dixon and Stanko 1995). Additionally, insufficient officers again appeared to be a 
problem in the Metropolitan Police Service for both sector policing and its 
‘neighbourhood policing’ replacement due to the labour intensiveness of geographical 
responsibility. As an ‘optional element’ in the 1990s ‘neighbourhood policing’ model 
…geographical responsibility was so labour intensive that most 
divisions had not implemented it. Where it had been tried it was 
being restricted or abandoned due to understaffing. (The same 
appears to have happened in recent moves to ‘sector policing’, or 
geographical responsibility. Police sources suggest it was being 
supported in appearance only, with prevailing, relief-based methods 
continuing, and a reduction by half in sectors originally designated in 
one area. This meant officers operating on much larger areas, 
effectively returning to relief mode.) (Fielding 1995, 46) 
There may have been some reported benefits in these CP and local policing 
programmes, but the evidence of such successes was mixed and often uncertain due 
to the lack of systematic evaluation research undertaken. What all have in common is 
the failure to survive long-term due mainly to incompatibility with the broader 
institutional structures and priorities, management priorities, the dominant police 
cultural preferences, and insufficient officer numbers for resource-intensive elements. 
Taken together, it is clear that there are a large number of organisational obstacles 
that CP programmes face in modern Anglo-American policing institutions (Fielding 
2000). 
Another issue with CP programme research is that often there is little exploration of 
what CP looks like at the micro-level, or, in other words, how it is done. Fielding (1995) 
produced one of the few major studies investigating CP action at the street-level in an 
English force since the establishment of the modern CP philosophy. This work is 
important for understanding the implementation, success, and failure of reforms as 
public service delivery is mediated by street-level operatives (Lipsky 1980; Barrett and 
Fudge 1981). Overall, Fielding (1995) finds that CP can successfully deliver on its 
promises under particular conditions and can effectively facilitate some elements of 
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crime control, such as teamwork, planning, and acting on quality information. These 
elements are notable because they are realised through complex tasks and interactions 
that involve, for example, communication, persuasion, conciliation, negotiation, and 
the generation of local knowledge. For Fielding, then, quality of delivery is important 
too, and models that encourage valuable practices in understanding communities and 
controlling crime in the long term are worth preserving and persevering with. 
2.4.2 Embedding Problem-solving, Chicago Style 
One of the more systematically evaluated and relatively successfully implemented 
models of CP identified in the literature is the Chicago Alternative Police Strategy 
(CAPS). Although the senior police management were sceptical, the City Mayor ordered 
the strategy’s implementation in 1993, generating political capital in the face of high 
crime, amongst other political problems (Skogan and Hartnett 1997). Skogan and 
Hartnett (Ibid., 52-57) identify six key elements of the programme: 
1. Change the entire organisation: CP is not the role of one specialist department 
– all units would have a CP role. 
2. Permanent beat assignments: Officers stay on beats long enough to build 
relationships with the community and generate local knowledge. 
3. Commitment to training: An investment in an extensive amount of training in 
problem-solving skills and a general understanding of the programme and their 
individual roles. 
4. Community role: Involve the community in solving problems through building 
partnerships with residents and public and private agencies. 
5. Expansion of the police mandate: CP is linked to the delivery of other public 
services to effectively solve problems that cannot be tackled by a pure policing 
response. 
6. Crime analysis: An emphasis on geographic crime analysis with the assistance 
of computer technology and crime maps  
As with all CP programmes the systematic and meaningful involvement of the 
community is crucially important for the programme to operate, and Skogan and 
Hartnett described the use of regular beat meetings for solving community problems 
in every Chicago neighbourhood as the “most unique and visible features of Chicago’s 
new program” (1997, 113). Although the police found the effective organisation and 
execution of these meetings difficult, the events were successful in some respects and 
experienced improvements over time in a number of ways: 
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The adoption of clear procedures, model agendas, informative 
materials to be distributed, training for officers and beat facilitators, 
special training for beat sergeants, and internal inspections, has 
increased the quality of beat meetings and standardized their 
operations. In 2002 we observed noticeably fewer very poorly run 
meetings. (Skogan 2004, ii) 
Fung (2006) is positive about the impact that CAPS had on residents, arguing that beat 
meetings represented ‘empowered participation’, as residents were able to 
participate in dialogue about neighbourhood problems and governance and were 
empowered through their collective decisions directly determining police actions. 
However, although the community involvement in beat meetings was generally 
sustained in the first ten years of the programme, the effectiveness of problem-solving 
was limited and, along public satisfaction, showed improvements in the early years but 
declined over time (Skogan 2004). 
As with many other CP programmes (Fyfe et al. 2002; Somerville 2009b), one of the 
more difficult aspects of the beat meetings were involving all community groups and 
thus representing the views of specific sections of the community. Residents that 
attended meetings were more likely to be home-owning, older, longer-term, and more 
educated residents, whereas sections of the community who were suspicious of the 
police were less likely to participate. In particular, the Hispanic community tended to 
be underrepresented at beat meetings and had difficulty sustaining involvement in 
problem-solving activities, which was a particular concern considering they were more 
likely to report high levels of perceived crime in their neighbourhoods (Skogan and 
Hartnett 1997; Skogan 2004). However, Skogan’s (2004) research shows that regardless 
of the attendees being unrepresentative in terms of demographic characteristics, their 
views about neighbourhood problems tended to be representative of the wider 
community (cf. Sagar and Jones 2012). 
Skogan and Hartnett (1997) also explored interaction styles at beat meetings, finding 
these varied between districts. This refers to how police and residents perceived their 
roles in beat meetings, and thus how interactions were organised and responsibility 
distributed. The styles identified are as follows: 
1. Police as leaders: The police set the agenda and residents follow it.  
2. Police and residents as partners: There is a somewhat balanced and cooperative 
relationship between police and community. 
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3. Police and residents as independent operators: Police and community have 
clear division of functions and agendas. 
4. Police and residents as adversaries: Police and community have conflicting 
goals and methods. 
The first three styles were roughly equal in occurrence, representing around one third 
of all meetings each. Style four was less usual, accounting for only 6% of the meetings. 
Style two was the preferred mode of interaction, as it represents both the highest level 
of community participation and cooperation as well as the willing and functional 
participation of other agencies in the beat meeting and problem-solving processes. 
Skogan (2004) adds that participation and cooperation in meetings are also improved 
and sustained by social factors, such as the ways that networks of police and residents 
are fostered by informal talks, communication outside of the formal meeting structure, 
and the provision of refreshments. This highlights that the social rituals of community 
engagement can be functional for the goals of these beat meetings. 
The CAPS project illustrates that CP programmes can be more successfully 
implemented and sustained, showing a number of benefits that were more elusive or 
at least more poorly understood in previous CP programmes. To simplify, what appears 
to be crucial to the success and sustained success of CP is political commitment, 
effective police leadership, public support, officer support, and the patience and hard 
work of all actors involved (Skogan and Hartnett 1997). Additionally, the CAPS 
evaluation also revealed some difficulties and complexities of police-community 
cooperation, and this requires a serious and sustained programme of training and 
nurturing of skills. 
2.5 The Development and Delivery of Neighbourhood Policing  
NP was required to be implemented across all police organisations and their 
neighbourhoods by the New Labour government in 2008. The then Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair, described the NP reforms as a way to ‘revive the idea of community policing, 
but for a modern world’ (cited in Innes 2005, 156). Like CP, NP can in one sense be 
understood as a policy response to the deficiencies of opposing policing models and 
other change motivations, and as such it is a product of its time. Like other previous 
iterations of ‘neighbourhood (-oriented/team) policing’ (e.g. Talarico and Swanson 
1980; Oettmeier and Brown 1988; Fielding 1995), NP has programmatic elements that 
aspire to organise police operatives into teams with geographical responsibility, 
decentralise authority to street-level operatives and communities, and encourage 
tactics, practices and outcomes that are distinctive to the CP philosophy. Each 
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Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) is responsible within their assigned area for 
performing the delivery mechanisms of NP – visibility, problem-solving and community 
engagement – and achieving the politically-defined outcomes – reducing crime, anti-
social behaviour and ‘fear of crime’ and increasing public confidence (Quinton and 
Morris 2008).  
Some of the main programmatic elements of NP identified by ACPO (2006), as well as 
academic researchers (Innes 2005; 2014) the Home Office (2004) and Home Office 
researchers (Tuffin et al. 2006; Quinton and Morris 2008) are synthesised in Table 2 to 
illustrate the contemporary and sometimes unique features of the model. This section 
will address the literature on the development, organisation, and delivery of NP in 
order to describe the structural characteristics, social organisation, and the practices 
of NPTs. NP emerged from the piloting of reassurance policing (RP) in the National 
Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP), and so this section will begin by outlining the 
centrality of the concept of reassurance in recent CP manifestations in England and 
Wales. 
2.5.1 Re-programming Community Policing: Reassurance, Neighbourhood Security, 
and Signal Crimes 
Some earlier proponents of CP were concerned with the ‘fear of crime’ and its impact 
on communities’ social control function through capable guardianship (Wilson and 
Kelling 1982; Skogan 1990). This hypothetical link between the fear of crime and the 
conditions of neighbourhood decline that enable more serious crime to materialize was 
the basis of the order-maintenance approach to CP. In an era of high and rising crime 
rates and the consequent ‘law and order politics’, the ‘crime management’ approach 
“was established as the de facto political priority for policing” (Innes 2004, 155). Crime 
management – where the police mission is oriented to the prevention and detection of 
crime – was the basis of the order-maintenance/zero-tolerance and intelligence-led 
policing models that were dominant in England and Wales in the 1990s. However, as 
crime rates fell in Britain in the mid-1990s there was not a corresponding fall in the 
fear of crime, and many people believed that crime had risen (Innes and Fielding 2002). 
This situation was called the crime-fear paradox, or the ‘reassurance gap’, as there 
was a lack of a straightforward effect of crime incidence on crime-related fear and 
risk perceptions. The value of the crime management approach was thus limited, and 
there were growing calls for the police to better reassure the public through increasing 
visibility, familiarity, and accessibility of the police (Povey 2001). Consequentially, the 
objective of the NRPP was to deliver enhanced ‘neighbourhood security’, which Innes 
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describes as a way to reconnect policing with the traditional and broader police mission 
as well as address the local manifestation of a “pervasive sense of insecurity 
engendered by the contemporary interactional and institutional orders” (Innes 2004, 
158).  
Key programmatic elements of NP 
Auxiliarisation/Civilianisation NPTs should include Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), and 
can include Police Specials and other allied partners, such as 
Neighbourhood Wardens, dependent on local decision-making (ACPO 
2006; also see Brain 2010).  
Citizen focus A government philosophy that connected a number of reform 
initiatives. Its aim was to ensure that public services are responsive 
to the demands of the public and improve the public’s experience 
of policing (Home Office 2004; Innes 2005).  
Delivery Mechanisms NP should be ‘evidence-based’ (ACPO 2006). Three ‘delivery 
mechanisms’ were specified as key elements of effective practice 
on the grounds of research evidence (Tuffin et al. 2006; Quinton and 
Morris 2008): 
 Visibility/Reassurance  
 Community Engagement 
 Problem-solving 
Geographical designation NP provides dedicated teams and resources to all neighbourhoods. 
NPT operatives should be identifiable, familiar, and accessible and 
communities should have a named point of contact. 
Information-oriented Deployment of resources linked to National Intelligence Model (NIM). 
PCSOs are often referred to as ‘eyes and ears’ of the police in the 
community, as generating community intelligence remains an 
important part of beat policing to feed into investigations. 
Engagement and problem-solving activities should be undertaken 
within NIM processes (ACPO 2006). 
Partnership working NPTs work in partnership with communities to identify 
neighbourhood priorities undertake ‘collaborative problem-solving’. 
NPTs should also form alliances with other local agencies and 
organisations, sometimes through multi-agency partnerships (ACPO 
2006). 
Signal Crimes Perspective 
(SCP) 
The theoretical basis of RP and NP delivery.  The SCP states that 
some events have a disproportionate impact upon people’s feelings 
and thoughts about their security and safety and consequently their 
behaviour. The role of NP is to identify which events are indicators 
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of concern in each neighbourhood and deal with these problems to 
reassure communities (Innes 2014).  
Team structure All teams should be structured to support the activities of the main 
delivery agents, the PCSOs (ACPO 2006). Teams generally have at 
least one supervisor/manager and a number of constables. 
Table 2 Key programmatic elements of NP 
At the same time, the New Labour Government were undertaking a ‘managerialisation 
of policing’, which included crime reduction targets (McLaughlin 2005) and the ‘public 
confidence agenda’ – a policy agenda centred around solving the problem of falling or 
low public confidence and trust in the police (Fleming and McLaughlin 2010). Moreover, 
the establishment of PCSOs by New Labour and the effective imposition of police 
workforce modernisation through ring-fenced funding, which Johnston (2003) notes 
was in response to, in part, the threat of ‘balkanisation’ of policing patrol provision. 
PCSOs were seen as vital to reassurance through their ability to provide visible patrol 
and a familiar and accessible presence due to the time-consuming demands of 
contemporary police work on warranted officers (Cooper et al. 2006). These moves 
signalled increased central government involvement in the reform of policing delivery 
across England and Wales and the further development of the police reassurance 
function, which meant there was sufficient political desire and funding to design and 
install a new CP programme.  
Catalysed by the recent concern about the reassurance gap in some police 
organisations, the Signal Crimes perspective (SCP) was developed for the Metropolitan 
Police Service and Surrey Police – one of the first organisations to pilot RP – and became 
the theoretical basis for how RP, and later NP, should be delivered (Innes and Fielding 
2002; Innes 2004; Innes 2014). The SCP updated the notion of the reassurance function 
of policing after the earlier work of Bahn (1974) and Kelling et al. (1974) that supported 
the idea of police foot patrol producing feelings of safety and security. In contrast, the 
SCP asserts that visible foot patrol and familiar, accessible police alone are not 
sufficient to increase neighbourhood security. The SCP also draws on the work of Slovic 
(1992), who posited that risk-related events communicate meanings that can be 
amplified by psychological, cultural, social and political factors, and thus each event 
has a particular ‘signal value’ that impacts upon the extent of a person’s risk 
perceptions.  
Applying this insight to policing and social control, the SCP identifies this phenomenon 
in social reactions to crime and disorder. For Innes and Fielding, crime and disorder 
events signal risk and those events with the highest signal value are “disproportionately 
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influential in terms of causing a person or persons to perceive themselves to be at risk 
in some sense” (2002, 5.2). The importance of the SCP was to extend the theoretical 
rationale of CP to police responsivity to locally distinctive, community priorities, and 
what constitutes the most salient threats to the ‘ontological security’ of a 
neighbourhood (Innes 2004). In practice, this means that on top of visible patrol and 
familiar, accessible police, neighbourhood security is enhanced by identifying signal 
crimes and disorders through community engagement and neighbourhood analysis, 
before these problems are targeted (Lowe and Innes 2012).  This enhancement is due 
to both problems of crime and disorder being tackled and the related benefit of 
increased feelings of security that could increase the informal processes of social 
control in a neighbourhood (Innes 2005). 
2.5.2 The Structure and Rhetoric of Neighbourhood Policing 
In spite of the success of RP as identified in the NRPP pilot evaluations (Tuffin et al. 
2006), the RP label did not survive and was subsequently replaced by NP. NP arguably 
represents a rhetorical diversion from RP. As such, Innes argues that NP should be 
viewed as a political construct as it is an attempt to ‘give a sense of cohesiveness’ 
(2005, 158) to a number of policing reforms through a rebranding exercise. These 
reforms include the ‘citizen focus’ philosophy and workforce modernisation 
represented by the introduction of PCSOs. In relation to CP, the label of 
‘neighbourhood’ symbolically shifts the emphasis away from problematic notions of 
‘community’ as bonds of interest to ‘neighbourhood’ as a bond of shared spatial 
experience, ‘to exploit a sensibility that people who live in the same area share inter-
twined fates in terms of their safety’ (Innes 2005, 159). It also avoids the complex 
notion of reassurance that encouraged a number of separate interpretations of what 
RP is. In practical terms for the police, a neighbourhood is potentially much easier to 
define and visualise and provides zones of potential partners with whom to cooperate, 
facilitating ‘neighbourhood management’ with other local agencies (Gilling 2007, 109-
110). 
In terms of structure, the NPP was largely similar to the NRPP, involving the same 
delivery mechanisms being performed in geographically fixed teams of NP operatives 
(Quinton and Morris 2008). There is much variation in how NP is implemented and 
delivered across police organisations in England and Wales, but the NPT structure, with 
its mixture of PCSOs, PCs and at least one sergeant, was the most distinctive and stable 
feature (Longstaff et al. 2015). Evaluation is another important element of CP 
programmes, and when piloted, the NPP was measured against its effect on the 
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following categories: feelings of safety and worry about crime; public confidence; 
social capacity and collective efficacy (meaning intra-neighbourhood cohesion and 
trust); community engagement, familiarity and visibility, and; crime and Anti-social 
behaviour (ASB). The crime and ASB indicator was added to the NPP evaluation by the 
Home Office, whereas the other measures also applied to the NRPP (Quinton and Morris 
2008). The NRPP evaluation found positive programme effects on many measures at 
the local ward level, including for crime, ASB and feelings of safety (Tuffin et al. 2006). 
The follow up evaluation of the NRPP sites showed that the positive results were largely 
sustained, but the NPP evaluation at the BCU and national level failed to identify any 
significant programme effects (Quinton and Morris 2008). 
Although ‘hard’ enforcement responses are one option for dealing with neighbourhood 
problems, NP evokes the ‘soft’ functions of the police – the ‘non-coercive aspects of 
police-led social control encompassing the provision of a visible presence of authority, 
persuasion, negotiation and community interaction’ (Innes 2005, 157). The emphasis 
on responsivity appears on face value to represent a decentring or destructuring of 
state social control, where the ‘competing stories’ of the community (Lyons 1999, 7) 
dominate and the demands of a community are prioritised by NPTs. A potential 
obstacle to this is not only traditional police sub-cultural resistance to ‘soft’ functions 
(Innes 2005), but also the paradoxical effect of what Savage (2007b, 314) calls the 
‘bifurcation of police reform’. That is, whilst the police and community are seemingly 
empowered by decentralisation to influence policing delivery through, respectively, 
increased discretion and responsive community engagement, they are also 
disempowered by extended bureaucracy in the form of government targets and plans, 
serving to weaken operational independence and the local control of services. Another 
layer of decision-making and priority-setting was later added at the force-wide level 
by the Police and Crime Commissioner reforms in 2011 (Lister 2013).  
2.5.3 Neighbourhood Policing at the Street-level 
A proper understanding of NP as a distinctive CP programme must include an 
exploration of its street-level organisation and delivery processes. Some of the earlier 
academic studies of RP and NP used interview data to show how street-level operatives 
perceived and made sense of the reforms. Johnston (2005) found that early progress 
in integrating PCSOs into ‘sector teams’ in London was mixed overall and worsened 
over a nine-month period, due to the pace of change and ‘unrealistic expectations’ 
respectively. According to Johnston, successfully integrating PCSOs into the police 
team is helped by effective communication, organisational support, acceptance by 
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colleagues, and adequate supervision. More general concerns were voiced by police in 
Millie and Herrington’s (2005) study of police views of RP, including putting RP and 
response policing into silos. The separation of these roles was seen as both necessary 
to prevent RP operatives from being abstracted away from their neighbourhood, and 
potentially harmful to the efforts to reassure the public if response officers did not 
accept the tenets of RP. Once NP was implemented, relations between PCSOs and PCs 
within NPTs were not completely harmonious, as O’Neill (2015) found that each role 
comprised separate ‘performance teams’ (see Goffman 1959), meaning that each role 
within an NPT11 presented a different and consistent definition of given situations. This 
is reminiscent of Manning’s observation that police work ‘is characterized by cliques, 
cabals, informal groupings that are a reaction to” risk and uncertainty in their world, 
and thus occupational culture is ‘revealed’ through teamwork (2003, 182). O’Neill 
distinguishes between complementary and competitive performance teams to account 
for variation in levels of cooperation or conflict within NPTs, with the former arguably 
better for increasing morale and achieving policing goals. 
The PCSO arguably became the key delivery agent of foot patrol and other community-
focused activities of NP. This was in part due to their role and delimited powers making 
them less likely to be abstracted from their neighbourhood and also the detailed 
knowledge of their beats (O’Neill 2014). The principle of ‘value for money’ in public 
service provision alongside private competition for street-based security patrols was 
also a motivation for government and police to introduce a cheaper police auxiliary for 
visible patrol (Johnston 2003). Merritt (2010) argues that the PCSO role can be viewed 
as a continuum from a crime control-oriented ‘junior enforcer’ to a community-
focused ‘bridge builder’, highlighting that the role could be constructed in different 
ways dependent upon the persuasion of individual PCSOs. This idea was expanded in 
the work of Cosgrove (2016), who explored how PCSOs engaged with the dominant 
occupational culture. Although based on a small sample, the study found that the 
majority of the PCSOs held aspirations to become police officers, which led them to 
associate with the dominant cultural orientation toward crime control. However, half 
of the PCSOs (6) in the study were characterised as ‘professional PCSOs’ as they 
recognised that “their value, effectiveness and career advancement lie in achieving a 
balance between the control, order maintenance and community engagement aspects 
of their remit” (Cosgrove 2016, 127). A quarter of the sample (3) were characterised 
as ‘frustrated PCSOs’, which meant they defined their role purely in terms of crime 
                                            
11 that is, PCs and PCSOs only as sergeants were not studied. 
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fighting, and the last quarter were ‘disillusioned PCSOs’, who are apathetic to the 
role’s purpose due to the lack of authority they possess relative to officers. The 
tendency for NPTs to have a crime control orientation has been noted in relation to 
community engagement activities, where problems are filtered and defined by police 
rather than being truly responsive to community concerns (Bullock 2013; Cosgrove and 
Ramshaw 2013). 
In contrast to studies that emphasised the crime-control cultural orientations of NPT 
operatives, McCarthy (2014) explored the delivery of ‘soft’ policing and found that, 
under NP, police have adapted to activities cynically dismissed by the dominant police 
culture as ‘social work’. On this adaption, he argues that: 
[t]his was due to a range of factors, especially the greater emphasis 
on Neighbourhood Policing, which enabled both male and female 
officers to engage in specialised policing tasks, as opposed to purely 
using Neighbourhood Policing as a ‘stopgap’ to gain promotion. 
(McCarthy 2014, 138) 
Some of the other factors that encouraged this orientation included stability of some 
officers in managerial roles in the same areas, as well as support for ‘soft’ policing 
activities from senior management. In practice, face-to-face interactions of 
partnership work involve interpersonal skills, such as the use of humour to reduce 
conflict at meetings and to discuss differences between professionals in a light-hearted 
way. Drawing on the work of Goffman (1959; 1967), McCarthy (2014) suggests that 
partnership meetings can be understood as ‘interaction rituals’, as the meeting 
contains a set of interactional rules that encourages cooperation and agreement 
between police and partners. However, McCarthy (Ibid.) also found that NP activities 
are gendered; any work with an emphasis on welfare or that involves supporting 
children and families is done mainly by women, and this is in line with previous 
evidence that women police take on gendered roles in CP (Miller 1999). O’Neill and 
McCarthy (2013) note that as part of this shifting orientation, the police cultural 
characteristic of pragmatism has only to be slightly adapted to fit with the ‘soft’ 
partnership activities. What is significant here is that in the bulk of CP reform 
literature, culture is viewed as an impediment to the implementation of CP 
programmes (Holdaway 1984; Chan 2003; Herbert 2005; Skogan 2008), but this work 
suggests that new cultural orientations can emerge and become part of the institution, 




NP is an interesting case in CP and highlights both some of the successes and some of 
the difficulties in implementing these kinds of programmes. It has a specific set of 
programmatic features that emerged due to multiple change motivations. CP 
programmes require political will and support, and NP was created in more favourable 
economic conditions and with greater central government involvement in, and funding 
of, police reform. The NPP was not completely resistant to the problems that have 
resulted in the implementation failure of previous CP programmes, but the structuring 
of NP appeared to have some advantages that built on previous successes of other 
programmes. In terms of practice, NP is notable in that the PCSO role and its level of 
integration into the police are unique features of the programme, and this role 
produces distinctive cultural dynamics in NPTs and the potential for distinctive delivery 
of neighbourhood security. 
Modern policing in England and Wales has always employed symbolism and rhetoric in 
order to create ontological and tangible security. NP has its roots in policing tradition, 
at least rhetorically, as it emphasises the broader functions of police and encourages 
activities that are symbolically communicative. In NP as well as CP, this evocation of 
tradition is seen as a response to the bureaucratic policing models that emerged in 
response to social and technological changes. Although these models may have 
increased effectiveness and efficiency to some extent, the side effects were de-
legitimation and social distance. NP is, of course, not just about tradition, but about 
integrating tradition into modern, bureaucratic, performance-oriented police 
institutions. It is evident that the NPP is a product of its time, and the reforms that 
forged it have made a distinctive and, to some extent, successful contribution to 
policing in England and Wales.  
The backdrop of austerity and its broad and historic socio-economic impact in the UK 
(see chapter 1) represent conditions that potentially challenge the philosophy and 
existence of NP. Previous research has repeatedly shown that CP is dogged by 
implementation failure due to unfavourable political or socio-economic conditions, a 
lack of resources, police cultural resistance, and inflexible patterns of delivery. Eras 
of significant socio-economic change provide the conditions for research to reveal the 
processes of change in CP programmes, and investigate how police institutions attempt 
to preserve or reform the features of such models. This study will use the conditions 
of the austerity era to question how police institutions adapt to new circumstances 
through reform, and how police make sense of theses reforms to enact change at the 
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street level. Understanding what is changing and how can inform broader 
understandings of the historical development of contemporary CP.
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3 Seeing through Multiple Lenses: A Mixed Methods Exploration 
of Neighbourhood Policing Reforms  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will detail and justify the overall research approach and methods used in 
this study. Chapters 1 and 2 explored the significance of the socio-economic context, 
the surround (Manning 2008), and the policing field (Chan 1996) on police reform 
processes and institutional change. With the onset of the austerity era in England and 
Wales and its significant implications for police funding as well as the general provision 
of local services, research is needed that can respond quickly to such events while 
investigating them deeply in order to understand the distinct impacts of the austerity 
era on policing.  
Through utilising a mixed methods approach, this study can explore the complex 
processes of institutional reform through different research methods. Chapter 1 also 
highlighted that the culture, interactions, storytelling, and sensemaking are forces 
that mediate changes and contribution to the enactment of reforms. This study focuses 
largely at the meso-level unit of the small group to explore how the environmental and 
institutional pressures are experienced and mediated by NPTs before shaping the 
action of NP delivery. Therefore, this chapter will also describe the importance of 
analysing the NPT as a local group (Fine 2012). 
3.2 Mixing Methods to Investigate Reform Processes  
This study employs a mixed methods research (MMR) design that comprises both 
quantitative and qualitative research tools as part of a between-method, two-phase 
process. The research design has the hallmarks of what Creswell and Plano Clark (2011, 
90-96) dub the ‘embedded design’, as the methods answer different secondary 
research questions with appropriate data and the overall study has a primary 
qualitative orientation. This section will outline the overall strategy of inquiry, 
including both quantitative and qualitative phases. 
The overall focus of study is on NP change, but change in police organisations takes 
many forms, such as “structure, technologies, and culture and the forces that shape 
them” (Mastrofski and Willis 2010, 56). Therefore, I decided that adopting this 
approach would help to build a fuller picture, with both breadth and depth, of how 
and why NP delivery is changing in the austerity era. The qualitative phase of the study 
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deals with exploring the how and why of NP delivery reform at the level of the NPT, 
which is the arena where NP is performed and meaningful change to street-level 
practice can be negotiated. The quantitative phase was designed in part to enhance 
the qualitative findings by revealing the observable connections between funding 
reductions and the resources available to NP, illustrating the social forces that may 
shape NPT culture and NP delivery – in other words, the relationship between austerity 
politics and NP reform and delivery. Using Bryman’s scheme of MMR’s logics of 
triangulation, the rationales inherent in this design are as follows: 
Completeness – refers to the notion that the researcher can bring 
together a more comprehensive account of the area of enquiry in 
which he or she is interested if both quantitative and qualitative 
research are employed. 
Process – quantitative research provides an account of structures in 
social life but qualitative research provides sense of process. 
Sampling – refers to situations in which one approach is used to 
facilitate the sampling of respondents or cases. 
Enhancement or building upon quantitative/qualitative findings – this 
entails a reference to making more of or augmenting either 
quantitative or qualitative findings by gathering data using a 
qualitative or quantitative research approach. (Bryman 2006, 106-
107; original emphasis) 
Each of these rationales will be explained in relation to the two phases of research in 
the following discussion. 
3.2.1 From bird’s eye view to street level: mixing methods and triangulating findings 
To understand change in NP in the austerity era (compared with the preceding era of 
higher funding) and an attempt at a harmonisation of local policing approaches, I 
devised a descriptive study of workforce change across all police institutions with NPTs 
in England and Wales. This constitutes an exploration of both the extent of the impact 
of funding reductions and how any impact is distributed across forces. This is important 
for two reasons. First, it will show how (un)evenly change is occurring across 
institutions, whether NP maintains former standards or becomes fragmented. Second, 
it provides an interpretive guide as to what is happening to NP delivery in different 
forces, assuming there is a relationship between the resources and structure of NPTs 
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and the delivery of NP (Punch 2012). This also means that the qualitative investigation 
of NP delivery can be contextualised against the force-level markers of change, and 
the sampling of cases can be based upon findings from the quantitative phase. For this 
reason, the quantitative research tool used – descriptive analysis of official data – was 
employed first at the start of a sequence of methods.  
 
Figure 3 Research design sequencing 
The qualitative phase of the research involves observations of police-community 
meetings and interviews with NPT practitioners to collect empirical data in order to 
provide insights into the changes in the delivery of NP and community engagement. 
This phase is more heavily weighted than the first in both a practical and theoretical 
sense. Practically, the fieldwork took a much longer time to organise and perform, and 
the research tools produced large amounts of rich data. Theoretically, the study is 
guided by the interactionist perspective (explained further in following sections of this 
chapter), placing emphasis on the potential for human interaction to produce social 
order and be influenced by structural forces (Fine 2012). Therefore, the qualitative 
analysis can enhance understanding of the broad structural changes revealed by the 
quantitative component, and show how these broad, contextual changes to police 
resources in the austerity era and institutional reforms are experienced and 
understood by those at the street level – providing a sense of process under conditions 
of structural change. In this case, the qualitative phase seeks to answer an extra sub-
question on top of the central research questions: How do NPTs understand and react 
to new social and institutional environments of the austerity era? Taken together, the 
findings from each phase can produce a more comprehensive (or more complete) 




3.3 Accessing the Team 
This section will describe the overall approach taken to fieldwork access, including the 
original planned approach of the research design as well as the difficulties, setbacks, 
and solutions to the social process of negotiating access to institutions and participants 
in social research. Negotiating access to police institutions for sociological research as 
an ‘outsider’ is notoriously difficult (Innes 2003; Loftus 2009; Hallenberg et al. 2015; 
Jones 2015; Topping 2015), and indeed issues of access had a continuous and significant 
effect on the research design of this project. Before eventually finding a willing 
institution and recruiting individual participants, there were a number of attempts to 
negotiate access with different institutions that failed. These failures to gain initial 
institutional access will be addressed first. The section will then describe the processes 
of negotiating access in the final fieldwork setting. 
3.3.1 Negotiation processes: Formal Proposals and Gatekeepers 
The initial approach to accessing NPTs involved proposing the fieldwork to police 
organisations to gain formal permission for semi-structured interviews. Overall, 
contact was made with five separate forces. After the first phase of research, I 
identified two forces that would provide comparative fieldwork sites in which to 
explore two distinct emerging approaches to NP. Due to this sampling justification, my 
contact with and proposals to forces were to some extent chronologically staggered; 
some sampling arrangements were preferred and thus certain institutions were 
pursued more vigorously than others at the beginning of the negotiation process. 
Although a comparative design was initially preferred, it quickly became apparent that 
achieving similar or indeed any access to separate institutions within the time 
constraints of a PhD project was very unlikely, which underlines the potentially strong 
influence of practicalities on research design. 
The second intention was to study a group of neighbouring forces that were creating 
new strategic alliances in order to reduce costs by streamlining their operations. These 
arrangements also involved collaborative efforts across the alliance to create a new, 
affordable NP model. In this case the negotiation stalled due to differences of opinion 
concerning the research design with the gatekeeper of initial access. This particular 
gatekeeper had knowledge of the policing evidence base and of the research process. 
However, this episode does raise the ethical consideration of such a gatekeeper’s 
preferences for research designs and the effect this has on the institutional influence 
on academic research. Upon being advised by the gatekeeper to revise and resubmit 
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the proposal, I decided to abort the negotiation due to the specific changes asked for, 
as well as some concern over the potential for the institution to exert further influence 
on the design. 
The breakthrough came after changing the research design once more. The setbacks I 
had already faced illustrated the challenges of gaining initial or even fruitful access in 
multiple institutional settings. I made the decision to focus on gaining good access in 
just one force. What was notable about this stage is that the eventual breakthrough in 
initial institutional interest was triggered by utilising my own contact – my PhD 
supervisor – who had knowledge of the current reform programme at the institution 
and laid the groundwork with a contact of his. It is not possible for me to know exactly 
how much my supervisor’s influence affected the outcome of my proposal being 
accepted, but the scenario does demonstrate the benefits of good networks, if for no 







Design? Description Result 
Contrasting 
reforms  
2 Y Forces with opposite 
extreme changes to 
PCSO workforce 
change and distinct 
policies to deal with 
NP in Austerity era 
One force 
rejected initial 
proposal due to 
perception that 




2 N Two forces entering 
into a strategic 
alliance with attempt 
to introduce new NP 




contact for both 
forces due to 
issues with 
research design. 
Single forces 5 N Single force access 
more practical – lower 
chance of obstacles. 
Focus on one type 
workforce change and 
reform plan.  
Initial access 
granted by one 




Table 3 Fieldwork Access Iterations 
In certain cases the more formal process of writing official proposal forms or creating 
proposal documents was accompanied by email discussions with potential gatekeepers. 
These gatekeepers were from different organisational levels, some with the capacity 
for formal input into the proposal process and others without such influence. The latter 
were most often NPT sergeants who had contacted me through finding information 
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about my research and expressing interest in my project or asking for research 
evidence for new NP models for their forces. They discovered the project through the 
College of Policing research map webpages, where I had uploaded the information in 
order to create a web presence for the project. This was not ever used as an initial 
access point to participants while institutional access was being sought, but it did serve 
two functions. Firstly, not all forces make their application processes publicly visible, 
and so contact with an ‘insider’ with an institutional email account presented an 
opportunity to discover the correct contact to start the application process. One 
gatekeeper offered to pass on my proposal to the correct contact in order to start the 
application process, which was convenient but did cause some confusion as the 
proposal was not in the expected format. Secondly, it presented opportunities for 
further access once the initial proposal phase was completed. One sergeant who 
contacted me eventually became a participant in the study. Before the project began 
I had considered the sergeant as a fruitful access point to NPTs due to past fieldwork 
experiences, and again I later found that sergeants tended to be the most significant 
gatekeepers of access to the NPT. 
3.3.2 Recruiting the Sample 
Negotiating access for qualitative fieldwork is not a single transaction but a continuous 
and often social process (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Burgess 1984). Gaining access 
to teams and individual participants requires more than submitting an application form 
to an institution, as a researcher approaching the institutional field will experience 
different levels of the institution with and through different gatekeepers. Higher up in 
a police organisation these gatekeepers might be civilian managers and administrators 
or officers in positions of senior management. Lower down there are middle managers 
and street-level operatives. I experienced challenges within both these broad levels, 
though the higher level, where the initial access was negotiated, tended to present 
the most acute difficulties12 to gaining access and maintaining the planned research 
design. 
After the initial institutional acceptance of the proposal, a research administrator was 
assigned to arrange interviews. This process was conducted by email and was largely 
straightforward, as the administrator was willing to assist in recruiting my desired 
interview sample. However, this route limited certain aspects of access, as the 
                                            
12 Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, 41) note that the ‘initial negotiations to enter the setting’ 
and the ‘first days in the field’ often present the most difficulties with access. 
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administrator chose the venues for interviews. Problems at the higher level emerged 
after the initial interviews when I attempted to extend my field access to observations 
of foot patrols in neighbourhoods. I proposed this extension of access via email to my 
current gatekeeper, the research administrator, with a new proposal that included 
confirmation of university ethics approval and an additional risk management plan. 
The request was passed on to an Inspector with research administration duties to judge 
whether I could gain institutional approval, but further access was denied. This 
irrevocably altered the research design, as I was then committed to fieldwork in this 
institution and going against the wishes of the institution would have been an unethical 
and impractical choice. 
As mentioned previously, access challenges also emerged at the ‘lower levels’ of the 
institution. The theme that connects most of these challenges is the relative lack of 
time that police have for either participating in research or helping a researcher 
organise fieldwork trips. This is to be expected, considering the constant pressures on 
resources in public services and the prioritisation of their core client-work over 
outsider interests (Lipsky 1980). In one fieldwork site, for instance, a sergeant had 
promised me access to his whole NPT for interviews and to community meetings for 
observations. For the former, we had agreed upon dates for the interviews to be held, 
but as these dates approached other business came up for him and his team. As for 
police-community meetings, these were often cancelled during my time in the field in 
this site and in others, with notice from police or without. Overall, this had significant 
potential to influence and change the research design and make fieldwork a messy 
process. Rather than equal access to different NPTs that I had planned, the fieldwork 
became a much more opportunistic endeavour, conducting interviews and attending 
meetings when and where openings occurred.  
Additionally, turning up for a number of public meetings that had been cancelled 
without any public notice affected me in other ways. These wasted journeys 
occasionally made me doubt the value of making a long and time-consuming trip with 
no data to show for it. Emailing members of an NPT to enquire about these events does 
not always lead to a quick response, and sometimes police just did not know in advance 
whether community members would attend. Waiting outside of meeting venues in an 
unknown area in the dark was also a potential risk, and made me question the wisdom 
of attending meetings at night if there was a chance of cancellation. From these 
episodes I learned the value in checking general meeting attendance in advance and 
opening up better lines of communication with NPT operatives in order to reduce the 
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risks of attending cancelled meetings. In my experience, as there was no single way of 
communicating effectively, I relied on a combination of avenues ranging from 
arranging my attendance for each meeting through a team’s sergeant to speaking to 
NPT operatives through police social media accounts. 
3.4 The Politics of Policing in the West Midlands 
The qualitative fieldwork was conducted in the West Midlands Police (WMP) force area. 
The boundary of this area was established in 1974 after the Local Government Act 1972 
legislated for the creation of new county-level authorities with coterminous county 
councils, before the Local Government Act 1985 abolished these in favour of a number 
of unitary authorities. Nevertheless, WMP survived as an organisation throughout the 
Local Government changes in the 1980s and the proposals for further regional force 
mergers in 2006. As a police institution of an area that is largely urban, WMP covers 
the second most populous of all police force areas (2.8 million people) and has the 
third highest rate of officers per 100,000 head of population (245) in England and 
Wales. In March 2016, the institution had a total of 6,944 officers and 506 PCSOs, with 
1,081 and 460 officially assigned to the Neighbourhood Policing function13 respectively. 
There have been moderate reductions to the PCSO workforce but maintenance of the 
proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce since 201014, making WMP fairly 
typical of PCSO workforce change in England. 
 Full-time equivalent 
officers 
Full- time equivalent 
officers available for duty 
Community Support 
Officers 
Total 6,944 6,636 506 
Neighbourhoods 1,081 - 460 
Table 4 - WMP officer and PCSO strength, March 2016, Source: Home Office 
3.4.1 Profile of the West Midlands 
WMP covers a large urban conurbation that is broken up into seven metropolitan 
boroughs, three of which are cities: Birmingham, Coventry, and Wolverhampton. The 
area does cover some rural land, such as a green belt between Birmingham’s urban 
sprawl and Coventry, but this is a small feature of the area overall. The area had a 
large manufacturing sector, which has decreased significantly in recent decades, but 
                                            
13 The ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ function measure has only been used in 2015 and 2016. Before 
this, forces supplied data for the ‘neighbourhoods’ function, but the criteria for inclusion was 
not explicit. 
14 See the following chapter for more details of workforce change and a typology of NP 
workforce change and implications. 
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still remains relatively high compared to the rest of the UK. There is relatively high 
unemployment (7.6% in 2016) and many urban localities (Lower Super Output Areas) 
fall within the most deprived 20%. The population is majority White/White British 
(70.1%) and Christian (60.5%) with a relatively large Asian/Asian British (18.9%) and 
Muslim (7.6%) population compared to the UK. The majority of the Asian population 
are Indian (6.8%) and Pakistani (7.3%), and the Pakistani and Muslim populations are 
most dense in the city of Birmingham.  
Birmingham’s unique ethnic mix is associated with a number of recent controversies 
and community tensions, the most high-profile of which in the UK was the so-called 
Trojan horse scandal, in which specific Islamic groups were accused of attempting to 
take control of a small number of state schools. The WMP Chief Constable of the time 
raised concerns over the manner of the investigation, suggesting that bringing in a 
counter-terrorism detective from the Metropolitan Police to investigate the matter 
could damage community relations (Pidd and Dodd 2014).  
The city has also been highlighted or labelled as a hotbed for Islamist extremism by 
researchers and journalists (e.g. Stuart 2017; Bassey 2013) and was once falsely 
described by a commentator as a ‘no-go zone’ for non-Muslims (Sanchez 2015). The 
media commentator Katie Hopkins also shared a claim on the social media platform 
Twitter that police were not allowed to enter Birmingham Central Mosque, a claim 
that was quickly refuted by WMP via the same medium (Rodger 2017). Due to this 
reputation and high Muslim population of Birmingham, the far-right protest movement 
English Defence League has held a number of demonstrations in the city and in 
surrounding boroughs, fuelling tensions between communities (Treadwell and Garland 
2011, 626-627). Despite the real threats along with some of the more sensational 
claims about extremism in Birmingham, WMP was judged to have good arrangements 
for meeting the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) and for preparing for any firearms 
attacks (HMIC 2017).  
3.4.2 Crime in the West Midlands 
In 2016 in the WMP force area, there were 67 crimes recorded per 1,000 of population, 
a rise of +6.2% compared to 2015 but a fall of -10.8% compared to 2011. The crime 
rate and recent one-year increase are close to the England and Wales average (68 per 
1000 and +7.8% respectively), but the longer-term fall is more pronounced than the 
average (-3.4%). The anti-social behaviour rate is also lower than average – 21 
compared to 31 per 1000 of population in 2016. However, the calls for assistance rate 
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is notably higher – 322 against 240 per 1000 of population – suggesting a high demand 
for response compared to the England and Wales average as well as the reported anti-
social and crime rates (HMIC 2017). Additionally, WMP was dealing with a high level of 
gun crime in the year leading up to fieldwork and this continued throughout the 
fieldwork phase. On HMIC’s PEEL (Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy) 
measures, WMP was judged to be ‘good’ on all measures apart from ‘protecting those 
who are vulnerable from harm, and supporting victims’, in which the force was deemed 
to ‘require improvement’ due to inconsistent completion of domestic abuse victims 
risk assessments. In relation to NP, HMIC found that structured problem-solving 
approaches in NPTs were restricted to isolated examples or that some officers and 
PCSOs did not understand these approaches. Therefore, WMP was advised to ‘adopt a 
structured and consistent problem-solving process’ (HMIC 2017, 19) in order to more 
effectively tackle crime and anti-social behaviour.  
West Midlands Police descriptors, 2016 
Area Population 2.8 million 
WMP operational workforce   
Officers/in NPTs 6,944/1,081 
Officers per 100,000 of population 245 
PCSOs/in NPTs 506/460 
Crime rate per 1000 of population 67 
Anti-social behaviour rate per 1000 of 
population  
21 
Calls for assistance per 1000 of 
population 
322 
Table 5 West Midlands Police descriptors, 2016 
3.4.3 Reform in West Midlands Police 
WMP has a history of CP reform, including the establishment of the CP-influenced 
civilian patrol schemes, Street Watch15 and Faith Watch. In the years since the 
beginning of austerity both the former CC, Chris Sims, and the recent PCCs, the now-
deceased Bob Jones and his successor David Jamieson, have expressed their support 
for protecting NP from the effects of funding reductions.  From 2009, WMP started the 
first of a number of organisational reform programmes, Programme Paragon, which 
aimed to improve public confidence, enhance partnership working, and reduce overall 
                                            
15 See Sharp et al (2008) and Williams (2005) for research into the issues of legitimacy of the 
Street Watch scheme. 
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costs. Paragon reduced the number of policing divisions from twenty-one ‘Operational 
Command Units’ to ten ‘Local Policing Units’ (LPUs). These new units were 
coterminous with local authority boundaries, and this arrangement was expected to 
simplify cooperation with other agencies. Each LPU was to have a Local Command 
Team consisting of a Chief Superintendent along with a number of Superintendents and 
Chief Inspectors, who were required to ensure ‘high quality local policing’ in the NPTs 
contained within these divisions (West Midlands Police Authority and WMP 2011, 7). 
From 2012, WMP recruited a consultancy agency to assist in developing the Continuous 
Improvement programme, which aimed to reduce waste, duplication and inefficiency 
in the institution’s systems and processes. As part of the reorganisation, greater 
specialisation was identified as a way to increase efficiency. NPTs would now have 
fewer staff who were required to be dedicated to the area and not abstracted to other 
teams or locations. NPT functions would now include offender management and 
tackling gangs and organised crime, whereas Response Teams would focus solely on 
responding to incidents and not investigations (West Midlands Police Authority and 
WMP 2012). Full remit for the patrol function was maintained after plans had been 
made – but subsequently rejected – to outsource some patrolling to the private security 
provider G4S (Warrell 2013).  
In 2015 the financial situation of WMP was worsening; there appeared to be no end to 
the funding reductions and there was the prospect of Home Office reforms to the Police 
Allocation Formula (PAF) that would be particularly unfavourable to WMP. WMP was 
especially vulnerable to central government funding cuts as they received a high 
proportion of their funding from the Home Office rather than local government or other 
sources, and thus faced the second highest real-terms funding reduction and the 
seventh highest savings requirement as a percentage of gross revenue expenditure out 
of the main forty-three forces of England and Wales (NAO 2015). In 2015, WMP 
threatened legal action against the Home Office due to the disproportionate effects 
of the planned PAF reforms (Travis 2015a)16. 
In light of this dire financial situation, CC Chris Sims decided that another 
organisational change programme was required, and a new consultancy firm was 
brought on board to assist with planning. This reorganisation was dubbed WMP 2020, 
and NP was again a ‘critical element’ of the reforms. The ‘WMP 2020 Blueprint’ 
promised a new NP model that is ‘not constrained by geographical boundaries’, would 
                                            




focus resources in the ‘areas of most need’, and develop ‘active citizens’ – an attempt 
to improve methods of ‘connecting and working with local people to share information’ 
(WMP 2015). Other planned features of the programme were an increase in digital 
services, making greater use of new technologies to improve various tasks, and a 
greater focus on prevention of victimisation, harm, and reoffending. 
In summary, WMP makes a fascinating setting for this project, as an institution that 
has been grappling with deliberate and far-reaching NP reforms motivated by the 
changing financial environment. The deliberate changes in large forces like WMP have 
the potential to inform future approaches to NP reform in other police institutions. 
Although WMP is unique in its funding arrangements, it has experienced workforce 
changes that are relatively typical of most forces in England and Wales. Additionally, 
the general features of the WMP2020 change programme were, to varying degrees, 
known to participants during fieldwork, and these proposed changes came after two 
other reorganisations in the space of six to seven years. This provides an interesting 
dimension to the thoughts, feelings, and expectations of those at the street level, 
having experienced big changes and awaiting further change to their roles and working 
environment.  
3.5 The Team as a ‘Tiny Public’ 
NP is delivered by specialist police units called Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs). 
These units are small groups of police who work and interact together in the 
neighbourhood, a hyper-local geographic boundary defined by the police institution. 
Due to the centrality of these groups to NP delivery, this study primarily focuses on 
how NP is organised at the meso-realm of the NPT. The qualitative analysis in particular 
is informed by the interactionist paradigm, especially Goffman’s (1983) principles of 
the ‘interaction order’, Strauss’ ‘negotiated order’ (1978) and Fine’s (2014; 2012; 
2010, 1979) theory of small group interaction as a basis for producing social order – 
small local groups as a ‘tiny public’. Fine and Goffman’s projects are nomothetic in 
nature, as they catalogue general principles of behaviour that can be identified during 
and as a result of group interactions. This study, however, is idiographic in nature due 
to the focus on particular constraining contexts and exteriorities that are specific to 
time and place that affect the NPT action and the delivery of NP. Examples of this are 
the austerity environment and its effects on the resources of NPTs nationally as well 
as the changing nature of crime and police- or community-defined problems (two 
different versions of demand) in the WMP setting and specific fieldwork sites. Social 
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and environmental contingencies also influence the development of a group’s unique 
idioculture, which is the:  
…systems of knowledge, beliefs, behaviours, and customs shared by 
the members of the interacting group to which members refer and 
that they employ as the basis for further group interaction. (Fine 
2012, 36) 
Fine (1979, 736-737) sees one function of the idioculture as a mediator between the 
group’s environment and action. In this sense, Fine’s project is about understanding 
the linkages between the macro- and the micro-levels present in the meso-level, and 
this is as relevant to groups within institutions as to any other social group: 
If the ultimate goal is to link an understanding of the macro and micro 
foundations of institutions, then groups are crucial because they 
comprise a meso-realm through which the macro and the micro are 
realized in spaces of interaction. Groups are “where the action is.” 
It is not just that groups mediate the micro and the macro; rather, 
this meso level has semi-autonomous properties and dynamics that 
shape everyday life and organizational character. (Fine and Hallett 
2014, 1774) 
This process of ‘realising’ the macro within the group setting and interaction order 
includes the influence of constraints, which are the ‘perceived boundaries on action’ 
(Fine 2012, 54), as well as environmental ‘exteriorities’ – the obdurate, stubbornly 
immovable contexts that cannot be resisted. Both influence the production of a group’s 
idioculture. This study is not solely dedicated to listing every constraint and obdurate 
exteriority, but it must be appreciated that NPTs are subjected to a range of them, 
such as the weighty expectations of police action, both internally from police and 
externally from wider society, as a body with specific and enduring functions and 
presentation (Manning 1997). That many essential elements of police objectives, 
culture, and practice have changed so little in recent decades (Loftus 2009; Skolnick 
2008; Chan 1997) is instructive in the study of attempted policing reforms and the 
barriers to them. According to Fine and Hallett (2014), the study of small groups in 
formal institutions is where we witness these linkages between macro and micro, 
where the adaptation to constraints and exteriorities is mediated by the idioculture 
before it translates to action, and where new negotiated realities produce new large-
scale social forces (see also Fine 2010). 
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In studying the NPT as a group, it is important to pay attention to the group structure 
and the groupness17 of the NPT. There are some characteristics of the NPT that are 
already known and fit with the sociological definition of a small group (Fine 2012, 25). 
They are small enough in number and localised enough for each member to have 
interpersonal collaboration and on-going interaction with each other member. As 
specialised teams in an institution, they have institutionally defined objectives that 
provide a basis for collective focus. Whether institutionally defined objectives align 
precisely with the actual communal standards of the NPT is an empirical matter, as it 
is within the group that these standards are shaped. Furthermore, NPTs have shared 
histories through which idioculture and collective identity can be formed (Fine 2010). 
While the NPT may have the basic structural characteristics of a small group, there 
still remain questions as to its internal groupness and differentiation between NPTs, 
especially in light of the institutional imposition of formal goals and boundaries. The 
levels of affiliation and allegiance of police to the collective focus of the NPT, and 
therefore the aspects or even coherence of an idioculture, can also be investigated. 
Do PCs, for instance, share the same values and goals as PCSOs or the Sergeant within 
the same NPT? Some recent studies point to weak groupness. Goffman’s concept of 
‘performance team’ is one way to view how such units may not be working towards 
the same goals, and O’Neill (2015) observed that the PCSOs and PCs in her study 
inhabited distinct performance teams. Furthermore, Cosgrove (2016) identified a 
number of cultural orientations from a sample of 12 PCSOs across two NPTs in the same 
institution. The results of these studies muddy the notion of groupness within NPTs as 
divisions in values and performance can exist within one specialist police unit. 
However, it is possible for some division to exist within groups under Fine’s definition, 
as long as enough similarities in knowledge, beliefs, behaviours, and history exist. 
Idioculture is also not completely static and can be negotiated and resolved as part of 
the group’s historical development (Fine 2010). It is also true that groups contain 
hierarchies and power relations, and these are structured in to specialist policing units 
by virtue of, for instance, the quasi-military rank structures within police institutions. 
In summary, a primary focus on the meso-level NPT as a unit of analysis provides a way 
for this study to make theoretical connections between the austerity era and the 
reconfiguration of NP delivery. Rather than focusing on structure or action alone, the 
small group as an arena of interaction that constitutes social and cultural orders. The 
                                            
17 By ‘groupness’, I refer to the various measures of interrelation within a group, such as 
members perceptions of cohesion, allegiance/affiliation, and commitment. 
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mixed methods research design allows me to explore the specific structural constraints 
as well as the social organisation, idiocultural elements, and actions of the NPT. The 
quantitative phase, while not analysing the team, will explore the connections 
between contexts (austerity era and workforce resources) that lead to constraints and 
exterior influence on NP delivery as mediated by the NPT. The qualitative phase will 
also include an investigation into the institutional reforms in WMP and the motivations 
for them – another context that ‘enables, constrains, and partially constitutes group 
interactions’ (Fine and Hallett 2014, 1776; original emphasis). The findings will provide 
an illustration of specific contexts and events that the NPT must react to with the 
potential for new influence on the idioculture. Furthermore, the qualitative phase is 
enhanced by the small group perspective through the use of observations and 
interviews to explore the social organisation of the group as well as the idiocultural 
elements of the NPT that produce local practices. Finally, observations of police 
meetings with other neighbourhood actors will explore the interaction order of formal 
community engagement situations. This is again relevant to the dynamics of the NPT 
as these meetings represent an interaction arena of networked groups and individuals 
where NPTs perform their group roles and practice community engagement with civic 
society. The following section will describe the processes of each of these methods of 
enquiry.  
3.6 Describing Workforce Change 
The first phase of the research explored how NP had changed throughout England and 
Wales in the austerity era using descriptive statistics. In order to understand change 
as a part of the wider political context of the austerity era, the PCSO workforce was 
used as an indicator of material change to the staffing resources of NPTs across all 
police forces in England and Wales. As budgetary reductions are the primary feature 
of austerity politics, workforce fluctuation is the variable that captures one direct 
effect of austerity on NPTs. To understand how NP delivery is being reconfigured in 
England and Wales, analysis of national data was therefore of critical importance in 
understanding the types and distribution of workforce change in all police organisations 
in England and Wales. 
Punch (2012) argues that community-oriented policing is vulnerable to organisational 
‘paradigm swings’, in which changing contexts of policing – political, social, and 
organisational – encourage policing practice and organisational rhetoric to ‘regress’ to 
a limited and ‘hard’ notion of policing. Innes (2005) also described similar process in 
reverse, where the politics of policing at the time encouraged the advancement of 
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‘neighbourhood security’ functions at the expense of an extensive focus on ‘crime 
management’ functions, which is effectively synonymous with the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
policing dichotomy, respectively. Recent concerns relating to a changing demand 
profile in policing in England and Wales has led to a shifting focus on the way police 
work in order to reduce demand and work more effectively with fewer resources 
(Elliott-Davies et al 2016; College of Police 2015). Some argue for a greater focus on 
early intervention and partnership working to prevent future demand and reduce 
reactive work (Boulton et al 2016). 
With these new concerns and historical precedents in mind, what does the austerity 
era mean for the continuation of NP as a policing approach that delivers neighbourhood 
security through the mechanisms of visibility, community engagement and problem-
solving? There is some evidence of a link between crude measures of police workforce 
resources and the ability to perform these delivery mechanisms. For example, Sindall 
and Sturgis (2013) provided some evidence that reducing police numbers leads to less 
visibility and thus lower public confidence, and they suggest that organisational 
efficiencies might not be enough to compensate for recent lost resources. 
Furthermore, the PCSO role, closely aligned with establishment of RP and NP 
programmes, is regarded as a vital resource for achieving NP objectives as the main 
delivery agents of visible foot patrol and community engagement (O’Neill 2014). As 
such, reducing PCSO numbers can change the realities of NP delivery and affect the 
resulting levels of security provided by this form of policing. Exploring force level 
workforce data can reveal which organisations are more vulnerable to such changes. 
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Official Data 
Official workforce statistics were used to describe changes to the PCSO workforce 
before and during the austerity era and analyse the implications for NP delivery across 
England and Wales. These research sub-questions framed the analysis: 
1. What are the trends in the numbers and proportion of Police Community 
Support Officers since 2004? 
2. How do these trends vary by police force areas? 
3. What are the implications of these workforce trends for the roles of 
practitioners and the delivery of neighbourhood policing? 
These questions were designed for the purpose of producing a broad answer to the 




The data sets used were the tables from the Home Office’s Police Service Strength 
publications18. The publications provided official biannual numbers for the police 
workforce broken down into different categories and roles and provided for each police 
force area. The data from these publications were collated into a series of 
spreadsheets: 
• Full time PCSO workforce by police force, 2004-2015 
• Specials workforce by police force, 2004-2015 
• Full time Police Officer workforce by police force, 2004-2015 
• Police Operational workforce by police force, 2004-2015 
The data in each spreadsheet were divided into three different levels: national 
(England and Wales); regional; and police force area. From 2004 to 2012, each year’s 
data represents the workforce figure for March that is given to the Home Office by 
each police force. 2004 was used as the earliest point of analysis as eighteen forces 
did not employ PCSOs in 2003. Furthermore, the NRPP began in October 2003 and 
therefore PCSOs would start to be integrated into an approach that was the basis for 
NP delivery after the time of counting for the 2003 data. For 2013, biannual data 
covering both March and September were used to ensure the most up to date figures 
at the time of analysis. The data for 2014 and 2015 represents projections for 
workforce numbers at March of each year given to HMIC by each police force. These 
years were included to provide insight into the intentions of each force.  
3.6.3 Analysis 
The PCSO workforce spreadsheet shows the main trends in national, regional, and local 
workforce changes, and these trends are described to answer the first two research 
sub-questions. An analysis of the temporal significance within the trends provides an 
interpretation of the effects of changes to police funding on the NP workforce, and 
this interpretation is used as a basis for the answer to research sub-question three. 
There are a number of points of temporal significance that are used as the basis for 
analysis, including the roll out of the NP programme in 2008, the change of government 
and Comprehensive Spending Review in 2010, and the expiration of the Neighbourhood 
Policing Fund in 2013. Institutional police documents were also used to illuminate 
                                            




possible reasons for specific cases of workforce change. This allowed further 
interpretation of the possible motivations and contexts of workforce change, beyond 
centrally imposed funding environments, for particular forces or regions. 
The data for police officers and police Specials were included as they provide the 
numbers of other staff that can be deployed in NPTs. The amalgamation of the numbers 
of officers, PCSOs and Specials therefore provides a figure of the operational 
workforce that is available for use in NPTs. From the operational workforce figure, the 
proportion of each separate role can be calculated to reveal the composition of the 
workforce by role. The trends in the proportions of each role are analysed to provide 
an answer for the final research sub-question on the premise that different operational 
roles are deployed in ways that have implications for the way policing is delivered. 
More specifically, both the numbers and proportion of PCSOs, and by extension the 
other operational roles, in the operational workforce have implications for the delivery 
of NP. 
3.6.4 Issues in Using Official Data 
The police workforce strength data set was used as official records provide the most 
accurate record of police employment divided by role. However, it is important that 
researchers maintain a ‘healthy scepticism’ over numerical data and recognise its 
limits (Bulmer 1980). In this case, using aggregate figures for each police role obscures 
intra-organisational differences in some categories, such as the specialisation of each 
employee. For instance, PCs are used in a variety of specialisations within 
organisations, such as armed response units, investigation teams, and response teams, 
and PCSOs can be used outside of NPTs too. Nevertheless, PCSOs are mainly used in NP 
and often PC roles in most other specialisations symbolise the crime management 
approach. 
One way the administrative data sets attempt to give more clarity over the NP 
workforce is by allowing forces to designate ‘function’ labels to the workforce that in 
most cases appear to fit with specialised team roles. A ‘neighbourhood’ category exists 
in the dataset, the criteria for inclusion in the category is not clearly explicated – 
inclusion does not necessarily mean the numbers relate directly to the NPT workforce. 
Another problem with using this actor’s category to monitor the level of staffing in 
NPTs is that the meaning of ‘neighbourhood’ is subject to change over time (especially 
in line with reforms to local policing operating models), and therefore is less useful for 
the analysis of NP change. Newly implemented local policing models that maintain 
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numbers according to the ‘neighbourhood’ category but operate over reformed 
boundaries and with new functions can lead to appearances that do not reflect the 
reality of change on the ground. This category was also cited for political purposes to 
show that neighbourhood resources had increased across the country, though the 
claims could be shown to be misleading by closer scrutiny of the data (Greig-Midlane 
2015).  
3.7 Interviewing the Team 
The previous section dealt with how this study views structural changes as a variable 
in organisational change, in that fluctuations in resources can influence or constrain 
the choices available to police actors in NP. One function of the quantitative analysis 
is to set the scene of NP delivery reform by revealing NP resource changes taking place 
within the austerity era. The second function is to chronicle the distribution of change 
across forces and to consider the implications for the range of these changes. The 
second phase builds on the first by investigating more deeply the effects of structural 
change on NP delivery through qualitative research methods. This section will set out 
the processes of designing and conducting interviews and field observations, as well as 
the analysis of the data produced by these methods.  
In order to understand how NP is delivered by NPTs and how this work is changing in 
the austerity era, I successfully conducted face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
with eighteen street-level NPT operatives (whom I will refer to generally as ‘police’), 
as well as three elite police actors who were involved in some capacity with high-level 
NP policy. The former group was formed of one inspector, six sergeants, five PCs, and 
six PCSOs who were currently working or had until recently worked in NPTs in WMP. 
The latter comprised WMP’s PCC, a WMP Chief Superintendent who was the lead for 
local policing, and the College of Policing’s lead on local policing. Each face-to-face 
interview was audio-recorded and lasted between approximately thirty and ninety 
minutes, with most lasting nearer to sixty minutes. 
The elite group also included an email interview with the Assistant Chief Constable 
(ACC) at WMP who oversaw local policing policy. A face-to-face interview was not 
possible with the ACC due to her own time constraints, and instead she offered to 
answer a set amount of questions via email. Although my preference was face-to-face 
encounters with the opportunity for follow-up questions and probing (Rubin and Rubin 
2012), I accepted the proposal as the only practical way to receive an account of NP 
reforms from the highest operational rank possible. 
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Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the most practical method to gain 
individual accounts of NP delivery, change, and the workings and idioculture of the 
NPT as a group. An interview can be used as tool to generate data on the rhetoric of 
policing; the normative positions on the function of NP and the motives that define 
actions and reform (Wright Mills 1940). It can also be used to generate data to explain 
the social action (Bruce and Wallis 1983) of police in NPTs. Much has been written 
about whether CP approaches are rhetoric or reality (Manning 1984; 1997; Mastrofski 
1988; Weatheritt 1988), and I take the view that it is possible to receive both rhetorical 
accounts and explanations of action through interview data, as long as one casts a 
critical eye over what is being claimed. Hammersley and Atkinson summarise this 
position19 as follows: 
For us, there are two legitimate and complementary ways in which 
participants’ accounts can be used by ethnographers. First, they can 
be read for what they tell us about the phenomena to which they 
refer. Second, we can analyse them in terms of the perspectives they 
imply… such participant knowledge on the part of people in a setting 
is an important resource for an ethnographer – though its validity 
should certainly not be accepted at face value, any more than should 
that of information from other sources. (2007, 97-98) 
As previously revealed in my account of negotiating access, I had hoped to gain greater 
access to NPTs through field observations of everyday NP work but ended up with 
limited access to only public meetings. Without this fuller access to observe the 
realities of how all types of NPT work is done, the interview became the most practical 
method to reveal the actual experiences of police in relation to, for instance, foot 
patrol. Of course, interviews generate a very different form of data with its own unique 
value to other methods, but in a multi-method study there is a case, putting aside 
obstacles and practicalities, for the same phenomena to be investigated using different 
research tools. In this case, I had to accept the interview as the best tool available for 
exploring explanations of action in specific areas of NPT work. 
3.7.1 Designing and conducting the interview 
The preparation for these meetings with respondents consisted of designing and at 
various points redesigning interview schedules that would elicit in-depth responses. 
                                            
19 Also, see Yearley (1989) for an in-depth discussion and critique of both ‘actionist’ and 
‘accountist’ positions.  
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The advance semi-structuring of the interviews reflected both the exploratory nature 
of the research design as well as my previous knowledge of the topic, but the main 
purpose was to explore the topic in my interviewee’s own words and this was reflected 
in the question wording. Different schedules were tailored for different roles and levels 
in order to better target the specific knowledge and experiences of each respondent, 
but the main themes were broadly the same for each level. Table 6 outlines the 
different roles and groupings and the broad topic areas included in the tailored 
interview schedules20.  
Each topic area contained a small number of main questions for discussion with 
additional follow-up questions attached in case of the need to probe further after 
initial responses (Rubin and Rubin 2012). The topics were chosen to broadly represent 
the themes of the research project, and each main question within was intended as a 
tool to encourage the respondents to openly discuss their views and experiences in the 
general area. In the interviews, I stuck to the wording of the main questions but follow-
up questions could be omitted or altered where necessary during the conversation. I 
listened carefully to responses in order to probe more deeply into responses that I 
judged needed elaboration or clarification. I asked questions both about abstract views 
and tangible experiences to the ‘operational officers’ grouping as a matter of course 
and in some cases to the ‘management and operational’ grouping. The intention was 
to elicit stories from respondents that might reveal a cultural perspective of NP 
delivery, a ‘sensibility through which action might arise’ (Shearing and Ericson 1991, 
481).  
Role/Grouping Topic Areas 
Operational officers (PCs and 
PCSOs) 
Managerial and operational 
(Sergeants and Inspectors) 
Chief Superintendent 
1. Value and values of NP 
2. Changes to NP delivery 
3. Community Engagement 
Assistant Chief Constable  
 No conversation topics, just a set number of 
questions for email response 
PCC 
1. WMP’s approach to NP 
2. Funding and Organisational Reform 
3. Community Engagement 
4. Role and Value of PCSOs 
College of Policing Local Policing 
Lead 
1. NP reform in austerity 
2. Role and Value of PCSOs 
3. Community Engagement 
                                            
20 See appendix 4 for full interview schedules, including all topic areas, main questions, follow-
up questions, and prompts. 
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Table 6 Interview Schedule Types 
The face-to-face interviews with police were mostly arranged to take place in private 
rooms (those with a door that could be closed) in police stations and offices or 
workplaces of individual respondents. The only interview that was conducted in a space 
without extensive privacy was with the College of Policing representative, as we met 
in an open-plan meeting space in one of the College of Policing’s buildings. These were 
good locations for interviews as the spaces were most often very quiet, relatively 
private (though there were a couple of interruptions), and were very convenient for 
most respondents, especially when I was in the respondent’s station. One issue with 
interviewing police in their stations while they are on duty is that there is always the 
chance they might run out on an urgent call for assistance with no further opportunity 
to reconvene and finish the conversation. This happened on just one occasion during 
fieldwork, and in that instance the interview only lasted for 10 minutes. To make 
matters more difficult, the sergeant who pulled the PC respondent out of the room to 
attend the call was my gatekeeper for that location, the local station of the NPT. 
Suddenly, I found myself alone in a police station conference room, my respondent 
and gatekeeper gone for an unspecified amount of time. After a few moments of 
recording the incident in my research diary, I decided there was no point in waiting 
any longer and so ventured further into the station to try and find other PCs or PCSOs 
who might want to be interviewed next. Luckily, I had already met some of the PCSOs 
through fieldwork and I was briefly introduced to other police at the beginning of the 
day. Had this not happened, my presence and requests to talk with other police may 
have been met with confusion and possibly suspicion. 
Qualitative fieldwork involves building rapport with participants and respondents to 
allow them to open up and give greater access to their world and experiences, and as 
interviews are an example of human interaction the same rule is applicable to the 
relationship between interviewer and interviewee (Burgess 1984). As I had not 
previously met the majority of interviewees in other fieldwork activities, most of my 
rapport-building or ice-breaking opportunities came in the opening exchanges before 
or at the beginning of the interview. Before interviews I exchanged greetings and 
pleasantries where suitable, as well as giving an account of my presence and, 
especially if asked, my research topic. This period was also the opportunity to ensure 
the respondent knew about the terms of their participation – such as the anonymisation 
of data where possible and their right to withdraw participation – and the nature of 
the interview – what we would discuss, how long I expected it to last, and that I was 
recording the audio. I used ice-breaker questions to begin the interview, specifically 
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asking all face-to-face respondents something about themselves, their career history, 
and the neighbourhood they worked in, as well as why they joined WMP. I chose to do 
this in the belief that it would ease them into talking about the substantive topic, 
following the logic that it is easier to talk about oneself and one’s job than any other 
topic. This exercise also generated some contextual information about each 
respondent, which is presented in Table 7. Overall, the respondents were very 
talkative in interviews, and most interviews lasted near to an hour with only a very 
small number lasting for less than forty-five minutes, and so rapport and engagement 
did not appear to be a problem. 
3.7.2 Sampling 
The overall strategy was to build a purposive sample of policing actors in WMP who 
were involved in NP at a number of different levels: delivery, management, and 
strategy. Most interviews (18) were conducted with street-level police, as these are 
the actors who deliver NP on a day-to-day basis and therefore have knowledge and 
experience of how NP is delivered and organised by NPTs in WMP. This part of the 
sample included: 
 5 PCs  
 6 PCSOs  
 6 Sergeants  
 1 Inspector  
A smaller number of interviews (4) were carried out with ‘elite’ actors involved in NP 
through their roles in WMP (3) and in the national policing body, the College of Policing 
(1). Elite interviews give insights into high-level policy environments, the rules passed 
down from senior positions in organisations to the street-level.  
The table below lists all respondents by their designated pseudonyms and provides a 
short profile of each. Thirteen of these respondents were chosen by the institution 
after I had advised my official WMP contact of my preference for police of a range of 
different ranks and with involvement in NPTs. I approached most other respondents 
via email to gauge interest in and organise participation, and one respondent (NPT2 
SER) contacted me after discovering information about this project online.  The NPT1 
prefix relates to respondents from one NPT (referred to here as ‘Middleton’) who were 
recruited by their Sergeant after I had contacted him via email. 
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Middleton has a high representation in the sample as it was initially selected as one 
neighbourhood site that could provide comparative interview and observation data 
against other sites with other comparable sample sizes. Unfortunately, the level of 
access required to these other sites for comparisons did not materialise during the 
fieldwork phase, illustrating the effect of fieldwork constraints on the final sample. 
Middleton and Heathville are notable sites as I conducted observations of some 
interviewee respondents at public meetings, meaning that the interview conversations 
sometimes contained discussions about what I had observed in the field. 
The profile table shows that the majority of respondents were male (16) and the 
minority female (6), with a 50% female representation in the PCSO sample and only 
16% of PCs, meaning a very slight female overrepresentation in the former and male 
overrepresentation in the latter when compared to the England and Wales police 
workforce – 45% and 30% respectively. However, the sample is not intended to be 
statistically representative given the small numbers overall, but it is useful to note 
issues of representation in light of research findings on gendered policing cultures and 
‘soft’ policing (McCarthy 2013; Martin 1999). The respondents had a variety of career 
backgrounds, as shown, and also a variety of other employment and personal 
backgrounds, which are not presented in order to ensure anonymity. Some of these 
backgrounds were in retail or other service sectors, and the respondents had joined 
WMP in order to gain more job satisfaction. A small number of the respondents told 
me that they joined WMP for job security, including some PCSOs. 
Respondent  Area Gender Occupational Experience 
CSO1 City, inner-city 
neighbourhood 
F Over 1 year as CSO, previous 
administration roles in WMP 
CSO2 City, central 
neighbourhood 
F 7 years, only CSO. Ex-retail worker.  
CSO3 City, inner-city 
neighbourhood 
M 9 years. 1 and a half as PC, then CSO  
PC1 City, central 
neighbourhood 
F 11 years, neighbourhood and response 
PC2 City, inner-city 
neighbourhood 
M 13 years, most in neighbourhoods, 
also response, CID 
PC3 City, inner-city 
neighbourhood 
M 6 years officer, last 2 years in 
neighbourhoods, 4 on response 
PC4 City, inner-city 
neighbourhood 
M Long service (at least 18 years at time 





SER1 City, inner-city 
neighbourhood 
M 24 years, previously CID 
SER2 City, central 
neighbourhood 
M 10 years, Response, neighbourhood, 
custody, priority teams (CAPT) 
SER3 City, 4 neighbourhoods M 13 years. Currently neighbourhood 
coordinator 
SER4 City, inner-city 
neighbourhood 
M 13 years, response, ‘proactive team’, 
CID 
INSP1 City, oversees 4 NPTs M 20 years’ service, previous experience 
in response and investigations 




M 15 years, 4 years as Special before, 




M 10 years. Previously CSO for 18 
months 




M 8 years as CSO 




F 8 years as CSO 




M 7 years as CSO 
NPT2 SER Town, inner-city 
neighbourhood 
(Heathville) 
M Over 20 years’ experience, response, 
intelligence, firearms, drugs teams. 
Over 5 years as NPT Sergeant 
ChSUP West Midlands and 
central LPU in City 
F 21 years’ service, investigations, 
firearms, public order. Former staff 
officer to Chief Constable. 
ACC West Midlands F  
PCC West Midlands M N/A 
CoP LPL National M Officer since 1980s 
Table 7 Respondent Characteristics 
The elite respondents were chosen purposively according to their role. Proposals for 
an interview were sent via email to an administrator or personal assistant in the offices 
of the ACC and PCC. I contacted the PCC’s office without any prior notice, but the 
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recruitment of Chief Superintendent, ACC and CoP representative involved some 
groundwork by other people in my network. Indeed, speaking with the CoP 
representative was not part of the initial sampling plan, but was rather the result of 
other contacts recommending that I speak with him. Harvey (2011, 433) recommends 
researchers to be very transparent with elite respondents, giving as much information 
as possible before commencing interviews. Although I tried to follow this rule for all 
my respondents regardless of their status, there were some differences with elite 
participants. Firstly, I made sure they understood that WMP would be named in the 
thesis, and this meant that because of their unique roles in the institution they would 
not be able to be effectively anonymised. Secondly, due to the absence of anonymity, 
I offered to send transcripts to elite participants for review in the event that they 
wanted to minimise the risk of occupational or political harm. 
3.7.3 Coding and Analysis 
The main objective of analysis of the interviews was to understand how NP is delivered 
by NPTs through a meso-level analysis of NPTs as a ‘local arena where interaction is 
performed and institutions are inhabited’ (Fine 2012, 1). As previously discussed, this 
involved treating the interview data as both descriptions of real action and rhetorical 
accounts of action. Additionally, it involved exploring the data for signs of the effects 
of the wider environment on the dynamics of the NPT’s organisation and aspects of the 
idioculture and how this regulates the behaviour of the members of the NPT (Fine 
2012, 51). I wanted to understand the police alignment with CP or ‘soft’ policing values 
within the NPT, exploring rhetoric to see if soft policing was a defining value of NPT 
idioculture, and consider how specific rhetoric might be instrumental in resisting or 
coming to terms with change. Additionally, the data were investigated for perceptions 
and experiences of real change in the modes of delivering NP, such as the shift from 
neighbourhood security to crime management (Punch 2012). 
Analysis is a constant and iterative process that takes place throughout fieldwork and 
beyond (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Layder 1998; Glaser and Strauss 1967), and 
this section will describe the process in an orderly fashion while at the same time 
attempting to include some of the messy realities. My overall strategy for coding and 
analysis was based on both a priori knowledge of NP research as well as a preference 
for inductive exploration of new data, what Layder (1998) terms as an adaptive theory 
approach. In practice, this meant that I had some knowledge of what analytic 
categories would be created to record specific descriptions of phenomena in the data, 
whilst also allowing new categories to ‘emerge’ from the data – that is, allowing what 
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the respondents said to inform the coding process and direct me to unplanned 
theoretical explanations. This back and forth process lasted well into drafting the 
analysis chapters, illustrating the lengthy process of clarifying and finalising the 
questions and findings of a research project. 
My coding plan was a six-step process. First, after interviews had taken place, all 
interview audio was transcribed verbatim and the resultant Word documents were 
exported to the computer-assisted qualitative data analysis programme, NVivo. Before 
commencing any coding procedures with NVivo, I chose four transcripts from across 
roles and ranks to read through in order to identify some preliminary themes and note 
down some initial ideas and questions as annotations and memos. Most of the 
categories I identified first were aligned to some degree with the research questions, 
the interview schedule topics, and the literature on change in CP and NP. During this 
stage, I started to categorize how participants understood the values, objectives, and 
processes of NPTs, as well as the effects of the wider social and political environment. 
Other categories emerged from the data where issues directly and indirectly linked to 
the research questions were raised by respondents. For example, I created categories 
for welfare and job satisfaction, as well as identifying different emotions expressed by 
respondents. Overall, this is what Layder (1998, 53) describes as ‘provisional coding’ – 
coding parts of a transcript that trigger ‘some association with a particular concept, 
category or idea.’ 
I then entered my provisional codes into NVivo as ‘parent nodes’ and started to apply 
my provisional coding framework on three other transcripts. During this stage, I started 
the dual process of both adding more ‘parent’ and ‘child nodes’ to represent new ideas 
that emerged from reading more transcripts and refining existing nodes by making sure 
that the way I had categorised data could be applied consistently across similar 
excerpts. After this trial run of coding, I reviewed all the nodes I had created to see if 
they fit into the thesis narrative as it was emerging. The next stage was to return to 
NVivo and fully code every transcript with the remaining nodes – what Layder would 
call the ‘core codes’ (1998, 56). Although I envisioned the previous step as the last one 
in the process, the reality was quite different as planning and writing analysis chapters 
is itself a creative process that brings up further questions and interpretations of data. 
In my case, I revisited the coding process at step four to re-code some of the material 
into new analytic concepts, illustrating the iterative process of qualitative research 





1. Detailed reading of small sample of transcripts.  
2. Identify themes in relation to my prior knowledge and think about other issues raised in 
the data. Create list of categories broadly relevant to research topic. 
3. Trial run of coding on small number of other transcripts. Do the themes fit? Add more 
parent/child nodes where new ideas arise. 
4. Take stock of parent/child nodes. Do they relate well to research questions and 
emerging narrative of thesis? Change or remove nodes that do not fit. 
5. Full coding.  
6. Plan analysis with current codes. Go back to stage 4 where necessary. 
Table 8 Coding Plan 
3.8 Observing the Team 
The second qualitative research tool I used was observations of Police and Communities 
Together (PACT) meetings; formal, public events involving NPT operatives, community 
members, and on occasion representatives from other local partner agencies. The aim 
of these observations was to explore the delivery of community engagement in the 
context of organisational reform, austerity politics, and the accounts and rhetoric of 
interview respondents. This involved understanding the way CE was used to deliver NP 
mechanisms, such as problem-solving and reassurance, and how the interaction 
between police and community members affected these processes and the conduct of 
NPT work. 
Observations are sometimes characterised as being either ‘non-participant’ or 
‘participant’ in methods textbooks (e.g. Bryman 2004), systematic (Reiss Jr. 1971) or 
unstructured, or as a spectrum of approaches between ‘complete observation’ to 
‘complete participation’ (Gold 1958). To simplify the effective differences between 
these dichotomies, a non-participant, systematic, complete observation suggests a 
field researcher with detached presence in the field, having little effect on the natural 
setting and participant interactions within. In contrast, the unstructured, participant 
observation favours the integration of a researcher into the social world of the 
participant, investigating this world through natural interactions over an extended 
period of time. I will not label my approach to field observation in any such specific 
way, but in accordance with my mixed-method approach and combination of deductive 
and inductive analysis my observations included elements of a number of these broader 
techniques. Indeed, my approach was both in part systematic and unstructured, largely 
non-participant and naturalistic yet with definite moments of participation (or 
interaction) in the social world of the participants. The observation strategy was based 
on decisions relating to the collection and analysis of appropriate data as well as 
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situational choices relating to the field and the data generating opportunities that it 
represented, and this will be further elaborated in the following discussions. 
3.8.1 Research Sites 
The field observations were conducted in three research sites between November 2015 
and April 2016. All sites were urban neighbourhoods within the setting of the WMP 
area. These sites are referred to by the aliases of Kingston, Middleton, Heathville, and 
they are profiled in Table 9. The sampling of these sites was opportunistic, in part due 
to the setbacks I faced in accessing other areas of NPT work. I first looked at the WMP 
website’s local policing webpages21 to identify which neighbourhoods had a relatively 
high number of PACT meetings taking place. Middleton was chosen due to a high 
number of PACT meetings scheduled for the first three months of my fieldwork stage 
advertised on the WMP website. I emailed the Inspector and Sergeant of the Middleton 
NPT to notify them of my research and my attendance at the meetings, and also to 
arrange further access to the NPT for interviews with willing respondents. 
Site Description 
Kingston Inner-city suburban neighbourhood in large city, mixture of residential and 
commercial. Multi-ethnic and deprived area with high crime rate. Contains 
Princetown microbeat – most PACT meetings took place here – with high 
crime rate, high deprivation and large black African-Caribbean population. 
High violence and anti-social behaviour. 
Princetown PACTs held in Islamic community centre and church, led by PC 
and attended by PCSO and, on one occasion, one other PC. Very large 
attendance at Islamic community centre. 
Middleton Inner-city suburban neighbourhood in large city. Mainly residential, but some 
industrial and commercial estates. Multi-ethnic and deprived area with 
moderate crime rate. Biggest problems at the time of fieldwork were anti-
social behaviour and violence. 
Three locations used for PACT – community centre, sheltered housing estate, 
and council building. PACTs run by PCSOs. Attendance was very low for nearly 
all meetings. 
Heathville Largely residential suburban neighbourhood of a large town. High white 
British population, high deprivation, high crime rate and historically 
significant problems with burglary. Biggest problems at the time of fieldwork 
were anti-social behaviour, violence, criminal damage, and vehicle crime. 
PACT meeting held at community centre and led by Sergeant. Small group of 
older residents regularly attend and had built up familiar relationship with 
Sergeant. 
                                            
21 These web pages no longer exist in the form they did during fieldwork, as the information 
they provided have been subsumed by the national police.uk website. A new website – ‘West 
Midlands Now’, https://www.wmnow.co.uk/ – has also now emerged, which allows registered 
users to “learn about community groups, events and meetings in your area.” 
Table 9 Fieldwork Sites 
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My intention was to choose a number of sites with a number of meetings advertised 
for comparison, but few NPTs had advertised their meetings through the webpages the 
first time I checked. Heathville was chosen for the next site after discussion with the 
Sergeant of its NPT. He had contacted me many months before I began to attend PACT 
meetings to convey interest in participating in my research, and from him I discovered 
that three meetings were scheduled over a five-month period in Heathville, though 
only one was advertised. At first, PACT meetings in Kingston were not advertised 
either, but towards the end of the year a number of events were shown on the WMP 
website. I emailed the Sergeant of Kingston, who gave me advice about which meetings 
would be useful to attend and put me in contact with the PC running the PACT meetings 
in the Princetown microbeat.  
3.8.2 PACT Meetings and the Process of Observation 
The police running or attending PACT varied by rank, role, and number. In most 
meetings, PCSOs represented the NPT as chairs of the meetings, while other series of 
meetings were run by a PC and a Sergeant22. Overall, I planned to attend twelve PACT 
meetings across three neighbourhoods. In the end, seven PACT meetings formed the 
basis for the analysis, and these took place over five months across the three 
neighbourhoods, each lasting one hour to one hour and thirty minutes. I also went to 
three PACT meetings in Middleton where no residents or police attended, and one in 
Middleton where no residents and one PCSO attended, but only after being alerted to 
my presence by the manager of the residential estate in which the meeting was 
scheduled. One PACT meeting in Heathville was cancelled, but in this case I was given 
advance notice by the Sergeant of the NPT. Additionally, I attended two community 
meetings in the Kingston neighbourhood that were not chaired and in one case not 
attended by police representatives, though these became exercises in attempting to 
build rapport with local police and community actors and finding out more information 
about local issues and police relations, rather than being at the centre of any formal 
analysis. 
At the PACT meetings with residents and police present, attendance varied 
considerably. One attracted over forty community members, with three police and a 
council representative, while at another just one resident managed to attend. The 
venues were meeting rooms or common areas in community centres, churches, local 
                                            
22 I was aware of a meeting in another neighbourhood run by an Inspector, but I did not observe 
any of these. 
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government estate, or residential estates, as well as one school gymnasium. Different 
meetings in different areas attracted residents with very different demographics; men, 
women, younger and older people, and a number of ethnicities were represented. 
Some meetings were more demographically diverse than others, and this was largely 
mediated by the location and type of venue that hosted the meeting. Community 
centres tended to attract their own users and volunteers, and PACTs in housing estates 
tended to attract their own residents and employees. The rooms tended to be arranged 
in one of two ways: residents sat on rows of chairs facing the chairperson or a panel of 
agency representatives, or; all participants sat facing each other in a circle of chairs, 
sometimes around a table and sometimes with space in between. 
Before attending meetings I attempted to contact NPT managers to make them aware 
that I would be attending meetings in their neighbourhood and get advice on which 
meetings would go ahead. Making contact was useful because some meetings that were 
advertised did not take place and some that were advertised online were tasking 
meetings that were not actually open to the public. I also wanted to ensure that the 
police running the meetings expected my presence and were informed of my purpose. 
Some knew that I would be attending and others did not, but even those who did were 
not always aware of my research purposes. Informing residents of my attendance in 
advance was impossible because I did not know who would decide to come, but still I 
wanted as many people to be aware of my purposes as possible. In most cases this 
meant arriving early and conversing with residents before the meeting started. This 
was useful as I was able to speak more widely about the area and its issues, and if I 
spoke with the right person they would introduce me to other residents. However, 
most of the time I could not make everybody aware through this method. It was more 
effective to have the chairperson introduce me close to the start of the meeting, which 
was possible on some occasions but not practical on others. 
At the meetings, I made sure to choose a place to sit amongst the residents where I 
would observe and write field notes simultaneously. I decided against sitting or 
standing separately in order to reduce my visibility or be more of a distraction. I 
reasoned that given the social situation, one in which many people were strangers and 
the interaction was formally structured to some extent, my presence would probably 
not have an excessive effect on others. At the same time I tried to choose a position 
where I could observe as many faces of both residents and police as possible. This 
approach could be characterised as Gold’s (1958) ‘observer-participant’ or Spradley’s 
(1980) ‘passive participant’, as I did not purposefully interact with participants during 
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the official proceedings of any meeting and neither was it ethical nor appropriate to 
act as a local resident, concerned about issues in the area. At the same time, I was 
present and visible, and I did interact with both police and residents before (as 
mentioned in the last paragraph) and after the meetings, asking participants about 
their experiences of the meetings and relationships with other actors. For example, I 
spoke with residents about what they hoped could be achieved by coming to the 
meetings and having this type of contact with police. Speaking to residents did in some 
cases build rapport – especially where the issues being raised at the meetings were 
viewed as serious and urgent – and I was asked by some community members to return 
to future scheduled meetings. 
I made field notes of meetings during the observation in long-hand format, which was 
labour-intensive and challenging given the concentration involved in the combination 
of watching, listening, writing, and thinking. Nevertheless, long-hand notes worked as 
an effective memory aide when writing up after meetings and helped to construct a 
more accurate portrayal of what was said and done at these events, such as the specific 
wording of verbal exchanges and facial and bodily reactions during exchanges. In the 
field notes, I recorded these verbal exchanges and body language as well as 
information about the physical features of the meeting space, information about the 
venue, the feel or atmosphere of the meeting, the observable emotions, the types of 
issues raised, information that was observable or revealed by the central characters, 
the conventions of the meeting (as set by police or chairperson), and interactions I had 
with participants before and after the meeting. These interactions outside of the 
meeting were recorded opportunistically – usually when I was sitting alone waiting for 
meetings to start, or afterwards while sitting in my car or on the train. The field notes 
were written up in full at the next available opportunity in order to keep memories of 
the events as fresh as possible. 
Observing meetings at multiple sites and each meeting more than once involved extra 
spatial and temporal dimensions that exposed some similarities and differences 
between specific PACT events as well as the approaches of different NPTs and police 
to community engagement. Observing the same residents and police over a number of 
meetings revealed a sense of how interactions at PACT developed over time and how 
these interactions affected the process of defining neighbourhood problems and 
deriving plans for action. 
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3.8.3 Analysing Interactions at PACT 
To analyse the observation data, I use Goffman’s (1982) concept of the interaction 
order as an analytical apparatus for exploring the police-community interactions at 
PACT. Viewing PACT meetings through an interactionist lens shows how the situational 
realities and constraints of the community engagement field shape the delivery of NP. 
As different groups were observed across a number of meetings at different times, the 
spatial and temporal context is relevant and thus the analysis of each group is 
presented separately to emphasise the particularities of each group. Time is also 
relevant to the analysis of the interaction order as continued co-presence of police 
and community members has the potential to progress relationships within each group. 
See chapter 6 for the associated concepts that were used to understand the meanings 
and wider implications of these interactions.  
3.9 Ethical Processes and Reflections 
Ethics in social research relates to broad considerations about the risks and harms 
posed to researchers, participants and other parties of interest by the research process 
and actions of the researcher. Formally, these considerations can be the list of issues 
raised during the institutional ethical approval process and the fieldwork procedures 
implemented to comply with the agreement between the researcher and institution. 
Guillemin and Gillam (2004) call this ‘procedural ethics’, and distinguish it from what 
they term as ‘ethics in practice’. This latter category they describe as the “everyday 
ethical issues that arise in the doing of research” (Guillemin and Gillam 2004, 263). 
This latter concept not only includes the dilemmas experienced and unplanned courses 
of action taken by a researcher in the field, but also any decision made that could 
constitute an ‘ethically important moment’ that could have unforeseen ethical 
ramifications. This section will address both the procedural ethics of this study, 
themselves influenced by the broad principles of codified ethics in criminological 
research, while considering some issues of potential importance that arose in the field.  
Elementary ethical procedures were followed in the categories of informed consent 
and reducing risks to the participants as well as myself23. For participants in this study, 
the two are closely linked as the main risks to participants is potential harm to 
reputation or interests. To gain informed consent, gatekeepers were asked to supply 
                                            
23 Some of the risks as a researcher performing observation fieldwork were presented in section 
3.3. Rudimentary procedures were followed to reduce these risks, such as informing family of 
my whereabouts and journey times as well as carrying a mobile phone. 
93 
 
every interview respondent with a research information sheet and consent form (see 
Appendix 2) in advance. I brought extra copies of these documents to interview 
appointments, and this was useful as some respondents had not received them. In 
every case I verbally confirmed that each respondent had read the information sheet 
and was aware that participation was voluntary and responses were, in most cases, 
confidential. As previously discussed in section 3.7, I confirmed with elite participants 
that WMP would be named in the study and therefore they could not be fully 
anonymised. Naming the institution, then, also constituted a decision with ethical 
implications. I chose to name the setting due to the very specific reform packages that 
describe new approaches to NP and framed discussions in the interviews. Fortunately, 
none of the elite participants objected to being identifiable. 
While conducting field observations, I encountered some difficulties in achieving the 
ethical standard of explicit and informed consent, sometimes leading to what Watts 
(2011) terms an ‘ethical compromise’ in observational fieldwork. My plan involved two 
stages. First, I emailed the relevant NPT managers to inform them of my research 
objectives and intended presence at specific meetings. As I could not always rely on 
an email to the NPT to receive a quick response, and because information was not 
always passed on to police running the meetings, the second stage of the plan consisted 
of arriving early at the venues for PACT and letting police and residents know who I 
was and why I was there. In ideal situations, I persuaded police or other chairs of the 
meeting to introduce me, or allow me to introduce myself, to the entire group at an 
early stage of the event. However, this was not always possible to arrange and 
opportunities for introducing myself to all attendees were sometimes limited. Where I 
was not introduced, I did not want to have an especially formal presence or impose 
myself too vigorously in order to keep the event as naturalistic as possible.  
In reality, when my identity was made known my presence was usually greeted with 
indifference, perhaps due to PACT being open to the public and often attended by a 
range of neighbourhood actors with various roles and interests. This might not always 
be the case in such meetings. In Heathville, the sergeant recalled PACT meetings some 
years ago where people he described as local criminals would turn up to meetings in 
order to identify members of the community who were potentially ‘grasses’, which 
could have led to intimidation of attendees. It was therefore important for me to not 
identify any residents by their real names or descriptions in my field notes to reduce 
risks of harm to participants, instead using pseudonyms in the eventuality that my field 
notes were lost or stolen. The sight of me writing in a notebook during meetings also 
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led some people to question whether I was a journalist after some meetings, and this 
was the most hostile questioning I received during fieldwork.  
Other perceptions of my presence were more positive but equally ethically troubling. 
In one location I was vigorously welcomed by some community members and asked to 
keep coming back to witness what some residents perceived as police indifference to 
community problems. Some police respondents also revealed preconceptions of my 
role that I had not knowingly encouraged, such as a sergeant who said that WMP worked 
with “people like [me]” to install more scientific approaches to delivering crime 
prevention activities. These episodes raise questions of the participants’ expectations, 
researcher positionality, and advocacy (or even bias) in research, relating to ethical 
issues about the function of social research and the relationship between researcher 
and participating individuals and groups. Of course, it is difficult to spend time with 
people, hearing their grievances, trying your best to understand their actions and world 
without trying to help forward their interests in some way. However, there are ethical 
problems associated with partisanship at the expense of presenting ‘value-neutral’ 
findings in relation to research questions (Hammersley 2000), such as a deleterious 
effect on academic rigour or even alienating groups with other interests (Fine 1993, 
270-272). In my view, my research should aim for both value neutrality in its conduct 
and value relevance in its implications. That is, I can hope that by studying the broad 
topic my research could someday become work, or influence other work, that 
contributes some general social progression or lessening of harm, without ‘taking sides’ 
in the process. 
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined, justified, and contextualised the mixed methods research 
design that this study employs. The mixed methods design consists of three separate 
methods to provide breadth and depth in the investigation of reform processes in a 
large and complex institution. The methods were sequenced so that the initial 
quantitative phase, with its broad view of structural changes to NPTs in England and 
Wales, could inform the sampling, and contextualise the results, of the qualitative 
stage, which consisted of a deeper case study approach in the West Midlands. The 
research design follows a number of rationales identified in Bryman’s (2006) scheme 
of MMR’s logics of triangulation – completeness, process, sampling, and enhancement 
– in order to make each phase complementary to the other and to highlight the 
interrelation between internal and external institutional contexts and the complex and 
dynamic reform processes within one police force. Finally, the NPT as a local group 
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(Fine 2012) serves as the primary unit of analysis in the study through which the 
complex processes of cultural mediation can be explored. Analysing NPTs as a group 
provides an opportunity to witness and understand the linkages between macro-
structures and micro-interactions. This is crucial for a deep and nuanced understanding 
of how police institutions react to the socio-economic environment. 
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4 Changing the Beat? The Extent and Distribution of Change in 
the Neighbourhood Policing Workforce 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explore the structural context of NP in the austerity era. Through a 
descriptive analysis of police workforce data, it will show how NP is changing 
structurally throughout England and Wales and argue that the socio-economic context 
of policing can trigger institutional reform processes and challenge prevailing ideas of 
policing delivery. These structural changes are of interest because of both the political 
environments they reflect and the implications they have for service delivery. The 
localised arrangement of state policing bodies in England and Wales means that these 
types of changes can be distributed unevenly, though variation within this distribution 
is by no means inevitable. 
Describing the recent changes to police workforces – encompassing the national whilst 
interrogating the local – lays the foundations for a deeper investigation of the reform 
processes within the police institution. The ability to categorise changes on a national 
scale allows the creation of a tentative typology that signals the relative implications 
of change across different localities. It also provides directions for subsequent phases 
of research undertaken as part of this project by revealing particular quantitative 
changes in potential research sites. 
To understand the implications of NPT staffing structures and levels for service 
delivery, the outcomes, processes and the corresponding activities encompassed in the 
roles of NPT practitioners will be explored. The staffing levels of Police Community 
Support Officers is chosen as a signifier of potential reform of the NP programme’s 
structure and the delivery of NP. The next section offers an appreciative account of 
the PCSO role to illustrate why they are the key delivery agents of NP. 
4.1.1 Appreciating the Value of Police Community Support Officers’ to Neighbourhood 
Policing  
PCSOs are inextricably intertwined with NP; most PCSOs in England and Wales are 
situated within NPTs and these teams provide an appropriate structure for the kinds 
of activities that these unwarranted officers are expected to undertake. The role was 
introduced in 2002, preceding the initial reassurance policing trials by one year and 
the Neighbourhood Policing trials by four. The national roll out of the NP programme 
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came two years after the NP trials and with it the ring-fenced Neighbourhood Policing 
Fund. (NPF) This fund was to be used to employ a larger number of PCSOs to staff 
NPTs. The NP programme was founded with the intention of utilising this role as a 
ubiquitous deliverer of NP, and therefore the programme relies not only on the 
continuation of the role but with an adequate number working within NPTs, ensuring 
the delivery of the programmatic processes and outcomes to a greater extent than was 
possible before 2008. 
O’Neill (2014) describes PCSOs as a ‘vital component’ of NP who have ‘a great capacity 
for engagement work’ (267) due to the time they can spend developing relationships 
and building social capital. O’Neill thus views NP as providing a natural home for the 
activities of PCSOs, as the programme was designed to deliver this standard of service 
across England and Wales. There is a mutual co-dependence between PCSOs and NP;24 
the programme needs operational staff who are not likely to be abstracted from their 
designated ‘neighbourhood’, whilst the existence of the programme provides an 
appropriate structure for the role and activities of PCSOs and a justification for the 
continuation of their employment. The size of the PCSO workforce is dependent on the 
continuation of the programme or a similar approach and vice versa. This is less true 
for other officers for two main reasons. The first is the proscribed activities of each 
role; PCs and other warranted officers are more likely to be pulled away from 
community-focused or visible tasks to focus on incident response and paperwork. This 
is due to the second interrelated reason of the legal definition of each role; PCSOs as 
unwarranted yet operational police staff are less suited to the uncertainties of incident 
response (such as an escalation from non-crime incidents to crime incidents) or other 
duties that require more coercive powers. 
The introduction of PCSOs in 2002 can be understood as a form of workforce 
modernisation, with roots in debates over what constitutes ‘core’ police functions. 
Like Teaching Assistants to Teachers and Healthcare Assistants to Nurses, PCSOs are a 
cheaper alternative to police officers when performing tasks that do not require the 
same level of training or warranted status, such as those activities envisaged as the 
bulk of NP work. Schedule 4 of the Police Reform Act 2002 supplies them with a number 
of powers for use in response to anti-social behaviour25 or low-level criminality, such 
as the power to seize alcoholic beverages and illegal narcotics or to issue fixed penalty 
                                            
24 Or rather, there is a co-dependence between PCSOs and any recent manifestation of 
community policing in England and Wales, such as RP. 
25 See Harradine et al (2004) for a working definition and typology 
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notices, but they do not have the power of arrest. The latter is significant as PCSOs 
should not be used to respond to incidents where there is a likelihood of 
confrontations, arrests or risk of harms to anyone present (Kirby 2007, 6-7), and 
therefore they should have more time to spend on visible foot patrols and engaging 
with individuals, organisations or community groups in their NP area. An early Home 
Office evaluation found that PCSOs are best utilised when their role is clearly defined 
to enable this division of labour between them and warranted officers (Cooper et al. 
2006, 73; also see NPIA 2008 and; Cosgrove and Ramshaw 2013). 
Cooper et al. (2006) also concluded that PCSOs were generally more visible and familiar 
than police officers, more engaged with communities than police officers, good at 
dealing anti-social behaviour, good at engaging with young people and more likely to 
be provided with information by the public due to their perceived accessibility and 
approachability. Clayman and Skinns (2012, 9) also found some evidence that young 
people felt less reluctant to confide in PCSOs compared to police officers due to the 
former being perceived as less authoritative than the latter, due to the ‘power 
differential’ between the roles and the relative familiarity of PCSOs. Similarly, Innes 
(2014, 134) suggested that the more varied demographics of PCSOs compared to PCs, 
such as age, could explain in some cases a tendency for PCSOs to ‘possess the right 
kinds of soft skills and personality traits’, which in turn lead to more positive 
interactions with younger people. These symbolic and practical differences can be 
utilised to build better relationships and increase access to community information, 
and this shows how the role is suited to the mechanisms of NP that rely more on soft 
power, rather than hard. 
The utilisation and staffing levels of PCSOs represent one element of the NP 
programme. The role came into existence prior to the respective policing reforms of 
RP and NP and has provided a relatively affordable way of carrying out the required 
tasks of each. PCSO workforce change is therefore a signifier of broader programmatic 
reform and by extension a potential signifier of changes in policing philosophy. 
4.1.2 Closed Purses and Flattened Fences: the Comprehensive Spending Review and 
the Neighbourhood Policing Fund  
The NP programme ensured a standardisation of a resource-intensive way26 of 
organising local policing across England and Wales, and therefore one role of central 
                                            
26 Boyd et al. (2011, 30) show that ‘community policing’ is the largest ‘component of local 
policing’ in England and Wales in terms of officer and staff allocation. 
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government in delivering the NP programme was to establish the Neighbourhood 
Policing Fund (NPF); ring-fenced funding that was to be distributed to police forces on 
appropriate implementation of plans for NP, including the employment of PCSOs for 
use in NPTs. This was initially expected to increase the operational civilian workforce 
(PCSOs and Neighbourhood Wardens) to 25,000. This financial incentive showcased the 
Labour government’s strategy to roll out a standardised programme of NP through 
financial power, and by extension the support for the integration of the PCSO role with 
NP. 
The NPF was thus a central element of the NP programme as an incentive to ensure 
greater harmony in the provision of NP delivery. This ring-fenced funding was 
discontinued in April 2013 (April 2011 for the Metropolitan Police) and consolidated 
into the Police Main Grant, with discretion over the allocation of funding for NP 
resourcing being handed to incumbent PCCs. This highlights the move away from 
centrally influenced funding decisions over NP and the heightened potential for 
divergent approaches to NP resource allocation across police force areas. 
Before these changes came into effect, the Coalition government’s 2010 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) announced an intended real terms cut of 20% 
(£1.9Bn) to the central government contribution to police by 2014-2015. The yearly 
reductions in the contribution placed immediate pressure on police forces to find 
savings, some of which would inevitably come from reductions to police officers and 
civilian staff employment costs. Funding for police forces is complex due to a range of 
grants coming from different central government departments and local authorities, 
and locally this complexity is exacerbated by the needs-based distribution of central 
funds through the Police Funding Formula and the differences in local tax revenues 
through the police precept (Brain 2011). Police operational staff such as PCSOs can 
also be funded by external organisations or by match-funding, where police and 
external organisations both contribute a percentage of yearly staffing costs. 
Nevertheless, cuts to the central government contribution fall significantly on all 
police forces, if somewhat unevenly, affecting the capacity of forces to maintain the 
staff resources for NPTs. Brain (2011, 8-9) calculates that local policing was 
disproportionately affected by changes to police grants, losing £1.36Bn between 2010-
11 and 2014-15. 
These changes to the police funding regime are points of temporal significance when 
analysing the changes to the NP workforce. First, the NPF was announced in 2004 
(Home Office 2004) and came into effect in the same year. By 2010 all police forces 
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had to find ways of reducing costs in order to keep up with yearly reductions to the 
central government contribution. In 2013 the NPF is consolidated into the Police Main 
Grant, ending the ring-fenced funding for PCSO staffing costs as well as the incentive 
to maintain nationally a harmonious approach to the delivery of local policing. These 
developments constitute a potential driver of NP workforce change in England and 
Wales. However, because changes to funding arrangements favour local discretion, the 
trends in workforce change are likely to vary by police force. At the same time, 
different forces face a range of financial fortunes, with resources being 
disproportionately allocated by both the Police Funding Formula and the amount raised 
through council tax, local grants and other contracts. Taken together this suggests that 
workforce trends potentially reflect both deliberate changes due to local discretion 
and involuntary changes due to financial pressure. 
4.1.3 Trends in the number and proportion of Police Community Support Officers since 
2004 
In England and Wales there was an upward trend in the numbers of PCSOs in the police 
workforce until 2010, when the workforce begins to reduce. The two steepest jumps 
in the periods of 2004-2005 and 2006-2007 represent the Reassurance and 
Neighbourhood Policing piloting stages respectively, when police forces had access to 
ring-fenced Home Office funding. This ring-fenced funding had to be used to employ 
PCSOs as part of the Home Office’s National Policing Plan in 2002 and the full roll-out 




Figure 4 Number of Police Community Support Officers, 2004-2015 
The PCSO workforce began to decrease from 2010, coinciding with the change in 
government and the Home Office targets to reduce central funding to police forces by 
20%, but started to level off with a much smaller reduction in the period of 2012-2013. 
This has taken the PCSO workforce in England and Wales below the levels of 2008, the 
first year of NP after the piloting stage (2005-2008). The projections for the years 2014 
and 2015 show only slight fluctuations in each year and an overall reduction across the 
whole period of 2013-2015. However, the projected figures should be used with caution 
as they are subject to changes – i.e. they show intentions rather than certainty. This 
uncertainty is illustrated by Table 10. 
 







PCSOs, England and 
Wales 
14,205 13,553 14,241 14,032 
Table 10 - Number of PCSOs, 2013-2015 
This table shows that regardless of the previous intentions of all 43 police forces – what 
the projected figures portray – situations can and do change, whether because of the 
challenges of retaining or employing staff, or a change in strategic workforce planning. 
The workforce figure for September 2013 suggests that, by 2015, the number of PCSOs 
in England and Wales could fall well below the projected figure of 14,032. The 
September 2013 figure represents the lowest PCSO workforce since before 2008 – the 
102 
 
first year that each and every ward in England and Wales was to have its own NPT – 
falling close to the 2007 workforce level, with just 56 more PCSOs now than in 2007. 
 
Figure 5 Operational Roles as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce 
Between March 2010 and September 2013, the average reduction in PCSOs across all 
forces in England and Wales was 19.9%. This is very close to the 20% reduction in central 
funding, and seems to show that the PCSO workforce is falling in line with funding 
reductions – in other words, this operational, or ‘frontline’, role is not being shielded 
from the effects of fiscal reforms. However, although PCSO numbers are falling, in the 
operational workforce the proportion of PCSOs in England and Wales is relatively stable 
– 9.1% as of September 2013, representing a 0% change since 2010. This is due to 
changes in the other operational roles, with a loss of over 15,384 police officers and a 
gain of 2,563 police specials during the same period. 
Whilst the figures for England and Wales show the general trend, we start to see big 
differences in the PCSO workforce trends by looking to the regional level. Table 11 
shows in league table format the percentage change of the PCSO workforce by region 




Regions27 league table - PCSO workforce change 
2010-2013 2010-Sep 2013 2010-2015 (projected) 
Wales 49.0% Wales 57.2% Wales 61.9% 
East Midlands -1.2% 
East 
Midlands 
-2.2% East Midlands 5.3% 
South West -2.9% South West -5.9% South East -3.4% 




South East -7.9% 
Yorkshire 
and Humber 


















-18.1% North East -9.1% 
East of England 
-
15.4% 






London -49.3% London 
-
54.2% 
Table 11 Regions league table - PCSO workforce change 
Between March 2010 and September 2013, the London PCSO workforce had been 
reduced by 49.3%, almost 30% larger than the average change (-19.9%) for England and 
Wales in the same period. Occupying the opposite end of the table to London, Wales 
shows even more exceptional changes when compared to English regions, with a 57.2% 
increase registered and further growth in the PCSO workforce expected by 2015. These 
changes represent new directions for both London and Wales. 
From 2004 to 2011, London and Wales saw similar trends in the proportion of PCSOs in 
the operational workforce, whilst London year-on-year had a higher proportion of 
                                            
27 ‘Regions’ are based on the geographical boundaries used in the Home Office data. 
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PCSOs in their operational workforce than Wales until 2010. This changed in 2011 with 
London’s first notable decrease in the proportion of PCSOs since the creation of the 
role: PCSOs went from making up 8.3% of the operational workforce in 2010, to 7% in 
2011, and then to 4% by September 2013 (see Figure 6). This means that not only were 
PCSO numbers being considerably reduced in London, they were coming to have 
proportionately less of a presence within the operational workforce, making up less of 
the workforce than they did in 2007. In Wales from 2012, the trend was contrary, with 
PCSOs making up 9.6% of the workforce that year, increasing to 12.9% in September 
2013. 
 
Figure 6 PCSOs as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce, by customised Regions 
The other regions of England have all seen reductions so far to a lesser extent than 
London but with varying degrees of change between them. South West and South East 
regions show changes between March and September 2013 that suggest they are 
currently on course to meet their projected targets. The opposite is the case for all 
other English regions, with the North East figures receding most from its 2015 
projection, showing a larger reduction than the -19.9% average and representing a 
decrease of 162 PCSOs28 between March and September 2013. The only English region 
                                            
28 This figure may be distorted by the re-grading of PCSOs to police staff in the Northumbria 
region. The number of such cases is not provided by the Home Office data. Without further 
information on the numbers re-graded or reasons for it, this investigation will represent the 
effect of the re-grading as a reduction in PCSOs. 
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to increase the number of PCSOs in this semi-annual period was the South East, jumping 
from 1,689 to 1,721 PCSOs. Nevertheless, the proportions for the English regions 
remained largely stable (see ‘Other’ in Figure 6), especially when compared to London 
and Wales.  
In summary, PCSO numbers notably increased at the national level after the 
establishment of both the RP approach and the NP programme. This is consistent with 
the perspective that the PCSO role is suitable for the policing activities and delivery 
mechanisms of each of these developments in local policing arrangements. For the 
steepest increase, the effect of central government policy of the time and the 
consequent availability of ring-fenced funding for the establishment of NPTs and 
recruitment of more PCSOs is clearly visible in the data. The increase in PCSO numbers 
lasted until 2010, the year of the CSR, at which point the year on year increases came 
to an end as the first ever reductions in PCSO workforces were recorded. The PCSO 
workforce declined at a greater pace in the years following both the CSR and the 
expiration of the NPF, giving credence to the interpretation that both austerity 
measures and the removal of targeted funding explain the change in the NP workforce 
across England and Wales. 
The proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce has remained stable in most 
regions, illustrating how workforce change could be described as falling evenly across 
roles. However, there is not a balanced and standardised approach to workforce 
changes across England and Wales as evidenced by the sharp increase in the Welsh 
region and the sharp decrease in the London region. The next section looks deeper into 
the localised difference to further interrogate these regional discrepancies. 
4.1.4 Variation across Police Force Areas 
The data for police force areas provide the most accurate representation of PCSO 
workforce trends. As individual forces have ultimate control over their own staffing 
levels, analysing the trends at this level helps to uncover the contexts behind 
workforce restructuring. It also allows further interrogation of the regional data by 
breaking down each region into its component parts to test for divergent responses 
within these areas.  
The data show that trends in the PCSO workforce between 2004 and 2010 are relatively 
consistent across the police forces in England and Wales. Centralised police reforms 
and access to the Neighbourhood Policing Fund coincided with the biggest increases in 
the PCSO workforce. Since 2010, however, there have been a number of differences in 
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the change in PCSO numbers and proportion across forces. The vast majority have 
reduced their PCSO workforce, and this is reflected in the overall trend for England 
and Wales, but there are three broad, distinctive trends that can be identified. These 
are discussed below. 
4.1.4.1 Proportionate reductions 
The majority of English police forces have experienced reductions in their PCSO 
workforces below the average change in England and Wales (-20%). As the reduction 
to the central police funding is also 20% in real terms and police forces have been 
urged to protect the ‘frontline’, those forces that have experienced a PCSO change 
between -1% and -20% can be considered to have implemented workforce changes 
roughly commensurate with these new financial pressures.  
Table 12 shows that within the forces falling into this bracket there is considerable 
variance in the PCSO reductions experienced. To further illustrate these differences, 
in the West Midlands 155 PCSOs were lost between March 2010 and September 2013, 
whilst Sussex and Suffolk each only lost 6. 
This group can also be said to have experienced proportionate reductions, as the 
proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforces in each of these forces was not 
excessively altered – the changes to this measure registered between +0.8% and -0.8%.  
Forces with smaller reductions (<-20%), 2010-Sep 2013 
West Midlands -19.1% Bedfordshire -11.3% 
Dorset -18.8% Surrey -11.3% 
Cleveland -18.3% Durham -10.3% 
Avon & Somerset -17.6% Humberside -8.6% 





Cheshire -14.9% Derbyshire -4.7% 
Kent -14.1% Lincolnshire -4.5% 
West Mercia -14.1% Suffolk -3.6% 
West Yorkshire -12.7% Hampshire -3.3% 
North Yorkshire -12.2% Thames Valley -3.2% 
Staffordshire -11.8% Sussex -1.6% 
Table 12 Forces with smaller PCSO reductions (<-20%), 2010-Sep 2013 
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Although there is variation between these forces in terms of changes in PCSO numbers, 
the amount of fluctuation in PCSO proportions is less defined. For example, the 
proportion of PCSOs in Cleveland increased by 0.4% even as they lost 35 PCSOs over 
the same period. 
4.1.4.2 Disproportionate Reductions 
Certain forces have reduced their PCSO workforces by more than would be expected, 
using the central funding reductions as a benchmark for proportional decreases to 
operational staff. 
Starting in the capital, both police forces in the London area had large proportional 
decreases to their PCSO workforce between March 2010 and September 2013. City of 
London reduced their PCSOs by -70.5% – the largest percentage decrease in the 
country. The Metropolitan Police force had the largest decrease after City of London 
at -49.1%, or 2280 PCSOs – making it the largest reduction in the number of PCSOs. The 
Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) outlined plans for a new approach to 
local policing in the Metropolitan police force area in its police and crime plan (MOPAC 
2013), in which the boundaries and staffing levels of NPTs were to be changed. This is 
likely to be connected to the fall in PCSO numbers within this area at that time. 
Exceptional approaches in the City of London Police are on the whole not surprising, 
as this is the smallest policing area in England and Wales and has unique 
characteristics. The Metropolitan Police is also an exceptional force by many measures 
– such as the size of its workforce, the population and population density of its policing 
area – but with a higher proportion of its policing area being residential, the PCSO role 
within NP is possibly more suited to this force area than the City of London. These 
differences in priorities are reflected in the amount of PCSOs as a proportion of each 




Figure 7 PCSOs as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce, London Forces 
London forces were not the only ones to see large reductions in their PCSO workforce. 
The other forces that saw reductions larger than 20% are detailed in Table 13. 
Table 13 Forces with the Biggest PCSO Reductions, 2010-2013 
 
* Some of this change due to re-grading of PCSOs 
Northumbria registered the next largest decrease in this period after the London 
forces, though as noted, this figure may obscure the real change due to the re-grading 
Forces with biggest reductions (>-20%), 
2010-September 2013 
Region Mar 2010-Sep 2013 
London London, City of  -70.5% 
London Metropolitan -49.1% 
North East Northumbria* -43.8% 
North West Merseyside -31.3% 
Eastern Essex -28.5% 
North West Cumbria -22.8% 
West Midlands Warwickshire -22.5% 
Eastern Hertfordshire -21.0% 
Eastern Cambridgeshire -21.0% 
East Midlands Northamptonshire -20.6% 
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of PCSOs in this force. Using the period of March 2010 to March 2013, the change in 
Northumbria was less severe, at -10.6%. The other North East forces also saw 
reductions using the September 2013 measure: -18.3% in Cleveland; -10.3% in Durham. 
The proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce has been maintained at a 
relatively steady level in Cleveland and Durham, but Northumbria now has a much 
smaller proportional presence of PCSOs – 5.8% – as compared to the previous three 
years. This is also the second lowest proportion in England and Wales; only City of 
London has a lower level at 1.9%. 
All forces in the North West region have seen reductions in the 2010 to September 2013 
period, but two forces have seen reductions higher than 20%; a -31.3% change in 
Merseyside and -22.8% in Cumbria, meaning a respective loss of 147 and 25 PCSOs for 
each force. Both of these reductions mean that the forces now have fewer PCSOs than 
expected, going by their projected figures for March 2014. Cumbria, however, has 
increased its PCSO workforce since March 2013, suggesting that it could be on track 
for its 2014 and 2015 projections. 
 
Figure 8 PCSOs as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce in North East Forces 
In the Eastern region there are three forces with reductions larger than 20%; a -28.5% 
change in Essex and -21% in both Hertfordshire and Cambridgeshire. Essex Police had 
projected a loss of 83 PCSOs (-18.6%) between 2010 and 2015, but have now registered 
an actual loss of 127.  
110 
 
Hertfordshire and Cambridgeshire have also lost more PCSOs now than projected for 
2015. There is now a smaller proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce in Essex 
(7.9%) and Hertfordshire (8%) than the England and Wales average (9.1%), the English 
average (8.7%) and the Eastern region average (9.2%), and both forces have fewer 
PCSOs than they did before 2007 – the year before NP was fully rolled out. 
Other large decreases are found in Warwickshire and Northamptonshire Police, two 
smaller forces that cover non-metropolitan counties. Warwickshire’s PCSO workforce 
has decreased by 31 PCSOs (-22.5%) since 2010, but the force has projected further 
reductions by 2015 (73). Currently PCSOs make up 9% of the operational workforce, 
but by 2015 this could change to 6%, the third lowest figure for this measure. 
Northamptonshire now has 34 fewer PCSOs (20.6%) than in 2010, and similarly expects 
to further reduce the PCSO workforce to 112 by 2015. This means that PCSOs make up 
7.8% of the operational workforce now, and potentially 6.1% in 2015. 
4.1.4.3 Disproportionate Increases 
There are a number of forces that have maintained or even increased their PCSO 
workforces. Table 14 shows the forces with increases: 
Forces with increases  
2010-Sep 2013 2010-2015 (projected) 
Dyfed-Powys 72.5% Dyfed-Powys 79.4% 
North Wales 70% Gwent 72.0% 
South Wales 50.9% North Wales 66.8% 
Gwent 49.3% South Wales 51.0% 
Devon & Cornwall 16.2% Nottinghamshire 40.1% 
Nottinghamshire 8.9% Wiltshire 8.4% 
Leicestershire 1.3% Derbyshire 0.1% 
Wiltshire 0.5% Lincolnshire 0.1% 
South Yorkshire -0.1% South Yorkshire 0.1% 
Table 14 Forces with Disproportionate Increases in the PCSO Workforce 
It is clear that all Welsh forces have had the largest increases, making the changes to 
the PCSO workforce consistent within this region. The reason behind this is easily 
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explained; the Welsh Labour government has funded 500 PCSO positions to be created 
between 2011 and 2015. In September 2013, Wales had 410 more PCSOs than it did in 
2010, with the highest numerical gain in South Wales (+171) and the highest 
proportional gain in Dyfed-Powys (+72.5%). By 2015, Welsh forces expect to employ 
another 34 PCSOs. 
This rise has contributed to higher proportions of PCSOs in the Welsh operational 
workforce between 2011 and 2013 (see Figures 6 and 7). The proportion in South 
Wales, for example, remained between 8% and 9% between 2007 and 2012, but as of 
September 2013 the figure stands at 14.9% - the largest operational workforce share 
in England and Wales. From 2008 to 2011, South Wales, North Wales and Gwent all had 
PCSO making up around 8% of their workforces, whilst Dyfed Powys had a proportion 
between 5 and 5.6% in the same period. The significant increase in PCSOs since 2011 
means that the Welsh police forces now operate with very different workforce 
compositions.  




Figure 10 PCSOs as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce, Selected Welsh Forces (2) 
 
No other area has experienced the consistent increases across forces as seen in Wales, 
but there are some other notable increases. The South West region includes forces that 
have reduced their PCSO workforces by up to 18.8% (Dorset) since 2010, but Devon and 
Cornwall have added 59 more PCSOs (+16.2%) in the same period. The rise in Devon 
and Cornwall seems unexpected as the actual workforce trend is in opposition to the 
projected change between 2010 and 2015 (-0.8%). However, it appears that the trend 
could change again after a review of the PCSO role in Devon and Cornwall by the PCC 
(western Morning News 2014). Though Wiltshire police have registered a slight increase 
in their PCSO workforce (+0.5%), the workforce trend is moving away from the 2015 




Figure 11 PCSOs as a Proportion of the Operational Workforce, Selected South West Forces 
Nottinghamshire Police has increased its PCSO workforce by 24 (+8.9%) since 2010. The 
Nottinghamshire PCC pledged to employ 100 more PCSOs and to campaign against 
central funding reductions in his Police and Crime Plan, and the Home Office data 
shows a projected increase of 40.1% (+108) by 2015 in the force. If the force is to 
achieve these numbers, there is some way to go – 84 more PCSOs would be needed in 
the next year and a half. Regardless of the potential to fall short of the 2015 
projections, Nottinghamshire has increased the share of PCSOs in its operational 
workforce from 9% in March 2010 to 10.5% in September 2013, currently above the 
England and Wales average (9.1%) and East Midlands regional average (9%). 
4.1.5 Summary of findings 
Overall, there has been a variety of approaches to workforce restructuring in police 
forces since 2010. Although the large majority of police forces have reduced PCSO 
numbers, there are a number of forces that have maintained or increased their PCSO 
workforce strength. The change in PCSO numbers at the police force level ranges from 
-70.5% to +72.5%.  
The London and Welsh police forces have pursued markedly different approaches, 
occupying opposite ends of a spectrum of workforce change. The changes in London 
are exemplified by the Metropolitan Police purposefully reassessing their local policing 
structures and workforces (MOPAC 2013), whilst in Wales all forces have received a 
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Welsh Government grant for employing 500 additional PCSOs. Although there are 
differences between the remaining English forces, these are less severe; whilst PCSOs 
are generally being reduced, their proportions are being largely maintained.  
4.2 Implications for the delivery of Neighbourhood Policing 
The vast majority of police forces have reduced the number of PCSOs in their 
workforces, and this signals that NP has been weakened in England and Wales due to 
the importance of this role to its suitability to performing the tasks that support the 
three delivery mechanisms of NP; visibility, community engagement and problem 
solving. This section develops this idea by outlining a broad typology of workforce 
reform that explores how different approaches to workforce reform engender changes 
to the way policing is delivered.  
Considering the recent history of police reforms is vital to understand the implications 
for policing and workforce change in the current climate. Most importantly, the 
reassurance policing approach was established to address the social distance between 
the police and the public that had arguably widened over the past few decades (Innes 
2004). It was a response to the pitfalls of popular policing approaches in the 1990s – 
“zero tolerance policing” and “intelligence-led policing”. These approaches were 
effective in reducing certain crimes but did not make people feel safe and were 
considered to be punitive and intrusive (Greene 1999). The approaches focused heavily 
on the crime management of ‘crime control’ functions of the police (Innes 2004) – the 
direct prevention and detection of crime by the police. 
By contrast, RP was intended to address public insecurities and assure local people 
that the police were providing the service they wanted. Through this reassurance, it 
was hoped that communities would become stronger and cooperate more with the 
police to help reduce crime.29 In this way, the approach was considered to complement 
the crime control functions of the police with a stronger focus on the “neighbourhood 
security” functions (Innes 2004) – reassurance and community engagement. These 
functions can and do exist alongside the crime management functions, but they are 
often not considered central to the police mission by many police officers (Reiner 2010; 
Skogan 2008). Therefore, teams and staff dedicated to these functions should help 
                                            
29 The connection between strong neighbourhoods the prevention of crime is a feature of many 
influential policing theories – e.g. Wilson and Kelling’s ‘Broken Windows’ (1982) and Sampson 
et al.’s ‘Collective Efficacy’ (1997) 
115 
 
police forces to focus resources on public feelings of safety, readjusting the 
composition of the police role in society. 
Due to the funding reductions made to the police contribution, there have been recent 
calls to change the way policing is delivered in order to make it more efficient (for 
example, Fraser et al 2014; Greenhalgh and Gibbs 2014). As NP is resource-intensive, 
the current approach has been earmarked for significant changes, with a greater focus 
on the direct preventative work of the police (Greenhalgh and Gibbs 2014). These calls 
for reform signal a potential adjustment to police functions, away from neighbourhood 
security and towards crime management. 
Against this historical context, changes to the operational workforce and NPTs can be 
viewed as signals of a reprioritisation of police functions. A large reduction in the 
amount and proportion of PCSOs, whose roles are the embodiment of the NP approach, 
is likely to lead to a restructuring of NPTs in terms of staffing levels or even 
geographical boundaries – e.g. NPTs covering larger areas than before. This then has 
the potential to reduce the focus on the neighbourhood security functions of the given 
police force, and proportionally increases the resource allocation for crime 
management functions. The opposite can be said for forces that increase the amount 
and proportion of their PCSO workforces, where a strengthening of NPT resources 
occurs and neighbourhood security functions are given a higher prioritisation. 
4.2.1 Typology of Reforms 
Three types of approaches to operational workforce reform are now suggested as a 
way of highlighting the different consequences for local policing delivery. Due to the 
variation across the 43 police forces, it is difficult to envision the likely implications 
of these workforce changes for the whole of England and Wales. Nevertheless, there 
are certain assumptions we can make, based on the aforementioned historical contexts 
that indicate that different approaches to workforce restructuring subsequently 
influence policing styles and the prioritisation of policing functions.  
4.2.1.1 Weakened Neighbourhood Policing  
This label describes the situation where police forces have experienced high reductions 
in their PCSO workforce as well as a reduction to the proportion of PCSOs in the 
operational workforce. In the forces that have experienced such changes, there tends 
to be a relatively low proportion of PCSOs and a high proportion of officers. 
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With these changes, there is likely to be a move away from the functions associated 
more strongly with NP – such as visibility, reassurance and community engagement – 
due to fewer PCSOs and potentially fewer dedicated staffing resources for each NPT. 
The potential weakening of NP structures indicates that more focus may be placed on 
crime management functions, such as incident response and investigation. 
The Metropolitan Police Service is a clear example of the kind of changes that can take 
place under these conditions. The force’s new Local Policing Model (LPM) constitutes 
a rearrangement of local policing resources and the establishment of new structures 
in which these resources are deployed. The previous arrangement of local policing 
resources in the MPS was the ‘1:2:3 model’ – meaning one sergeant, two PCs and three 
PCSOs allocated and dedicated to each team and thus ward. Under the LPM, there are 
only two dedicated staff per ward – one Dedicated Ward Officer and one dedicated 
ward PCSO, representing ‘a 77% reduction in ward based neighbourhood policing when 
compared to the 1:2:3 model.’ (D’Orsi 2015, 12) Although overall resources for the 
model have been bolstered thanks to an additional 2579 warranted officers, the teams 
have been endowed with 10 additional primary functions, including ‘crime 
investigation’, ‘responding to non I & S calls’30 and ‘Crime scene/Hospital 
guards/Custody constant watch’ (D’Orsi 2015, 16). In light of fewer dedicated ward 
officers and PCSOs, as well as fewer PCSOs overall, the ability to undertake the tasks 
aligned with neighbourhood security functions to the same extent as under the 
previous model is uncertain. 
4.2.1.2 Proportionally maintained Neighbourhood Policing  
The forces in this category have generally experienced reductions to their PCSO 
workforces, but the proportion of PCSOs remains stable, changing by less than 1% in 
either positive or negative directions. The proportion of PCSOs in these forces tends 
to be mid-range, relative to forces with the highest and lowest proportions. 
The consequences for this category are less clear, as the forces within it registered 
PCSO workforce changes between +1% and -20%. Some forces have the ability to 
maintain staffing levels in NPTs, whereas those at the other end of the scale may have 
to adapt their NPT structures, such as enlarging the boundaries of local policing areas 
and reducing the number of teams, or reducing staffing levels. However, as PCSOs are 
being maintained in proportional terms, there is an implied support for the policing 
                                            
30 An I graded call – ‘immediate response’ – should be responded to within 15 minutes, and an 
S graded call – ‘significant priority’ – should be responded to within 60 minutes. 
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functions associated with the NP approach, and there may not be as much change to 
the prioritisation of policing functions. 
In those areas that have fewer resources for NPTs, both in the ‘weakened’ and 
proportionally maintained’ categories, the experiences of public services as a whole 
will likely change. As local authorities in England also faces an average real terms cut 
of 28% between 2010 and 2014 (NAO 2014, 11), people’s qualitative experiences of 
local services in many areas31 are starting to reflect the reduced capacity of local 
government to deliver aspects of these services. This has led to the deterioration of 
‘neighbourhood environmental quality’ and reduced infrastructure and staff resources 
for children’s services, which affects feelings of security for some residents in these 
neighbourhoods (Hastings et al 2015, 47-63). This is problematic for the police if public 
demand for their services does not reduce or increases due to the reduced capacity of 
local government, at the same time as a reduction in their own capacity to deal with 
a broad range of calls for service. Additionally, the quality and extent of partnership 
work between police and partnering agencies could be jeopardised by funding cuts 
across services, and the onus may be on the police as dominant partners (McCarthy 
and O’Neill 2014) to maintain effective partnership working. 
4.2.1.3 Strengthened Neighbourhood Policing 
This label refers to forces that have increased their PCSO workforce and have 
experienced an increase in the proportion of PCSOs by at least 1% for each measure. 
These forces tend to have a higher proportion of PCSOs and a lower proportion of police 
officers. However, the reductions in police officer numbers are not especially high 
within this group. 
In these forces NPTs remain well staffed, and potentially have a higher proportion of 
dedicated PCSOs within them. Where PCSOs are increased in both proportion and 
number, this signals a strengthening of NP structures and thus a prioritisation of 
neighbourhood policing functions. In cases where the proportion of PCSOs has risen 
extensively and the proportion of police officers has fallen, there is the potential for 
the crime management functions to be given relatively less prominence. 
However, although a greater number of PCSOs may offset the reductions in police 
officer numbers and provide greater visibility and familiarity, they are starting to 
perform functions previously not associated with their role such as investigation (Trudy 
                                            
31 Cuts to local authority spending are unequally distributed, and ‘there is a clear tendency for 
the percentage cuts to be greatest in the most deprived category and least in the most affluent’ 
(Hastings et al 2015, 11). 
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Lowe, quoted in Downey 2015). This group of forces is also not immune from the 
potential pressures associated with reduced funding in across other local services, and 
this could affect the potential to maintain effective service delivery. However, if the 
principles and mechanisms of NP are more suited to multi-agency working, especially 
problem solving (McCarthy and O’Neill 2014) then a continuation of this model should 
be beneficial in this area.  
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the effects of a significant and sudden change to the socio-
economic context of policing in England and Wales. As police forces face cuts to their 
budgets, uneven impacts on budgetary pressures and fewer centrally dictated 
restrictions on the use of these funds, a range of responses are emerging to these new 
funding environments. The changes encompassed in these responses include 
fluctuations in the numbers and proportions of different operational roles, alterations 
to the existing functions and structural constituents of the current NP model, and the 
establishment of new local policing models and organisational change programmes that 
can serve to overhaul NP. The more deliberate approaches to the reform of territorial 
policing models illustrate that the austerity era has triggered processes of ideation, 
and the principles of NP are being challenged and dismantled in some forces. 
In the years under New Labour’s reform programmes, influenced by the ‘new localism’ 
agenda, “[p]ublic sensibilities increasingly govern[ed] the politics of policing” (Fleming 
and McLaughlin 2010, 199), and as a consequence the symbolic functions of policing 
were attended to with the aid of increased public spending and ‘communities’ were 
provided with new channels of engagement with state agencies. The localism agenda 
was still explicit in the Coalition policing policies (Loader 2014). Paradoxically, the 
potential degradation of neighbourhood security functions and increase in social 
distance between public and police would occur alongside recent policing reforms that 
aim to decentralise police governance by scrapping central targets, installing a system 
of directly elected commissioners, and reassigning a degree of force autonomy through 
the flattening of national ring-fenced funding. Communities across England and Wales 
would thus receive differentiated policing services that are shaped by local funding 




4.4 Postscript: the two halves of the austerity era   
This phase of the research took place before the qualitative investigations commenced 
in 2015. This was an important year for police forces because, in the wake of the Paris 
terrorist attacks in November, the government decided to halt the planned police cuts 
and promised to protect real terms spending on policing (Travis 2015b). However, the 
total government funding to PCCs would remain relatively static for the next five years 
and central government would instead commit more funds to counter-terrorism. Where 
police forces could benefit from general funding rises would be through the council tax 
precept, which increased by just over £1Bn across England and Wales between 2015 
and 2019 (Home Office 2019). Funding problems remained, however. Firstly, the 
impact of the new funding settlement would be unevenly distributed as some forces 
are more reliant on central government funding than others (Crawford et al. 2015). 
Secondly, the new settlement was not an attempt to restore the general capacities of 
police forces, and overall all forces experienced a 19% real terms funding cut between 
2010 and 2018 (NAO 2018). Effectively, this meant that workforce reform decisions and 
fluctuations would continue to be affected by overall police disinvestment in the 
austerity era. The following update to this chapter’s analysis will briefly explore the 
workforce trends since 2015 and reveal the continuing impact of police disinvestment 
on the NP workforce. 
Nationally, the PCSO workforce has continued to fall. From a peak of 16,918 in 2010, 
by March 2019 the workforce reduced by 43.6%, representing a fall of 7,371 PCSOs in 
England and Wales (see figure 12). The reduction was higher in 2010-2015 (-27.1%) than 
in the latter period of 2015-2019 (-22.6%). The 2015-2019 reduction appears to be 
higher than might be expected considering the post-2015 funding settlement, 
suggesting that austerity era reform in England and Wales is steadily moving away from 
models that require a higher PCSO resource. In regions, Wales did not maintain the 
2010-2015 growth in the PCSO workforce, rather experiencing a 14.3% fall between 
2015-2019. However, this reduction did not undo the earlier reforms to increase PCSO 
numbers, and Wales enjoyed an overall rise of 17.9% between 2010-2019. The pace of 
PCSO reductions slowed in the London region, but this did not change London being 
the region with the largest reductions overall. Excluding the East of England, which is 
skewed by change from one particular force, the other English regions varied from 
overall changes of -24.7% in Yorkshire and Humber to -41.5% in the North East between 
2010 and 2019, which largely maintains the rough pattern of regional changes from the 















Wales 37.5% -14.3% 17.9% 
Yorkshire and Humber -12.2% -14.1% -24.7% 
East Midlands -1.9% -25.4% -26.8% 
South West -10.9% -20.0% -28.7% 
South East -14.9% -19.0% -31.1% 
North West -13.7% -20.6% -31.5% 
West Midlands -23.3% -15.5% -35.2% 
North East -39.1% -4.1% -41.5% 
East of England -26.4% -53.2% -65.5% 
London -61.7% -29.9% -73.2% 
Median -14.3% -19.5% -31.3% 
National -22.6% -43.6% -27.1% 
Table 15 PCSO workforce change by region 
While most English regions did not experience disproportionately high decreases 
between 2015-2019, the East of England experienced a larger percentage change in 
the PCSO workforce in the second half of the decade. Accelerating reductions in 
Bedfordshire, Cambridge, Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk, take most forces in the region 
into the ‘weakened NP’ category along with the London forces. In Norfolk, the PCSO 
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workforce was reduced by 78 (-28.2%) between 2010-2015, and 197 (-100%) between 
2015-2019. This total decimation of the PCSO workforce came after plans in 2017 to 
abolish the PCSO role in the force area, with the Chief Constable citing a combination 
of a growth in complex crime and budget reductions (BBC News 2017). This came to 
fruition in 2018, with all PCSOs either being redeployed or made redundant. In order 
to maintain neighbourhood security functions, the force’s new ‘Norfolk 2020’ model 
promises to resource NPTs with at least one ‘beat manager’, 14 sergeants, and 7 
‘Engagement Officers’ (Norfolk Constabulary 2018), as well as using casually employed 
‘scene guards’ (Dodd 2019). The new reforms to the NP model and workforce, however, 
have not yet been evaluated (HMICFRS 2019). Other large forces outside of this region 
have also openly considered drastic changes to the PCSO workforce. The Metropolitan 
Police and WMP suggested they would abolish or considerably reduce, respectively, 
their PCSO workforces, but did not go through with these plans after the announcement 
of the new funding settlement in 2015 (BBC News 2015a; BBC News 2015b; Beake 2015). 
By 2019, the proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce varied across individual 
forces, and most (27) forces maintained 6-9% PCSOs. A smaller range of forces had 
PCSO proportions between 10-11% (9) and lower proportions between 0-5% (7). The 
proportion remained high in the Welsh police forces, even though all Welsh forces 
experienced a net loss of PCSOs between 2015-2019. Yorkshire and Humber forces also 
maintained high proportions of PCSOs (see table 16). Forces in London and the East of 












Wales North Wales 11.25% 
West Midlands Staffordshire 11.13% 
North East Durham 11.01% 
Yorkshire and Humber North Yorkshire 10.93% 
Wales South Wales 10.80% 
Wales Dyfed-Powys 10.56% 
South West Wiltshire 10.36% 
Yorkshire and Humber Humberside 9.85% 
Yorkshire and Humber West Yorkshire 9.73% 
West Midlands West Mercia 9.50% 













Though the proportion of PCSOs in England and Wales fell steadily and slowly in the 
austerity era, the more notable change in the operational workforce was the increase 
in the Specials workforce in both numbers and proportion between 2010-2015 followed 
by a sharp fall in the specials workforce and an increase in the proportion of officers 
(see figure 13). While specials appeared to be used in the first half of the austerity era 
to plug gaps in the operational workforce left by PCSO and officer reductions, the 
latter half of austerity appears to show a distinct change in approaches in which officer 
resources were starting to be protected. The PCSO workforce continued to fall steadily 
and the boom in specials recruitment finished abruptly, with many specials not being 
retained. This perhaps reflects difficulties in the retention of volunteers and the 
relative importance of maintaining warranted officer numbers in times of budgetary 
pressures.  
To conclude, reforms to the PCSO workforce continue to show general patterns 
nationally and in certain regions, but with much variation between forces. More 
deliberate changes to workforce mixes appear to represent ideation that is motivated 
by changes in the policing field (force resources and changing demands), some of which 
are catalysed by the surround (political influence through governance and austerity).  
Region Force 
East of England Norfolk 0.00% 
London London, City of 0.71% 
East of England Essex 2.92% 
East of England Suffolk 3.02% 
London Metropolitan Police 3.74% 
East of England Bedfordshire 3.87% 
East of England Cambridgeshire 4.72% 
North East Northumbria 5.64% 
South East Surrey 5.83% 
East of England Northamptonshire 5.89% 




Figure 13 Roles as a proportion of the operational workforce, 2004-2019 
    
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
PCSOs 1.63% 3.43% 3.57% 7.39% 8.76% 8.90% 9.09% 8.92% 9.04% 9.26% 8.67% 8.36% 8.11% 7.83% 7.84% 7.39%
Specials 9.04% 9.52% 10.05% 9.93% 9.80% 9.50% 10.12% 11.30% 12.47% 11.89% 14.64% 15.75% 11.62% 10.42% 9.35% 8.72%

















5 The Social Organisation of Neighbourhood Policing  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes how Neighbourhood Policing (NP) is positioned between the 
interests and expectations of the wider police organisation (teams and objectives) and 
other neighbourhood actors (communities and other local organisations), and situated 
in local geographies with variable characteristics. It illustrates how Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams (NPTs), and within them the operatives of NP – the Sergeant, PCs and 
PCSOs – create shared assumptions and processes to achieve organisational objectives 
in a way that is commensurate with their understanding of their individual roles, the 
role of NP, and the external environments of NP delivery. These environments include 
the hyper-local geography of the neighbourhood, socio-economic change, and local 
and national politics, which provide constraints in the form of policies and their impact 
on police capabilities and routines, local problems, and community expectations. On 
the other hand, these environments also provide resources for police story-telling and 
cultural standards for action (Shearing and Ericson 1991; Fine 2010). When these 
environments lead to change both internal and external to police institutions, street-
level police make sense of how these shifts impact their work through talk and 
storytelling. 
Using data from semi-structured interviews with NPT operatives, this chapter 
illustrates how neighbourhood policing is delivered in the West Midlands in light of the 
environmental contexts that influence and constrain these processes. The previous 
chapter revealed how workforce reductions and new models of local policing have 
created new conditions for NPTs and the delivery of NP. Police stories of the everyday 
work of NPTs can illustrate the effects of current social conditions on practice, the 
impact of police reform and socioeconomic change on police cultural understandings 
of their role, and the potential for reform to NP delivery. Street-level stories about NP 
values, functions, and practice can also point to broader shifts in police institutions 
through identifying police narratives about broader policing objectives and the role of 
NPTs in contributing to institutional goals. Additionally, as NP is a manifestation of 
Community Policing (CP) and the successor to Reassurance Policing (RP), approaches 
to policing that promote community participation and social closeness, the cultural 
narratives of NPTs can reveal how police in these teams relate to ‘the community’ 
both in terms of how the police-community partnership is understood and the effects 
of police-community interactions on NPT work. 
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The chapter first analyses the relationship of NP to its environments, exploring the 
way people, places and other organisations create the social conditions to which NPTs 
react. The first of these is the array of the geographical characteristics of 
neighbourhoods and micro-beats32, which police interpret in order to organise their 
work. The second is the presence of characters and organisations with whom police 
interact and are expected to collaborate, and how their presence affects the everyday 
work of NPTs. The third is the organisational position of NP; the police organisational 
expectations of the role of NP in relation to the wider system of policing and the 
influence of these expectations. 
After investigating these externalities, the internal processes of NPT organisation will 
be detailed. The processes are organised into themes that were created during the 
coding of interview data and that reflect the most commonly referred to principles 
and types of activity33. These are: connection and interpersonal work; collaboration 
and problem-solving; information gathering, and; crime control. The section starts by 
exploring the roles of different NPT operatives and how their labour is divided. 
5.2 Environmental Context of NP 
NPT work takes place in a number of environmental contexts. These environmental 
frames influence and constrain the work that NPTs do and in part influence the NP 
mandate. Local geographies influence police interpretations of the problems of crime 
and disorder, and local characters influence police understanding of their 
neighbourhoods through a variety of interactions, including those of a collaborative 
and adversarial nature. NPT work is also positioned within the wider police 
organisational context of street-level emergency response teams and investigation 
teams, as well as senior managerial strategies of controlling crime and crime analysts 
formulating intelligence products and tactical responses to local crime reduction. The 
following material will show that within the police organisation NP is understood in 
opposition to reactive work of response and investigation teams, but NPT operatives 
perceive that high volumes of response and investigation work overflows from these 
teams into NPTs. 
                                            
32 Neighbourhood here refers to the whole jurisdiction of each NPT. Micro-beats are divisions 
of a neighbourhood. 
33 The data mainly comes from the responses to the question, “What do you think is the most 




Figure 14 - The Social Organisation of Neighbourhood Policing – environmental context 
5.2.1 The Neighbourhood 
Knowing the neighbourhood – the physical spaces, the residents, the opportunities for 
and the actuality of local criminal behaviour and disorder – is of utmost importance 
for NPT operatives if they are to deliver NP effectively and satisfy organisational 
objectives. ‘Local knowledge’ is valued in NP as a way of interpreting the 
characteristics of a neighbourhood. In other words, Local knowledge is “not a jumble 
of unconnected facts but a scheme of interpretation” (Fielding 1995, 167). It is one 
component of the craft of the ‘Bobby’, the beat-based, uniformed agent of the police. 
This scheme is largely generated by police at the street-level, a contrast with other 
teams and departments who do not experience working in a neighbourhood, walking 
the beat, and attending meetings with communities and other partners.  
5.2.1.1 Scheme of Interpretation 
NPTs are home to the beat policing style – that of visible foot patrol in a specified 
geographical area by familiar police – and utilise its methods of connecting police to a 
neighbourhood, in part, to equip police with ‘local knowledge’. The following 
illustrates that one tactical justification for connecting police to the community 
members and other partners in a neighbourhood is to build up a scheme of 
interpretation to aid effective problem-solving: 
NPT1 Serg: I think for me, it’s grassroots knowledge of what goes on 















everybody speaks English as their first language. So majority of our 
work is spent working with the likes of Birmingham city council, 
housing associations trying to nip anti-social behaviour in the bud by 
talking to landlords, council, building owners, the concierges, local 
shop keepers. Majority of what we do working with other agencies 
and partners, trying to resolve problems very, very early. Our job is 
one of problem solving really, not racing out to burglaries in progress. 
It’s grassroots policing with local knowledge.  
I see that with some of the PCs here. They’ve been here for quite a 
while and they know the local offenders. They know a generation of 
offenders because they’ve kept continuity. They are the local beat 
bobby, and their knowledge is superb.  
The type of local knowledge that police refer to emphasises a deep understanding of 
neighbourhood characteristics and characters. Police must know their neighbourhood 
and its current problems to gain insight into how to alleviate neighbourhood risks, who 
helps or hinders this work or is in need of police assistance. In other words, police seek 
and cultivate knowledge of the external geographies and characters that shape their 
work in order to prepare for situation-specific conduct (Manning 1997, 202). 
5.2.1.2 Constructing Neighbourhood Characters 
In institutions, street-level bureaucrats tend to categorise or label external 
constituents in order to organise and account for their work, especially the clients or 
users of a public service (Manning 1997; Lipsky 1980, 69; Prottas 1979; Van Maanen 
1978). Police come into contact with a variety of actors during the course of their 
routine work, and the data show that NPT operatives construct particular 
neighbourhood characters as part of their scheme of interpretation. In WMP, the 
context of the austerity era and the concerns over high demand appeared to colour 
the ways police appraised these different characters. As such, specific stories of 
neighbourhood characters engage with wider narratives about the role of NP and how 
this could change according to principles of demand reduction. The analysis identified 
that these types of stories categorised these characters in three broad ways. First, 
allies are those partners that collaborate productively with NPTs by passing on useful 
information or coproducing safety. Agencies generally fall under this category, as do 
particular members of the community. Second, the neighbourhood characters who 
interact with police through seemingly trivial requests or calls to service, or attend 
PACT meetings without contributing to police objectives, are seen as time-wasters. 
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These characters increase police demands that are either seen as trivial on un-
actionable. A third category is the vulnerable, which refers to those who are 
considered at risk of victimisation due to various social or immutable characteristics 
(see Bartkowiak-Théron and Asquith 2015). Police are more ambivalent concerning the 
extent to which interactions with these characters constitutes time well spent.  
It is important to note that, unlike in some policing studies (Manning 1997; Van Maanen 
1978), the following character types (see table 18) are not labels used by the 
respondents themselves, but are rather created here to refer to the characteristics of 
these neighbourhood characters that are relevant to the social organisation of NP. 
5.2.1.3 Allies 
Allies are the preferred neighbourhood partners of NPTs; they are the agencies and 
members of the community who productively collaborate with police or take action 
that contributes to achieving NPT goals. Good partners also increase efficiency, acting 
to reduce the amount of time police spend on issues that are perceived to be 
unimportant, low-status police work with, or the work that police no longer want to 
deal with due to falling resources. 
One example of an ally is someone who is considered to be a ‘key individual’ as part 
of the ‘key individual networks’ (KINs) approach (ACPO 2006). The following sergeant 
describes how these community characters contribute the delivery of NP: 
Serg1: …by having all those leaders and key members of the 
community you could probably get a lot more done than if you go out 
and try it individually. So this cul-de-sac problem I’m talking about 
where I’ve got a lot of problems, I’ve got one key member of the 
community who represents all of the community, and I went to him, 
or he invited me to meet him. He’s far more influential around this 
than I would be if I had to deal with these people individually. So 
again it goes back to doing more with less. So if I reach out to that 
one person, he can reach out to 100. That’s better for me than trying 
to reach out to 100 people, which is a lot harder. 
These ‘key individuals’ are perceived to be useful allies relative to other members of 
the community due to their potential for community building and information 
gathering. The idea that one individual ‘represents all of the community’ suggests a 
useful shortcut in terms of police time and effort in delivering representative 
community engagement, and if these characters can live up to this ideal type it 
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presents a process that is much more efficient and effective at identifying local 
problems and building a scheme of interpretation.  
The other primary allies are the partnering organisations and groups of NPTs. Police 
value these partners because they are potentially productive collaborators, even if 
they do not always live up to this potential. The following describes the mutual benefit 
and reciprocity between police and partners, where particular resources can be 
provided that police would otherwise not be able to access: 
Serg 2: With our partner agencies - each area of the city centre is a 
BID, which is a Business Improvement District, which has a salaried 
director and each of the businesses pay a bit from their rates towards 
that, to kind of make the place look nice, to improve the public’s 
visit to that area. We work very closely with them, a lot of the time 
because they actually provide lots of money and problem solving for 
us, which is fantastic. In return they want something as well. We 
used to obviously have a link in, so they would know all the PCs and 
the sergeant who dealt with their area. So they could put us in touch 
with other contacts, whereas now it’s anyone’s guess. There’s five 
different sergeants so everything has to go via the inspector, and 
someone gets nominated to deal with a certain problem, but you 
have lots of different teams dealing with different problems, 
whereas before we had that one point of contact who would put us 
in contact with other people as well. 
Allies are important for helping police understand the local geography of their 
neighbourhood, but links with these allies relies on stable resources as a point of 
contact. Changes to NPT resources may mean that the most productive and valued 
relationships between police and partners deteriorate.  
Furthermore, good relationships with partners may also be forged along more 
interpersonal lines. The following inspector considers that common experience, 
empathy, and camaraderie can be a basis for reciprocity and collaboration, which in 
turn can make NP more efficient in the austerity era. 
Insp1: It’s all about partnership in relation to relationships, person 
to person. And because we’ve got very good relationships with the 
individuals, the housing officers or whatever, they haven’t been 
altered. I would say, in fact, maybe there’s a slight sense of 
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camaraderie in relation to, ‘we know what you’re going through with 
the cuts, we’re going through them as well.’ And because there’s a 
bit of a joint venture there, we understand each other’s pain to a 
degree. I don’t think that on a personal level it has affected it. What 
I’ve yet to see though, really, is a full understanding that because 
we won’t take primacy anymore in everything, because we’re not 
able to, that they’re going to have to pick up some extra work or 
figure out a creative way of dealing with it. Or in fact, of course, 
we’ve got to go with the resources that we do have and jointly. You 
know, the two-make-greater-than-the-whole type approach, the 
synergy of it, if you will. That I’ve yet to really see happening. 
5.2.1.4 The Vulnerable and the time-wasters 
While dealing with ‘vulnerability’ is seen as a priority in contemporary policing 
narratives, NPT operatives have mixed views on the extent to which the problems of 
vulnerable individuals and groups are a constructive use of police time. Dealing with 
‘vulnerability’ by understanding and reducing risks has become an imperative focus of 
NPT work since the Pilkington scandal, and by extension this has reaffirmed the focus 
of NP on ASB:  
Ch.Sup: If you look at the journey around antisocial behaviour, it’s 
far more now up our agenda than it probably was 10 years ago when 
issues such as the Pilkington case have focused minds on the 
importance of vulnerability. I think that’s the important part of what 
neighbourhood teams do; addressing antisocial behaviour and looking 
for the longer term solutions, sustainable solutions, so the problem 
solving aspect, as opposed to being all about vehicle crime or 
burglary. 
However, the vulnerable are seen as an ambiguous category because they are 
sympathetic characters that represent time-consuming work. Stories about the 
vulnerable are attempts to make sense of police obligations to vulnerable people in 
light of the Pilkington scandal on one hand and the demand reduction push on the 
other, and to consider the approaches for dealing with different vulnerable people. 
The distinctions made between different vulnerable groups show that this is not a 
stable category for organising NP work in a simple way: 
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NPT1 Serg: An example of that, we have got one at moment where 
a lady is suffering from dementia, she is calling the ambulance 
service daily and she is calling the police daily, and we are working 
with various partners to get the lady into an appropriate care home. 
And of course overnight the demand for all the services will cease, 
apart from obviously the direct service that she is involved with. To 
give you an idea just in terms of cost to the ambulance service, they 
did a breakdown of cost for us. It's about £100,000 in terms of how 
many resources has been allocated to that particular individual. So, 
on top of that the police resources, you are talking a lot of money to 
just deal with one individual. 
Some vulnerable people are considered to be worthy of urgent police responses, while 
others are not due to the triviality of their demands and worries: 
NPT2 Serg: For me, I feel that the level of service that we give the 
guy who’s got low tolerance is probably not a million miles away from 
the service that we give the person that is in really, really great 
need. And I feel again - I’m not talking out of turn here, because I’ve 
raised this with my senior managers - I feel that we have to come to 
a point where we say to the guy or the lady that is reporting very 
low-level stuff, and it's just down to their real intolerance of young 
people being allowed to play in the streets. That we have to come to 
a point where if we want a reduced demand, at some point we’ve 
got to say to this individual, we’re not going to come and we’re not 
going to help you anymore, because there’s got to be a cut-off point 
somewhere. 
For me I want to be over this side of the scale where I’m helping Mrs. 
Miggins who is very vulnerable and is really suffering. And I want to 
put a robust action plan in place to tackle her issues, and tackle the 
offenders and to give her the best service that I would give anybody. 
But at the other end of the scale, that guy is reporting 20 logs a week, 
and he isn’t really in my eyes, isn’t really suffering major ASB. There 
has to be a point where we can’t keep attending to under-tens 
playing football in the street.  
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The one label that was used by many respondents as both a term of affection (when 
vulnerable) and derision (when a time-waster) was ‘Mrs Miggins’. This label referred 
to typical interactions with older women in the neighbourhood, in which the character 
was either a vulnerable resident in need of police help or who felt overly vulnerable 
or outraged and thus demanded excessive police service. The overlap between Mrs 
Miggins as both vulnerable and time-waster is evident in Van Maanen’s explication of 
ideal types, and how these are “subject to situational, temporal, and individually 
idiosyncratic restriction” (1978, 224). To paraphrase Van Maanen (ibid., 224), Mrs 
Miggins in one context is not the same as Mrs Miggins in another. In the following 
account, for example, Mrs Miggins is viewed as a typical character in an overly service-
oriented NP, in which unproductive interactions with community members replace 
‘gritty’ tactics involved in problem-solving: 
To me, neighbourhood policing is actually a quite a gritty, in-your-
face kind of policing really, because it’s getting in to sort a problem 
that causing the community an issue. …It’s not just going round and 
having a coffee with Mrs Miggins and just, ‘oh that sounds terrible, I 
know’, and then going away. 
NP was originally formulated as a citizen-focused approach to engagement and 
problem-solving work (Home Office 2004), attempting to create a consumer-oriented 
ethos whereby police attempt to deal with community members in a way that enhances 
satisfaction and involvement in policing priorities (Lloyd and Foster 2009). Most police 
in NPTs experience some level of frustration with the public demands or expectations 
of them, or the issues that are raised in community engagement meetings, when the 
responses would be trivial or ‘un-actionable’ – that is, outside the boundaries of the 
police remit or ‘real’ police work. This inspector links recent reforms to police’s 
reluctance to let down community members who make such demands: 
PCSO3: Unfortunately the police sometimes have been responsible 
for this more than anyone else as in we said, "we'll deal with your 
report. If it's dog-fouling we'll deal with it. If it’s partnership we'll 
deal with it. If it’s music we'll deal with it. So now we've become the 
be-all and end-all. "Any issues, call the police. Don't call the council. 
Call the police first of all and then we'll deal with it if we have to." 
We just have to get that role really – we're everything to every man, 
to all men, when it’s not reality. That's why we now have said, "look, 
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you're housing, you deal with this side of things and we'll deal with 
the criminal activity or ASB, but you need to do your part of it."  
Insp1: And there are things that historically, I remember twenty 
years ago certainly the phone call would have been, to the member 
of the public, “why are you phoning us? It’s nothing to do with us. 
We’re not going to get involved in that”, something of that nature. 
And that would have been accepted. You try and do that now… now 
whether it’s a societal thing again, whether it’s because complaints 
are more easily made… but if you don’t get the answer you like on 
the end of the phone, it is much easier to make a complaint about 
that. Now again, instead of the organisation just, you know, blankly 
saying, “Well that’s quite right. It’s nothing to do with us. You need 
to go and speak to the council”, you’d do the relevant signposting, 
which is what we’re trying to do now with force contact, because 
we’ve realised we’ve just taken on too much.  
The solution to seemingly increasing public demands is for police to signpost 
complainants with un-actionable demands (or which police define as un-policeable 
(Roussell and Gascón 2014)) to other, appropriate agencies. During fieldwork 
observations and interviews, police often noted that community members raising un-
actionable problems was a common feature of community engagement activities and 
other civilian-initiated encounters. These feeds into the general anxiety that the 
prevailing ethos of policing as a customer service meant that the police function had 
become too broad, leading to changing public expectations and increasing demand for 
issues that police perceive as trivial. 
Grouping Characteristics Examples 
Partners Help inform police of 
neighbourhood characteristics 
and risks. May collaborate with 
police through collaborative 
problem solving, surveillance 
or liaison 




collectively as ‘Key 
Individual Networks’ or 




Face higher risks of harm, need 
assistance from police or other 







harder to reach due to social 
marginalisation or segregation 
Time-
wasters 
Interact with police often, are 
concerned about general 
neighbourhood security, ask for 




Miggins’, most PACT 
attendees 
Table 18 - Neighbourhood Characters 
5.2.2 Neighbourhood Partnerships 
NP is designed to be the visible and accessible component of police organisations to 
external actors through community engagement and collaborative problem-solving 
with neighbourhood partners. Through these activities, NPT operatives come into 
contact with a variety of actors and organisations – the bulk of which make up the 
allies of NPTs – all with their own interests and capacity for the coproduction of 
neighbourhood security. The most common partners of participating NPT operatives 
were the agencies of local government, but housing associations, voluntary sector 
organisations and individual members of the community also collaborate with NPTs for 
the purpose of solving local problems. These activities vary from long-term projects, 
formal tasking groups and engagement meetings, to informal interactions with 
networks of individual or agency contacts.  
The geography of a neighbourhood is a factor in determining which partners are 
available to interact with the police. City centre police have more contact with 
organisations who deal with problems that tend to be more acute in inner-city 
locations, such as visible homelessness, whereas those in residential neighbourhoods 
often find themselves in regular contact with housing officers and housing associations, 
as issues in housing estates make up a large amount of the work of such an NPT. 
Collaborative efforts are often problem-driven, as the existing problems of a location 
affect the types of partners that police have. This effect of geography is demonstrated 
in the following excerpts: 
CSO2: I currently work at the city centre, and we have quite a high 
population of the homeless community. … so I know that there’s been 
a lot of work at the city centre at the moment with an operation 
called ‘Op Engage’, whereby different teams have all been tasked to 
obviously go out, come across anyone that’s homeless, speak to and 
find out why they're homeless, and signpost them to various agencies 
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so that they get the help and support that they need, whether it’s 
with housing or it’s drug use or anything like that.  
NPT1 PC1: When I say partner agents I basically mean the housing 
associations that obviously have properties in this area of the city. 
Those are basically the main partner agencies that I work with as an 
officer. 
In residential neighbourhoods, the partners of community engagement activities 
include residents of the neighbourhood, whereas areas with more commercial 
properties, such as the city centre, business owners and workers become the focus of 
engagement work.  
CSO2: RCO meetings, it’s a Retail Operation Crime meeting basically. 
It’s a unit that’s been set up, and they publish photos and build up a 
literature of shoplifters for the City Centre. Then, they have this 
meeting with various agencies and city police will come together 
each month, and they’ll talk about what’s affecting the business, 
how it’s affecting them and then find out what agency needs to 
resolve that matter. 
The different ‘communities’ of these neighbourhoods represent different security 
interests that order NP. Community engagement work is tailored to specific groups in 
neighbourhoods and as a result resources are targeted at the type of work that is 
commensurate with these interests34.  
5.2.2.1 Motivations for collaboration: reciprocity and competence 
NPTs often see the reciprocal relations involved in collaborating with partners as 
beneficial to achieving police goals. This reflects the emerging ‘new pragmatism’ in 
NP (O’Neill and McCarthy 2012); the belief that collaboration is a more effective 
method of solving local issues and helps police use their time more efficiently. The 
experience or promise of other partners reducing police workloads is articulated by 
the following Sergeant: 
Serg 4: That is one of the things that has improved over time, 
because there's been such a push to work together collectively. That 
                                            
34 This reflects the common criticism of community policing it takes sides in community conflicts 
and prioritises certain interests above others (for example, see Crawford 1997), and the 
interests that are over-represented are from groups with higher social capital and better 
historical relations with, and more trust of, the police (for example, Skogan 1989). 
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is where we've made the biggest gains, because we certainly work 
really well with our partners, really, really well. We fail miserably 
without them. We are lucky in terms of when we have peaks they 
usually have troughs, and they'll help us out. We might be completely 
to capacity, running investigations, running ASB jobs and everything 
else, and we might have to pick the phone up and say, "Look, we’ve 
got this neighbourhood issue. We could really do with you, going to 
court and getting an ex parte injunction against X, Y and Z, because 
these are the issues." "You helped us out last week, we’ll do that for 
you", and they'll go off and do that for us, as a short-term, medium-
term, sort of problem solving issue. 
Here, the collaboration is about the efficient distribution of work between agencies, 
where partners will pick up tasks that are within their remit and that their 
collaborating partner does not have sufficient time to do. Without this collaboration, 
the police will ‘fail’ to achieve objectives due to their limited capacity. Police value 
having direct contact with partners that have the remit and spare capacity to deal 
with overlapping issues of order maintenance and public safety, especially by phone. 
Good communication and close, reciprocal relationships are also valued by the police 
as tools of persuasion in instances such as these: 
NPT 1 Serg: We've just closed down a club that's had issues with noise 
and the license has been taken away from that club. The noise 
equipment has been seized by Environmental Health. This place is 
still operating not as a club, but there's loud music from there. So I'm 
now having to poke the city council and go, "I need you now to start 
doing your noise stuff or looking at closure orders on this premises, 
because you need to invoke your legislation there to do this. I will 
help you where I can. I will visit them and I will take camcorders and 
that and I will help you because it's a thorn in my side as well. But 
we need to work together on this. We've got a good working 
relationship where you just have to set your stall out a little bit, say 
what you can do and what I need off you and what you can do. Now 
we can work together." It's about building those relationships, that's 
why. And we need that local link.  
This quotation further demonstrates how different agencies also have specific powers 
to complement their remits, and as ‘knowledge brokers’ -  or “expert advisors of 
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security and security managers to other institutions” (Ericson 1994, 151) – NPTs need 
awareness about which agencies are most appropriate for each problem or incident in 
order to distribute tasks or signpost people to the correct organisation. Distributing 
neighbourhood security activities and the responsibility for invoking responses to 
neighbourhood problems is economical: 
NPT2 Serg: The other thing for me while we are working with 
partners is that when I look at the legal bill for all the injunctions 
and all the evictions that we've done, the housing provider picks up 
the tab. Hence it’s a massive money-saving exercise for all the police 
as well. So it’s really advantageous, clearly with all the spending cuts 
that are coming in now, it’s not going to be as free and easy to get 
an injunction or an eviction as it has been in the past. 
Ways of working that reduce police workload and other costs are increasingly being 
sought by NPTs to address the new socio-economic environment of policing.  
5.2.2.2 Difficulties in collaboration 
There are a number of difficulties associated with collaboration. Partners need to be 
available to each other, through convenient means of contact and the capacity, and 
desire, to take part in collaborative activities. Police prefer partners to be contactable 
by the quickest means available, but some partners do not respond quickly due to their 
methods of contact: 
PC 1: Communication can be difficult because it's all down nowadays, 
down to email. Everything, "E-mail me." Very rarely people answer 
the phone. I pick up the phone and answer it. That's due to a lack of 
time. More burdens on individuals. More on specific persons, officers, 
and other partnering agencies. It is difficult. It is purely because 
they've got more to do in less time. And it's because it's frustrating 
them. Because you're trying to get the same sort of result as you did 
before, say, three years ago. Say, "I just had to phone somebody and 
they came out and sorted this out for me." But now you have to go 
through these procedures, you have to… jump through these hoops 
and all that. It's like a policy for the policy's sake sometimes. 
The practice of inter-agency communication can be an administrative burden for police 
who want swift responses to both calls for assistance and live issues. Increasing 
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reliance on E-mail in organisations lends itself to a potentially slower response to 
contact, as the officer above has experienced. 
Partnerships do not always result in efficient, multi-agency approaches to specific 
problems, and sometimes instead present opportunities to exploit connections with 
partners for the benefit of one agency or individual. The notion of segregated remits 
is used by police and other partners to avoid increasing their own workload, according 
to this officer: 
PC 4: I think personally and the police are as guilty of this as much 
as anybody else. I've seen a lot more defensive practice coming in 
terms of people sort of be more willing to say, "that’s not my 
responsibility. That’s not my agency," and batting things off and 
trying to get another agency to take ownership of something. Rather 
than it being an agency defensive practice, sort of, I think it is more 
personal with people's workloads. They're just swamped with... 
People have become very defensive in terms of saying "Look, I just 
can't take any more work on and I think we are very much the same 
as police.” I think some officers are carrying such a work load that 
they will just sort of feel as though they are at breaking point and 
say, "Look, I can't take any more work now."  
It is the connection between agencies and the knowledge of each other’s remit that 
provides opportunities for partners to exploit each other’s capacity for dealing with 
specific problems. In some instances, the close relationships built up between partners 
are used as channels to reduce workloads by relinquishing responsibilities. This 
‘defensive practice’ works both ways, according to the PC above, and represents 
divisions between partners that hinder collaborative practice. 
5.2.3 The Organisational Position of Neighbourhood Policing 
NP has been described as a police organisational arrangement to encourage ‘soft’ 
policing initiatives (McCarthy 2014, 261) that involve fostering connection to 
communities and collaborating with partners to solve neighbourhood problems. At the 
same time, others have observed that NP work is affected by the dominant35, ‘hard’ 
notions and priorities of police work (Bullock and Leeney 2013; Ramshaw and Cosgrove 
2013; Cosgrove 2016) and that ‘hard and soft policing forms are enacted concurrently’ 
                                            
35 Loftus (2009) argues that in police institutions the traditional, street-level police cultural 
characteristics are still ‘dominant’. 
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(Innes 2005, 157). The distinction between the orthodox crime control and the 
neighbourhood security missions is understood by police through the lens of short-term 
versus long-term solutions to crime problems. NPT operatives sometimes use the 
‘sticking-plaster’ metaphor to describe how the approach of Response Teams is not 
concerned with causes of crime and long-term solutions: 
PC2: …to be a good neighbourhood officer you've got to take the 
plaster off, because Response put a plaster on it and you've got to 
try and get to the root of what is actually the problem. 
The distinct missions both share the core objective of crime reduction, but emphasise 
different methods to achieve these goals.   
5.2.3.1 Situational Demands of the Neighbourhood 
Although NP resources are intended to be dedicated to specific locations and the 
neighbourhood security mission, organisational pressures require police officers 
especially, who are in high demand across the organisation, to be more flexible. The 
crime-fighting activities that police in NPTs undertake are also influenced by the 
characteristics and demands of their neighbourhood: 
Serg 3: I think we're trying to be careful not to be obsessed by crime. 
That would seem strange for police officers, but it does lead towards 
that. If we have high burglary stats in Moseley, which we do every 
now and again, we'll tend to change neighbourhood policing to be 
target-hardening and going out and doing some of the investigation, 
walking some of the routes, looking for property, checking and 
rechecking CCTV in case investigation missed it, to try and give a 
premium service still to the neighbourhood around burglary. You 
could argue when neighbourhood policing started, that's not really 
what it was. It was supposed to be all about engagement. So, I think 
we kind of shift as and when. In a busier neighbourhood, we'll do 
more crime stuff and community safety stuff. In less busy areas… 
we'll help address mental health and some of those things that maybe 
we shouldn't be taking all the burden for, but we probably do. 
The effect of situational variables – or neighbourhood context, such as local crime 
rates36 - on policing styles illustrates that NPT work is flexible and context-specific. 
                                            
36 Sobol et al. (2013) found that neighbourhoods with higher crime rates predicted more police 
‘vigour’ – the propensity to employ formal legal interventions. 
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Government and organisational policy demanded prioritisation of the reassurance and 
problem-solving functions of NP. Where NPTs deem there to be more immediate 
problems of crime and disorder, however, these functions can be deprioritised. The 
above excerpt also represents the perception of many respondents that the 
performance of crime-focused and community safety activities are in tension with each 
other; there is a perceived dichotomy between these types of work, rather than each 
being interrelated. 
5.2.3.2 Data-driven demand 
Demand is often a data-driven influence on police work, as high or rising crime 
statistics of particular types affect the prioritisation of police objectives, and this 
prioritisation of problems leads to whatever activities are judged to be an appropriate 
solution. Data-driven prioritisation can at times be in tension with what police in NPTs, 
particularly at the street-level, thought of as the core work of NP, which they often 
claimed was difficult to measure: 
CSO3: I think recently, some of the senior officers did actually come 
out with neighbourhood police officers and they’re surprised in what 
we’ve done. You can’t normally quantify it and measure it up against 
a response team, where you’ve got so many officers, you crime so 
many things, and being able to identify who’s the offender in these 
things. Whereas neighbourhood policing, just by being a presence, 
walking past someone when they’re going in with their shopping, 
they must feel more reassured. "Oh, there's someone there in case 
something happens. I know someone’s not too far away." 
Some respondents worried that data-driven approaches intrinsically favour the crime 
management mandate of NP and the traditional measures of policing success, and do 
not pick up the effect of, for example, the reassurance function. This appears to be 
perceived as something of an existential threat to NPTs, who see that the work of 
Response Teams will show up on performance metrics more than NPTs due to the work 
of the former being directly aligned with crime management activities.  
Analysis of the data generated through policing activities is applied to the tactic of 
targeted patrol. NPTs in the West Midlands undertake Target Area Patrols (TAPs), 
which are fifteen-minute patrols of crime hotspots three times a day. The objective of 
these patrols is to prevent street crime and ASB in areas and at times with higher rates 
of these types of incident, based on Koper’s (1995) findings that the ideal dosage of 
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police presence at hot spots to deter crime and disorder is ten to fifteen minutes. 
While TAPs are a form of visible presence of police in the neighbourhood, increasing 
visibility of police to the entire neighbourhood population is not the rationale, and as 
such they are crime control-centred. 
PC3: We’ve now inherited an area of policing called TAP patrols, 
which we do now, which has been proven through research. That’s if 
we visit certain areas for several times a day, over a daily period, 
the crime level in that will drop drastically. And so far we’ve only 
been doing this for the last three weeks. Before it was brought in we 
were actually experimenting with it on our neighbourhood. We’ve 
seen a drastic drop in the crimes in these areas, so it does work.  
The analysis of data to inform street-level practices reflects recent movements to 
embrace the science of crime control and the professionalisation and specialisation of 
policing practice (Holdaway 1977, 2017; Innes et al. 2006; Shearing and Ericson 1986; 
Willis et al. 2007). The use of TAPs illustrates that the role and work of NPTs are not 
sheltered from the influence of contemporary and changing scientific knowledge. 
Indeed, the promise of more effective methods of crime control37 was welcomed by 
many of the respondents. Sergeants in particular were enthusiastic about the benefits 
that these new tactics bring to the performance of their teams, and a few even hoped 
that the changes will more broadly reform the general practices and culture of NPTs. 
Serg 1: I think the way forward is… being scientific with our 
approach, having tight timescales, deploy resources to those 
timescales, make sure they’re disciplined and rigid so we stick to 
those timescales to have maximum impact. I think that’s the way 
forward rather than just employing a load of officers who will just go 
around, doing what they want, walking wherever they want and not 
                                            
37 Innes et al. (2006) question the assumed objectivity of crime-analysis technologies, observing 
that: 
…charts and maps do not capture the dynamic, fluid and interactional 
qualities of crime. In fact, they effectively tend to ‘de-contextualize’ 
incidents, lifting them out of their settings, stripping away ‘local’ details 
and thus understanding. (52) 
In this sense, effectiveness is defined by how police reduce crime problems that they 
themselves are involved in constructing through the use of crime analysis technologies. 
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having a real approach to what we’re doing and then not being able 
to measure what we’re doing. So I’m for it. 
This sergeant sees new developments in the science of crime control as a way to strip 
away the functions of neighbourhood policing that he perceives to have no value – in 
this case, random foot patrol – and take up practices that are more measurable and 
demonstrably effective to the organisation. 
5.3 Processes of NPT work 
In order to realise the multidimensional NP mandate that is shaped by the above 
environmental contexts, NPTs organise their work through the allocation of activities 
to each NPT operative according to their role, and the execution of these activities in 
a number of domains of NP delivery. These roles and tasks together equate to the 
collective activity of NP – how each NPT operative’s actions “build upon and contribute 
to each other and something larger” (Hall 1987, 11). 
5.3.1 Division of Labour 
NPTs in WMP were made up of a number of different operational police actors, always 
including Sergeants, PCs, and PCSOs, and with Inspectors overseeing the management 
of more than one team. Each role is focused on delivering NP through the performance 
of allocated roles that contribute to the success of the team. The police organisation 
has a militarised rank structure for police officers, but in NPTs the inclusion of PCSOs, 
who are not part of this traditional structure, means that there is a mixture of formal 




Figure 15 - Neighbourhood Policing hierarchy 
PCSOs are not formally subordinate to PCs, but their organisational standing is lower 
as it is focused on tasks of low police-cultural status and they do not have the 
development opportunities open to officers (O’Neill 2014). Some PCSOs are also 
reported as having ambitions to become PCs (O’Neill 2014; Cosgrove 2016), and so PCs 
have some level of informal influence of the work of PCSOs, which can be more crime 
control-oriented (Cosgrove and Ramshaw 2013). Although they are in the same physical 
team, PCs and PCSOs may also be in different ‘performance teams’ (Goffman 1959; 
O’Neill 2015), where PCSOs attempt to create an impression of competence to an 
audience of PCs, but do not try to create these impressions together as ‘teammates’. 
Together, this points to role-dependent experiences and views of the division of labour 
in NPTs. 
5.3.1.1 Street-level 
The Bobby is usually identified as a friendly yet authoritative PC of a bygone era 
(Loader and Mulcahy 2003, 69-99), but in the present day (in the West Midlands, at 
least) the PCSO is more likely to undertake the role and responsibilities typically 
associated with this idealised figure. PCSOs are considered to be more suitable than 
PCs for these responsibilities because their role allows them the time to be in the 
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neighbourhood and perform the gradual tasks of building connections and local 
knowledge: 
NPT1 PC: I think without community support officers, neighbourhood 
policing, obviously, a lot of people would talk to the community 
support officers a lot more then they'd talk to the police officers on 
the team because they're out there more. They're on foot. They have 
got more time than we've got because there's more of them. People 
will see them and talk to them. And I think if all of a sudden they're 
not there anymore, you lose a massive, certainly, intelligence tap for 
what's going on in the area. Knowledge as well. Everything really. I 
think if you take them away and what you've got left, I don't know if 
it's a neighbourhood team anymore to be honest, I don't know why. 
Sergeant and a couple of PCs, it's... You need more numbers and I 
know they're not going to replace them with police officers. There’s 
absolutely no chance of that. 
NPT2 Serg: I think they’re invaluable, I really do and I think they are 
going to be very sadly missed38. They are the eyes and ears. I feel 
that people are in the communities in my experience of 
neighbourhood policing are more inclined to tell a PCSO information 
than sometimes a constable. In terms of intelligence gathering, I 
think they're invaluable. People tell them so much. They've got the 
time and they are not abstracted in the same way the constable is. 
They are not going to be sent to certain jobs. Like for example, when 
response, on a late shift in particular, are absolutely strapped and 
they’ve got no one else to send, straight away they’re going to look 
at either the CAP [Community Action Priority] team and, when the 
CAP team are completely exhausted, they’re then going to look at 
the neighbourhood teams. And that’s what we find a lot of then. 
When the CAP teams and the neighbourhood teams, from a PC point 
of view, are being utilized, your PCSOs are key to your neighbourhood 
policing fortune, because they’re your visibility when your PCs are 
committed. 
                                            
38 At the time of interview, WMP planned to drastically reduce the number of PCSOs. However, 
this was eventually avoided due to news that police spending would be protected in the 2015 
autumn spending review. 
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PCSOs are often referred to as ‘the eyes and ears’ of NPTs, and this emphasises the 
expectation that part of their role is to gain information from community members 
and observe the risks present in the neighbourhood. PCSOs are equipped with these 
abilities in part due to the organisational pressures on PCs, who may be abstracted 
from neighbourhood security duties by other teams in times of need, such as response 
or the ad hoc resource of Community Action Priority Teams (CAPT). This is such a 
common issue for NPTs39 that PCSOs are viewed by many colleagues as vital to not only 
the delivery but the very existence of NP. L 
The following respondent adds that the role of NPT PCs has, over time, moved away 
from being a specialised neighbourhood PC towards a flexible resource that works for 
the fulfilment of wider police organisational goals, performing the duties of other 
teams: 
NPT1 PC1: I came over here on the something called Continuous 
Improvement, which in theory was a very good idea because in 
departments like Response, investigation, neighbourhoods, CID, it 
was clearly marked out what we would all be doing. And at first, it 
worked really well because we were being left to do the work that 
we need to do within the neighbourhood. But since that time, it's all 
changed now. We get called out to more and more jobs that Response 
can’t resource because they're short-staffed and it takes us away 
from the stuff that we need to be doing or that we should be doing. 
In that respect, it's changed a lot.  
The PC describes how the Continuous Improvement programme effectively delineated 
the activities of local specialist teams, but with the onset of reductions to workforces 
the PC role in NPTs has shifted to cover the deficit in capacity of other teams to meet 
their responsibilities. This effectively limits the ability of PCs to perform the proactive, 
long-term activities that are intended to achieve the neighbourhood security 
objectives of NP. 
5.3.1.2 Managerial 
Sergeants, as the ‘practitioner managers’ of police organisations (Butterfield et al. 
2005), have considerable influence on the priorities and activities of NPTs, and they 
can use this influence to set much of the overall tone of NP in their given area. This is 
                                            
39 NP has been dealing with PCSO abstractions and ‘role drift’ for many years (see, for example, 
National Policing Improvement Agency 2008) 
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noted most by police when their team has experienced a change in management. 
Sergeants each have their own policing philosophy and attitudes towards NP delivery, 
which, according to police, affects the type of work that is prioritised in their 
neighbourhood: 
NPT1 CSO1: What tends to happen, if I’m honest, is you get a new 
sergeant come in and they change things up. One sergeant will have 
you working this area and then a new sergeant will come in and 
they’ll say, “No, I want to do it this way,” and in my experience every 
single time we’ve had a new sergeant, they change things for 
whatever reason.  
PC4: Some team sergeants are very crime orientated and they will 
almost run the neighbourhood team more like a crime team. 
Personally, I think that’s wrong. Some teams will, day after day, be 
going out doing drugs warrants, smashing in doors, racing around in 
their cars, wanting to have the lights on, racing to 999 jobs, if it’s on 
their patch. I think some teams and supervisors have missed the 
concept of what we should be doing. I think most supervisors now are 
quite smart to say, “Well let’s look at what are the issues a 
neighbourhood team should be dealing with.”  
The PC above voices the view that sergeants who focus more on crime control activities 
do not understand, and thus jeopardise, the NP mission – a mission that is distinct from 
the traditional or dominant police cultural sense of mission. In fact, many of the 
respondents, but not all, viewed facets of the traditional police culture and the 
activities that such characteristics promote as somewhat incompatible with NP ‘issues’ 
– the activities that fulfil the neighbourhood security mission of NP. Crime control-
oriented sergeants prioritise, for instance, drug warrants, emergency response, and 
apprehending offenders instead of problem-solving projects, reassurance patrols and 
building relationships with community members and partners. For PCs especially, this 
can have a significant impact of their experience as an NPT operative, as sergeants 
can choose to abstract them from neighbourhood security duties. Overall, this suggests 
that sergeants practise street-level discretion in setting the agenda for the work of the 
NPT, and this is not necessarily congruent with prevailing organisational policy. 
Due to the police organisational hierarchy, sergeants in NPTs face pressures of their 
own. NP managers are being asked to refocus the activities of NPTs in the current era, 
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and the nature of these changes means that sergeants may, depending on analysis of 
neighbourhood data, be expected to guide their NPT operatives away from activities 
with a low impact on crime data: 
Serg 3: I think that there's some of them that haven't changed a lot. 
I think some are still struggling to do neighbourhood policing that we 
used to 5 years ago. So there's a continuous battle for myself to say 
“Well, no, drop the stall down on the high street, and let's target the 
children's home because there's four people in there and three of 
them are burglars and one of them is involved in child sexual 
exploitation. So let's focus our time on that home, because that's 
where we'll make a bigger impact than speaking to people shopping." 
This sergeant’s view is that NP is not a static approach to policing and must change 
according to current organisational philosophy and objectives, installing a greater 
focus on more harmful crimes, such as child sexual exploitation. Sergeants are aware 
that, in order to manage their NPT operatives to bring about change in NP delivery, 
they must challenge current NP values and impinge on any police discretion to 
prioritise their own workloads: 
Serg 4: I have to be very directive to the team, in terms of, “This is 
what we are going to achieve and this is how we are going to achieve 
it,” so there’s less autonomy for people to go out and just say, 
“Right, I’m going to go out and just walk on patrol.” We do ethical 
demand patrols, so there’s two years of data that are done by 
departments similar to this - intelligence; they sit behind us - that 
will tell us where hot spot areas are, effectively. We’ve got six at 
the moment that sit across the ward and there’s a piece of research 
that’s doing evidenced-based policing that suggests if we’re doing 
15-minute patrol in that area, we have an impact over a period of 
time. So we go in and we do those ethical demand patrols to reduce 
demand front end. Just looking at the figures and what we’ve 
achieved and how it feels, it’s been quite successful. It’s something 
that we’re pushing really hard.  
The idea of demand management is being used by police management as a way of 
understanding how NP activities can be configured to fit current organisational 
objectives. The sergeant refers to the way these imperatives come from more senior 
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management through his evocation of the chain of command, or getting his “arse 
kicked”: 
Serg 4: Each month there’s a demand management meeting and from 
that there’s a list published of the highest demand locations in your 
area. The expectation is, as a supervisor, I will put in place a plan, 
whether that be formal or informal to reduce or manage that demand 
at that location. I’ll basically get a three-month period to resolve 
that before I start getting my arse kicked basically. 
Just as in other middle management roles (e.g. Greer and Page 1955, 1-4), the sergeant 
is obligated to realise the objectives of those in senior positions through directing the 
efforts of street-level workers. In times of wider organisational reforms, it is their role 
to reconfigure the work of NPTs to fit with new organisational philosophy and meet 
institutional goals through the production of favourable data. Therefore, while 
sergeants do practise discretion in influencing the agendas and policing styles of NPTs, 
implementing organisational reforms is incentivised through performance measures. 
5.3.2 Connection and interpersonal work 
Many of the respondents considered one primary goal of NP to be the nurturing of 
relationships between themselves and the communities that reside in the team’s 
designated neighbourhood. The notion is that the delivery of NP relies on the craft of 
creating and maintaining bonds between police and communities or individuals in those 
communities, much like other, past forms of community policing and beat policing in 
Britain (for example, Fielding 1995, 67-102; Holdaway 1977, 123). Presence, 
continuity, and communication skills are the tools that NPT operatives employ in the 
attempt to reduce ‘social distance’ and nurture social closeness.  
5.3.2.1 Familiarity 
Being familiar is intended to cultivate the connection between NPTs and their 
communities. In practice, this means a PC or PCSO (or sometimes a Sergeant) being 
recognisable by face, name, or both, to some community members. Police hope this 
will connect them to those that have a stake in the neighbourhood, establishing 
relationships that can then be nurtured and utilised. In this way, a relationship created 
becomes an opportunity for greater individual contacts and connections that are, 
according to this PCSO, often ‘positive’: 
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CSO3: I think [our relationship with the public is] generally good and 
that's because really the familiarity with us, because we dealt with 
them and an issue that they had, or because they see us every other 
day walking around. It builds that link and a bond. And knowing the 
officer’s name, straight away there is a relationship. Sometimes it’s 
negative but a lot of times it’s positive. 
The PCSO here refers to situations where familiarity can be produced – during contacts 
with community members who have raised issues or when patrolling by foot. The 
continuous presence and visibility of police in the neighbourhood is seen as 
fundamental to community members knowing and recognising their local police.  Being 
on first name terms – or at least, the community member knowing the name of the 
NPT operative – signifies to police a personal connection, a ‘relationship’, where 
knowing a person’s name removes one layer of unfamiliarity. Removing this layer can 
create a positive bond, but this is not guaranteed40. 
Some respondents noted that some community members crave familiarity and a 
relationship with local police, and achieving this has been mutually beneficial to both 
parties. Respondents suggested that being a familiar presence to, and creating a 
heightened personal connection with, community members increases communication: 
JGM: [D]o you think that [familiarity] helps with that relationship? 
CSO1: Definitely because I think the public feel more comfortable 
telling you things. Do you know what I mean? A lot of people call me 
by first name when I walk around, and I like that because I think I'm 
not different to you guys. I'm just here in case you need help. That's 
how I see it and I can probably direct you or sort that help for you. 
But I'm exactly the same as you guys I'm no different. 
                                            
40 There is evidence to both support and cast doubt on the value of close, familiar relations 
between police and public. In the UK, Innes and Innes (2011) found that knowing police by 
name or appearance increases public confidence, but actual contact decreases confidence. 
More recently in the US, Lee et al. (2015) found that college students with less social distance 
to the police were more likely to have confidence in the police, but that negative encounters 
were associated with less confidence. A lack of procedural justice may play a role in negative 
outcomes; procedurally just behaviour - including treating people with dignity and respect - 
during police-citizen encounters generally increases, trust, legitimacy, and public cooperation 
with police (Tyler 2004). Skogan (2005) found that citizen (dis)satisfaction with police 
encounters in Chicago was related to the quality of police contact, the demographics of citizen 
interactants, and who initiated the encounter.  
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PC1: Then you know you've got that relationship strong enough for 
them to feel free to pick up the phone and speak to you whenever. 
Even though you're working it's like an extended network of friends 
and family and stuff. But you still keep that boundary, you know, of 
what your role is.  
The above are typical responses from respondents. Familiarity of local officers, being 
recognisable and being on first name terms with local people, was seen as a leveller – 
breaking down the differences in status between the public and police, and leading to 
a relationship where residents feel comfortable to make contact with police, improving 
communication. This has echoes of the mantra that ‘the police are the public and the 
public are the police’. The imagery of friends and family illustrates the kind of 
relationship where each party feels free to communicate, to speak to each other 
‘whenever’. PC1, however, adds the qualification that this closeness has limits. Police 
cannot remove all barriers, even if the neighbourhood role encourages a greater level 
of closeness41. To him, difference and distance are to some extent an unavoidable and 
necessary part of their role. 
The austerity era threatens this aspect of NP as falling NPT resources means that there 
is less time to nurture relationships with community members a breed familiarity, as 
this PCSO explains: 
NPT1 CSO1: I think it was a lot better. I think it was much better 
when, as I say, we had the numbers to focus on our areas. I would 
have a beat which was [microbeat] and that would be my beat. I 
would be able to pop in to the elderly care homes, pop in to the 
schools more often, and you’d know people on first name terms but 
now I can’t actually do that as much. Obviously, you stop going into 
places because you can’t be there, and obviously, that personal 
connection goes, doesn’t it? Whereas before you’d pop in and you’d 
say, “Oh, I’ve seen this, I’ve seen this.” You now go in for two weeks 
and people fluctuate, people move out and you walk in there’s a new 
manager, “Oh, I don’t know who you are.” And then the connections 
are lost basically. 
 
                                            





Connecting with members of communities, maintaining these relationships, and 
creating satisfaction and comfort was seen by most NPT operatives to be instrumental 
to the execution of other policing tasks and the fulfilment of police goals. Continuity 
and familiarity are components of the concept of a ‘single point of contact’ for a 
neighbourhood; an NPT operative whose name and contact details are known to 
community members to simplify channels of communication and encourage 
interactions and reporting. PC1 and PC4 explain below how the existence or absence 
of the single point of contact affects people’s disposition: 
PC1: But I think the main issue is a single point of contact. People 
are comfortable with that. When there's no consistency, residents, 
especially the older generation, when there's no consistency of who 
you're talking to, then having to repeat themselves too much that 
frustrates them, that frustrates the older generation. The kids they 
say one thing one day, then they say another. But the older 
generation, when they've said something, they actually said it and 
they don’t like repeating themselves, be that to me or to you, to 
somebody else.  
PC4: To the community, I think it is having officers who are known, 
who members of the public can recognise and know as one of their 
local community officers and having that continuity of a 
neighbourhood team. The community get really fed up and annoyed 
when we as a force keep changing our neighbourhood teams, moving 
particularly the supervisors and inspectors. That really pisses them 
off. And the positive spin off of the force is by having that continuity 
of neighbourhood teams, we build up that trust with the community 
and from that we gain information and intelligence.  
The continuous presence of this recognisable figure in the neighbourhood engenders 
comfort, but absence of the single point of contact angers certain groups who expect 
this continuity. The example of older people’s frustration with repeating themselves 
illustrates how community members dissatisfied with police organisation can become 
less responsive to their local police representatives, and consequently reports of local 
crimes and problems fall and intelligence thins out. Falling resources in NP means that 
this familiarity and continuity is threatened by the personnel being lost or shifted from 
their neighbourhoods to cover gaps elsewhere: 
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NPT1 CSO2: Because of losing numbers off the team, we have to 
keep rejigging who's got what beat, what microbeat. So I went in 
yesterday, and they were like, 'oh you’re back'. And I said 'no, it’s 
because someone is off sick who actually runs that microbeat.' So it’s 
confusing for them. It’s like, “oh, so you’re not back then?” Because 
that was my original beat with the officer who left the team for 
[other area]. And you have to keep explaining though, “it’s not my 
beat, so you won't be dealing with me directly. This is your officer 
but because they’re off, then I can deal with whatever it is that 
you’ve got a problem with.” Yes it’s difficult because you feel like 
you have to keep explaining the situation. 
Gaining higher levels of intelligence is also contingent on the community’s trust of the 
police, which is itself expected to be nurtured by continuous presence of known, 
recognisable police. Trust of the police by the community is also seen as a condition 
of passing on higher levels of intelligence. The absence of this figure would therefore 
damage the connection between police and community and closes down opportunities 
for communication. Organisationally, these activities rely on team stasis to prevent 
abstractions or other uncertain geographical allocation of staff resources. In this 
passage, CSO2 identifies the qualities of a single point of contact that leads to open 
communication: 
CSO2: I’ve been on holiday, and I’ve been walking around the City 
Centre today, and people say, “Oh, you’re back. Oh, we’ve missed 
you. We've been quiet [CSO2’s first name].” Isn’t it great? If you 
spend time talking to your community and go and approach them, 
and take time to get to know them, and find out what affects their 
business or what doesn’t affect their business, or just have a general 
chat, the community are so open arms to you. That’s what they want 
to see. They want to see those approachable, smiling, helpful 
people. They don’t necessarily call on us every five minutes; that’s 
not the case at all, but they want to see us walk through the city and 
know and feel reassured that we’re there and happy that we’re there 
and I’ve clearly been missed. They miss you as well [laughs].  
Building a connection with the community is not just about being present as a single 
point of contact, it also relies on the quality of interaction. As was clear from the 
observations of PACT meetings in all neighbourhoods, body language, demeanour, and 
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attitude are often used as ways to endear police to their local communities, and to 
encourage community members to open up productive channels of communication.  
5.3.3 Collaboration and problem solving 
Although working with others on neighbourhood security issues is in part another way 
connecting with communities, collaboration is a distinct category of NPT action due to 
its processes and objectives. It is not primarily about forging relationships – though 
good relations are considered conducive to effective processes of collaboration – but 
instead the practices involved in working with other neighbourhood stakeholders 
towards the fulfilment of shared goals (McCarthy 2014). These shared goals may be the 
explicit reasons for such interactions and partnerships, but police engage in 
collaboration as a means to achieving other policing objectives. Therefore, good 
partners to the police are those who have strategic utility42. 
5.3.3.1 Community Collaboration 
In community engagement, with individuals representing a community or communities 
in one part of a neighbourhood, some police view good collaboration as including actors 
who provide most benefit to the police in carrying out their duties and achieving their 
goals.  
Serg 1: I think the pressures always there to have those links with 
the community. I think the reason they want us to engage with the 
community is that when something does happen, we’re able to reach 
out to the community and defuse situations. I think that’s the 
motivation behind it. I figure on a day-to-day basis there’s no 
requirement for me to go out and link with the community. Yes, it’s 
part of my day job, we should be meeting and greeting people, but 
it’s more important for me to have links with key members of the 
community so that if they’ve got an issue in the community then they 
come to us, and if we’ve got an issue with that community then we 
can approach them.  
It’s like, we had a murder yesterday in [place]. After this meeting 
I’m going to see the senior investigating officer in charge of the 
murder. She’s going to speak to me about who to reach out to in the 
                                            
42 In the context of austerity, there are signs that police and other agencies are prioritising 




community to get intelligence to try and solve this murder. So it’s 
that time then that it’s key. You’ve done all the groundwork. You’ve 
gone in, picked up phones and spoke to the right people. That’s what 
I think community engagement is for, rather than just going out there 
and speaking to just anybody.  
The sergeant uses engagement to help his team defuse situations, solve issues and 
detect offenders. Rather than routine community engagement and informal 
interactions, he prioritises building bonds with a strategic contact from a community, 
a person who is both a conduit of information and an enabler of reciprocal relations 
between police and community. Together, these contacts are known as a Key 
Individual Network, or KIN, and they make up the civilian membership of the allies 
grouping.  
The contact passes on information to the police to build intelligence about situations 
and incidents, and they also receive police contact or information when the police 
need to ‘reach out’ to a troubled community or in times of urgent need, such as 
detaining a person suspected of a serious violent crime.  
The contact needs to be the ‘right’ person; someone who has access to useful 
information and is sympathetic to police objectives. Other respondents did have a 
broader understanding of community engagement processes than this sergeant, but 
the emphasis of strategic relations is applicable to other collaborative efforts 
undertaken by NPTs. 
5.3.3.2 Multi-agency Collaboration 
Police consider a good partner to have the potential or track record of easing workloads 
or providing information that would otherwise be hard to come by. Beyond official 
remits and powers, police sometimes encourage partners to act as conduits of 
information between the partner’s work setting and the police. Shop owners, for 
example, are encouraged to utilise video technologies to record incidents and to pass 
on evidence of incrimination. Another common example is those partners that work 
with or inside housing estates that make up considerable amounts of police demand, . 
This PCSO laments the loss of an extremely useful partner in this regard – the tower 
block concierge: 
NPT1 CSO1: Actually, as I said before, covering a large area with lots 
of tower blocks and flats, there used to be the concierge based at 
the tower around [area in neighbourhood], so you’d have somebody 
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based in [one] Tower it was and somebody based in [another] Tower, 
think it was. They basically control all the CCTV. They liaison for you, 
so if I wanted to know who had been in and out of the block or if I 
wanted to know if they’d any calls about, noise nuisance, I go straight 
to them. We were on friendly terms and they’d help me out with 
information and vice versa. 
They got took out a couple of years ago now I think it was, and there’s 
nothing there now. If I want any information, I have to phone up the 
housing officer. The problem with that is the housing officer doesn’t 
just cover those flats so they don’t know as much basically.  
The concierge’s role and resources meant that the PCSO had access to superior 
surveillance and extended knowledge of the occurrences within these tower blocks. 
Different partners have different access to resources of information, and liaising with 
the housing officer does not provide the privileged access previously enjoyed by the 
PCSO. This suggests that the austerity era may serve to exacerbate the decline of 
secondary social control agents and activities (Jones and Newburn 2002, 140) in some 
spaces, and by extension reducing the broader security network that NPTs rely on. 
As well as these covert processes, police use partners, such as housing associations, to 
try and open up channels of communication between NPTs and residents who have 
purposefully limited relations with police, as this PC explains: 
NPT1 PC1: A lot of people because of where they come from have 
got a natural distrust of police, which obviously as the neighbourhood 
team we're keen to show them that they can trust the police and 
country. But it's very, very difficult to try and breach that. A lot of 
the groups in the community are quite gated. They’re guarded 
against – and that's where obviously with the housing associations 
that is a way into what to speak to them and show them that they 
can speak to us normally and that we’re not there to – obviously 
we’re there to enforce the law but we’re not there as – we're 
approachable is what I'm trying to say at the same time.  
In this way, partners can act as intermediaries and communicative links between 
residents and police. Police use partners that are in close proximity to these groups to 
establish a link with their clients.  The hope is that the police can build trust with 
people who are disengaged form the police. Whether this is a likely outcome or not, 
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police messages to these groups can be given extra legitimacy if these agencies deliver 
the same messages, as the inspector explains: 
Insp1: Like I said, via safer estates, going through partners to talk to 
their clients, who are invariably the same as ours, so that the 
message can get kind of spread out, you know, it’s not just coming 
from the police. You know, ‘my housing officer also told us that.’ So 
therefore, it kind of lends a bit more credibility. A lot of the time we 
say something, and it’s like, ‘well, you would say that’, or you know, 
‘you’re trying to protect your own’, or something of that nature. 
5.3.4 Information gathering 
Knowledge about local communities, characters, crime, and disorder is produced by 
NPTs through the gathering of raw intelligence and the creation of data. Police seek 
to create opportunities for community members to reveal pieces of information that 
would otherwise be restricted.  
5.3.4.1 Community intelligence mining 
One tactic is to operate in the social spaces of community members, such as holding 
surgeries in cafes or meetings in, for example, community centres. 
PC1: We are really skimming the surface now. It’s the lack of in depth 
we're able to provide. Before you were able to go to speak to two, 
three people or members of your community at a diner. You got so 
much intelligence over one cup of tea. Now as an individual officer 
in our neighbourhood we don’t get time to do anything like that. … 
We had built that relationship. The relationship building is gone. 
According to PC1, the presence of police in the neighbourhood allows these ventures 
into neutral and familiar spaces where actors engage in familiar rituals, which 
encourages the community members to freely pass on information, improving the 
depth of intelligence and local knowledge produced. The way PC1 describes this type 
of information-gathering exercise can be contrasted with PACT meetings; at the former 
the attendees are allies, perhaps because they are specifically invited to these 
informal events, whereas any community member can attend the latter, including 
time-wasters. PC1 fears that staff resource constraints directly impinge on information 




The information passed to police can be utilised directly in their other activities, such 
as investigation, and/or inputted into the organisation’s intelligence database. In 
regard to the former, gathering information is one building block of the NPT 
operative’s ‘scheme of interpretation’. That is, information gathering itself partially 
informs the way police understand the physical features, people, and problems of their 
neighbourhood. These understandings can be drawn upon to investigate incidents or 
solve problems:  
PC2: That vulnerable person who has seen your face before and has 
got that confidence in telling you things. …I could be out on my bike 
or just popping somewhere and they'll say, "[PC's name], I've got 
something to tell you," and it might be that little snippet of 
information that puts together a job or somebody who's bringing in 
stolen goods because they've got that confidence in you. You lose the 
numbers, that's happening less and less now because they're not 
seeing us enough. 
‘Snippets of information’ that are given to police by community members can be 
combined with existing local knowledge to piece together an understanding of a recent 
incident or on-going problem, also referred to as the ‘jigsaw approach’ to investigation 
based on information gathering (Fielding 1995, 168). Respondents considered that their 
scheme of interpretation is of, at least, equal quality to the directions provided by 
senior officers after neighbourhood data have been analysed:  
NPT2 Serg: We have a list. There's a meeting that they do with senior 
officers here and various inspectors and obviously the data is 
collected. And then I will then look at that demand list. I'm always 
looking at it anyways to be honest with you. So, when I get the list 
from the senior management team there is no real surprises for me. 
Because I found that when you are looking at the logs on a daily basis, 
you’re looking at the crime at a daily basis, when you then get a 
hotspot address, nine times out of ten you are already working on 
that address already, and you’re trying to combat it before it’s even 
flagged up. 
Sergeants in NPTs especially can build a broad scheme of interpretation of their 
neighbourhood by informally analysing incoming data, such as reports from police or 
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community members. In their managerial role, this knowledge can be used to direct 
and distribute the NPT’s resources. 
5.3.4.2 Knowledge Exchange 
The flow of information is, in some cases, bidirectional. In the quest to connect and 
collaborate with communities, especially where there is a strategic case for doing so, 
police share information with specific community members: 
PC4: In this neighbourhood team, for example, I am the designated 
CT prevent officer for the area where I work as the area is deemed 
to be vulnerable in terms of radicalization. One of my weekly tasks 
is to speak to my community contacts, engage the feeling of the 
community in relation to worldwide events, UK foreign policy, et 
cetera, and that’s a weekly task. I then feed in to a community 
impact assessment, which is done, which is at a tactical and strategic 
level. Yes, community teams I feel are crucially important for that 
flow of information. And it is a two-way flow as we are hearing of 
information, and in instants we can feed back. We have those 
relationships with those key members of the community and it is an 
open corridor of information exchange. 
The ‘key members of the community’ are those individuals of strategic importance to 
the police, who are the gatekeepers of access to ‘hard to reach’, vulnerable 
communities and restricted knowledge. These strategic relations in the West Midlands 
are currently aimed largely at Muslim communities who are deemed at risk of 
radicalisation and extremist activities. Maintaining trustful relationships with these 
contacts, just as with partnering agencies, involves the reciprocal arrangement of 
bidirectional information sharing, though the PC’s later example of this relates to 
giving advice and support to communities affected by radicalisation, rather than 
restricted knowledge held by the organisation. In other engagement activities, police 
do pass on advice to community members and share anonymised data or information 
about local crimes and problems. 
5.3.5 Crime control 
Although the majority of respondents did not associate the core duties of NPTs with a 
crime and incident focused style of policing, some police still valued this type of 
policing more highly than neighbourhood security activities. Regardless of these police 
sub-cultural preferences, NPTs practice crime control and law enforcement activities 
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in their own and, in times, other neighbourhoods. These activities cover a number of 
policing functions: prevention of crime and ASB through, for instance, targeted patrols, 
diversions, and offender management; enforcement of the law through responding to 
calls for service and apprehending suspects; investigation and detection work through, 
for instance, executing warrants.  
5.3.5.1 Diversions 
An activity that NPTs also employ in the name of prevention, but is not driven by data 
analysis, is the practice of diverting youth from crime or criminogenic lifestyles 
through community-based initiatives and programmes, or early interventions. In 
contrast to data-driven tactics, such as TAPs, police who undertake these interventions 
sometimes worry that due to the nature of the initiative the effects are not as easy to 
measure, and thus will not be considered to be a valuable use of police time by the 
wider organisation and their managers (for a similar account, see McCarthy 2014, 141): 
NPT1 CSO3: Myself and [other PCSO] run a football coaching thing 
for all the school kids where we’ll go round and organise so they’ve 
got something to do in the holidays. Stop them messing about or 
doing whatever else they might be doing. But that’s not necessarily 
recorded anywhere.  We’d write the reports and stuff, but somebody 
on the response team isn’t going to know about that.  
Diversion yes, and obviously it just builds more relationships with us, 
because we turn up in our football kit and talk about how Man United 
got on at the weekend, and then just when your just in between 
games or whatever you talk about the latest computer games. 
Because being a youngish lad myself, I’ve got a lot in common with a 
14-year-old lad on the basis of I like PlayStation games and I like 
football and stuff like that. I like a nice pair of trainers, whatever. 
So you can talk about that kind of stuff rather than police stuff, and 
they see you as totally different. So it works on all levels. And then 
the lads are more likely to come up to you and go, “I’m having a bit 
of trouble at school” or “I’m having a bit of trouble at home.” It’s 
just a bit more—they see you as a person.  
These kinds of early interventions are crime control and prevention activities that 
follow the logic of ‘soft’ policing and a community-oriented ethos, through methods 
of persuasion and displays of shared values and interests between police and young 
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people. The closeness provided by police-led initiatives provides the opportunities for 
police to humanise themselves in order to connect with, and feel more trusted by, 
young people. These kinds of projects are traditional community policing activities, 
focused on building relationships through interpersonal connections. This area of 
policing, though notionally connected to preventing crime and disorder, is closer to a 
social service in which the ‘big stick’ of policing is absent (Fielding 2002). 
5.3.5.2 ‘Hard’ interventions 
On the ‘harder’ side of the spectrum, NPT operatives make use of coercive legal 
powers to investigate and prevent crime and ASB. The PCSO role and NP were 
established in the same era as other government policies that sought greater control 
over ASB and other less serious offences. The influence of those policies, such as the 
creation of the Antisocial Behaviour Order (ASBO), is still present in the way police 
deal with ASB even though the policies and powers have since been reformed. The use 
of one such punitive intervention, the civil injunction, was referred to by the following 
PC: 
PC3: So the neighbourhood teams have become very professional and 
proficient at dealing with, for example, civil interventions - what 
were anti-social behaviour orders and they’ve just changed recently. 
A lot of the colleagues on response and CID wouldn’t have a clue if 
we said, “Well let’s get an injunction against somebody that they 
can’t be in the presence of any unaccompanied girl under the age of 
18.” A lot of colleagues might look and go, “Why would you do that?” 
– “Because the intel is he’s a child sexual offender. We’ve got all this 
intel on him and we’re going to go and get an injunction saying he 
can’t be anywhere in England and Wales in the company of an 
unaccompanied girl.” So those sort of things the neighbourhood 
teams have become really quite good at.  
Although NP embraces the use of ‘soft’ interventions and less punitive methods, long-
established coercive powers were still being used by NPTs to control crime, and NPT 
operatives felt capable of using these powers well. 
5.3.5.3 Warrants 
Sergeants talked about the operations and activities that NPTs undertook in order to 
control crime through investigation and detection, such as search warrants for drug 
operations and operations that focused on traffic and parking. To the following 
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sergeant, tackling a drugs problem was intuitively a good way to reduce all crime in 
his neighbourhood: 
Serg 1: Invariably I used to do one or two warrants, execute a few 
drugs warrants a month, pair and execute them. I used to have an 
officer that would just deal with warrants for me, because warrants 
go hand in hand with crime. So I’ve said got a drugs problem, so to 
combat that we need warrants. If we can get rid of the drugs 
problem, you can cut a lot of the other associated crime. That’s the 
first thing that went so I haven’t been able to do a warrant for 6 
months now. Other things… operations like parking operations, 
speeding operations, that type of thing has gone out of the window 
because I haven’t go the capacity to do that. In the middle I look at 
ASB and community cohesion, everything else around that was 
secondary. That stuff was coming in slowly and at least I can deliver 
that. At least I can respond to public calls for service. 
The above also illustrates how NPT operatives saw NP changing due to the loss of 
warranted officer resources. In this case, the loss of officers meant that proactive 
targeting of specific problems of crime was less likely to be undertaken. Instead, the 
community-focused functions and responding to crime and ASB made up an increasing 
proportion of NP work. Rather than ‘soft’ activities being at most risk of being 
deprioritised, it was the proactivity and responsivity of the problem-solving approach 
that some respondents, especially sergeants and PCs, found more difficult to sustain. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the way NP is socially organised in urban areas of the West 
Midlands, highlighting a number of factors involved in influencing local policing 
delivery. The most significant finding in relation to this thesis is that there are 
competing narratives amongst NPT operatives of how NP should be delivered. In 
contrast to some notable studies of police culture in general (Loftus 2009; Rubenstein 
1973; Van Maanen 1978) and in NP (Bullock and Leeney 2013; Ramshaw and Cosgrove 
2013; Cosgrove 2016), neighbourhood security activities were more likely to be viewed 
by the respondents as the primary functions of NP. That is, the dominant shared 
assumption is of NP as a specialised arena for the delivery of ‘soft’ police functions 
(reassurance, engagement, and problem-solving) and skills (communication, 
persuasion, and negotiation) in the wider organisational pursuit of crime reduction. 
The evocation of community-focused activities and relationship building is also used 
163 
 
defensively, as a critique of the pressures of new organisational realities and 
expectations that threaten to reform their roles and practice (see Manning 1997, 133), 
such as the use of NPT operatives for the work of other specialised teams or 
management focus on short-term crime reduction as a measure of success. 
In contrast with the logic of the dominant narrative, some NPT operatives regularly 
questioned the value of a consumer-oriented ethos in engagement activities and sought 
ways to reduce the amount of ‘un-actionable’ demands made of them by time-wasters, 
often through community engagement activities. This fits with reform narratives of 
demand management/reduction that promote a redefinition of the NP remit in order 
to reduce workloads. However, actual changes to practice observed by respondents 
did not move solely towards either crime control or neighbourhood security functions, 
but were characterised more by a loss of proactivity and longer-term problem-solving 
due to diminishing resources of personnel and time in both police and partner agencies. 
Police organisations may view more utilisation of partner capacities as a smart way to 
reduce demand, but some agencies face similar squeezes to their resources and as a 
result use the logic of demand management and segregated remits to refuse 
responsibilities passed on from other agencies. 
The setting and situational demands of neighbourhoods were shown to influence how 
NPTs organised their work. NPT operatives interpret their settings – the characteristics 
of the neighbourhood and its inhabitants – in order to make decisions about what kind 
of work is necessary to deal with known problems. Geography also influences the 
available partners or communities who provide the most strategically useful 
relationships for dealing with local problems of crime and disorder. NPT work is flexible 
and context-specific as police react to situational realities of their neighbourhoods. 
What is still not completely clear from the data, however, is the full range of reasons 
for the prioritisation of specific problems in neighbourhoods at the time of research. 
Certain communities and partners appear to have more avenues of collaboration with 
NPTs and therefore more sway over defining local problems. Partners are sometimes 
chosen due to their capacity to understand problems and coproduce solutions, and this 
supports the notion of the ‘new’ pragmatism in the NPT sub-culture (O’Neill and 
McCarthy 2012). Data and intelligence products from ‘above’ appear to define crime 
control problems, such as the case of TAP – an area of proactive policing that is 
produced from data that is collected both from the neighbourhood and by NPTs, but is 
analysed above the NPT level.  
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Sergeants occupy a crucial position in the NPT structure from which to internally 
influence change and negotiate new NPT practices, as the agenda of an NPT is 
influenced by sergeant’s views of NP work. In this study, sergeants were influenced by 
the promise of new crime analysis technologies, scientifically approved/improved 
practices, and measurable outcomes. A more crime control oriented view of NPT work 
combined with their managerial discretion could lead to significant changes in NP in 
the future. However, a competing narrative of NPT work could also face resistance 
from the lower ranks and the ‘new’ dominant view of NP. 
Changes to the socio-economic environment influence police to think in new ways 
about how they perform their work, and eventually this could lead to individuals within 
NPTs enacting change. Ideas are produced and reproduced by different actors – 
sometimes from higher up in the organisation, sometimes from broader discussions in 
the policing field and between colleagues. Ideas, rhetoric, and narratives filter through 
organisations with varying levels of effect. Reforms and stories of reform must be made 
sense of at the street-level, and in NPTs some of the new ideas about NP delivery are 
gaining cultural currency to an extent – especially where they resonate with narratives 
of professionalization and efficiency and the stripping away of particular functions that 
are not viewed as core police work. On the other hand, these ideas and narratives are 
not accepted unconditionally and are in tension with particular cultural understandings 
of NP, which increases the likelihood of resistance to new styles of delivery in a way 





6 The Interaction Order of Police Community Meetings 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the austerity-era delivery of community engagement by 
neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs) at public meetings and explores the interactions 
between police and community members during this type of encounter. This 
exploration is undertaken with a view to understanding how stories of reform in the 
austerity era and the police-community interactions affect police delivery of 
community engagement. To be successful, police organisational reform relies, to some 
extent, on street-level practitioners understanding and accepting new policy rhetoric 
if it is to become policy in practice (for example, Chan 1997; Skogan 2008; Loftus 
2009). The previous chapter explored how police make sense of NP work and how they 
understand both recent and upcoming change programmes in West Midlands Police. It 
noted that stories of demand management/reduction were often used to negotiate 
reforms that signalled a departure from the previous organisation of local policing 
work. How, then, do these stories and understandings play out in the arena of police-
community engagement activities? How is the delivery of community engagement 
affected by these understandings of organisational change? 
Police and Communities Together (PACT) meetings bring police from NPTs, residents 
of the same neighbourhood, and occasionally other public officials and partners 
together for face-to-face encounters. These encounters are designed to provide a 
forum for local communities to raise any local issues of public safety and crime, oblige 
police and partners to prioritise community concerns, and hold local police and 
officials to account at regular intervals43. The main function of community engagement 
under the NP model is to ensure that the police are responsive to the community-
defined problems that most impact a sense of local security (Skogan and Hartnett 
1997), as well as to provide strategic interactions and collaboration with those 
communities that have critical security needs (Innes 2006). Community engagement 
through these meetings also contributes to the democratic aspirations of community 
policing, by providing forums for participation and deliberation that rebuild trust and 
social capital, even if the consultation format is somewhat flawed in practice (Bullock 
and Sindall 2014; Hughes and Rowe 2009; Gilling 2007). 
                                            
43 The Policing and Social Responsibility Act 2011 dictates that meetings between local police 
and residents must be held in each ‘neighbourhood’ at ‘regular’ intervals, but does not define 
‘regular’ and allows police chiefs to define ‘neighbourhood’. 
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The existence of events that can be used as tools by local communities to potentially 
influence local policing priorities raises the possibility that police organisational reform 
could be constrained by such a mechanism that encourages public control over police 
decision-making (Foster and Jones 2010), but focusing on the influence of only the 
community in these encounters ignores not only the police presence, role and action 
at the event, but also the interaction itself. The presence and role of the police actors 
at PACT means that communities do not always have significant influence over local 
police priorities when concerns raised by the community are reframed by police to suit 
organisational or team objectives or even rejected entirely as issues that are not ‘real’ 
police work or are ‘unpoliceable’ (Hunter and Fyfe 2012; Rousell and Gascón 2014). 
This exposes a tension between the philosophy and the practice of the community 
engagement mechanism in neighbourhood policing. The PACT meeting interaction 
itself, however, is not so easily controlled by police – that is, the way that face-to-
face encounters influence the possibilities of police performances and the strategies 
they use to form an impression of themselves and their organisation (Manning 1997, 
40). Looking beyond the outcomes of PACT, the behaviours and restraints to behaviour 
that form the face-to-face interactions in community engagement can, in theory, 
influence what types of new relationships can be forged with communities in an era of 
(attempted) comprehensive reforms to policing. This is where Erving Goffman’s 
understanding of social interaction is useful. 
6.1.1 The Interaction Order 
The work of Goffman and his ultimate concept of the ‘interaction order’ provide an 
analytical apparatus for exploring the police-community interactions at PACT. For 
Goffman, whenever actors are co-present in face-to-face encounters, where one actor 
can sense that they are being perceived by another, pronounced behavioural changes 
occur that “provide evidence of our statuses and relationships” (1983, 3). These 
behaviours include manner, appearance, and talk, which make up our ‘expressive 
equipment’ (Goffman 1959, 32) – the tools we use to express meaning about ourselves 
in social situations. The fact that these encounters reveal consistent features of social 
organisation, Goffman argues, illustrates that the interaction order is an ‘analytically 
viable’ domain of activity (Goffman 1983, 2), distinct from other domains, such as the 
‘economic order’. The idea of consistency in the arrangements of this domain across 
time and space means that the interaction order contains an orderliness: 
I mean to refer in the first instance to a domain of activity – a 
particular kind of activity, as in the phrase, “the economic order.” 
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No implications are intended concerning how “orderly” such activity 
ordinarily is, or the role of norms and rules in supporting such 
orderliness as does obtain. Yet it appears to me that as an order of 
activity, the interaction one, more than any other perhaps, is in fact 
orderly, and that this orderliness is predicated on a large base of 
shared cognitive presuppositions, if not normative ones, and self-
sustained restraints. (Goffman 1983, 5; original emphasis) 
This doesn’t mean that the order is a “product of normative consensus” as is the case 
in social order (Goffman 1983, 5), but rather the reasons for maintaining the 
interaction order are more varied, including the expectations of others’ behaviour and 
an array of cultural assumptions we bring to an interaction – the foundations of the 
“cognitive relation we have with those present before us” (Ibid., 4). Since the 
interaction order is orderly, with actors tacitly supporting its arrangements to maintain 
it, the order can also be breached and repaired. Goffman’s body of work is dedicated 
to detailing the ways that these phenomena occur.  
Goffman analyses the maintenance, breaching and repair of the interaction order by 
viewing interaction as a set of staged performances, where actors perform roles that 
are commensurate with their self-conception. An actor does this because they know 
that other participants in an interaction – their audience – seek information pertaining 
to the actor’s background, attitude, personal qualities, and so on. This is because: 
Information about the individual helps to define the situation, 
enabling others in advance what he will expect of them and what 
they may expect of him. Informed in these ways the others will know 
how to best act in order to call forth a desired response from him. 
(Goffman 1959, 1) 
Goffman names this process, where actors are selective in what they present to others 
in order to influence perceptions and thus interactions, ‘impression management’. 
Police use presentational strategies to manage public impressions and expectations of 
police action, capabilities and competence (Manning 1997). These impressions, as part 
of the interaction order, are maintained through presentational strategies but can be 
breached by ‘expressively incompatible’ events (Goffman 1959, 235-236). A more 
contemporary conceptual manifestation of these kinds of breaches is ‘interactional 
vandalism’, which refers to a deliberate breaching of the interaction order where a 
‘subordinate person breaks the tacit basis of everyday interaction of value to the more 
powerful” (Duneier and Molotch 1999, 1288). This illustrates the way that breaches 
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can give people of lower status a kind of pleasure, and simultaneously deprive people 
of higher status of “the ability to assume in others the practices behind the social 
bond” and thus a sense of ontological security (Ibid., 1290). In police-community 
encounters, residents, I will suggest, sometimes deliberately breach the interaction 
order for the purpose of challenging police presentational strategies and deriving a 
political benefit.  
What can be breached can also be repaired, and Goffman uses a number of concepts 
to describe different strategies of interactional repair, such as those that fall under 
the concept of ‘face-work’ (Goffman 1967). The face metaphor is central to the idea 
of maintenance, breaches and repairs, where face can be saved, lost or renewed. 
Similar to the idea of presentational strategies, a performance that attempts to 
maintain specific impressions is dubbed a ‘line’ – “a pattern of verbal and acts by which 
[an actor] expresses his view of the situation and through his evaluation of the 
participants, especially himself.” (Goffman 1967, 5) The line an actor presents should, 
in order to maintain face, “present an image of him that is internally consistent” and 
is supported by others (Ibid., 6). The breakdown of a line and the resulting loss of face, 
an interaction breached, leads to shame and embarrassment. Goffman (1967, 20-22) 
outlines a number of micro-actions that act as repairing strategies, such as: challenging 
the misconduct that threatens face and breaches order; giving the offending actor an 
opportunity to correct or redefine the offence, compensate for it, or castigate 
themselves; the acceptance of the offender’s offering, and; the expression of 
gratitude from the forgiven offender. Police community engagement work at PACT 
involves the maintenance and repair of the interaction order by both police and 
residents, and is carried out for the sake of amiable relations and continued 
collaboration. 
Strauss (1978) has argued that while a focus on the domain of interaction is crucial for 
understanding resistance to change, viewing group interactions through Goffman’s 
framework emphasises inertia and does not adequately theorise social change: 
Goffman’s social order is extremely fragile, its rules subject to 
disobedience or unwitting breakage, its interaction continuously 
subject to potential or actual disruption. Manipulation of events, of 
self, of other’s situations, of props, and so on, is a constant feature 
of that interaction. At most, negotiation serves mainly to maintain 
that fragile order in some sort of uneasy equilibrium or to reinstate 
it after its disruption – certainly not to change the features of that 
170 
 
order, to develop it into something new. Goffman, for the most part, 
seems relatively uninterested in social change. Neither social change 
nor negotiation is central to his thought. (Strauss 1978, 38) 
Strauss’ concept of ‘negotiated order’, on the other hand, allows for more agency in 
the interactions between individuals and collectives, and thus emphasises how 
individuals and groups “continually make adjustments to the situations in which they 
find themselves” (Fine 1984, 243). Both Goffman and Strauss recognise that individuals 
and groups are embedded in social structures – such as organisations, cultures, and 
history – and constantly perceive these structures within interaction (Ibid.). However, 
Strauss argues that actors constantly negotiate change to “achieve their interests and 
legitimate their perspectives” (Barley 2017, 348), albeit with the various structural 
understandings and constraints and the influence this has on the possibilities for 
negotiation. For police institutional change, this alludes to the potential for change 
and resistance through interaction, between internal constituents themselves (police-
police interaction) or internal and external constituents (e.g. police-community 
interaction), but highlights the importance of structures and rules for influencing these 
processes. 
6.1.2 Three Neighbourhoods 
The following sections compare three different neighbourhood sites (see chapter 3 for 
information), describing and exploring the interaction order of police community 
engagement at PACT. In each site, the meetings undertaken in one PACT venue provide 
the data, and each of these settings has its own distinct atmosphere and recent 
historical relations between police and community. Two meetings from each venue 
provide data, and within each story these different meetings are occasionally 
contrasted with each other to show the effect of time on the development of relations 
and the consequent effects on the interaction order. Analysing neighbourhoods 
separately emphasises the importance of the environmental context of NP work. 
6.2 The Bastion of a Reformed Neighbourhood 
In order to maintain the potential benefit of contacts, officers must 
invest considerable time in a series of ‘community contacts’ which, 




Maintaining confidence is a popular rhetorical strategy in the delivery of community 
engagement, and this was a strong theme in Heathville. The Sergeant was determined 
to maintain both the delivery of neighbourhood policing in Heathville and the 
perceptions that the residents had of the team’s capabilities. The latter is compatible 
with the view that effective police work relies on the confidence, trust and 
cooperation of local communities. Encouraging confidence was a deliberate strategy 
of the Sergeant in order to preserve the conditions of relative safety that had been 
achieved in the neighbourhood in recent decades. The surrounding ward and most 
neighbourhoods in the ward are classified as ‘most deprived’ in the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation, both in relation to the country and the metropolitan district. The 
neighbourhood where I attended the community meeting is no exception. The 
neighbourhood, and one housing estate in particular, was infamous in the late 
twentieth century for its high deprivation, crime and incivilities. I was told by one 
resident, ‘Bob’, that the notoriety of the local housing estate was such that a well-
known television production company sent an even more well-known television news 
presenter into the estate to film a secret documentary. This, he said, did not end well 
as the presenter was targeted by locals during his stay and was eventually “chased out 
of the area”. 
Since these troubled days, the neighbourhood has been through a positive 
transformation as crime and antisocial behaviour rates have plummeted. Bob was 
adamant that these reductions were due to the policing and community safety reforms 
in the era of the New Labour Government. He also mentioned that Heathville has 
become even safer due to the good work of the Sergeant and his team since the 
Sergeant took charge of the NPT five years ago, which is supported by local police 
recorded crime statistics. It is also a view that was shared by the other attendees of 
the community meeting, who were very vocal about what a good job the Sergeant has 
done and how much they appreciate his efforts. In this environment, it might be 
expected that maintaining confidence is not an onerous task, and this was the reality 
to some degree. However, when contrasted with the rhetorical strategy of managing 
expectations, it is notable that this strategy is actively pursued in the face of dwindling 
team resources – to the extent that the Sergeant suggested the quality of service will 
remain the same regardless of recent reductions in staffing levels and boundary 
enlargements. 
I attended the meeting on the day that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had made the 
announcement in the Autumn Spending Review statement that the policing budget was 
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to be protected. This followed some weeks of speculation about the level of the next 
round of cuts to policing, as departments had been asked by the Treasury to model 
real terms spending reductions of twenty-five and forty per cent by 2019-20 (HM 
Treasury 2015). The Home Office was one of the unprotected departments, but its fate 
in the spending review was kept secret from the press and the public and so the 
eventual announcement was met with surprise in the media and relief across police 
organisations. This was a concern for NPTs and residents as West Midlands Police had 
recently announced the impending loss of over four hundred PCSOs from their 
workforce due to financial pressures (BBC News 2015a). Even following this news, the 
Sergeant remained cautious, warning the residents that the plan to cut PCSOs might 
still go ahead so they should be prepared for Heathville to lose resources.  
The sergeant reminds attendees that PCSOs may be lost from the 
team in line with plans announced by the force. He draws attention 
again to news today of police budget protection in spending review, 
and links this to recent terrorist attack in Paris. He says because of 
this the losses planned for PCSOs are now not totally inevitable but 
that residents should still be prepared for the PCSO cuts to go ahead. 
He says that the PCSOs do a great job. 
Bob says this would be a shame as he thinks without the PCSOs the 
team will lack the “eyes and ears” they have now. He asks how many 
PCSOs and PCs have been lost recently. The sergeant tells him PCs 
have been lost but there is one more PCSO in the team compared to 
the recent past.  
Harry asks if the force could employ more specials. The sergeant says 
there is a force wide freeze on special recruitment. He explains that 
specials have too high of a turnover. Specials join and soon realise 
they don’t want to do the job. He says this also costs the force lots 
of money in ‘kit’. 
This sharing of concern and hope for future policing resources and community safety 
was one sign of the strength of the bonds built in this neighbourhood between the team 
and these residents44. The developing story of the effect of the cuts on the ability of 
the police to meet local priorities was a common theme across nearly every meeting I 
                                            
44 They would learn less than a month later that the planned cuts to the PCSO workforce would 
not go ahead due to the protected budget. (See BBC News 2015b) 
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observed, and this talk often acted as a show of reciprocal solidarity between police 
and residents in areas where residents had congenial relations with police. 
6.2.1 Cooling the Residents out 
Although the consensus amongst the residents was that the Sergeant had been doing a 
good job in Heathville – a general approval, confidence and trust in his ability and 
actions – the most striking part of the first community meeting I attended in Heathville 
came when one resident, Sheena, had to be ‘cooled out’ by the Sergeant not long in 
to the meeting: 
Sheena says a neighbour’s window was broken during an attempted 
burglary and she was involved in reporting the incident and witnessed 
the damage.  
“No one came to see me.”  
She says the Sergeant promised her that she would be visited by him 
or another team member. She is calm but seems to be upset by this 
and has her arms folded. The Sergeant shows surprise with wide eyes 
and raised eyebrows.  
“No one came? Really?”  
He then apologises sincerely. He explains that one of the PCSOs was 
told to attend and he thought that the task had been undertaken. He 
says he is very annoyed that this didn’t happen and will raise the 
issue with the PCSO the next time he sees him.  
 ‘Cooling out the mark’ is a method of consoling those who are distressed after a 
discrepancy between expectation and reality - a loss of status leading to humiliation 
and damage to or destruction of the self. The ‘cooler’ takes on the role of consoling 
or pacifying the victim of the loss (Goffman 1952). There were two parts to the cooling 
out process in this interaction. The first was a simple and sincere apology. The Sergeant 
knew that this resident’s confidence and trust were shaken after this promise was 
broken. Sheena’s expectations of the local service, which had perhaps been set or 
strengthened by the Sergeant, were high and being visited by one of the team formed 
part of these expectations. The Sergeant reacted to what Sheena considered to be a 
serious breach of her relationship with the team with this apologetic gesture, both 
verbal and in concerned facial expressions, to express an understanding of her 
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perspective. The second reaction was a promise to follow up on the reasons for this 
inaction. He identified which team member had deviated from their duties by outlining 
the action he took after her call to report the attempted burglary, and promised 
further action. This signalled to his audience that he does not accept deviations from 
these kinds of duties in his team and that he will discipline team members who fail to 
take community visits seriously. 
From this episode, Sheena could be the type of character that some officers 
caricatured as a ‘Mrs. Miggins’ in interviews (see chapter 5); an older lady who is 
demanding of police service, and who will inevitably lead to more ‘rubbish’ work – a 
combination of Manning’s (1997, 203) identified caricatures of ‘old dears’ and ‘cows’. 
The Sergeant’s attentive treatment of her, then, is notable in its opposition to the 
view (whether real or implied) that Sheena’s request for police service is a low-priority 
task for the team, or even the idea that the police should now shed any tasks that are 
outside the constructed boundaries of the notion of ‘core police work’ – the kind of 
tasks that are directly related to reducing crime and protecting people from harm, 
rather than the broader social tasks. Also absent from this discussion was any 
suggestion that a reduction in team resources might have contributed to the failure of 
the PCSO to visit. Austerity was no excuse for this Sergeant. The team were expected 
to continue to deliver this aspect of police service, regardless of the police 
organisational talk of reducing ‘unnecessary’ demand in a time of cuts to the service. 
After the meeting and as we were driving back to the station, the Sergeant articulated 
to me why this episode angered him so much. He prides himself on having built a strong 
relationship with key members of the community that will continuously engage with 
his team and form part of the apparatus of co-productive social control, as this 
cooperation has been one factor in the reform of Heathville. The attendees at the 
meeting, he said, had continuously participated in PACT and were a productive source 
of community intelligence. This again reflects one positive perspective of the value of 
PACT, even at its most mundane. That is to say, maintaining a fruitful relationship with 
a neighbourhood or community relies on nurturing the bonds of trust between the 
police team and individual residents. The residents in Heathville have come to expect 
the level of service that the Sergeant has always promised them, and any deviation 
risks a rupture in trust. In the opinion of the Sergeant, any such damage to the 
reputation of his team and himself could result in the retreat of neighbourhood 
contacts from PACT or the broader network of police-community contact and 
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intelligence, and the perceived severity of this scenario is commensurate with the 
sincerity of his apologetic rhetoric and humble demeanour.  
6.2.2 Keeping Up Appearances 
The Sergeant’s reaction to this situation, along with his broader perspective, alludes 
to a view in which the broad range of police work, including reciprocal relationships 
with communities and all the mundanities that this entails, is necessarily 
interconnected to aid the pursuit of police organisational and NPT objectives. 
Maintaining the confidence of local residents in the ability of NPTs to provide an 
expected level of service is one presentational strategy that fits with this broad notion 
of police work, highlighting the strategic value of a continuously amiable relationship 
with neighbourhood contacts. The Sergeant deployed the kind of rhetoric that assured 
residents of continued police capabilities in the face of reduced resources a number 
of times. The following exemplifies how the strategy of maintaining confidence is in 
tension with the narrow view of ‘core police work’, especially through the use of 
encouraging residents to make full use of available state services: 
Sheena interjects with a story about a time she and her neighbours 
contacted the police after one of her neighbours could not contact a 
resident whom they feared might have had an accident inside or 
worse. Eventually they asked the police to check the property. The 
police arrived and found that the man was fine – he had just been 
having a shower. 
The Sergeant says she and her neighbours did the right thing by taking 
their fears seriously and ringing the emergency services, and said 
even with police funding cuts residents should always feel able to 
call the team if they ever have any suspicions.  
“Even with the cuts, we’re still catching criminals. Even if we can’t 
prevent a crime, we’ll still lock them up.” 
Whilst it is true that there is an apparent admission by the Sergeant of reduced police 
capacity to prevent crime, the Sergeant is emphasising continuity: the continued 
capacity of emergency services to respond to calls; the continued ability of the 
criminal justice system to detect and apprehend suspects, and follow existing 
procedures of justice; and the continued conditions in which residents can be ‘better 
safe than sorry’ – that is, not having to worry about excessive use of state services. 
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One could question the limits of this rhetoric being delivered in the context of PACT. 
Those physically present at the meeting may pay attention to such messages, but how 
much further does this message go? Or perhaps, who is the intended audience and what 
is the intended effect upon them? Looking at the delivery of this message in isolation, 
beyond the confines of PACT venues, family, friends, acquaintances or associates might 
hear the intended message through word of mouth. The extent to which this happens 
is not evident from my observations, but the Sergeant must accept the possibility that 
the transmission of this message is limited in reach – it may not be shared amongst all 
residents in the neighbourhood. A message as significant as the above, which reaffirms 
the capability of emergency services, would probably reach a bigger audience through 
different means – leafleting or broadcasting through other forms of publicly available 
media, for instance. The decision to transmit this message at a PACT meeting could be 
part of a broader organisational strategy, where a collaborative effort is made to shape 
public understanding of police capabilities with consistent rhetoric. If this is indeed 
the case, it again raises the possibility that such a message or its interpretation would 
be in conflict with one current rhetorical strategy of demand reduction. That is, 
reassuring the public that they should make use of emergency services no matter how 
unsure they are of the necessity whilst simultaneously nudging the public to make less 
use of police services as a dual-approach is contradictory and contains the potential to 
confuse receivers of these mixed messages. 
Regardless of any such existence of a coherent organisational strategy of maintaining 
confidence in police capability, this form of impression management in the setting of 
a PACT meeting, with its own limited audience, bears its own symbolic value. 
Maintaining local confidence in the competence of the NPT and the police and 
emergency services in general in this setting can also be interpreted as a routine to 
sustain the existing network of neighbourhood contacts. The Sergeant’s perspective on 
the reciprocal importance of community confidence and the productiveness of 
community intelligence is, in this sense, revealing of the utility of rhetorical strategies 
at the neighbourhood level. It is notable that, at this level and especially in a context 
where the Sergeant takes ownership of the organisation and performance of PACT, the 
Sergeant has considerable discretion and control over the dosage of any prevailing 
police discourse transmitted to this captive audience. The talk of limited resources 
and its relation to reduced capabilities was present at the meeting in numerous 
instances, but when the two competing discourses combine, as in the claim, “Even 
with the cuts, we’re still catching criminals”, maintaining confidence is the ultimate 
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message – it has a higher dosage than any rhetoric that suggests limitations to police 
capability.  
To a researcher well versed in the characterisation of street-level work as ‘an implicit 
tension between resource constraints and the inexorable demands for public service’ 
(Lipsky 1980, 172), the tension between these competing rhetorical strategies is not 
surprising. It is, however, more noteworthy that this Sergeant, as both street-level 
practitioner and supervisor, chooses to give precedence to a message that has less 
salience in current organisational thinking and does not alleviate the burden of high 
demand on the street-level officers in a time of fewer resources. 
The Sergeant also showed equal attention and concern for all issues raised in the 
meeting. Even when residents referred to incidents that did not necessarily constitute 
a criminal offence, the Sergeant did not ever signal that he and his team were more 
or less interested, or that their interest was ordered by a sense of severity: 
Before the conversations peter out completely, Winnie contributes 
for the first time, raising the issue of loud motorbikes driving past 
her house. She says that the noise has been bothering her. The 
sergeant gives this his full attention with his gaze directed at Winnie, 
and as he does the other conversations wind down and the attendees 
start to listen to Winnie’s issue. The sergeant asks for details and 
notes these down on the paper in his hand. 
Winnie presents this as a quality of life issue rather than one of any law-breaking or 
potential infringements. There is no information given that clearly demonstrates illegal 
behaviour. The passage above shows the two distinct ways that the Sergeant conveys 
his interest in the lives and concerns of the residents. Firstly, his body language signals 
focus and attention – a very basic way to demonstrate your interest – even as the 
potential for distraction remains in the form of continuing chatter of the other 
residents (I say ‘chatter’ as it was a conversation about the amount of fireworks the 
residents had heard this year, and did not contain any explicit requests for a police 
response, nor were they complaining of harm caused by fireworks). Secondly, noting 
down the details of this incident signals the intention to follow up on the issue – that 
is, the future use of NPT resources to further investigate the noisy motorbikes. Both 
gestures show the residents that their attendance and input are appreciated and the 




Of course, it is not certain that Winnie’s complaint is unrelated to criminal behaviour 
– further investigation could reveal uninsured drivers, for instance – but the 
determination to treat all issues with equal attention is in contrast with some of the 
other PACT meetings I attended. Rather than taking the opportunity to remind 
residents of the NPT’s limited capacity, the Sergeant instead reinforces the impression 
that the residents of the neighbourhood can expect a sustained level of service. 
Overall, it signals the Sergeant’s rigid faith in the priority-setting process of PACT – 
the kind of equitable responsivity that is commanded from official neighbourhood 
policing policy documents. This police-led, consumer-focused, playing-it-by-the-book 
(in the sense that it is orthodox for the era of the Neighbourhood Policing Programme) 
approach was apparent in the Sergeant’s style throughout the meeting. The meeting 
opened with a presentation on recent crime figures for Heathville before residents 
were invited to raise new issues. Every issue raised was explored and noted down, and 
the Sergeant would give preliminary thoughts and advice on what could be done.  
The only aspect that I had not considered to be part of an orthodox PACT format before 
attending was the occurrence and police allowance of unfocused discussion and 
multiple conversations cutting across the room: For example:  
Mary says that she has also noticed that there was less noise from 
fireworks during the Halloween and Guy Fawkes Day period compared 
to other years. Two or three of the other attendees jump in to voice 
their disagreement. This results in three different conversations 
starting up across the room on roughly the same topic. The sergeant 
allows this to continue until the conversations naturally wind down.  
There are two observations I make about this phenomenon. Firstly, unfocused 
discussion was a big enough portion of the meeting to constitute one routine element 
of the overall ritual of PACT. It did not seem out of place and it felt appropriate in this 
meeting with its familiar and friendly atmosphere. Secondly, this behaviour could itself 
be productive in creating a convivial atmosphere that would entice residents – all of a 
similar age group – to come back for the pleasure of gossiping with other users of the 
community centre. This fits with the Sergeant’s preference for preserving the bonds 
between residents and police in the neighbourhood, which forms the apparatus for 
potential community intelligence gathering and the coproduction of safety. Something 
that builds rapport and draws in the crowd, no matter if not strictly adhering to the 
primary purpose of PACT, can be beneficial to police organisational objectives (see 
Fielding 1995, 88-92). However, it is not productive in the orthodox sense of raising 
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specific issues of community safety and creating actionable priorities for the NPT. This 
latter point was referred to by PCSOs in Middleton. Their perspective was that the 
residents rarely raised any issues that were relevant to police work or were actionable 
as priorities, instead coming to PACT as a social event to have a cup of tea and a chat 
with friends and share concern about bin bags being dumped on the streets. An 
approach that is overly relaxed and invites apparently mundane chatter can grate 
against the more traditional police sense of mission, but allowed in moderation it could 
help to produce the conditions for fruitful community engagement. 
6.3 The Agitators 
Whenever anyone makes a claim against anyone else, any kind of 
demand on their time and resources, the response is defended in 
terms of values and beliefs. In the normative debate the claims of 
society against its members are asserted, and accepted or denied. 
(Douglas 1994, 43) 
6.3.1 Playing to the ‘Audience’ 
The organisation and performance of PACT meetings are influenced not only by street 
level police agents but also by their biggest audience – those residents who attend the 
meetings, and especially those that do so of their own volition and take an active role 
in proceedings. The attendance and participation of residents are also shaped by other 
environmental factors specific to their neighbourhood, shaping relations between 
community and police and thus the performance of PACT. A neighbourhood with 
entrenched problems of crime and disorder, combined with a community affected by 
and sensitive to these specific forms of social problems, transforms the character of 
PACT performances and challenges police rhetorical strategies and impression 
management.  
The neighbourhood analysed in this section, Kingston, is close to the city centre, and 
is an area with high multiple deprivation with a large proportion (over fifty per cent) 
of ethnic minority residents. The specific microbeat where PACT took place, 
Princetown, has previously attracted media interest due to the mixture of high 
unemployment, high welfare payments, and stubborn crime and antisocial behaviour. 
It also received attention for its association with a rise in gun crimes in Birmingham 
over the preceding year.  
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The venue for this PACT meeting is the basement of an Islamic community centre in 
the midst of high-rise and low-rise estates, with a public park across the road. The 
attendees at the meeting all appear to be of East African descent and of Islamic faith. 
Later on in the evening the attending PCSO, Richard, admits that, although this is a 
public meeting, he considers it unlikely for members of other ‘communities’ to make 
an appearance. The external and internal settings – physical spaces and their social 
contexts – of PACT influence the size and characteristics of an audience as well as the 
issues and perspectives brought by them. The social context of a neighbourhood may 
control the fears, concerns or hopes of its residents, whilst the existing social 
infrastructure bears its own capacity to filter civic participation. Community centres 
and other social infrastructure make convenient venues for PACT meetings, and the 
police teams and communities that I observed sought out venues that yield higher 
levels of participation (at the very least, measured in attendance) and do not carry a 
room booking fee. 
Unlike the other community centres in this fieldwork, this venue attracted large 
numbers of residents from this particular community in the evening. At the first 
meeting, there were over thirty in attendance. Many attendees appeared to be present 
as part of their social and spiritual routines – socialising with peers and other families; 
attending evening prayers – rather than being there purely for PACT. The majority did 
not speak at the meeting. Children played together at the back of the room.  
The large number of attendees influenced the style of the meeting. The furniture was 
readily arranged by members of the community centre into a conference-style set up, 
with chairs behind trestle tables at the head of the room for the police, which faced 
rows of chairs of residents. The other meetings I attended attracted fewer residents, 
and this allowed for a different set-up; a circle of chairs, sometimes with a table in 
the middle. The conference-style set up limited unstructured and spontaneous 
dialogue, with residents generally raising hands or waiting their turn before directing 
questions or rhetoric towards the police (and other officials) as chair people.  
Before the meeting, in a telephone conversation, PC Ben told me that this event was 
a “community-run” event. This was optimistic as the community effectively resisted 
PC Ben’s encouragement to choose a community chair for the event, regardless of their 
verbal acceptance of the suggestion that was made every meeting. For example, in 
the second meeting, this was broached immediately:  
PC Ben opens the meeting, saying that this event is not a ‘police-run 
meeting or a Birmingham city council meeting’ but instead is for the 
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community and therefore he would like them to run the event. He 
says that the community should nominate one person to chair, but 
this won’t be done today. I notice a few of the residents nod their 
heads – they seem to be on board with this suggestion generally. 
… 
PC Ben says that “it is important that the agenda is governed by the 
people in this room. We want you to become the tasking group for 
the police in this area.”  
It was PC Ben’s belief, expressed to me after the second meeting took place, that once 
the community took ownership of the meetings, they would also start to take 
ownership of the issues that they were bringing to the events. His attempts to change 
the style of the meeting was thus part of his strategy to activate this community as 
co-producers of neighbourhood security.  
6.3.2 False Steps in Forbidden Clothing 
Different communities and cultures have different expectations for social order and 
etiquette – the way that things should be and the way that people should interact, in 
the world in general and in specific places or situations. An example of the etiquette 
in this centre, as mentioned above, is the removal of shoes on arrival and in the 
specified zones. The police that attended the first of these meetings made an instant 
faux pas on arrival at the centre, as they walked into the carpeted basement still 
wearing boots. 
[The police] are still wearing full uniforms including stab vests and 
boots. They are asked to remove their shoes as the centre users pray 
on the floor in this room. PC Ben says they will if this is necessary. 
There is a polite back and forth interaction, with some of the centre 
representatives insisting it is not completely necessary if it is a hassle 
for the officers (not all of those who made their preference for 
removing shoes known are involved in this decision), and PC Ben 
removes his shoes. PCSO Richard offers to take them off but 
eventually decides to keep them on, and PC Aliya sits down at the 
end of row A and does not remove her shoes.  
If the police and other agencies want to encourage mutual respect, empathy and 
increase participation in this community, such a faux pas could jeopardize the 
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impression of the team (Goffman 1959, 204), and hence disrupt relations and increase 
social distance. Some of the attendees express that they would appreciate police 
following the culturally defined conduct of the venue. Most of the attendees do not 
comment, though the room is full and many are observing the incident. However, those 
that do comment exude a polite and lenient disposition and there is no clear or 
immediate consequence to the action. They allow the faux pas to pass, and thus save 
the face of the police. The meeting flows much in the way one would expect for an 
occasion when one group are holding the other to account. If there is any effect of this 
scene, it is not obvious or it has only a low-level or internal impact on the attendees. 
In following meetings police and other council officials continue to wear shoes, but the 
behaviour is not questioned again by residents, at least not when I am present. It 
appears that after initial concern about appropriate behaviour and observance of the 
venue’s rules, an exemption for these outsiders is tacitly accepted. 
To me as a third-party observer, the scene signalled an unwillingness of officials to 
uphold cultural rules and respect their meanings. There are possible practical reasons 
for the police to both keep on and remove their shoes – for the police, they might be 
worried about loss or damage; they might want to be prepared to make a fast exit 
from the building for some reason; for the community, wearing shoes in a place of 
prayer is unhygienic and potential sacrilege – but it is notable that the police prioritised 
their own convenience over both the situational etiquette in itself and the practical 
basis for this etiquette, which is explicitly verbalised within the exchange. Beyond this 
interpretation of convenience, police dress and appearance is also communicative of 
authority, and police in different areas sometimes chose to remove parts of their 
official dress or equipment at PACT meetings. As this meeting was more formal (in 
tone and in room lay-out), formal and authoritative signals were more appropriate, 
whether intentional or otherwise. It felt somehow appropriate that this unfocused 
interaction – non-verbal, communicative gestures in face-to-face interactions – set the 
scene for further conflicts between police and community. 
6.3.3 Blame and Negotiation 
Tense relations were apparent even before proceedings began. At the first meeting, 
three men did most of the talking. One of these men, Imran, spoke with me before the 
meeting commenced: 
One resident, ‘Imran’, approaches me as I am sat down to have a 
chat. I ask whether he has attended many meetings with the police 
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before and he responds by telling me that he has but the police do 
very little for their community. He and the community have raised 
issues with them many times before but the police seem to excuse 
themselves from dealing with their concerns seriously. He says that 
they often use the phrase, “we have to prioritise our workload”, 
which he interprets as a way to brush off their concerns. He says the 
community feel ignored by the local police team. He speaks strongly 
and articulately, with determination and what sounds to me like 
resentment.  
This was the first sign that the relationship between police and attendees was not as 
harmonious as I had witnessed in other neighbourhoods. The community believed that 
crime and disorder in Princetown were serious enough to warrant strong police action, 
but that the local police had ignored them and made excuses. The phrase “we have to 
prioritise our workload” is a direct reference to finite resources, but the more vocal 
residents, at the very least, did not accept that the police lacked the capacity to deal 
with issues that were vital to a satisfactory level of security and quality of life. 
This critical stance was a consistent theme in this meeting. Just a couple of minutes 
after the meeting starts, Majid, the first resident to speak, sets this tone.  
Majid speaks first, telling the officers that the community have had 
problems recently, and that people will want to raise concerns both 
generally in front of the room and privately. He speaks loudly, clearly 
and with a level of articulacy that makes his words sound rehearsed. 
PC Ben responds with general comments about the recent calls they 
have been receiving that relate to this area, which are mostly related 
to the behaviour in an around the high-rise estates, such as people 
“hanging around on the stairwells”, fighting and drug taking. He says 
that these are not just issues for the police and that other agencies 
have a responsibility to help in these areas too. He says that some 
understanding is needed for non-criminal behaviours as well, and 
they should “remember that some of them are your neighbours”, 
suggesting that the attendees need to consider the maintenance of 
their relationships with the wider community. PC Ben goes on to 
point out that the policing team have recently, in partnership with 
the local premier league football club, set up some new engagement 
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schemes for younger people – football and boxing clubs with classes 
– that is aiming to divert young people from deviant public activities. 
Majid speaks again and says that the issues that generally concern 
people are related to their safety. He says that many of them do not 
feel safe when people are drinking alcohol in public places. He thinks 
that the area is safer than it once was, and appreciates the effort of 
the police, but that local parents are still very worried for their 
families, especially about the park and the area in front of the row 
of shops across from the high-rise estates. 
Majid took on the role of a spokesperson for the community, summarising their 
problems, fears, limitations and reliance on police intervention in local issues of 
security. He fulfilled this position competently, speaking articulately and forcefully, 
standing as he delivered his monologue, as if well rehearsed and addressed to the 
general rather than specific audience. This was the start of a prolonged rhetorical 
battle between the resident speakers and the PC. The former consistently demanded 
that the police use their position and powers to solve local issues, whilst the latter 
argued that the community needed to do more to help make Princetown safer.  
The next passage again exemplifies this rhetorical struggle: 
Majid says he was also attacked not so long ago by a big group of 
people. He managed to fight them off without sustaining any serious 
injuries. He said the police were informed but only one of the 
perpetrators were ever caught, and this makes him worried that the 
police are ineffective at tracking down offenders. PC Ben says he 
spoken with Majid about this incident before, and that he can’t 
discuss the specifics of this case now but that Majid makes good 
points about the area. He says that if Majid wants more done he 
needs to think about whether he can offer any more assistance to the 
police, such as whether he would recognise the individuals or 
whether he has seen them again since the incident, and speak with 
the police privately.  
Majid’s story again criticises the police, this time for their limited capability to detect 
perpetrators of local offences and the consequences for the community’s security. He 
is prepared to fight off attackers and to report the incident, but that is the limit of his 
capability and thus his responsibility as an individual. The implication is that there are 
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clear, delimited roles for both him as an individual, resident or community member 
and the police as agents of the state. The explication is more direct – work harder and 
make us safer. 
Majid identifies the risks of his community and blames a lack of situational protection 
– related to the type of blame Douglas describes as attributing misfortune ‘to the work 
of individual adversaries’ (1994, 5; my emphasis). Rather than just highlighting the 
immorality of the perpetrators, the focus of the blame is placed on the situation that 
allows adversaries of the community to commit offensive acts. Part of this situation is 
the inaction of capable allies, and so the lack of protection provided is a normative 
issue. In Majid’s view, the police have the capacity, knowledge and responsibility to 
protect them from risk. Criticism of the police is therefore warranted on an ethical 
level when they fail to eliminate risk. 
The PC’s response to this is the reverse of Majid’s rhetoric of blame. Rather than the 
police being at fault for inaction and thus insecurity, the PC argues that, due to the 
inherent limitations of the police, the community are bound by a responsibility to 
provide greater assistance to the authorities. In this interpretation it is the community 
who hold the power to eliminate risk and produce public safety, and by extension the 
obligation to achieve this through measures such as collating and communicating 
information to the neighbourhood policing team. This normative logic, similar to 
Garland’s ‘responsibilization’ (1996), sits comfortably with the rhetoric and economic 
logic of ‘demand management’, and so can be read as one strand within the 
organisation’s presentational strategy. 
Later in the meeting, the debate re-emerges but with more explicit reference to police 
capability and the impact of limited resourcing: 
Majid says that the residents want to feel that they are safe in their 
own area. They don’t want to be in danger, but neither do they want 
to police the area themselves in absence of effective policing by the 
state. He says that the policing resources given to the area are not 
enough to deal with these problems, but he does believe that the 
team can be more present on the streets than they are currently. PC 
Ben says the team were patrolling the area today and moved on some 
people who were upsetting locals. He says this patrolling is routine, 
although it is not every single day. He agrees with Majid that their 
team is small for the area.  
186 
 
Again, Majid reaffirms the community’s expectations of the state to create safety in 
light of the limited responsibility of community members to police the neighbourhood 
themselves. What is different this time is an offer of conciliation through empathising 
with the difficulties of policing a troubled area with limited resources – compromise as 
a tactic of negotiation.  For Majid, the issue of resources was a mitigating factor for 
the team, but it did not negate his substantive criticism. Neither did it increase the 
desire of the community to take matters into their own hands, explicitly signalling that 
they place responsibility for controlling these problems with the police. This is where 
the offering ends, as Majid reasserts his belief that the police are capable of more. 
The PC sustains his defence with an example to contradict the specific point of 
criticism, but he also makes a concession with the admission that patrol is not an 
everyday activity and that resources for the neighbourhood are relatively low. This 
signals that there is common ground between the two parties on which consensus can 
be made and compromise reached, but still maintains the overall police perspective 
that the team are limited in their capabilities to control entrenched problems of crime 
and disorder even when performing the work that is desired by the community. 
6.3.4 The Offering 
The police and residents employed the same rhetorical strategies in the following 
meeting, but there were new developments. The most significant catalyst for these 
developments was a tangible offering from the police of a proposal to implement a 
Public Space Protection Order (PSPO) – a recently legislated power to restrict 
continuous activities that have a “detrimental effect on the quality of life” (Anti-social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, s59(2)(a)) in a specified area. The potential 
use of this instrument would, according to the police, help to alleviate the community-
identified problems that caused the most concern. A lot of the feelings of insecurity 
and anger were caused by groups of people drinking alcohol in public places, as this 
was perceived by some residents as a driver of other, more serious acts of violence 
and intimidation. This excerpt illustrates some of the intensity of feeling around the 
issue: 
…Imran raises an issue of people drinking alcohol on the streets. The 
area is an Alcohol Free Zone, and Imran says that although there are 
stickers up all over the area, including on shop windows, people are 
still congregating to drink, especially outside the row of shops, and 
causing trouble. He says the police have to take this seriously 
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because there is a breakdown in order and this is emboldening people 
to commit other crimes. 
“This behaviour is the cause of crime. The police know about it but 
nothing has been done.” 
Imran is visibly angry and shouts these comments to front. His body 
language is very animated, with arms waving up and down and 
sometimes pointing at the officers. PC Ben remains calm. He nods 
slightly when listening and responds to Imran by saying that he knows 
this has been raised before. Before he can add anything else, Imran 
continues with no sign of a change in temperament. “The 
convenience store is the source of the issues. They are selling drink 
to underage people.” PC Ben, remaining placid, says that the team 
have been dealing with this issue, adding the qualified concession, 
“Maybe we can do more, but we haven’t had any calls about it.” 
“No one trusts you to do anything about it. They won’t call,” Imran 
replies. 
Usman, who is much calmer, voices agreement with Imran. He asks 
the police what they think about this situation, because it is a 
continuous problem for the community. Imran does not give PC Ben 
time to answer. He says that the drinkers and perpetrators of the 
criminal behaviour are cowards and that the police just need to 
deliver a harder response to show the perpetrators who is in charge. 
He thinks the behaviour will stop if the police do this, and it will 
prevent more serious acts as well. 
“The law is on your side. Do something about this and the people will 
be on your side too.”  
The issues of groups congregating outside the convenience store and in the park, those 
groups drinking alcohol in these places and the signals of insecurity sent out by these 
actions constituted the central and most mentioned concerns at each PACT meeting in 
this neighbourhood, and the above demonstrates that the relationship between this 
community and police is influenced by the existence of the issues as well as the 
perspectives on the causes of and the police responses to these problems. The 
community perspective – espoused in almost complete unison by residents – was that 
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significant blame lay with the police for using neither their analytical capabilities to 
understand the criminogenic influences nor their legal powers to alleviate and 
eliminate the deviant and criminal acts. 
The negotiation hinged on a ‘catch twenty-two’ situation where the community 
perceived that the police would not respond to their concerns and so did not ‘trust’ 
them enough to call for assistance, and where the police claimed that they could not 
respond to these concerns due to the lack of reporting. Imran’s call for the police to 
act first in order to get the community ‘on their side’ suggested a way to break this 
cycle that would be commensurate with the community’s construction of blame, 
whereas PC Ben asked for more reporting from the community. 
The work done on the PSPO proposal between the first and second meeting was a 
compromise that showed to the community the police’s willingness to do something to 
contribute to a solution for the community-identified problems. The community had 
called in part for harsher enforcement measures and the potential implementation of 
the instrument was one way the police could satisfy this demand. Rather than back 
down fully on his own perspective of blame on the community for the lack of police 
action, PC Ben qualifies this new development with renewed calls for the community 
to take responsibility for their area, linking this to the PSPO proposal as well as other 
neighbourhood issues: 
[PC Ben] says that the team need to justify the need for a PSPO to 
be used in the area to the council, but he is concerned that the 
success of implementing the order could be hampered by the lack of 
calls to service the team get in the area. He says that the lack of 
calls is troubling considering that both he and the community are 
very aware of the kind of problems in the area. Imran says that it is 
not surprising because the local people do not have faith in the police 
and therefore don’t call them when they witness incidents. PC Ben 
says that he accepts this, but the situation is difficult because the 
distribution of police resources is based on the number of reports of 
offences. He again addresses the room imploring them to call the 
police whenever they witness any incidents.  
“If anything happens, call the police. We will do our best to come.” 
PC Ben reminds the audience that they have other responsibilities 
and issues to deal with in the area, not just those that the community 
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have mentioned, such as call outs to the tower blocks and work with 
schools. He gives an example of the kind of work they do that will 
positively impact those that live in the estates, where the police 
work with the council and tenants to remove neighbours that cause 
continuous problems. 
If the announcement of the PSPO proposal was intended as a tactic to soften the 
community dissent and move the dialogue on to a new place, it was only partially 
successful. After the proposal was made and maps of the proposed geographic area to 
be covered were handed out to residents by PCSO Richard, the regular speakers Majid 
and Imran did refer to the plan, though these comments ranged from inquisitive yet 
sceptical (Majid) to explicitly critical (Imran): 
“We know that you’re trying to do your best for us, but the people 
here do not feel safe. We don’t want to be confronted in the street 
or our children to be in danger in their own neighbourhood. If this 
thing [the PSPO] happens for real, will it turn things around?” says 
Majid. “I can smell drugs every time I go to the shop. The CCTV still 
doesn’t work so no one can stop them. The streetlights on [local 
street] aren’t working, and a friend of mine was attacked there just 
last week.” 
He says that the community want the police to give them a timeframe 
for when the PSPO will be established and then give them an idea of 
when the violence will stop. He is still polite but firm in his speech 
and demands. 
… 
[Imran] asks why they need a new power like this when ASBOs do the 
same thing. [He is not aware that ASBOs no longer exist and no one 
corrects him] He says that the issues won’t stop and the police have 
to address the causes. “You need to get to the source of the issue.” 
Although Imran appears visibly agitated, his speech becoming faster 
and louder the longer he talks, PC Ben responds very calmly. He 
attempts to reject the idea that the police can tackle the causes of 
the problem, instead saying that the police are only there to enforce 
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the law. “We’re limited in what we can do unless there is an 
offence.” 
All the central actors employed repetition of the points that constitute their line. The 
continued presence of these repeated phrases and arguments illustrated that no 
significant compromise to the line had been made as explicit demands had not been 
met, and therefore the negotiations had not made progress. The maintenance or 
alteration of the line could in this sense function as a gauge of how far negotiations 
had progressed. PC Ben maintained his position that the community were still obliged 
to do more, in order for his offering to be validated. Majid and Imran made the police 
aware that their position remains the same regardless of the new development, largely 
because the development was hypothetical, not yet resulting in changes to their sense 
of security. Nevertheless, there were signs that the unified position of the residents 
was starting to change, or soften.  
Unlike Imran’s wholly critical position and intensifying anger, Majid was composed, 
showed interest in the proposal and wanted to know more details, signalling that he 
was receptive to the idea in theory. Shortly after the above interaction, Imran’s anger 
grew further still and resulted in a heated argument with Rochelle – a Housing Manager 
employed by the council – in which Imran made an accusation that the present officials 
did not act because they did not have a personal stake in the neighbourhood: 
The Acting Housing Officer, Rochelle, suggests that she can arrange 
a meeting between the council housing staff to discuss the problems 
of crime and disorder taking place in the local park. 
Imran takes issues with this, saying that he has called the council 
before about the condition of the park and nothing was done. “It’s 
the dirtiest it has ever been. It’s filthy.” He is visibly angry, shouting 
his comments louder now than I have witnessed before. Pointing 
towards the officials at the front, he makes a more personal 
accusation. 
“If you lived here and your kids played there, you’d do something 
about it. You would!” 
Rochelle says she’d like to speak with him after, but he turns his face 
away from her as she offers. Imran gets up from his chair and leaves 
the room, heading up the staircase to the ground floor. 
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Personal accusations are a strong expression of blame, and through this Imran 
maintained the position that the officials could only absolve themselves through action 
to solve the community-identified problems. There were two usual police (and other 
official) responses to hostile and angry statements. The first was to simply repeat the 
counterfactuals commensurate with the line, as PC Ben did in the passage before last, 
and the second was to offer the chance to speak after the meeting. Not only does the 
latter provide the opportunity for a break in or end to hostility that publicly contradicts 
the police perspective, but also, in practice, conversations outside of the meeting 
format were less heated, intense and accusatory, and more amicable. When the police 
spoke to Imran after this meeting, the atmosphere was in stark contrast to that in the 
previous interactions: 
Once the police break free and make their way to the exit, Imran is 
waiting at the top of the stairs. He shakes their hands and thanks 
them for coming, and seems almost apologetic about his conduct in 
the meeting, saying that he doesn’t mean to get as agitated. PC Ben 
brushes it off, saying that it’s fine and that the police are here so 
that the community can “hold us to account”. 
Rejecting the apology is in a sense face-saving, in that the police explicate their 
acceptance of Imran’s performance in the meetings. In other words, they assure him 
that he is not violating any rules or hindering their own performance, and thus they 
are able to avoid an encounter that threatens Imran’s face. This also serves the 
purpose of signalling that the policing team are accountable to the community and 
care about their concerns. 
Other residents who did not participate in the first meeting went further than Majid’s 
curiosity outlined above, praising the police and revising the dominant rhetoric of 
blame: 
Faheem then strikes a more conciliatory note, attempting to speak 
for the room as he says, “We hope that we can all work together from 
this point to make this place better.” PC Ben agrees and starts to 
make another similar speech about cooperation and reciprocation – 
“Your future is our future…” – but as he starts the call to evening 





In the second row, Javeed stands and says that the community really 
appreciate the police coming. He tells a story about a time when his 
son was robbed. “The police were fantastic.” However, he says that 
in general the community want a lot more support. 
“This is a very good community with good people. What we want is 
reassurance from the police. When we had a problem with robbers, 
the police sorted it in a week. But now we need a good plan for the 
troubled youths in the area. We’re not blaming you, but we want to 
know how we are going to work together.” 
PC Ben has his thumbs up and is nodding. 
These outbursts of praise were vehicles for conciliation and interactional repair, as 
Faheem, and less so Javeed, diverged from the line that had been maintained to this 
late point in the second meeting. The ‘audience’ performance contained collective 
expressions of blame, possibly rehearsed and nearly always unified, and the adherence 
to the team’s line signalled discipline and loyalty. These rare slips in the line were an 
indication that the line (if rehearsed at all) had not been rehearsed well or taught 
widely enough, thus disrupting the performance. Regardless of the team dynamics of 
the community, PC Ben revealed his pleasure and approval both verbally – through 
subsequent statements of police-community reciprocity – and non-verbally – thumbs 
up and nodding, for example. This is a good sign for him regarding the negotiation, as 
after largely hostile responses these conciliatory remarks show that community 
perspective could be ‘softening’ – that is, converging with the police perspective.  
6.4 The Indifferent Neighbourhood  
Police attitudes to PACT and the delivery of community engagement through PACT are 
impacted upon by perceptions of productiveness, efficacy and success. Some police 
informally judge the value of PACT meetings through measures such as meeting 
attendance, as well as the quality of contact with the attending residents. The turnout 
and the overall interest that is signalled by turnout gives police a sense of the value of 
this kind of engagement activity. Time is precious and activities are prioritised in order 
to maximise the potential to achieve the defined objectives of the team. The definition 
of these objectives is formed through numerous sources: police react to calls for 
service; a mixture of reports, police observation, and community information influence 
police constructions of the neighbourhood and its security; middle-managers collate 
and analyse information about neighbourhoods and set tasks based on their analysis. 
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The neighbourhood Sergeant can choose to monitor engagement activities and make 
or advise changes as he or she deems appropriate. 
The process of building strong and lasting relations with neighbourhood residents and 
communities can be an arduous and an unrewarding experience for some police. It 
involves skills of communication, the virtue of patience, the occasional need for 
creativity, and the chance of failures along the way. These failures can come in the 
form of lack of community interest, problems with chosen venues, interpersonal 
differences between police and residents and police fatigue with the processes and 
lack of outcomes. Notwithstanding the element of chance, different tactics and skills 
are employed at the discretion of the police in neighbourhood teams, but decisions 
about where and how to hold PACT can be moderated by the sergeant. Street-level 
NPT practitioners can shape the approach and style to engagement activities within 
the constraints of team and organisational objectives, environmental factors (the 
existing problems of a neighbourhood), and the interaction between police and 
residents. 
6.4.1 Indifference 
Maintaining participation in a neighbourhood with no critical or mobilising issues poses 
challenges for the police. Residents may not be convinced of the need for contact or 
an on-going relationship with the police, and vice versa. In Middleton, PACT meetings 
were often poorly attended or attracted no residents, and were occasionally cancelled. 
The following passage illustrates problems of PACT organisation and participation that 
may affect on-going police-community relations.  
The venue is a hall that was part of a sheltered housing estate for 
people over the age of sixty, which is itself nestled in the middle of 
low-rise housing estates and a primary school. There were no signs 
of life on the streets outside or on the concourse of the estate. There 
were no notices or signs of an imminent public meeting, and I could 
not see an obvious entrance to the hall. I rang the number of the 
estate manager, which was advertised on a permanent sign, and told 
her I was here for the police-community meeting. 
“Today? We have to have the meetings on Tuesdays now. The hall’s 
been booked out by another person, but I’m not sure if I called the 
police to cancel their meeting,” she explained. “The PCSO might 
come by soon. Can you see her out there?” 
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“No,” I said. “But I’ll wait outside to see if they turn up.” 
“If you wait for five minutes, I can come and show you into the hall.” 
As promised, the manager met me at the outer gates and walked me 
to the hall entrance, which was inside the boundaries of the estate. 
She showed me the interior of the hall and informed the man using 
the main room that the police might turn up for a meeting, but that 
they would not disturb his use of the room.  
The manager explained that the meetings were not usually well 
attended, so the three seats in the corridor would probably be 
sufficient. The venue had hosted these events for about a year. The 
earlier meetings were attended by four to five people, and these 
were local residents from outside the estate. She said the residents 
of the estate live very sheltered lives and thus had no pressing 
security concerns, and this was the reason they were not interested 
in attending the meetings. 
“The police will probably stop the meetings soon. You can wait here 
with a hot drink if you like. The kitchen is just there, so help 
yourself.” 
… 
PCSO Ellie arrives five minutes before the start of the meeting. I ask 
about attendance here and she tells me she has tried to increase 
participation by leafleting the neighbourhood extensively to inform 
other residents about the meeting, but this had not yet had any 
effect. She says that residents no longer attend the meeting at this 
location but other meetings in the area are well-attended. 
She adds that the team have recently lost one PCSO and this has 
hindered their capacity to run meetings in three different locations 
in the area. The manager asks if she is busy. PCSO Ellie replies that 
the team are ‘swamped with incidents’ right now. 
The choice of venue has a tendency to shape participation. When residents do not 
perceive any critical and mobilising issues of crime and disorder, PACT attendees tend 
to comprise those for whom it is convenient to attend. Meetings at community centres 
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generally attract users of the same community centres and venues in housing 
association estates tend to attract internal residents. If, in the latter case, residents 
lead sheltered lives and rarely leave their residence, this will likely impact upon issues 
raised and unless the estate has its own security issues then residents may not produce 
‘actionable’ priorities for the police. In the above case, PCSO Ellie has attempted to 
attract residents external to the estate to this venue for meetings through leafleting, 
but this had no effect to date45. This raises the question as to whether a choice of 
venue is neutral. That is to say, whilst encouraging participation from insiders, the 
choice of venue could discourage and effectively exclude the participation of 
outsiders. 
The uncertainty around attendance is a concern for police in NPTs and low attendance 
is a frustration in light of the competing demands on their time. The NPT sergeant in 
Middleton told me that the team would keep PACT as long as people were attending 
and that he is “not certain of [PACT’s] value at the moment” – a view also held by 
some others in the team. The police are aware of the potential each venue has for 
encouraging or discouraging attendance, to some extent at least. In Middleton, the 
conundrum seemed to be that residents were generally indifferent to community 
engagement activities (this was the consensus between NPT staff) and none of the 
venues guaranteed acceptable or consistent levels of attendance over the period that 
I was in the field. The inconsistency of attendance along with occasional staff absence 
and variations in those running each meeting meant that the running, execution and 
value of PACT in Middleton was unpredictable for both police and residents. This 
unpredictability was reflected in the eventual decision to cease PACT in one of the 
three venues – the community centre – due to poor attendance, even though some 
months before this location was considered to be the best attended and most 
productive in the view of the PCSOs who ran it. 
In terms the value of these meetings, two PCSOs noted that when they took on the 
running of a new meeting, after the sergeant has assigned them to a new ‘micro-
beat’46, the residents appeared to lose interest and participated less, suggesting the 
importance of building rapport or familiarity to the quality of engagements. The PCSOs 
suspected that residents would turn up primarily for gossip with a familiar officer or 
PCSO or even just for the tea and cake, fuelling the sense that PACT was more often 
used as a social gathering rather than a serious partnership against crime and disorder. 
                                            
45 Other police I spoke with in Middleton and beyond had similar experiences with leafleting. 
46 Micro-beats are divisions of neighbourhoods. If an officer is assigned a new micro-beat, they 
will attend and run the associated PACT meeting in their new area. 
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What this appears to highlight is a tension between how and why police and residents 
use PACT. Residents without mobilising issues form rituals around the comforting 
aspects of PACT – they may give the police their time, participation and allegiance if 
certain conditions are met and experience provided. It may not be a coincidence, then, 
that at one PACT I attended one of the PCSOs tasked with running the meeting forgot 
to attend (the other was called to an incident). Fortunately, in a show of mutual 
indifference no residents attended either. 
Another aspect of PACT ritualisation is the limited pool of attendees – often referred 
to by police as ‘the usual suspects’. As above, the core groups who attend PACT are 
sometimes perceived by officers to attend only for the comforts of social interaction, 
gossip and sometimes consumption of tea and cake. However, the existence of such a 
group of ‘insiders’ also has implications for the publicness of PACT meetings. The 
following describes the second PACT meeting in this neighbourhood, and starts to 
illustrate the issue of publicness: 
I arrive at 18:45, fifteen minutes before the start of the meeting. 
The venue is a small, single-storey council building that appears to 
serve a number of functions; visible from the entrance are a meeting 
room and laundry room. The building has one main entrance, an 
‘accessible’ entrance that is approached via a ramp, and a tall, metal 
gate securing entry at the back with a spherical CCTV camera over-
looking the back area. The main entrance is a thick, double-glazed 
door with an electronic key-pad and sensor for key fobs. I cannot see 
any way to attract the attention, such as a doorbell, of anyone who 
might be inside. The building appears to be deserted – there are no 
lights on apart from dim emergency lights in the main hallway – but 
I knock on the door’s glass front anyway. Nothing happens. I wait 
outside until 19:15. In this time no one else approaches, no sign of 
any police or curious residents. 
… 
Once I am on the train, I check the website to see if this publicises 
the cancellation of the meeting, but the listing is unchanged. 
It transpired that the meeting was cancelled as the PCSO tasked with running it was 
on sick leave. In this case, any usual attendees of this meeting either did not turn up 
through coincidence, or knew about the cancellation through forms of communication 
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that exclude online advertising and physical notices on the venue. To put it another 
way, if a core group attends then the police that run PACT are aware of who these 
people are, and if a meeting is cancelled then the police may only need to inform the 
group personally – face-to-face on the beat, by telephone or email. If no outsiders to 
the core group attend then there appears to be no reason to publicise a cancellation.  
Attendance may also be affected by preparation and disorganisation. In the first 
passage, the manager had double-booked the hall, which not only illustrated a 
breakdown in communication between police and venue management, but also raised 
the possibility that residents’ attendance could be affected by incorrect information 
emanating from those outside of the police. At the community centre, a later meeting 
was also advertised a day earlier by the venue’s administration staff. They corrected 
this two days before the meeting, but, come the day of PACT, only one resident 
attended, thirty minutes late.  
6.4.2 Chatter and Anecdote 
When residents with few or no mobilising issues attend PACT and the police allow for 
an informal atmosphere – through, for example, room-layout, body language, meeting 
structure and tone of voice – there is a tendency for both residents and police to 
converse freely and the tell anecdotes. These activities appeared to serve different 
purposes: filling up time in the absence of or between issues raised; sharing knowledge 
of techniques and products that prevent victimisation; expressing values about public 
safety and behaviour; and explaining disorderly or criminal behaviour. Chatter and 
anecdotes were part of the PACT rituals at many meetings I attended, and in the first 
meeting I attended at the community centre in Middleton this was a common 
occurrence. 
The PCSOs running this meeting were content with the event being sociable and with 
residents conversing with each other. The residents knew each other from attending 
other activities and classes at the community centre, and PCSO Ellie was also familiar 
with most of the residents and had built good rapport, thus the relations were good 
and the atmosphere convivial. This was at the beginning of the first meeting, just after 
the PCSOs had sat down, introduced themselves to any new attendees and asked the 
regular attendees how they were: 
The room is filled with talk and one of the attendees shows everybody 
a picture of the centre’s members on a trip to the set of a popular 
soap opera. The PCSOs seem to know the attendees fairly well, 
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conversing easily with them and having good rapport. Their speech is 
informal and friendly. Both PCSOs have open body language, but 
PCSO Adam has his arms folded. Regardless of this he does not appear 
too cold or unfriendly. 
The PCSOs did not follow a more formal structure of PACT, such as reading out crime 
figures or some other introductory presentation about police activities in Middleton. 
Instead, the meeting opened with friendly chatter and small talk. The soft, waiting-
room style chairs were arranged into a square, all facing the middle of the room, and 
this made dialogue between any attendee easier than if the chairs were in rows, 
conference-style. The centre’s staff laid out refreshments on a small table, including 
cakes and sandwiches, and just behind this table was a kitchen with facilities for 
making hot drinks. The PCSOs removed their hats, stab vests and jackets on arrival, 
making their appearance more casual and familiar as opposed to the authoritative and 
officious signals transmitted by a full police uniform.  
The overall atmosphere and style of the meeting meant that conversation was easy 
and almost constant, and this sometimes resulted in unfocused chatter with different 
conversations cutting across each other, as the following passage illustrates: 
The attendees talk amongst themselves, with different conversations 
happening simultaneously. There is a relaxed atmosphere and 
everybody is speaking together as friends or acquaintances at a social 
event. The PCSOs do not stop simultaneous conversations from taking 
place, and do not make any attempt to bring the group into focusing 
on one speaker at a time.  
The residents then start to discuss a story they have heard about 
bystanders being hurt due to guns being used in gang-on-gang attacks 
as well as violence and gang culture amongst youths more generally 
in the UK, especially London. They draw on these stories and worry 
that this kind of incident might be more likely in the local area if 
more guns fall into their hands.  
This also shows that, regardless of the apparent lack of focus in outbreaks of chatter, 
the talk can, and usually did, regain focus on issues of public safety. As in the above 
passage, these anecdotes may not be directly relatable to the future work and 
priorities of the NPT – they are not ‘actionable’ concerns – but they are effective in 
communicating general fears or hopes for the local area. The chatter also gave an 
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indication of whom or what the residents blame for rising gun crime in their city (‘gang 
culture’) and the absence of blame for others (such as the police). These rituals of 
storytelling do not produce specific, actionable priorities for the police, but they do 
communicate the community’s values and anxieties. Allowing these unfocused stories 
to be told maintains the comfort and pleasure of the interaction at PACT. 
In this and other PACT meetings, both police and residents often told anecdotes in 
which the moral was one of individual responsibility to prevent the risk of 
victimisation, conveniently congruent with the police rhetorical strategy of demand 
management. Giving crime prevention advice is a well-known function of NPTs and 
policing more broadly, and this message is well received and repeated by regulars at 
PACT where police-community relations are amicable. The following discussion that 
took place at the first meeting illustrates how anecdotes that do not communicate the 
messages of police rhetorical strategies, or even community values of personal 
responsibility, are countered or developed by others in order to convert or reinforce 
the ‘moral of the story’: 
Steve says that he has seen young people smoke drugs on the bus, 
and the driver and passengers are too scared to deal with them and 
tell them to stop or get off the bus. Other residents say this is 
understandable and they would also tend to not get involved to avoid 
confrontation. PCSO Ellie explains that drivers are discouraged by bus 
companies to deal with this kind of behaviour as their insurance is 
void if they leave the cabin. She says they can use the emergency 
button instead though.  
One resident shares a story in which a bus driver was stabbed for 
standing up to someone on the bus. PCSO Ellie again says that this is 
why bus drivers should stay in their cabins. PCSO Adam says, “You 
have to look after number one.” He says that even PCSOs are not in 
a position to deal with people who represent a risk as they do not 
have the protective kit to be safe from injury or the powers to use 
necessary force.  
… 
Margaret tells them “You should have something more to protect 
yourself”, not just their radios. PCSO Adam says that they always risk 
assess every situation and their sergeant never expects them to put 
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themselves in danger, and instead to be “risk free”. He also says that 
they travel in pairs where possible and especially in certain areas and 
during more risky times or periods.   
The ritualised nature of PACT in areas without mobilising issues, involving the comforts 
of chatter or value-laden anecdotes, appears to be comforting and appealing for 
residents. Whilst some police take the view that the presence of these core groups 
may have strategic benefits, for many police a regular crowd of attendees who come 
for social reasons rather than to contribute to police goals is frustrating. In the first 
meeting, it was clear that PCSO Adam noticed what appeared to be the residents’ 
indifference or lack of involvement in the serious work of PACT, slipping out of 
character when residents overstepped what he saw as their role as good participants 
in the PACT process:  
In the middle of this conversation, the residents start to stand up and 
either walk to the kitchen or leave the meeting. Some are talking 
amongst themselves. As the PCSOs finish speaking to Margaret about 
the tall bush, PCSO Adam says, in a voice not loud enough for 
residents currently engaged in conversation to hear, “I guess that’s 
it then.”  
Moments later, Steve verbally confirmed the police suspicion that PACT is more a social 
event than productive work that contributes to the police mission: 
PCSO Ellie says that they will be back next time, and that residents 
will be informed of the time and date by the community centre. 
Steve smiles and says, “It’s good to have a natter, isn’t it?”  
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the interactions that take place at PACT meetings in the 
West Midlands. Three case studies were presented to highlight the impact of the 
neighbourhood context on the delivery of community engagement and the variation in 
NP work. Police come to PACT with understandings of the organisation of police work 
and the effect of institutional change on this work, and this feeds into the impressions 
they give of themselves and their teams through rhetorical strategies – the verbal 
expressions that support their line, the overall presentational strategy. Police at PACT 
make use of two rhetorical strategies that are, at times, in tension with each other.  
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Maintaining confidence is a strategy of promoting police competence, used to reassure 
communities that the police will continue to provide the level of service that the 
community expects, despite falling resources. To maintain this line, police must 
persuade residents of its veracity. If residents are not convinced, they question or 
refute the line by citing incidents where local police action does not live up to 
community expectations and, in so doing, they breach the interaction order. Once 
breached, repair work must be undertaken to avoid the destruction of the interaction 
– a point of no return, the loss of status. This repair work can take a number of forms, 
such as cooling out residents whose confidence has been shaken through an apology or 
refuting claims of deliberate inaction or ineffectiveness. If police attempt the latter, 
however, some concession or understanding of the residents’ point of view is also face-
saving – it maintains the interaction order by avoiding too strong a contradiction, and 
signals that the police believe residents to be sincere in their concerns and beliefs. 
The rhetorical strategy for reducing demand was used to change public perceptions of 
the extent of police capabilities. This was supported by the prevailing economic, 
political and organisational climate, and police drew on this strategy to redefine their 
relationship with the communities at PACT. They did this by citing the tasks they could 
no longer do to the same extent as before the austerity-era, such as patrolling, and 
emphasising the increasing obligation of residents to take more responsibility for issues 
of neighbourhood security. This was in tension with the maintaining confidence 
strategy because the rhetoric is sometimes contradictory when considered through the 
lens of public expectations of police responsibility and capability. Whether or not the 
community accepted this line, when it was deployed, was dependent on the 
expectations and local security concerns of the residents. Those residents that 
challenged the line were deliberately attempting to breach the interaction – to 
vandalise the impression the police were trying to maintain.   
The concept of interactional vandalism is useful for this particular phenomenon at 
PACT because it highlights the uneven relationship between police and certain 
communities at PACT, and how breaching is carried out for normative or political 
purposes. When residents shout angrily at PACT meetings – when they strongly blame 
the police for inaction or accuse public officials of indifference to entrenched problems 
of crime and disorder – they are challenging the current order and negotiating social 
change by disrupting the line. Strauss (1978) suggests that Goffman’s view of social 
order does not pay sufficient attention to the ubiquity of negotiations in interaction 
and their impact on social change, and data presented in this chapter supports the 
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idea that some breaches are deliberate negotiations for new interactional 
arrangements. Yet the conservative effect implied by Goffman’s interaction order is 
still present at PACT, as there is constant interactional maintenance through repetition 
of rhetoric, the building of rapport and convivial relations, and the rituals of gossip 
and anecdotes. Attempts to reconfigure the relationship between police and 
community in the austerity era will need to take account of both police and community 
expectations and the effects these have on face-to-face interactions. 
Overall, the tensions in performing community engagement activities reveal the issues 
for maintaining the responsive approach of NP. Attending community meetings is 
difficult due to dwindling resources, but also difficult to neglect when faced with 
community expectations in face-to-face settings and the traditional presentational 
strategy of maintaining confidence. The normative order of an interaction is difficult 
to shift when police or residents are not in agreement, but actors attempt this by 
breaching the interaction order through a variety of means – shouting, storytelling, 
blaming, persuading – all things that will disrupt the rhetorical strategies and the line 
– seeking out repairs to this breached order that will result in a set of normative 
arrangements that are more beneficial or acceptable. Through maintenance, breach 
and repair, actors negotiate the order they want at PACT – an order they think is 
necessary to create impressions commensurate with their self-conceptions but also to 
enable arrangements that they believe enable a route to meeting collective goals. 
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7 Discussion and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This research set out to explore the reforms to NP delivery in the austerity era by 
utilising a mixed methods research design. The conditions created by the financial 
crash of 2008 led to political, economic, and fiscal changes that posed significant 
challenges for police institutions. Decades of increasing investment in policing ended 
and a new era of disinvestment begun, with overall police spending falling by 14% in 
real terms between 2010/2011 to 2014/2015 (Crawford et al. 2015). In recent years, 
overall police funding has started to rise again due to increases in some funding 
streams, such as money raised through the precept, but the central government grant 
has remained flat and with an increasing proportion directed to ‘national priorities’ 
rather than the priorities of the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) (NAO 2018). As 
some police organisations are more reliant on central funding than others, the impact 
of cuts to the central government grant is unevenly distributed (Crawford et al. 2015). 
The recent rises to police funding also do not bring overall funding back to the levels 
enjoyed in 2010, with a 19% real terms fall between 2010/2011 and 2018/2019 (NAO 
2018). Clearly then, the impacts of policing disinvestment are still being felt whether 
or not austerity measures have finished, and therefore the character of the political-
economic environment of the austerity era arguably remains. 
The austerity era, which includes austerity measures that directly impact police funds 
as well as the broader social impacts of falling investment in other services, is both a 
backdrop to this study of policing reform and a potential direct influence in how 
reforms are created, justified, and implemented. This direct influence can be observed 
in the macro-level restructuring and political rhetoric that accompanies it, as well as 
some of the stories of the NP role, reform and change that are told by police 
institutional actors. Structural change has an influence on the complex mechanisms 
and dynamics of police reform, and it is these processes that are a central focus of this 
thesis. The influence is not determinative but the reality of disinvestment can both 
constrain action and be used to justify or explain action. Of course, other changes in 
society can also have a similar impact on these processes and the policing field in 
general, and this study is not blind to other environmental factors, stable or unstable. 
Nevertheless, the austerity era is characterised by significant political and economic 
shifts and the potential for institutional transformation. As a resource-intensive 
policing programme that relied on a ring-fenced funding pot, the Neighbourhood 
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Policing Programme (NPP) was vulnerable to reforms in an era of disinvestment and 
therefore this study is a timely exploration of NP delivery in the post-NPP context. 
The mixed methods research design I employed enabled a more comprehensive picture 
of the broad phenomena of NP delivery reform and change across different levels of 
the institution to emerge. The idea of ‘levels’ of the institution is a convenient way of 
showing empirically how change processes operate in police institutional macro-
structures, culture, rhetoric, and street-level interactions. The quantitative phase 
revealed a fall in the NP workforce across England and Wales and analysed some of the 
motivations for these emerging models of NP and ‘local policing’.  A typology of NP 
workforce change was produced that interpreted the effects of these new directions 
and noted the implications for the future of NP delivery. This typology also facilitated 
the design of the qualitative phase of the study, guiding sampling choices and tailoring 
research methods to the particular structural changes in the West Midlands. The 
qualitative phase produced a deeper account of the reform processes within NPTs in 
WMP. The interviews focused on the impact of new institutional environments on NP 
delivery in WMP and the police stories of roles, reforms, and change. Observations of 
community engagement delivery through meetings explored how police-community 
interactions mediate NP delivery in the context of the austerity era. These diverse 
research methods all explored reform and change processes at different levels of the 
institution and in different domains, but it is a contention of this thesis that they are 
all linked by the ideas of NP delivery, reform and change that are referred to in 
institutional stories. 
This chapter will first provide a brief summary of the findings from the different phases 
of the fieldwork to show these processes of change, mediation, and resistance within 
these separate domains. Triangulating these findings at the different levels of the 
institution involves theorising the connections between these change processes, and 
the second section of this chapter will discuss the findings in reference to the theories 
and concepts of institutional change and police reform. 
7.2 Summary of research findings  
7.2.1 Macro changes and new approaches 
The quantitative phase of the research established that austerity measures combined 
with shifting policy agendas correlated with a disproportionate decrease in the PCSO 
workforce in England and Wales – that is, the PCSO workforce percentage decrease was 
larger than operational police officers. The disproportionate loss of PCSOs signals that 
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most police forces in general may be moving away from the neighbourhood security 
function and towards a crime management function. Across the 43 territorial police 
forces, a variety of approaches to workforce changes can be identified. Analysis of the 
data showed that forces fell into three broad categories of PCSO workforce change, 
each signalling different intentions and implications for NP delivery:  
1. Weakened NP – where forces had high and disproportionate reductions in the 
PCSO workforce, signalling a move away from the NP delivery model and 
neighbourhood security functions. 
2. Proportionally maintained NP – where forces reduced the PCSO workforce, 
reductions were roughly commensurate with funding reductions, but the 
proportion of PCSOs in the operational workforce remained stable. This 
category contains the most variation between forces, with some likely able to 
maintain their provision of NP delivery and others likely needing to adapt their 
approach due to higher reductions.  
3. Strengthened NP – where forces increased the number and proportion of PCSOs 
in the operational workforce. These changes signal a continuation of and 
intentional support for NP structures and delivery. 
It is notable that the more autonomous devolved governance structures in London and 
Wales were associated with the most extreme changes to PCSO workforces at either 
end of the spectrum. The MPS, for example, quickly established a new model that was 
less reliant on PCSOs compared to their previous Safer Neighbourhoods model. This 
‘radical reorganisation’ of policing delivery (MOPAC 2015, 2) was supported by MOPAC 
as a way to implement the priorities of the Mayor of London’s Police and Crime Plan 
2013-2016 – namely the priority to increase the presence of police constables in London 
(MOPAC 2013). In Wales, the increase in PCSO resources was a direct result of the 
Welsh government’s support for the NP model and a new grant to fund 500 more PCSOs 
across Wales (Lowe et al. 2015). Although politics were not a clear influence in changes 
across all forces, these cases showed that political ideation did play a role in some 
reforms. 
The reduction of the central government grant was too large for police institutions to 
absorb costs without reducing the operational workforce. The employment of PCSOs 
for NP delivery was in part funded by the NPF and this expired in 2013, effectively 
terminating the NPP by removing an essential programmatic element. The 
fragmentation of NP and other local policing approaches brings to an end the 
(attempted) harmonisation of NP delivery that was promoted by the NPP and is 
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consistent with the retreat of central government from police governance and its 
strategic role in NP delivery. This means that police institutions are no longer expected 
to follow a pre-structured NP model and are instead free to either continue with the 
previous model or design a new one. Due to the localist agenda that underpinned the 
reforms to police governance, it is now at the discretion of the PCC to financially 
support NP or invest in other models or priorities.  
7.2.2 Police accounts of Neighbourhood Policing organisation and reform 
Additional to the clear divisions in the approaches to structural reform of NP delivery, 
there are also competing stories of NP delivery and reform in the individual accounts 
of NPT operatives in WMP. Chapter 5 provided a snapshot of the organisation and 
delivery of NP in WMP through these accounts. Alongside organisational reform 
programmes were both stories that supported reform efforts and those that disputed 
the institutional reform narratives, including the policy decisions and the justifications 
and motivations for change. At the street-level, the latter was the dominant narrative 
of the study’s participants, reflecting an emerging cultural orientation of police that 
undertake neighbourhood security functions in NPTs. The pro-reform stories reflected 
a disposition towards crime control and greater rationalisation of NP delivery, and this 
supports the institutional agenda of demand reduction and the broader policing agenda 
of professionalization. 
This dominant sub-cultural narrative relates to the value of NP as a specialised arena 
for the delivery of neighbourhood security through utilising ‘soft’ policing tactics and 
skills. For police with these views, change is understood as inimical to the functioning 
of NP in delivering a good service to communities. They are somewhat critical of the 
emerging narratives of reform to NP delivery, which do not reflect the values they 
ascribe to NP, instead focusing on the efficiency of demand reduction and technology. 
The other narrative centres largely on professionalization and the control and 
reduction of demands on police time. This view broadly promotes the idea of a 
redefinition of NP delivery in order to realign police work to a narrower set of police 
functions. Although this narrative did not appear to be the dominant one in this study’s 
sample, sergeants, who are significant and influential actors in the NPT as a social 
grouping, keenly took up ideas around professionalization of delivery. 
Although the tension between these two narratives alludes in part to the paradigm of 
crime management and neighbourhood security – sometimes referred to as the ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ policing dichotomy – respondents tended to view the main impact of 
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austerity as a reduction in the capacity to be proactive, rather than a complete 
devastation of the neighbourhood security paradigm. Elements of NP delivery and 
rhetoric in WMP are stable. Although geographical boundaries grew and resources 
shrank, the NPT structure remained and police understood their teams to be 
performing neighbourhood security functions as a primary objective. However, 
performing these functions routinely had become difficult due to abstractions to other 
teams, especially Response Teams.  
Furthermore, NP delivery is influenced by geography and situational demands of the 
neighbourhood and its residing communities. Police interpret their neighbourhood 
setting – its character, problems, and the demands and participation of communities – 
to make sense of and organise NP work. The community engagement function was 
another mechanism of NP that continued to be delivered through PACT meetings, but 
even where meetings were poorly attended and police were sceptical of the value of 
such meetings there were few signs during the fieldwork phase that NPTs would retreat 
from these meetings completely. This illustrates that changing routines may be 
challenging where this work is based on established policing tactics that are valued by 
some police, partners, and communities. Rather than reforms resulting in a clear 
direction of change, NP shows both unintended continuities and changes. Police 
accounts of NP delivery and the social organisation of NP in WMP represent much 
continuation of earlier themes in policing research, and therefore some level of police 
institutional continuity is apparent.  
7.2.3 Community engagement in the context of austerity and narratives of change 
Drawing on observational data, Chapter 6 focused on the delivery of community 
engagement in PACT meetings, exploring police interactions with communities and 
other partners in the context of the austerity era and contemporary reform agenda in 
WMP. The main finding was that police use rhetorical strategies in PACT meetings to 
manage impressions of NP delivery and the capacity of NPTs in the austerity era. The 
competing narratives of policing reform noted in Chapter 5 were observed in the 
delivery of community engagement at PACT meetings. These narratives are used as 
practical strategies to account for local police (in)action. 
The rhetorical strategy for maintaining confidence is used to create impressions of 
competence, to keep residents confident in local police, and to keep communities 
engaged with community engagement activities. NPT operatives make claims that the 
NPT can continue to deliver the level of service that communities expect, regardless 
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of cuts to the police and reductions in NPT resources. The rhetorical strategy for 
reducing demand attempts to control the impressions of the extent of police 
capabilities to maintain expected levels of service in a neighbourhood. This is deployed 
as an attempt to (re)define the relationship between police and communities through 
police-community communication at PACT meetings.  
The effectiveness of these strategies is related to communities’ acceptance or 
refutation of the police definition of their own capacity and abilities in the austerity 
era. Accepting the police line maintains the interaction order of PACT, and signals a 
willingness of communities to participate in community engagement on police terms. 
PACT meetings are social events that often involve mundane chatter, gossip, and a 
convivial atmosphere, as these maintain the interaction order and help to form bonds 
between police and communities. Refuting the line, on the other hand, means that the 
interaction order of PACT is temporarily breached, as both police and communities 
seek consensus on the function of PACT. Once breached, both police and communities 
undertake repair work in order to create or restore genial relations and avoid lasting 
damage to any actor’s status. The process of breaching and repairing the interaction 
order also has a more practical objective: to negotiate the roles and responsibilities of 
police and community actors. This relates to who has the power to define ‘problems’ 
and PACT can therefore also be described as a setting with a shifting, negotiated order, 
in which both the police and community enrol rhetoric in service to their own ends and 
in which differing expectations are managed. 
7.3 Discussion: An institutional perspective of change in Neighbourhood Policing 
delivery  
This section will discuss the research findings in relation to the theories of (police) 
institutional change and the interactionist perspectives introduced in Chapter 1, and 
is organised into sections that address each of this study’s primary research questions. 
Institutional theory acknowledges that change does not happen easily, institutions 
have stabilising mechanisms and values which make them resistant to change, and 
substantial reforms are difficult to implement and can indeed lead to unexpected 
changes. Nevertheless, institutional change does take place in different ways: 
sometimes severely, episodically, and unpredictably, and at other times gradually and 
adaptively (Baumgartner and Jones 2012; Streeck and Thelen 2005). The normative 
context of an institution provides some clues as to which reforms will resonate with 
institutional cultures (Carstensen 2017), but this cultural resonance is not a simple 
model of reform in which change can be easily predicted. Studies of police change 
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have long noted the resistance to reform provided by occupational cultures (Holdaway 
1977; Loftus 2009), and how culture is influenced by structural realities that are 
unchanged by internal reform processes (Skolnick 1967; Chan 1997). Furthermore, 
police culture is neither monolithic nor static, and police institutions and teams 
contain points of cultural conflict and discursive struggle. Cultural resonance may be 
a factor in the acceptance of reforms, but it is not the only process of mediation. 
Change is also negotiated through interactions, talk and sensemaking, and the meaning 
of change is situated within small groups and their idiocultures (Fine and Hallett 2014). 
Another part of the change process that requires theorisation is the role of the 
exogenous shock as a trigger for punctuated (Sherman 1978) or gradual (Carstensen 
2017) institutional change. This study analysed how the shock of the UK fiscal crisis 
and the subsequent austerity era, as a macro-structural ‘surround’ (Manning 2008, 87), 
has been influential in NP reforms and broader police institutional change. This section 
will also deal with these questions of how NP delivery and the police role are tied to 
this ‘surround’, and what the implications are for police institutional values and 
approaches to local policing delivery. There are specific claims and general claims here 
that will be discussed separately. First of all, the specific claims about the impacts of 
the austerity era of NP delivery will be discussed. This deals with the contemporary 
austerity era and changes in NP more directly and asks, ‘what has changed and what 
are the implications for NP?’ The next sub-section considers the issues of individual 
and cultural mediation from an interactionist perspective, which highlights the 
significance of stories, sensemaking, and group culture in negotiating change (Fine and 
Hallett 2014; Fine 2012; Weick 1995; Strauss 1978). Lastly, the discussion pans out to 
the topic of police institutional change, focusing on the general question of, ‘how does 
change happen?’ This will consider the significance of the structural mechanisms of 
change. 
7.3.1 The Impact of Austerity on Neighbourhood Policing Delivery 
In the austerity era, change in NP delivery is complex, messy, and unevenly distributed. 
Nevertheless, a number of the identifiable changes and challenges to NP delivery and 
the police role more generally are due to the reductions in the police workforce, 
reductions in time resources, and new reforms that are a product of the austerity era. 
Identifying the impact of deliberate reforms is difficult due to the impact of the socio-
economic environment on the policing field. There is also the danger that due to the 
dilution of some aspects of NP delivery, as well as the strains that this causes to NPT 
operatives, there is a regression to the social distance that catalysed ideation of RP in 
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the early twenty-first century (see Innes 2004; Povey 2001). The delivery mechanisms 
of NP (Quinton and Morris 2008) and neighbourhood security functions (Innes 2004) are 
at risk of being deprioritised even where NP models still attempt them. This does not 
mean that austerity has ended these mechanisms and neighbourhood security functions 
– they are enduring characteristics of British policing – but it does have serious 
implications for how NP is understood and delivered. The following subsections discuss 
the impact of austerity era reforms on the structure, role and mechanisms of NP. 
7.3.1.1 Neighbourhood security and the police role in society 
Just as in WMP, there are conflicting stories about the police role in society in national 
conversations, and the old model of NP still receives plenty of rhetorical support from 
individual members of parliament (Grierson 2018), political parties (BBC News 2016), 
metropolitan mayors (e.g. Mayor of London 2017), PCCs (e.g. Gloucestershire OPCC 
2018), police regulatory bodies (CoP 2018), and others (Independent Police Commission 
2013). NP and neighbourhood security therefore appear to still be valued institutionally 
and politically, and this fits with the historical values, functions, and symbolism of 
British (and especially English) policing (Loader and Mulcahy 2003). Regardless, 
emphasis on aspects of the police role changes over time. Some have noted these 
swings or oscillations in the recent past, at least at the rhetorical and programmatic 
level, as seen in CP movements, POP, ILP, and ZTP (Manning 2010; Innes 2004; Innes 
2005; Maguire 2000). Punch (2012) asserted that community policing is particularly 
vulnerable to this swing in times of austerity, with ‘soft’ functions being deprioritised 
in favour of ‘hard’ functions. This may apply to some aspects of NP and neighbourhood 
security, but is far from clear that such a comprehensive swing would happen in 
England and Wales given policing history and symbolism. It would also be imprecise to 
portray NP as only delivering neighbourhood security functions, as the ‘harder’ crime 
management functions are also an important operational aspect of any local policing 
model in practice (Innes 2005a). For example, in WMP crime management strategies 
are valued by and are part of the routines of NP operatives, and these routines include 
some of the hallmarks of ILP: exchange of information between partners, data-driven 
patrolling, and the increased specialisation of skills and functions (Maguire 2000). 
Policing approaches, such as CP and ILP, can be thought of as the prevailing ideas in 
policing, in which certain aspects of policing are emphasised more than others in a 
given period (Innes 2004). The distinction between rhetoric and reality, or ideas and 
routine police work, highlights the different levels at which ‘swing’ can occur, as well 
as questions regarding the relationship between each level. The rhetoric of policing 
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approaches may not accurately describe police work at the street level (Manning 1997), 
perhaps because aspirations are difficult to put into practice due to the institutional 
pressures of policing (Ratcliffe 2002).  Accordingly, while policing rhetoric and ideation 
may be developing to account for the new policing surround, changes to police work 
and specifically NP delivery are not necessarily in harmony with rhetorical swings. 
Indeed, rather than a deliberate and pointed reconfiguration, NP as a specialist area 
of policing has been diluted due to time constraints and restructuring. It is contended 
here that where this restructuring of the NP model has taken place – that is, resources 
are reduced, geographical responsibility is broadened, and the roles of NPTs diversified 
– this can lead to a low-definition policing where the function of teams are less focused 
and the resources are spread more thinly, whether NP resources are assigned to a team 
or floating between teams. Policy ideas can be the cause of this change or they can be 
in tension with it. Rhetoric can be a prelude to these changes, an ad hoc justification 
of these changes, or a reflection of aspirations for another mode of policing delivery. 
In the current austerity era police work and institutional rhetoric do yet not appear to 
be harmonious, but there are connections between the two as both are dealing with 
the pressures of disinvestment. Overall, this suggests that change in NP under austerity 
is a complex process, contingent upon a number of factors in the policing field and 
surround, as well as the relationships between rhetoric, deliberate reforms, and 
unintended changes.  
7.3.1.2 Seeing Visibility Differently 
One of the most significant dilemmas for many police institutions in the austerity era 
is how to maintain a visible presence on the streets with fewer NPT operatives. 
Visibility is a symbolically important function of NP and British policing, and has been 
integrated into the RP and NP programmes as a vital component (Barker and Crawford 
2013). Indeed, the official evaluations of RP and NP identified visibility as a necessary 
delivery mechanism through its association with higher confidence when combined 
with problem-solving and engagement – the other two delivery mechanisms of NP. 
Sindall and Sturgis (2013) also found that not only is visibility associated with higher 
confidence in police, but higher police numbers themselves have an indirect effect on 
confidence through increasing visibility. It is not only NP that relies on higher officer 
numbers; the order maintenance approach of the New York Police Department in the 
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1990s, notable for its success in crime reduction47, was bolstered by the recruitment 
of over nine thousand officers between 1990 to 2000 (Reaves and Hickman 2002). 
Barker and Crawford (2013) highlight the importance of political ideation in times of 
austerity, as ideological commitments to state shrinkage and private provision of 
services create an inhospitable environment for resource intensive policing models. As 
such, official Home Office policy has been for police institutions to deal with resource 
reductions through efficiency savings and increasing the proportion of the frontline 
workforce. The claim embedded in this policy is that the police workforce was too 
large, and a smaller organisation could provide the same level of service with 
significantly fewer employees – the mantra of ‘doing more with less’. Some argue that 
police numbers and visible foot patrol have little to no impact on crime rates (Clarke 
and Hough 1984; Kelling et al 1974), yet recent studies suggest that numbers and a 
visible presence are predictors of higher confidence in the police as well as lower crime 
rates (Sindall and Sturgis 2013). Although in recent years the police cuts coincided with 
falling aggregate crime rates as measured by the CSEW, giving an opportunity for the 
government to claim that the police could do ‘more with less’, the evidence suggests 
that increases in police numbers, alongside effective use of these resources, can 
reduce crime (Bradford 2011). If police numbers are often a prerequisite for enhanced 
visibility, then the link is especially important for NP as a model that relies on visibility 
as one vital delivery mechanism. 
Internally, the necessity of visibility and visible foot patrol has been questioned. In a 
speech on ‘re-imagining’ policing, Thornton (2015, no page) makes the case for 
hotspots policing as a valid tactic for crime reduction, but criticises the idea that 
visibility should be ‘an end in itself’. Thornton’s notion that visibility should only be 
applied to methods that directly reduce crime is framed by the argument that the use 
of visible policing in the pre-austerity era, when neighbourhood security and the 
reassurance function was emphasised, is unsustainable. 
When budgets were larger we could afford higher levels of visible 
patrol and we have increased visibility in recent years with more 
Special Constables and Police Community Support Officers.  But is 
that sustainable? 
                                            
47 Although some claims for the impact of police on the New York crime drop are overstated 
(see Bratton 2005), Zimring (2011) finds it plausible that police made a contribution to the 
reduction in crime. 
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We need an honest conversation about what policing is here to do… 
in recognition of the changing operating environment and 
significantly reduced resources resulting from the public sector 
spending cuts and austerity measures. (Ibid., no page) 
These new ‘conversations’ about what policing should become due to the constraints 
of austerity are indeed happening inside police institutions. Some participants in this 
study thought that the concept of visibility may itself need to be ‘re-imagined’ due to 
the combination of shrinking NPT resources and the increasing digitalisation of social 
life. One suggestion was to use graphics that symbolised police presence in online 
spaces, echoing requests from the NPCC (2017) for police actors to consider how social 
media can enhance visibility. In either approach, the visibility mechanism of NP is no 
longer considered viable in the austerity era unless it is reconceptualised to mean 
effective tactics of direct crime prevention or a more efficient form of symbolising 
police presence in social spaces. The austerity era therefore catalyses stories about 
the function of police and a national downward trend of actual police visibility on the 
streets (ONS 2015). 
7.3.1.3 From Antisocial Behaviour to Vulnerability 
Neighbourhood security functions persist to some extent due to internal institutional 
values and external pressures. Reducing ASB is an important objective of NP through 
the neighbourhood security function, and in recent years the harmful impact of repeat 
ASB on vulnerable people has had a ‘raised policy profile’ (Donoghue 2013, 809). This 
still remains present in the high-level priorities of police organisations (HMICFRS 2018; 
NPCC 2016), which is consistent with the historically broad remit of beat policing (Innes 
and Weston 2010). The Pilkington case, for example, still had ramifications for how 
the NP role is understood by police in WMP at the time of fieldwork, yet HMICFRS 
(2018) judged that WMP’s performance in keeping vulnerable people safe ‘requires 
improvement’. NPTs are potentially well-placed to co-produce solutions to ASB with 
their partners, and the ‘boots on the ground’ and quick responses that can disrupt and 
reduce the harm of ASB (Innes and Weston 2010). At the time of writing, the most 
recent PEEL inspection (HMICFRS 2018) suggests that nationally the allocation of staff 
to NPTs is still falling, ‘protecting vulnerable people’ is improving modestly, less use 
is made of powers and tactics to deal with ASB, and in each of these measures there 
is still considerable variation between forces. Nationally, while reducing ASB as a 
function is still institutionally valued, the increasing focus on vulnerability and complex 
crimes (CoP 2015) may have encouraged a higher proportion of existing resources to 
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be used on specific forms of ASB. This is consistent with institutional stories of demand 
management that seek to rationalise the deployment of policing resources and 
redefine and rebalance police functions.  
7.3.1.4 Community Engagement: Inertia and Stories of Reform 
Delivery mechanisms of NP may also be somewhat stable in the face of external and 
internal pressures due to opposing institutional forces. Community consultation in the 
form of PACT or other police-community meetings are routine and historical aspects 
of police community engagement (Innes et al 2009), at least in some areas, as well as 
fulfilling legal obligations to communities and police promises of consultation and 
engagement. That is, there is institutional pressure to carry out forms of CE. Although 
some police do not always see it as a worthy way to spend police time, PACT satisfies 
these pressures, alleviating the need to introduce other methods of carrying out formal 
engagement, which could require innovation to create, institutional agreement to roll 
out, and new skills to run (Ibid.). A risk for CE is that, though it continues to have high-
level rhetorical support and the related obligation of NPTs to perform it, it is often 
misunderstood in principle or practice and its delivery is patchy. Firstly, training may 
be inadequate or non-existent, as it was in WMP according to interview participants, 
and many police organisations do not share an understanding of what community 
engagement is or should achieve (Simmonds 2015). Secondly, the tension between 
community-defined and police-defined problems is a stubborn issue. CE that deals with 
what appear to be trivial issues can demotivate police with a particular sense of the 
police mission. Dealing with each community-defined issue is a time commitment so 
police with dwindling time resources may resent what they perceive as trivial requests 
made to them through engagement processes. The rhetoric of ‘citizen focus’ and the 
notion of providing a service in line with community expectations (Home Office 2004; 
NPIA 2008b) is being challenged by diminished resources as well as the new stories of 
demand management, efficiencies and the police role.  These new stories do not 
prioritise the customer service ethos that was present in the early policy rhetoric of 
NP.  
On the other hand, austerity has triggered stories about how community engagement 
practices can be reformed to make better use of digital technologies, local informant 
networks, and methods that foster citizen participation in the production of local 
security (Simmonds 2015; Fisher and Ritchie 2015; Bluelight Consultancy 2017). These 
stories are told largely in response to police efficiency drives and resonate with some 
of the original intentions of CP to increase community participation in policing, but 
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some of the reforms proposed in these stories also have implications for levels of 
participation and representation. Digital engagement methods, for example, could 
increase participation and representation in police consultation and engagement 
processes. The difficulties of organising, running, and ensuring (representative) 
attendance at PACTs could be bypassed, and community engagement could be 
transformed. However, any transformation would have to deal with the variance in the 
practices and rules of interaction over digital platforms. Face-to-face interactions are 
an inherent feature of public meetings and, as was shown in chapter 6, have a specific 
effect on the ordering of police-community relations and consequently co-production. 
We know ‘remarkably little’ about the consequences of new policing technologies 
(Byrne and Marx 2011, 17), and the same applies to new digital methods of community 
engagement.  
One issue for the digitalisation of community engagement and co-production is the 
protection of community members’ data and identity. This concerns both the 
involvement of private companies in providing platforms or potentially facilitating CE, 
as well as other individuals who may be motivated to know details of attendees or 
proceedings of these interactions. If this is not protected, then cooperation in some 
areas may be more difficult to forge. Of course, the opposite may also be true, that 
delivering such engagement processes over new secure platforms could reduce the 
potential for local intimidation, but this would require the presence of individuals with 
such intentions to be filtered out. This depends on the model of digital engagement 
chosen in the future (Meijer 2012). 
7.3.1.5 Structural reform 
The effect of structural reform on the role of NP has already been discussed above, 
where it was proposed that a low-definition NP is emerging due to these reforms. The 
following paragraphs will explore how this is happening in more detail.  
Many police forces are reforming the boundaries of geographical responsibility for 
NPTs. These boundary changes may impact how NPTs treat the smaller areas that were 
once the units of geographical responsibility. That is, there is a tension between the 
idea of enlarging geographical responsibility while focusing resources on the specific 
neighbourhoods with the most immediate or serious problems, as bigger boundaries 
can merge more diverse neighbourhoods. Rubinstein (1973) suggests that police 
organise their knowledge at the district level – that of geographic responsibility. 
Changes to this responsibility causes temporary confusion to police as they have to 
learn about these new geographies. This could just be a teething problem for police 
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who remain in one NPT, but for police used as more flexible resources across different 
micro-beats or neighbourhoods, this threatens to detach crafted local knowledge from 
the problem-solving function (also see Klinger 1997, 299). 
New geographical criteria for resource allocation in the austerity era may often mean 
that more resources will be focused on areas with higher crime rates or more serious 
problems. For example, the WMP 2020 reforms proposed ‘mission-focused teams’ that 
could work with the range of situational demands across different neighbourhoods, 
making police more responsive to the particular problems of higher-risk areas. One 
consequence of this type of reform, however, is that resources could be pulled away 
from neighbourhoods where less immediate engagement is required, potentially 
reducing efforts to maintain relationships and confidence in lower-risk areas. Following 
a protracted period of police disinvestment, the increasing focus of police analysis of 
the risks of harm and the severity of local problems – categorising neighbourhoods by 
levels of ‘need’, for example (Sims 2012) – could change who are the beneficiaries of 
engagement activities, and the extent to which particular communities receive such 
police services. 
7.3.1.6 Diminishing Proactivity 
One account of NP change that was forwarded by the participants in this study is the 
idea that performing proactive policing work is now more difficult. Writing about police 
investigation, Maguire (2008, 437) states that proactive policing gives “more weight to 
longer-term planning and to agendas set by the police”. In Maguire’s conception, 
knowledge of an area’s problems is constructed by police and this is relevant to both 
the science and craft of policing neighbourhoods with a range of profiles. That is, 
police attempt to create a systematic understanding of the characters and problems 
of a neighbourhood in order to plan tactics and operations that stop on-going 
neighbourhood problems and prevent future offences and disorder. These functions of 
policing are still valued in stories of demand management as proactive work is 
expected to go ‘upstream’ and reduce future demand overall. Although the austerity 
era may have brought a sharper focus to these concerns around prevention and demand 
reduction, it may simultaneously have the contrary effect of reducing the ability of 
police to dedicate resources to this work. This challenges Punch’s (2012) suggestion 
that policing oscillates between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ functions, as, like NP in general, 
proactivity is not limited to one side of the ‘soft’/’hard’ dichotomy. With proactive 
work increasingly harder to perform (HMIC 2017), the austerity era may have triggered 
an unintended shift towards what Loader (2006) refers to as a ‘narrow’ policing 
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orientation, in which policing intervention is minimal and reactive rather than the high 
numbers, visibility, and proactivity of CP approaches. 
Scott (1998; also see Lum et al 2012) suggests that reactive policing objectives emerge 
in response to efficiency drives that rely on performance culture because the more 
proactive functions of CP are difficult to measure. However, Scott (1998) also noted 
that competitive performance culture is resisted by police occupational culture. In this 
study police in WMP worried that a lot of the proactive work they perform is not 
measurable, and through reforms that promise efficiencies and rationalisation through 
more performance management a similar situation could arise in police forces with 
decreasing NPT resources. There are sources of potential resistance to competitive 
performance cultures in the current environment, including central government and 
street-level police cultures, and the use of ‘hard numeric targets’ in policing is thought 
to be falling since the Home Office abolished national performance targets in 2010 
(Curtis 2015). However, localised target cultures may still emerge or persist in some 
forces (Ibid.), and the PCC role may play a part in encouraging the creation of new 
performance measures (BBC 2013).  
In NPTs, proactive work in particular is now more difficult to do due to reduced 
resources. Although it is practically difficult to resist changes that are linked to the 
lack of resources, cultural resistance within NPTs may limit the impact of specific 
reforms that lead to a higher proportion of reactive demands. Dominant conceptions 
of NP in this study suggest that proactive work is highly valued by many, even if it is 
at risk, and when new environments, stories, and reforms challenge strong policing 
values, some form of resistance is to be expected. The effectiveness of any resistance 
depends on many factors, of course. Group dynamics of NPTs and the attitudes of 
sergeants in particular could have an effect on how reforms are mediated or resisted, 
but these must be understood in relation to material changes in police institutions as 
both practical or structural ‘constraints’ as well as a resource for ideation, stories, and 
sensemaking. 
7.3.2 Stories and sensemaking in Neighbourhood Policing Teams 
Stories are a ubiquitous tool of change and resistance across different levels of the 
police institution (internal) and across constituents of the institution (internal and 
external). The accounts of change given by participants within this study reflect wider 
contemporary and traditional stories about policing. The different perspectives about 
what policing is and should be, as well as how it should react to the shifting socio-
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economic environment, reveal discursive conflicts around policing delivery and the 
role of the police. In institutions, stories also reveal how change is understood and 
enacted and, in the case of NP in particular, give an insight into how groups attempt 
to maintain or negotiate a local culture (Fine 1987; 2012; Fine and Hallett 2014). The 
understanding of local group culture in policing, it will be contended here, is a vital 
avenue of policing research. How police are grouped in new forms of neighbourhood 
or local policing will likely affect how individuals understand and enact reforms as well 
as meet individual and collective objectives. It is within these groups that talk and 
stories help to understand and enact change as well as negotiate order (Fine 1984; 
1987; 2010; 2012; Fine and Hallett 2014; Strauss 1978). 
7.3.2.1 Understanding the team 
Studies of NP and other team policing approaches in general have lacked theorisation 
of how requiring officers to work together in a small group – a group that officially has 
pre-defined policing delivery mechanisms and objectives – impacts the social 
organisation of policing. Interactionist perspectives of policing have in the past 
considered how police work (Manning 1997) and NP work (O’Neill 2017) is affected by 
the formation of performance teams. This Goffmanian concept of teamwork describes 
how during group interactions particular actors will work together to convey a specific 
impression to their audience through a unified performance. For O’Neill (2017), this 
concept is useful for showing the interactional divisions between PCSOs and PCs within 
NPTs, and considering whether NPTs contain complementary or competitive teams 
within the grouping, where relationships between PCSOs and PCs are either good or 
bad respectively. O’Neill uses these concepts for judging the quality of interactions 
within NPTs and thus the quality of policing delivery. While the idea of an NPT as a 
group and unit of analysis is touched on in O’Neill’s study, this is not the focus of 
theorisation. The conceptual distinction between Goffman’s performance team and 
Fine’s local group is outlined here: 
Despite a shared concern with interaction ritual, Goffman’s 
dramatism, focusing on free-floating, untethered interaction, 
contrasts with localism, emphasizing that action is shaped by and 
responsive to the embedded meaning of the group to its participants. 
As a result, practices, actions routinized in light of local cultures and 
a bounded interactional domain, are central. Every ongoing group is 
a local outpost of society. Although actions may extend beyond the 
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interacting group, group boundaries establish the legitimacy of group 
action. (Fine and Hallett 2014, 1777) 
What this suggests is that the NPT as a local group is influential in the social 
organisation and delivery of NP as regular intra-group face-to-face interactions build a 
local group culture – the idioculture – and set ‘standards for action’ (Fine 2010, 356). 
Of course, roles within these groups remain important for performances and the 
interaction order, but group culture and standards for action are negotiated over time 
with regards to the group’s local and historical context.   
For NP, the question is to what extent the NPT is a small group that regularly interacts 
and creates its own standards for action. If NPT members do not interact with each 
other and are teams in name only, then they are closer to Manning’s (2008, 104) 
description of the ‘notional team’, in which members rarely meet face-to-face and 
interaction is largely through telecommunication. The teams in WMP appeared have 
some level of groupness: teams, at the time of fieldwork, had the station as their base 
where briefings took place; sergeants were of course involved in briefing all police and 
justifying tactics; sergeants, constables, and PCSOs worked together to varying degrees 
on the engagement/problem-solving process. For Fine, it is important for team 
members to interact together enough to create an understanding between members. 
This depends on the extent and nature of the interactions. Stations provide one space 
where police can collectively and continuously make sense of their roles in NPTs. 
Although there are other spaces where this interaction can take place – when 
performing tasks like engagement or patrol together – reforms that seek to remove 
police from communal spaces, such as the reduction of stations and investing in new 
portable digital technologies, could reduce the time for intra-team face-to-face 
interaction and consequently diminish groupness. 
Groups as units of analysis are not only useful for understanding a unifying idioculture, 
but also for exploring the conflicts and negotiations that occur during times of external 
pressures and change: 
Interaction orders are not always peaceful or filled with consensus. 
They may be fraught with turmoil and appear chaotic, but they are 
socially organized nonetheless (Hallett, 2009). The same analytic 
perspective applies for understanding instances of conflict as it does 
for cohesion. Shared memory, performance, and differentiation still 
apply, although there is often contention as to the proper form that 
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these logics should take in and across groups. (Fine and Hallett 2014, 
1788) 
Conflicts in teams, especially in times of reform, are important signifiers of 
sensemaking processes, resistance, and struggles in the definition of standards for 
action, and the status and roles of group members, as well as the divisions within 
groups, is another factor in how standards for action are negotiated. In NPT 
hierarchies, sergeants appear to be significant players in setting the tone for their 
teams, reflecting the importance of police ranks in general (Manning 1997; Holdaway 
1988) and the sergeant role in particular for the reform of NP delivery. 
7.3.2.2 The role of talk and stories in Neighbourhood Policing 
Police tell stories in a number of settings. In this study these included: formal research 
interview scenarios, where there is the potential for quiet reflection and 
representative anecdotes with an academic audience; public meetings, where 
anecdotes or aphorisms are offered within the action of police work, and; more 
informal conversations between police and the researcher before and after public 
meetings, in which ‘show and tell’ commentaries are sometimes offered (Shearing and 
Ericson 1991, 489). Stories within NPTs can generate both police occupational culture 
and idioculture, but they are not the only relevant stories to NP. NPT operatives and 
other street-level police may hear stories about policing told by other internal and 
external constituents of policing. Stories about NP are told by interested parties in 
police senior management, politics, local communities and various forms of media. 
Indeed, stories are joint actions (Plummer 1995; Blumer 1969) in both institutions and 
local groups that serve to make sense of change, negotiate order, and create structure 
(Strauss 1978; Boje 1991; Fine 1979; 1984; 2010).  
Fine makes the distinction and link between the worlds of action and talk in his study 
of preadolescent baseball teams: 
Through this talk, the boy’s self and his knowledge of how to present 
this self to others are being developed: What is the range of 
appropriate behaviours and roles available, and how can one 
manipulate them in a variety of situations? (Fine 1987, 59) 
For Fine, it is talk within groups that organises their cultural outlook and distinguishes 
the group from broader moral and cultural concerns. In general, stories are both 
representations of group culture and tools for making sense of both action and 
structural influence on action. In NPTs, therefore, sensemaking involves talk and 
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storytelling to come to a collective understanding of the NP role and delivery as well 
as reforms and socio-economic change. NP is also ordered by negotiations between 
actors in NPTs and external groups. In public meetings, such as PACT, new stories of 
NP roles and delivery are either accepted or challenged by communities who 
themselves have their own cultural expectations regarding the police role in the 
management of local crime and disorder. Other agencies that participate in these 
meetings and partnership work with police may have particular expectations of the 
police role in collaborative work, as well as their own institutional pressures and 
stories. It is important to recognise the connections between the institution as a whole 
and the talk and action of the group, and how these processes can mediate change in 
the role and delivery of NP. The role and status of each storyteller, whether in the 
local group or the broader institution, also affects how stories are received and 
meaning generated within the group. This perspective of communication in groups and 
organisations as a negotiation of order is described in the following excerpt: 
The negotiated order perspective reminds us that organizational 
structure is not fixed but rather is continuously being constructed. 
People learn what they are expected to do in organizations through 
their communication with others and then find these expectations 
modified through additional interactions. Organizational life is not 
directed by an organizational chart but by the meanings of the social 
relations of the persons who inhabit roles in that formal hierarchy. 
(Fine 1984, 256) 
If the group culture is important for guiding action, this again highlights the potential 
influence of higher status members of the group. Stories from community groups, for 
instance, may be more influential in certain settings and for certain parts of police 
work than others. Stories from senior management may be imbued with a formal 
institutional status but less culturally influential than those from within the group. 
Sergeants, on the other hand, are likely influential both in terms of formal hierarchy 
and group status. 
Apart from the dynamics of groups and institutions, the success of reform may also be 
aided by the use of stories that resonate with occupational and group cultures. Senior 
management in institutions may attempt to change occupational identities through 
narratives that legitimate existing orders or reforms, but these can be resisted by 
occupational narratives (Humphreys and Brown 2002). This is a complex process due 
to intra-institutional conflicts; stories may be rejected if they do not reflect particular 
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values, but they may be accepted by others. In this study, different stories about NP 
and reform draw upon understandings of police institutional values to either support 
change or express apprehension and condemnation of incoming reforms. Furthermore, 
some stories may be culturally dominant in institutions or in groups. The existence of 
dominant stories, if opposing change, may restrict sensemaking and lead to 
institutional inertia (Näslund and Pemer 2011; Geiger and Antonacopoulou 2009). In 
NPTs, the dominant stories appeared to be those that support the new cultural 
dispositions of NP, but this is complicated by the existence of stories that may have 
more institutional dominance due to the support of higher status individuals – i.e. 
senior and middle managers, especially sergeants – and the traditional occupational 
culture (Skolnick 1966; Reiner 2010; Loftus 2009).  
The plurality of stories within policing could mean that policing is currently more open 
to sensemaking processes and the potential change that these bring. While the new 
cultural stories of NP are influenced by current NP structures and recent policing 
history, stories about demand reduction and retreating to the ‘core’ functions of crime 
reduction are likely triggered by the fiscal environment and supported by central 
government and the police regulatory bodies. According to Holdaway (2017), the new 
loosely coupled structure of police regulation supports the re-professionalisation of 
policing, and through the CoP this includes the establishment of a ‘corpus of knowledge 
about what works in policing’ (Ibid., 597) and standards for effective and ethical police 
action. The role of the CoP in particular represents a vehicle for knowledge production, 
ideation, and storytelling in policing, and it is likely that this plays a part in informing 
stories and sensemaking in NPTs, especially regarding reforms and change. In the face 
of these changes in an already complex world, nostalgia for the past is an act of 
resistance (Reissner 2011). 
While these stories tend to be influenced by role, rank, and existing subcultural 
dispositions within NPTs, these links are not definitively causal and one individual is 
capable of expressing seemingly contradictory stories about policing. Understanding 
individual police attitudes is useful for investigating cultural divisions (Cosgrove 2016; 
Muir 1977), yet stories can themselves be a separate unit of analysis. Stories are 
connected to the experiences and attitudes of story-tellers, but this connection does 
not have to be fixed as attitudes and experiences are not necessarily consistent over 
time and context, especially when individuals are in the process of sensemaking in a 
time of reform (Reissner 2011). 
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7.3.3 How police institutions change 
There is debate in policing studies regarding how sudden or gradual, unintended or 
deliberate police institutional change is (Manning 1997; 2001; cf. Marks 2000; Savage 
2007a). Much of this debate hinges on how change is operationalized and measured, 
as well the differences in police institutional change between states with distinct 
socio-economic contexts. Although some measures, such as workforce characteristics, 
tactics, and performance, may show some form of evolution over time and a more 
direct link to policy decisions, institutional perspectives of policing emphasise that 
there exists a largely stable core of values, functions and culture. This core may be 
influenced by changes to the peripheral measures, but it remains largely inert.  
This section will discuss how socio-economic factors and exogenous shocks impact the 
police reform environment more than most policing change studies account for. It will 
tentatively suggest that socio-economic environments constrain and influence police 
reform decisions and stories about policing, and specifically that austerity can both 
exert pressure and provide contemporary resources for the accounts of police reform. 
These structural environments and shifts are vital for understanding the opportunities 
and restrictions in processes of mediation, negotiation and sensemaking in police 
institutions. The interplay between different levels of police institutional change takes 
into account the impact of trigger events (Sherman 1978), the socio-economic 
environment (Manning 2008; Chan 1997; Reiner 2007), ideation (Béland 2009), story-
telling (Shearing and Ericson 1991), sensemaking (Weick 1995; Maguire and Katz 2002), 
and negotiation (Strauss 1978). Police institutional change occurs across different 
levels and these processes interact to both generate and stifle reforms, and therefore 
the influences at each level deserve analysis and theorisation in studies of police 
institutional change. 
7.3.3.1 Trigger events and policing reform 
Faced with significant exogenous shocks in the socio-economic realm, external and 
internal constituents may prompt institutions to enact reforms to address prevailing 
ideas about the how the institution should act in relation to its new environment 
(Sherman 1978; Manning 2001). The manner of these prompts vary; pressure to reform 
can come from legislation, government financial incentives, media narratives, 
representations of public opinion, and other changes in the policing field. The link 
between trigger events and their impact on police change processes requires attention 
in policing studies. Whether the impact of the shock is on ideas or more tangibly on 
the policing field, police institutions and their constituents react to these new contexts 
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through ascribing meaning to socio-economic changes, forwarding reforms, and 
sensemaking. 
Fiscal contraction in general and police disinvestment in particular is a deliberate 
economic policy, and the latter is a direct intervention in the reform of policing due 
to the unavoidable impacts this has on internal police budgeting and associated 
structural and operational reforms (Holdaway 2017, 593). The management of 
resources is experienced at the operational level as a series of top down reform 
initiatives that alter, for example, geographical boundaries, the resourcing and 
functions of the NPT, and some routine aspects of police work. However, the post 2010 
policy programme was not just economic. New systems of governance and regulation 
of policing have changed police reform decision processes, and these are based on 
eclectic ideological positions, such as localism and strains of conservatism (Holdaway 
2017; Lowndes and Pratchett 2011; Loader 2014). The extent to which such policy 
programmes were influenced by the financial crisis and resulting fiscal environment is 
debatable, but the austerity era can serve as a justification for any policy that 
professes to do more with fewer resources, or for new arrangements where securing 
efficiency is considered to be a core function (for example, see UK Government 2016).  
Chapter 3 showed that police workforce reform in England and Wales was suddenly 
impacted by departmental spending reductions. However, though a particular 
trajectory of change was triggered nationally, the relatively decentralised territorial 
model of policing in England and Wales, alongside the relative retreat of the Home 
Office from operational policing policy and accountability from 2010, allowed for an 
uneven distribution of workforce change. The reactions varied from proportionate 
workforce changes without stated changes to the NP model to workforce reforms that 
were intended to complement new or existing models, which appear to be dependent 
on local ideation. This more complex picture of stasis and change is further 
complicated by variation in NP delivery within police forces (Higgins 2018), illustrated 
in this thesis by the variety of approaches to community engagement between NPTs. 
This also highlights the importance of studies that respond to events that trigger socio-
economic change to develop additional evidence and insights for knowledge of police 
institutional change. Idiographic studies can capture the importance of periods when 
the socio-economic environment is in flux and compare the police institutional 
reactions to this environment with times of relative stability. 
Analysis of police institutional change after trigger events must pay attention to 
cultural and individual mediation in order to understand the impact of the shock on 
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policing delivery, or the causal mechanism of a trigger event on policy action. 
Exogenous shocks can act as a trigger for policy decisions, but these new policy 
decisions may amount to re-ordering existing institutional ideas and policies in order 
to resonate with institutional values and standards for action (Carstensen 2017). 
However, conflict in institutions means that particular values and standards will most 
likely be emphasised over others. In this scenario, cultural conflict means that there 
will be more occupational resistance and perhaps more protracted processes of 
sensemaking taking place before meaningful change can happen. 
7.3.3.2 Socio-economic environment of policing 
A distinction was made in chapter 1 between the trigger event of the global financial 
crisis, austerity as a government policy programme, and the austerity era as a 
consequential socio-economic condition. The trigger event is of course important for 
understanding the political reactions and the socio-economic impacts that emerge due 
in part to the altered political environment. At such times the surround and the field 
of policing are susceptible to change, bringing new political and tangible pressures on 
police institutions. According to Reiner (2000), the police role is relatively inert as it 
is tied to the overall social structure, but when the social structure changes 
considerably the police role and other institutional elements are more likely to change 
to reflect this new dominant order. Writing in the context of a society in greater flux, 
Marks also notes that “police organisations are under constant pressure to realign 
themselves to changing political, social and economic environments” (2000, 146). In 
England and Wales, and other countries with localised policing arrangements, local 
political cultures also contribute to the socio-economic environment (Lyons 1999; 
Manning 2008). 
Marks (2000, 144) argues that mechanical behaviour and structure can be changed, but 
this is “generally not accompanied by more fundamental changes in the basic 
assumptions that police hold about their work and their environment”. This cultural 
adaption is necessary for fundamental reform, yet in the context of the complex socio-
economic environment of advanced capitalist societies the pressures on institutions to 
change are unpredictable (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Furthermore, cultural change has 
occurred to some extent in Anglophone police institutions in recent decades (McCarthy 
and O’Neill 2014; Chan 2003; Loftus 2009; Charman 2017), but whether this can be 
considered to represent or enable fundamental change in policing (in England and 
Wales) is questionable. Instead, cultural divisions emerge that reflect both changes 
and continuities in the policing field (Chan 1996; 2003; Loftus 2009) and are influenced 
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by the work of specialist teams (O’Neill and McCarthy 2014) and the neighbourhood 
characteristics (Cain 1973; Rubinstein 1973). This study supported the idea that these 
divisions exist, and that during socio-economic shifts particular cultural understandings 
of police work can be challenged or supported through stories and sensemaking.  
The findings of this thesis support the idea of socio-economic forces influencing both 
change and inertia in NP in the austerity era. Some of the programmatic elements of 
NP may have been diluted or removed in WMP and other police forces, but the social 
organisation of police work appears to be relatively stable. For all the structural 
changes, reform efforts, and difficulties associated with squeezed resources that may 
be linked to an attempted change in the UK social model (Grimshaw and Rubery 2015), 
there are enduring features of policing that form the basis of NP delivery and 
organisation and will likely continue in new models of local policing delivery. Stability 
in police functions, social organisation, and routines are in line with punctuated 
equilibrium/order model of police institutional change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Manning 2001), even if some institutional elements shift more gradually, such as the 
integration of new digital technologies in police work. Although technologies are 
referred to in stories of efficiency and demand management as solutions to the 
limitations of contemporary policing in the austerity era, their integration in NP is still 
limited to a small number of initiatives.  
7.4 Final Conclusions 
7.4.1 Reforming Neighbourhood Policing in the Austerity Era  
This thesis provides a snapshot of policing reform in a time of police disinvestment and 
changing socio-economic conditions during a government programme of austerity 
measures. The financial crisis and the austerity era has been a significant concern for 
public services and has arguably led to a shift in the social model of the United Kingdom 
(Grimshaw and Rubery 2015; 2012; Grimshaw 2015; 2013). Police institutions have 
faced notable changes in the policing field, such as technological developments, the 
digitalisation of social life, the rise in complex crimes, and new understandings of 
vulnerability (CoP 2015; NPCC 2016), as well as a host of reforms to governance and 
accountability structures (Lister and Rowe 2015) and the police regulatory environment 
(Holdaway 2017). In light of these changing environments, this study used the following 
research questions as a basis for investigating reform processes in NP in the austerity 
era: 
1. How is Neighbourhood Policing being reformed in the austerity era? 
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2. What is the role of cultural narratives and stories in the explaining and 
justifying reform processes?  
3. How does the socio-economic environment impact the police role? 
 
To provide specific and broad answers with supporting evidence, this chapter first 
summarised the main findings from each of the empirical chapters. The next section 
then discussed these findings in relation to the policing and institutional change 
literature and offered contentions that relate to the themes of the research questions. 
This section will offer some general conclusions on these research themes and the 
implications of this thesis for policing studies and policy, before considering future 
directions for research on local policing approaches and police institutional change.  
The changes to Neighbourhood Policing are complex because it is being reformed in a 
number of different ways across the 43 territorial police forces. The structure of 
policing in England and Wales combined with the lack of a national programme or 
strategy means that new reforms to policing delivery are numerous and diverse, and 
there is evidence that differences in NP delivery exist within forces too. Nevertheless, 
NP delivery workforces across the country have changed, with a large reduction in the 
number of PCSOs in England and Wales. Forces that have high PCSO reductions 
alongside general workforce reductions are likely to face challenges in delivering NP 
as was envisaged by the Home Office (2004). That is, some of the programmatic 
features of the NPP have ceased, while the continuation of other features is locally 
contingent on resources, policing policy ideation, and reform decisions. At a national 
level, not only do these changes mean that the policy rhetoric and principles of local 
policing delivery are shifting, but the theoretical underpinnings and evidence base of 
the NRPP and NPP (Innes and Fielding 2002; Innes 2014; Tuffin et al. 2006; Quinton and 
Morris 2008) are no longer programmatically supported by central government nor the 
structures that once provided a natural home.  
For English police forces, the new approaches to deal with typical workforce reductions 
in the austerity era is likely leading to a dilution of the neighbourhood security function 
and the emergence of a more reactive style of policing, and therefore the idea of 
temporal oscillations in police functions has merit (Innes 2004; Punch 2012). Delivering 
NP as it was initially conceived is becoming more challenging due to the increased time 
pressures in policing as well as the emphasis placed on crime reduction as the core 
role of policing by the Home Office and a reform agenda that deprioritised 
neighbourhood security functions (Loader 2014). This is in part due to the unintended 
consequences of tangible changes to police budgets and resources, but also the 
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reactions to the shifts in the police surround and field – the social, economic, 
technological, and political changes that police policy actors and street-level 
operatives must make sense of and react to.  
New stories of policing delivery and the police role are told to create and account for 
reforms, as well as to give voice to the acceptance or resistance to these new ideas. 
NP itself carried its own stories of police professionalisation (ACPO 2006) that 
accounted for the centrally mandated emphasis of community involvement, problem 
solving, and visible beat policing. These stories were situated in the politics and socio-
economic situation of the first decade of the twenty-first century, but in response to 
the fiscal crisis and the shifting surround and field, new stories are emerging that 
challenge these accounts of policing and professionalisation. For example, 
professionalisation narratives now have to contend with the immediate concerns that 
police forces have of doing ‘more with less’ or maintaining expected levels of service 
with fewer resources. In other words, to stay relevant in the contemporary austerity 
era proponents of evidence-based policing and the evidence-base must factor in socio-
economic and political developments, and therefore ‘professionalisation’ is not a static 
concept in policing. In this context, resource-intensive policing approaches have to 
contend with the new dominant narratives of policing with heightened concerns for 
efficient or economical practices. 
Dominant narratives in policing can be resisted by NPT operatives. Where reform 
decisions relate to street-level practices this resistance could manifest itself through 
discretion, but resistance is common in rhetoric and stories about the role and routines 
of NP. This has given rise to a ‘discursive struggle’ in policing in England and Wales, in 
which NP delivery mechanisms and the ‘soft’ skills that are emblematic of community 
and beat policing are contrasted with new approaches to local policing that emphasise 
the reduction of demand through efficient practices, use of new technologies, and 
redefining the relationship between the police and the public. 
Overall, an institutional approach is vital for understanding police reform to emphasise 
the impact of the socio-economic environment on reform processes and reveal the 
complexities of policing change. Change is also mediated through institutional 
interactions and negotiations, and through internal cultures. These cultural and 
institutional contexts have enduring features but also shift through time, meaning that 
change in police institutions is often piecemeal but rarely transformative (Skinns et al. 
2017). This makes deliberate reform difficult and uncertain, as the complexity of social 
and institutional change means that mediation processes are either difficult or 
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impossible to predict. The institutional approach in the analysis of change in public 
services must take local and national politics seriously to provide a deep portrayal of 
social reactions to trigger events. 
7.4.2 Implications for Policy 
There are a number of policy implications raised by this study for the future of NP and 
police reform. This section will consider the key implications and potential policy 
responses for policing bodies. 
7.4.2.1 Structuring NP 
There are a number of reasons to carefully consider how the structures of existing and 
new local policing models impact policing delivery. The NPP was an example of an 
attempt by central government to transform policing delivery through ‘structuring in’ 
change, most significantly through the assignment of hyper-local geographical 
responsibility to specialist teams that were required to deploy PCSOs as part of the 
NPT workforce mix. Reducing NP workforces and enlarging boundaries means that 
resources for NP or local policing delivery are spread more thinly, diluting local 
knowledge,  reducing time for proactivity and risking a more reactive style of policing 
delivery. With policing organisations now concerned about managing demand, reducing 
this demand by targeting the ‘upstream’ problems and causes is a difficult task when 
NPTs perceive that their time resources are too limited to undertake proactive tasks. 
The dilemma that the austerity era poses is that achieving the expected efficiency in 
prevention and demand reduction is challenging if resources are stretched and NPTs 
are covering more policing functions and operatives are being abstracted to response. 
The ability of NPTs or other local teams to perform the kind of proactive work that can 
target problems and reduce demand (see Boulton et al. 2017, 72-73; Maguire and John 
1995) could be encouraged and monitored by forces. Evidence-based tactics for 
prevention and early intervention can be communicated by the College of Policing, but 
there also needs to be an understanding of the models, structures, and resources that 
best support these proactive tactics.  
Another important aspect of team structures in local policing models is the role of 
group interaction. There is a distinction to be made between a ‘notional team’, in 
which face-to-face interaction between team members is fleeting (Manning 2008), and 
a local group, in which members interact for sufficient time to negotiate local 
standards for action (Fine 1984; 2012). Given the opportunities for face-to-face 
interactions within policing teams, members can build a group identity that potentially 
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leads to a more unified approach to policing delivery. The sergeant role in the team is 
significant here, as they have potential for a high status role within teams to provide 
leadership and support (Butterfield et al. 2005). Sergeants have strong opinions on how 
policing should be delivered in their neighbourhood, and as such can be powerful 
enablers or obstacles to reform. Nurturing the relationship and opportunities for 
interaction between sergeants and team members, as well as persuading sergeants of 
the benefits of reforms, can therefore be productive. 
7.4.2.2 Storytelling as reform 
Related to the group dynamics of the team is the role of storytelling in police reform. 
In policing, stories represent accounts of action, justifications for reform, and 
communicate police values. Stories that resonate with occupational cultures are 
shared and repeated, and this suggests that how reforms are communicated can impact 
the process of translating policy decisions into action. However, the mediation process 
is complicated by conflicting stories within police institutions broadly (the ‘system’) 
and policing groups specifically (‘subsystems’). The process of sensemaking involves 
individuals coming to a collective understanding about events and changes in 
organisations (Weick et al 2005), yet the process is necessarily influenced by competing 
ideas in a discursive struggle in times of external and internal change (Thurlow and 
Helms Mills 2009). Importantly, the dominant stories in this struggle are more likely to 
restrict sensemaking and limit the potential for reform (Naslund and Pemer 2011). In 
police institutions, the dominant stories are likely different between specialist teams 
or different areas of the organisation due to the impact of organisational position on 
culture. This points to two interrelated lessons: the type of communication between 
police reformers and the street-level is important for persuading street level 
operatives to accept new reforms and; groups and individuals mediate reforms, and 
this process is influenced by occupational cultures. Therefore, telling a culturally 
resonant story to accompany reforms may be more persuasive for street level 
operatives when they are making sense of reforms.  
7.4.2.3 Nurturing Neighbourhood Security 
This study identified that NP delivery and the neighbourhood security function has 
been weakened due to both internal and external impacts of austerity. Despite the 
economic challenges of maintaining resource-intensive styles of policing, the College 
of Policing (2018) has recently produced guidelines to restate the benefits and best 
practice of NP. This is a useful resource for police forces that are able to or desire to 
reboot or maintain the NP model and sustain the neighbourhood security function, but 
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the impact of such guidelines may be limited in the face of increasing demand, 
constraints on resources, and the other effects of socio-economic change since 2010. 
The forces of decentralisation in police governance also potentially limit or constrain 
the local application of NP models, as without the more prominent role played by 
central government there is more scope for policy variation across forces.  
The signal crimes perspective was the early theoretical basis behind the neighbourhood 
security orientation of RP and NP, and the community engagement mechanism was 
vital for the identification of community problems and signal crimes and disorder. 
However, the delivery of community engagement is patchy and sometimes confused. 
In part, this is because of well understood facets of police occupational culture that 
mean police do not value the often slow pace of maintaining relations with community 
partners that appear to offer little tangible benefit to police in achieving institutional 
and group objectives. This is not true for all police, as there are cultural divisions even 
within NPTs that impact the value placed on engagement activities by individual 
police. Identifying police with constructive attitudes and appropriate skills for 
interacting, communicating, and negotiating with communities would be beneficial for 
the execution of the community engagement mechanism. These community 
engagement ‘specialists’ would have an appreciation for how interactions and 
negotiations work at PACT and the differences between communities and their 
influence on the range of styles of PACT meetings. In WMP, police reported an absence 
of formal training in community engagement. This is something that could be 
addressed at an institutional level in order to give elementary lessons about the 
functions and practice of running community engagement. Community engagement 
specialists could also take the lead in mentoring other NPT operatives, by buddying up 
or supervising others.   
PACT and other meetings should be appreciated for their potential for maintaining 
police-community relations, giving community groups a collective voice, and providing 
a forum for collective efforts in problem-solving. However, meetings can easily 
become routine, unproductive, and badly attended, and when they do the imperatives 
for police to maintain relations and sustain a forum for participation and consultation 
mean that it is neither desirable nor easy for police to retreat from delivering these 
events. In terms of problem-solving, these meetings are unlikely to be consistently 
productive across all neighbourhoods, so it would be desirable for police to utilise 
other, more methodologically rigorous techniques for identifying community problems 
and gaining community intelligence (Lowe and Innes 2012; Innes and Roberts 2008). 
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This is not to say that meetings have no value. The underlying agenda of NP and one 
of the most important tenets of CP is to reduce police social distance and provide 
avenues of participation and co-production, and the face-to-face interactions in these 
public events can foster community involvement and may contribute to community 
building.  
7.4.3 Implications for Policing Studies 
This study highlighted the influence of trigger events and socio-economic change on 
police reform at various levels of analysis and in a broader interactionist approach. 
The main contribution of this thesis is to situate the influence of socio-economic 
factors in the culture, stories, and street-level interactions of NPTs. The institutional 
perspectives on policing (Manning 1997; Crank and Langworthy 1992; Crank 2003) 
complements this approach through the recognition that the historical functions and 
values of the modern public police organisations are stabilising features. To deal with 
the complexities of police institutional change, this study combined concepts and 
theory from political science, police sociology, and interactionist perspectives to 
explore reform agendas, policing delivery, and processes of change. A mixed methods 
research design was employed to investigate NP reform at different levels of the police 
institution and this provided a broader picture of change, encompassing analysis of 
both structures and action. 
McMahon and Ericson (1984) argue that from a police reformer’s point of view, there 
is always something wrong with the past or present that requires necessary changes 
for the improvement of the institution, but these reforms themselves are likely to be 
challenged in the future in a perpetual cycle of change. This, they consider, is the 
pitfall of reform that is not based in ‘careful research and analysis’ (Ibid., 1). I suggest 
that careful research and analysis of police reform and change would avoid ahistorical 
understandings of police institutions and engage with broad theories of institutional 
change. Debate in the institutional literature relates to whether change is broadly 
episodic, sudden, and unpredictable, or slow, incremental, and adaptive. It is 
important to acknowledge how change occurs and how far police institutions can 
reform themselves or be reformed in the face of institutional or street-level resistance. 
Jones and Baumgartner’s (2012) model of punctuated equilibrium suggests that 
significant changes to institutions are episodic yet allows for gradual changes too. This 
is a useful perspective for understanding police change, as while generally reform 
appears to tinker often but rarely transform, exogenous shocks have the potential to 
trigger shifts in socio-economic conditions that influence ideation, policy, stories, and 
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sensemaking. Work on the impact of trigger events, socio-economic conditions, and 
police reform should build on earlier studies that emphasise these influences (Sherman 
1978; Manning 2008; Chan 1997; Reiner 2007).  
Another useful insight from the institutional perspective is that police institutions have 
a largely stable core of values and functions, which is an influential factor in police 
occupational cultures and action. This study supported the idea that while police 
culture and action is not static, there are notable continuities in routine police work 
and culture. Occupational culture reacts to the police institutional values and 
functions (Skolnick 1966) as well as the policing field, with new cultural attitudes and 
behaviours emerging in response to changing routines and environments of police work 
(Chan 1996; Loftus 2009; O’Neill and McCarthy 2014). Culture should be understood as 
a process of collective sensemaking and enactment with ‘ideational, behavioural, 
material, social structural, and emergent elements’ (Crank 2004, 15), as this 
appreciates the connections between the macro, meso, and micro processes and goes 
beyond depictions of culture as merely words or negative traits to be reformed 
(Waddington 1999). Furthermore, policing studies should extend the study of police 
cultures to the idiocultures of local groups (Fine 1987; 2012), as the group unit has had 
little theoretical nor analytical attention to date. This would build on work that 
identifies the divisions in police cultures that are influenced by rank and roles (Reuss-
Ianni 1982; Cosgrove 2016).  
7.4.4 Future Directions for Research 
In approaching the third decade of the twentieth century, over a decade after the 
financial crash, the contemporary landscape of NP and other local policing models 
across the territorial police forces of England and Wales provides an array of 
opportunities for future research on the implementation of new approaches. There are 
many police forces that are already remodelling neighbourhood/local policing (Higgins 
2018), and sites with such deliberate reforms would make fascinating case studies or 
comparison sites for research that aims to understand how local policing reforms are 
being configured. Such research could explore how the structures of models impact 
routine police work and policing delivery, to what extent neighbourhood security 
functions are emphasised by reformers, and how street level police understand their 
roles. An in depth qualitative research design could reveal how these reforms are 
framed by policing organisations as well as sensemaking at the street level. 
Additionally, models with well-defined objectives and delivery mechanisms would be 
suited to systematic evaluations to appraise modelling and implementation. 
234 
 
Furthermore, research into these models that can react to significant events or socio-
economic shifts could explore similar themes of reform and change as this thesis did, 
as timing is an important element of institutional change research. 
This thesis has discussed the potential importance of the team as an interacting ‘group’ 
that can produce an idioculture, and the ‘groupness’ and dynamics of NPTs and other 
policing teams could be ethnographically investigated through this lens. For these 
groups to interact sufficiently to build an idioculture, the structures of the model 
would have to allow for occasional-regular face-to-face interactions between team 
members. Sustained ethnographic investigation could reveal whether these teams do 
represent Fine’s (1987; 2012) local group and uncover the influence exerted by the 
highest status members. In this study, NPT operatives considered sergeants to be 
influential in setting the style of policing and standards of action in the team, even if 
this went against the dominant understanding of NP in NPTs. The structures of the 
model, group dynamics, storytelling, negotiations, and sensemaking should be 
investigated to broaden knowledge of the social organisation of policing teams and its 
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9 Appendix 1 - Participant Information Sheet     
Project Title:  Neighbourhood Policing in a new era: changes in 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams and community engagement 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you accept or 
decline it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask if there is anything 
that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
The research is being undertaken as part of a PhD thesis at Cardiff University, 
and is due to be completed by October 2016. This project has been approved 
by Cardiff University School of Social Sciences’ Research Ethics Committee. 
The supervisors for the project are Professor Martin Innes and Doctor Amanda 
Robinson, and the project is funded by the Dawes Trust. 
Project Aim: 
The project is exploring how and why Neighbourhood Policing delivery has 
changed in recent years, in order to gain a better understanding of the current 
provision and potential future directions of local policing in England and Wales. 
Participants 
There will be a number of participants from one police force area. It is up to 
you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you 
should keep this information sheet for your reference. You will then be asked 
to confirm that you are willing, but even after doing this you can still withdraw 
from the study at any reasonable time – before the writing up stage, which 
starts in January 2016 – and there is no obligation for you to give a reason.  
Participants will be granted anonymity where it is possible for them to remain 
anonymous. Some participants with very specific roles could be identified in 
the final document through information provided about his/her role and police 
force area. 
Methods of Research 
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The research will be conducted through an interview with each participant that 
should last approximately one hour.  
 The interview will be largely conversational, so please be prepared for 
in-depth discussions about the delivery of Neighbourhood Policing. 
 The location of the interview is subject to negotiation between you and 
the researcher. 
 The audio of the interview shall be recorded and later transcribed. 
The audio recording is to be used only for analysis by the researcher 
and will not be published or passed on to any other individual or 
organisation. 
 At any stage of the interview you may ask questions if you are 
uncertain about something, and you do not have to answer a question if 
you feel uncomfortable in doing so. If you wish, you may discontinue 
your participation at any time. 
Results 
If you wish to see the transcriptions of the interviews or results of the study, 
you can contact the researcher to request these. Contact details can be found 
at the bottom of this page. 
Complaints 
If you feel at any point during the research that you have been treated unfairly 
or are seriously dissatisfied in any way, you are free to contact the researcher’s 
supervisor to make a formal complaint. Contact details are provided below. 
 





















Thank you for taking the time to read this information and considering taking 
part in this research. Please do not hesitate to contact the researcher if you 
have any other questions.
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25 Appendix 2 - Consent Form 
 
 
Project Title:  Neighbourhood Policing in a new era: changes to 





1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have 
had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
before the writing-up stage, without giving reason. 
 
3. I understand that my responses are confidential, my name will not be linked with the research 
materials, and I will not be identified in the report or reports that result from the research, 
unless I request otherwise.   
 
4. I agree to take part in the study. 
 
















Please return this form to the researcher by email or post: 
 
Jack Greig-Midlane 
PhD office  
Cardiff University 







26 Appendix 3 – Field notes 
 
Kingston – PACT, 15/1/16 
Venue –Islamic community centre 
 
Attendees: 
2 PCs, 1 male 1 female 
1 PCSO 
Around 30 attendees  
 
Room layout: rectangular, conference style – trestle table at front of 3 rows of chairs, 
some chairs at back, all chairs are hard plastic with no arm rests – table with tea making 




Front row = Row A 
Second row = Row B, etc 
 
A4 = “Majid”  
C1 = “Imran” 
C4 = “Usman” 
 
Attendees, from left to right per row = A1, A2, etc; B1, B2, etc 
Standing attendees and those seated at back of room not coded due to movement 




Strip lighting – room is well lit 
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It is noticeably cold, especially before most of the attendees arrive, and some people are 
still wearing their coats, but it is not too uncomfortable to be without coat and shoes 
There are exposed plastic and copper pipes on some of the walls, coming from the 
ceiling. Occasionally, the sound of running water or pressurised movement can be heard 
coming from different directions. 
Floor is carpeted. The carpet is grey and, like the rest of the room, looks quite old. It is 





The area is very close to the city centre (about 30 minutes’ walk from New Street Station) 
with a mixture of low- and high-rise estates. I park my car in front of a row of small shops 
that is overlooked by the tower blocks. There is a park behind the towers. At just before 
six in the evening the area is busy with people using the shops and school students in 
uniforms. There is lots of chatter and people shouting to each other, not in an unfriendly 
way, and this makes for a bustling atmosphere at this time in the evening. 
 
 
The attendees all seem to be of Islamic faith or culture, which is appropriate given the 
venue, but it means that other groups are not represented at the public meeting. It takes 
some time for the all attendees to arrive, and when the meeting starts the number is 
closer to 15 people at most.  
 
When I enter the building I remove my shoes and wait on the ground level room, sat on 
decorative carpeted floor. Various people greet me and tell me the basement venue will 
be ready in a few minutes. 
 
Once I enter the venue and take a seat in the second row (row B), one person seems to 
introduce me to the others who are already sat down in a different language. One or two 
say hello and the others look over but say nothing. One attendee (C1) approaches me 
as I am sat down and tells me that the police do very little for their community. He and 
the community have raised issues with them many times before but the police seem to 
excuse themselves of dealing with their concerns seriously. He says that they often use 
the phrase, “we have to prioritise our workload”, which he interprets as a rhetorical way 
to brush off their concerns. He says the community feel ignored by the local police team. 




The police arrive shortly after this. They are still wearing full uniforms including stab vests 
and boots. They are asked to remove their shoes as the centre users pray on the floor 
in this room. PC1 says they will if this is necessary. There is a polite back and forth 
interaction, with some of the centre representatives insisting it is not completely 
necessary if it is a hassle for the officers (not all who made their preference for no shoes 
known are involved in this decision), and PC1 removes his shoes. The PCSO offers to 
take them off but eventually decides to keep them on, and PC2 sits down at the end of 
row A and does not remove her shoes. PC1 and PCSO stand in front of the chairing 
table facing the rows of chairs. 
 
As the room settles, but still with chatter and people coming into the room, PC1 starts 
the meeting by saying that they are “here to find out the issues you have” and then says 
that the meeting should be “community-led”. In this context, where the police are in the 
chairing position, the PC appears to be defining this style as one where the meeting 
starts not with a police presentation of recent crimes or issues in the area, but with the 
attendees opening the discussion with their current concerns. There is no reference to 
any previous community priorities or any recent police action to deal with community-
raised issues. 
 
A4 speaks first, telling the officers that the community have had problems recently, and 
that people will want to raise concerns both generally in front of the room and privately. 
He speaks loudly, clearly and with a level of articulacy that makes his words sound 
rehearsed. PC1 responds with general comments about the recent calls they have been 
receiving that relate to this area, which are mostly related to the behaviour in an around 
the high-rise estates, such as people “hanging around on the stairwells”, fighting and 
drug taking. He says that these are not just issues for the police and that other agencies 
have a responsibility to help in these areas too. He says that some understanding is 
needed for non-criminal behaviours as well, and they should “remember that some of 
them are your neighbours”, suggesting that the attendees need to consider the 
maintenance of their relationships with the wider community.  
 
PC1 goes on to point out that the policing team have recently, in partnership with the 
local premier league football club, set up some new engagement schemes for younger 
people – football and boxing clubs with classes – that is aiming to divert young people 
from deviant public activities. I think that these comments could have been used as the 
‘police-led’ introduction that the PC announced that he would not make at the start of the 
meeting. Effectively there was little difference between doing this at the start and doing 
so after the first comment. However, the approach of reading out local crime statistics 
has been avoided, and PC1 might have been referring to this more so than the reference 
to local projects that he thinks address the community’s general concerns. 
 
A4 speaks again and says that the issues that generally concern people are related to 
their safety. He says that many of them do not feel safe when people are drinking alcohol 
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in public places. He thinks that the area is safer than it once was, and appreciates the 
effort of the police, but that local parents are still very worried for their families, especially 
about the park and the area in front of the row of shops across from the high-rise estates. 
He says that attacks are common and that he knows someone who was attacked 
yesterday close by in a neighbouring area. PC1 turns to PCSO and asks if he know about 
this specific incident. PCSO says he doesn’t know anything about it. PC1 turns back to 
the room and says the incident was probably on a beat of a separate, neighbouring police 
team. The border of this other beat is a main road that is only a few minutes away from 
where we are now. As the attack is very recent they have not yet been made aware of 
this by the other team, so they do not know the details. 
 
PC1 and PCSO have relatively closed body language, sometimes crossing their arms or 
putting their hands into their stab vests just underneath their shoulders (presumably for 
comfort – taking the weight off of their shoulders or keeping their hands snug).  
 
A4 says he was also attacked not so long ago but a big group of people. He managed to 
fight them off without sustaining any serious injuries. He said the police were informed 
but only one of the perpetrators were ever caught, and this makes him worried that the 
police are ineffective at tracking down offenders. PC1 says he spoken with A4 about this 
incident before, and that he can’t discuss the specifics of this case now but that A4 makes 
good points about the area. He says that if A4 wants more done he needs to think about 
whether he can offer any more assistance to the police, such as whether he would 
recognise the individuals or whether he has seen them again since the incident, and 
speak with the police privately.  
 
PC1 then addresses the room and says that the police are currently working with the 
council to tackle the local drug use. He say the police team have the capability to remove 
alcohol and search for drugs, but they have not been receiving many calls about these 
kinds of behaviours. B5 says that it’s not just drug use, but dealing in public places too. 
PC1 repeats that they are not getting any calls about this. B3 asks if there is a number 
to call for the local police team. He says if they had a single number to contact the local 
team it would be better than calling a general number. PC1 explains that they can call 
101 or email the team. Some people in the room are confused about the 101 number, 
but PC1 reassures them that this number does take them through to the local team. 
 
A4 speaks up again. He says that the residents want to feel that they are safe in their 
own area. They don’t want to be in danger, but neither do they want to police the area 
themselves in absence of effective policing by the state. He says that the policing 
resources given to the area are not enough to deal with these problems, but he does 
believe that the team can be more present on the streets than they are currently. PC1 
says the team were patrolling the area today and moved on some people who were 
upsetting locals. He says this patrolling is routine, although it is not every single day. He 




PC1 asks if most of the problem behaviours are taking place in the early evening. Some 
of the attendees nod and agree and B3 adds that there are problems all day on weekends 
too. PC1 says, “call us and we’ll put resources in the right places.” The room has been 
quite noisy with conversation and noises from the exposed pipes for the last few minutes. 
 
A2 then leans over to A4 and speaks to him in another language. A4 relays her message 
to PC1, saying that school kids have damaged her home and perhaps tried to break in. 
The noise from the pipes has now stopped, making it easier to hear the speakers more 
clearly. PC1 says they have moved school kids on and will continue to do so but it is 
difficult to do so often, especially as many school kids are using the area to visit the local 
shops. 
 
C4 starts to speak, telling the police first that he is an Imam and that it was his daughter 
that was the victim of the attack yesterday mentioned by A4 earlier. He speaks 
articulately and loudly but never reached the point of shouting, which differs from A4. He 
says that this community has many needs and the police have in the past made a good 
effort to meet these, but people still feel unsafe so the police have more to do. “Our needs 
have not yet been met.” He continues, stating that the police use too many cautions as 
an alternative to tougher treatment, and this encourages people to commit worse 
offences. He tells the police that he understands local problems well, as he works with 
the council to tackle youth problems and extremism in the area, and this role has led him 
to work with the police at times too. He adds there have been a lot of stabbings and other 
physical assaults close by to this venue. He knows that officers do attend after these 
incidents but the perpetrators are rarely caught.  
 
PC1 enquires about C4’s daughter, asking how she is after the attack, showing concern 
with his body language – raised and pinched eyebrows. C4 says the attackers used a 
knife but luckily missed any vulnerable areas on her body. She is in hospital but not in a 
serious condition. PC1 says he wishes her a speedy recovery and that he will speak to 




PC1’s responses are not immediate after C1 speaks, perhaps giving others a chance to 
add to the conversation, but this could also be interpreted by attendees that police don’t 
know how to answer concerns or don’t want to. 
 
PC1 tells the room that these issues raised so far are very important, and that it is the 
responsibility of the senior officers to deal with most serious issues across the city. 
However, he says of the neighbourhood team’s responsibility, “We’re here for your 
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protection. Everything else is secondary.” This line is delivered more decisively and 
emotively than in his previous speech. Referring back to the attack on C4’s daughter, he 
says this incident was not officially in the team’s area, but as it close by he understands 
that it could affect people here. He then promises that he will update them when he has 
more information. 
 
PC1 goes on to show his appreciation for the high turnout at the meeting, saying that it 
is good that so many people have come tonight. Partnerships with agencies and the 
community is the key to improving public safety in the area. “Collective action is really 
important. We have to tackle these problems together.” He goes on to say that it is 
possible to achieve this even in the current period of austerity:  
 
“There are less of us and it’s difficult, but it’s not just about numbers. It’s about working 
in different ways.” 
 
He says what is really concerning him is that recent attacks have involved the use of 
weapons. He says that some people here might recognise or know more about some of 
the perpetrators, and the police need ‘community intelligence’ so they can be most 
effective at preventing more incidents like these. 
 
This is the longest and most impassioned speech from the police representatives so far. 
The attendees who were there from the start, and a few more standing at the back, 
listened to this intently but without showing any signs of agreement, such as nodding. 
They are focused and still. 
 
A few moments after PC1’s speech, C1 raises an issue of people drinking alcohol on the 
streets. The area is an Alcohol Free Zone, and C1 says that although there are stickers 
up all over the area, including on shop windows, people are still congregating to drink, 
especially outside the row of shops, and causing trouble. He says the police have to take 
this seriously because there is a breakdown in order and this is emboldening people to 
commit other crimes. 
 
“This behaviour is the cause of crime. The police know about it but nothing has been 
done.” 
 
C1 is visibly angry and shouts these comments to front. His arms are very animated, 
waving up and down and sometimes pointing at the officers. PC1 remains calm. He nods 
slightly when listening and responds to C1 by saying that he knows this has been raised 
before. Before he can add anything else, C1 continues with no sign of a change in 
temperament. “The convenience store is the source of the issues. They are selling drink 
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to underage people.” PC1, remaining placid, says that the team have been dealing with 
this issue, adding the qualified concession, “Maybe we can do more, but we haven’t had 
any calls about it.” 
 
C1 tells him, “No one trusts you to do anything about it. They won’t call.”  
 
C4 joins this conversation, and says that he agrees with C1 (C4 is a lot more calm than 
C1). He asks the police what they think about this situation, because it is a continuous 
problem for the community. C1 does not give PC1 time to answer. He says that the 
drinkers and perpetrators of the criminal behaviour are cowards and that the police just 
need to deliver a harder response to show the perpetrators who is in charge. He thinks 
the behaviour will stop if the police do this, and it will prevent more serious acts as well. 
 
C1: “The law is on your side. Do something about this and the people will be on your 
side too.” 
 
After a moment of silence, PC1, remaining placid, says it is difficult because the area 
has a small neighbourhood team, but concedes that they could be doing more and they 
will keep trying. He tells C1 that he will speak to him afterwards about this to see what 
they can do. C1 does not appear to be content with the suggestions that involve more 
community involvement in policing. He states that the problem is easy to solve for the 
police and they know this.  
 
“Just think about the shop. That’s where the problem starts. You don’t need my help to 
do that. The police have the training to deal with these issues and we don’t.” 
 
He says that this issue is the most important one for the community as it affects 
everybody’s lives. “Children are scared. Their parents and other people here are scared. 
We’re not even at war!” 
 
The conversation ends with a few moments of silence as PC1 does not respond to the 
last points, except with a slight nod. He looks around the room to see if any others want 
to add to this. When they don’t he askes if there are any other issues.  A5 says he was 
attacked on the street a few days ago. C4 says some of the people sitting in the back 
row witnessed the attack. During this exchange, the call to prayer comes on over the 
loud speakers that are attached high on the walls.  I cannot hear the rest of the exchange, 
but PC1 responds to A5 briefly. This conversation is conducted calmly. I am not sure 




Some of the attendees start to go upstairs. The call to prayer comes to an end and PC1 
acknowledges that the attendees will want to go upstairs to pray, so he says they will 
finish there. He tells them he will be back next month for the meeting and that he wants 
the meetings to be chaired by a member of the community rather than the police. He 
explains this will involve the chair taking responsibility for some organisation and making 
an agenda in advance, and the team will try to ensure that the council and local housing 
associations send representatives. He says that he doesn’t want the meetings to be 
police-led anymore. He asks what everyone thinks. A4 says that meetings should be 
called after immediate problems on top of the current schedule and PC1 says he thinks 
that is fine if a resident takes charge of organising this. 
 
The meeting comes to an end and most attendees go upstairs. PC1, PC2 and PCSO 
talk to individual attendees, including those who raised issues during the meeting. A 
couple of children are playing in the emptied room – jumping off stairwells and using the 
desk to role-play some kind of business encounter. 
 
I speak to A4 and C4. They tell me they think the police do a good job generally but it’s 
not enough for this area. They say the police can’t solve some of the community’s most 
pressing issues because of a lack of police resources. 
 
 
I then speak with PCSO. He says he’s been in the area for 2 years now but these 
meetings are relatively new, with only three having taken place so far. I ask him if he has 
received any training for delivering these types of meeting and he says that he has not, 
and that he just turns up and reacts accordingly. He says that the meetings only attract 
Muslims because of the space, and no other community members have attended so far. 
They have used another building in the area but as there is a hire fee for the room they 
tend to not use it. He also tells me that a lot of what they have to do at these meetings is 
‘managing expectations’ of the community as there is a lot that the team cannot do.  
 
I leave with C1, who is very calm now and not visibly angry in any way. He repeats his 
sentiments and says he knows the police try but that they aren’t doing enough. He leads 




27 Appendix 4 – Interview schedule 
Interview Guide – PCs/PCSOs 
 How long have you worked for __[Police Force]__? 
 What made you choose a career in the police? 
 
NP 
 Can you describe a situation you have experienced in which the work of your 
NPT has been successful, and illustrates the benefits of neighbourhood 
policing? 
o What do you think is the most important contribution of neighbourhood 
policing? 
 
 How do you think Neighbourhood policing is perceived by others in the police 
who don’t work in NPTs? 
 
Change  
 How do you think neighbourhood policing has changed, if at all, since you 
joined?  
o Is there anything about the way you work that has changed? 
 [prompts: boundaries, tasks, staffing levels] 
 
 Are there any examples you can think of that illustrate how the financial crisis 
and funding cuts are impacting upon the delivery of Neighbourhood Policing?   
o Are there any problems that you have to deal with more frequently now 
than in the past?  
 
 Have you experienced or heard about ways the funding cuts have impacted 
upon your partner agencies?  
 Are there any instances where your NPTs working relationship 
with these agencies has been affected due to recent changes? 
 
 What would you change about how Neighbourhood Policing is delivered? 
o Or… [Do you think NP has a future?] 
 
Public 
 How would you describe the relationship between the public and your NPT? 




 Can you describe any situation you have experienced that illustrates why 
community engagement is important, to either or both the police and the 
public? 
 
 In what ways does your NPT attempt to engage with the community? 
o Are there any groups that are harder to reach in your area?  
 Why do you think this is? 
 
 Looking back over your time in an NPT, are there any ways the team engaged 
with the public that were problematic or could be improved? 
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28 Appendix 5 – Interview transcript 
Me – How long have you worked for West Midlands? 
Insp-1 – 20 years 
Me – Can you describe the areas that you oversee. 
I-1 – I am responsible for an area of approximately 25,000 residents of Birmingham. I’m 
responsible for the policing of [neighbourhood policing areas, 4 of them]. Part of this 
LPU [Local Policing Unit] is broken down into different neighbourhoods. I’m the 
constituency manager, sector inspector under old money. That’s the area I’m 
responsible for. 
… 
Me – So you’ve got 4 [inspectors] in the local policing unit? 
I-1 – That’s right. 
ME – What do you think are the most important contributions of neighbourhood policing 
in West Midlands? 
I-1 – I would say that… one of the biggest areas is getting to truly know the area that 
you’re working, and not just geography, but the people. The police in general have 
gone through many, many changes over the years and there’s always been an element 
of, when I first joined there was a PBO, a permanent beat officer who was effectively 
allowed, if you will, by the organisation to stay in an area. And that single officer 
would often know all of the local criminals, all of the local kids, all the local issues. 
And that person could then feed into the organisation, about intelligence basically, 
about community intelligence. With the onset of neighbourhood policing in the main 
when we could actually throw some teams at it, so as opposed to one person there 
were multiple officers and PCSOs, the main aim’s always been to reduce demand. So 
understand the demand to start with – what is it, where is it? – and then look at longer 
term problem solving to effectively either target harden an area, deal with offenders 
on an offender management kind of perspective, and then work with partners to… kind 
of share resources to deal with a local issue. Because, as you’d appreciate, not all of 
it is just a policing issue. Sometimes it’s environmental health, council, [unclear word] 
landlord… and then with the onset really over the last… I’d say few years, but it’s been 
with us for longer than that, but certainly more focused after the Pilkington incident48 




in relation to ASB, is neighbourhood teams that have already been able to impact on 
that. So for me the focus is getting to know the area and the people – intimately in 
some places. Understanding where the demand is, and then trying to reduce that 
demand. IT’s a very long term plan. And as with everything from a government 
perspective, and you could argue the fast pace of life, we almost have a need to have 
an instantaneous result. Some of these issues takes months or indeed years to actually 
deal with. There has to be a political appetite to allow that to take time. In the 
absence of that, you’re basically hand to mouth existence all the time. So 
neighbourhood policing is definitely long term and, going on pure statistics, you could 
argue that the crime figures would show that we have been able to reduce crime. I 
know there’ll be lots of discussion over lies, damned lies and statistics but in the main 
it’d be true to say no matter which survey you look at, there has been a downward 
trend. And I would genuinely put that in no small part to the way that neighbourhood 
policing has impacted. Because response don’t have that time – they are the sticking 
plaster – they don’t have the time to, you know, reduce the demand to keep coming 
back to a certain address or what have you, whereas neighbourhood [teams] pick that 
up – look at the problem to the background of that.  Rather than just the domestic 
violence incident, for the sake of argument, that’s happening right here and now, we 
would then look at, okay whether there’s some kind of abuse – as in domestic, alcohol 
abuse, substance abuse, referrals, help, signposting… all that kind of stuff. And then 
when it comes to enforcement you would look at more to do with enforcing tenancy, 
you know to have that as a lever to almost force the person in to some form of help. 
And it’s that kind of work I would say’s been the main contribution to policing. 
ME – So in terms of… you mentioned the crime rate falling. Specific crimes – you’ve 
already mentioned domestic violence and antisocial behaviour, but other ones which 
fall in to that where you think you’d actually achieve… 
I-1 – Yeah definitely, I mean robbery, burglary and vehicle have been reducing. We 
aare showing an unfortunate little rise now in public place violence… whether that be 
a little bit of a delay to the austerity measures – I mean that as in a societal austerity, 
people struggling with finding work or what have you – it’s just a… There’s an argument 
saying that there’s a density issue in certain parts of the country, and a lot of on-street 
living, and the fact of the matter is, if you put human beings in close proximity to each 
other, they will rub along to a degree then there’ll be a flare up. And to me, when I 
look at the density of the population in the parts where I police, I attribute it to that 
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really. There’s just so many people in one area trying to get along, a lot of them do in 
fairness, but you know, there’s a number that don’t want to or just can’t.  
Me – How about people who don’t work as part of the neighbourhood policing structure 
– what do you think their perceptions are? Have they changed since neighbourhood 
policing has been bedded in? 
I-1 – I would say, having worked many different aspects of policing – whether it be 
response or neighbourhoods or an investigative role – I would say that anecdotally, you 
could argue I think that people who’ve never worked in neighbourhoods see it as a 
fluffy… cousin to mainstream policing. Because it’s not always… well, frankly those 
who haven’t worked it don’t understand that there is an enforcement element to 
neighbourhood policing. It’s not all going down the school fete and face-painting. In 
fact, we don’t have time to do that, and even more so now. I would say generally 
speaking, not everybody, but generally you just don’t know what it’s like – 24/7 
response. For those of us who’ve done it, do know to start with. I think personally it 
genuinely it makes you a more rounded officer, and I’ll say that for this reason; if 
you’re always going around putting a sticking plaster on things, and you never fully 
understand how everything links in in the background. When you do neighbourhood, 
you understand how all the agencies and partners come together, how it all works, and 
why it’s important to have certain information from response officers. Simple one 
being ASB – not getting names of the kids causing the problem. Neighbourhood will 
then struggle to pick that up and take it anywhere further. Response will then moan 
about all the demand they have, but if they give us a fighting chance to nip it in the 
bud with those kids, then they’d understand that actually we’re helping them, or trying 
to… and of course the public. So those who’ve always done response, it’s an extremely 
challenging job – there’s no two ways about that – but they don’t fully understand all 
the links in the chain. That’d be my take on it. And then because of that it’s, “well, 
neighbourhood have got it easy. You’ve got loads of officers.” I don’t know where that 
comes from because we haven’t. But those officers who’ve done both roles, they’re 
usually, I find, more rounded. More understanding of the system as a whole.  
Me – In neighbourhood policing teams, one of the things which is quite distinctive is 
the police community support officer role. How important do you consider them as 
part of the team? Their role, really. 
I-1 – I was working in a different LPU when PCSOs first came on board… probably about 
ten years ago I think. Maybe a little bit longer. I was probably the same as everybody 
else. I was suspicious. I saw it as possibly a cheap form of policing, etcetera, etcetera. 
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Certainly my view’s changed over the years. PCSOs are critical to neighbourhood 
policing. No two ways about it. Their initial deployment principles have been stretched 
and bent out of all shape. If you tried to apply the initial principles, you would 
genuinely struggle. They do… either they do it because they naturally do much more 
than they’re actually supposed to … observe, report and all that. They actually get far 
more involved. Or there have been… at times I suppose the organisation is at fault, 
because we’ve perhaps deployed them into a situation or to an incident they shouldn’t 
probably have been deployed into. But they manage very well. A lot of my PCSOs, if 
not all of them, can actually outshine PCs. Not sure why that is in all honesty. Maybe 
they’re not as indoctrinated perhaps into the way that police do things, so they’re 
more open to looking at it differently. But they’re critical. I really make very little 
distinction between my PCs and my PCSOs. The only time I do look at it is, as I say, for 
enforcement – as in actual powers of a constable. So such as doing a warrant. We’ve 
just got to make sure we’ve got enough cops going through the door. Things like that. 
Other than that, from a neighbourhood… because we do lots of warrants… again, going 
back to your previous question, response don’t actually realise how many warrants 
that we actually do… how many doors we put in. In relation to that, there’s very little 
distinction in my book. Some of the PCSOs would make great cops, and some of mine 
have gone and recently applied to join the job as a regular, and they’ve got in and 
they’re probably going to be very good. 
Me – Is that at all problematic in a sense? Going back to some of your initial 
expectations of them. Maybe what they become is too similar to a PC? 
I-1 – Yeah, you do have to remind yourself sometimes of the limitations of powers to 
start with, and also really their capability, as in they don’t carry certain equipment 
that we would. It doesn’t stop everything from happening, but of course it gives you 
that fighting chance to protect yourself. Personally, I wouldn’t be surprised over the 
years if PCSOs stay under the current government, with funding, etcetera. It wouldn’t 
surprise me if their powers broadened slightly. I mean there is obviously more potential 
within the legislation, which the current chief and the one before hasn’t used. There 
are times when, yes, it would be nice if they had a bit more power, but that purely 
comes down to boots on the ground. If I have a team of three PCs and four PCSOs, if  
a certain type of situation comes up it would be great to put all seven to it equally, 
but you can’t. And with the current situation, with the threat assessment, it means 
that PCSOs have to be double-crewed. Obviously when I say crewed, they’re on foot 
or bikes at least. That again is problematic for deployment, because there’s so few of 
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us. I always to them every single one of you – staff, officers, irrelevant – you are so 
important. We don’t have the numbers now where we can just throw people at a job, 
a problem. Everyone is so critical. As soon as we’re not there on the day for tour of 
duty, you feel it. They can do without me for a few days, maybe even a few weeks for 
some of them. A striped sergeant, you can maybe get away with a day or so if you’ve 
got a good team. But you start losing actual bobbies and PCSOs you feel it instantly. 
That’s why they’re so important. That’s why we try and make them understand. Of 
everybody here, this is irrelevant, you know. IT’s people who are actually going out 
there and doing the job. They’re the ones who matter. 
Me – We’ve touched on the numbers of staff available to you, but are there any other 
changes with neighbourhood policing or the structure of the teams which you’ve 
observed during your career? 
I-1 – I would say, in policing generally, but certainly within neighbourhood policing 
we’ve taken on things that historically weren’t a policing matter. Now whether we’ve 
taken them on… we like to see ourselves as a doing organisation. You know, you give 
us a problem and we’ll crack on with it. Now that’s not to diminish the work done by 
any partners but there is a level of frustration that statutory and voluntary, they just 
don’t have that level of operational tempo that we do. You know, they don’t really 
grip a problem and drive it, and really kind of, you know, “let’s get this resolved and 
move on to the next thing.” But there still seems to be a lag, and we tend to be pulling 
people along, or pushing them – whichever way you want to look at it – and because of 
that, we’ve almost created our own demand. And there are things that historically, I 
remember twenty years ago certainly the phone call would have been, to the member 
of the public, “why are you phoning us? IT’s nothing to do with us. We’re not going to 
get involved in that”, something of that nature. And that would have been accepted. 
You try and do that now… now whether it’s a societal thing again, whether it’s because 
complaints are more easily made… but if you don’t get the answer you like on the end 
of the phone, it is much easier to make a complaint about that. Now again, instead of 
the organisation just, you know, blankly saying, “well that’s quite right. IT’s nothing 
to do with us. You need to go and speak to the council.” You’d do the relevant 
signposting, which is what we’re trying to do now with force contact, because we’ve 
realised we’ve just taken on too much. But communities have become used to us taking 
it on, so all of a sudden when you start saying no, there’s a disappointment to the 
service that they’re receiving, whereas some years ago we were never doing it. As long 
as legislation said we have to do it… we didn’t used to do it. Somehow though we’ve 
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just eaten into other parts of work and taken it on board. And now we’re finding, you 
know what, we can’t service that anymore. So now all of a sudden we’ve got an 
expectation that we’ve raised and we’re struggling now to meet that expectation. So 
the perception of the public is, ‘the police are rubbish. They don’t do this that and 
the other.’ But actually we’ve never gone out and said, ‘well, a) we never used to do 
it, b) we don’t have to do that’, or what have you. We’ve just done it. And now that’s 
becoming very difficult. Some difficult conversations. 
Me: So you said you’re creating demand, and at the same time… now as you’re… 
I-1 – We’re trying to reduce demand. Yes exactly. It’s a bit of a dichotomy that, isn’t 
it. Yeah, we’ve created it in as much as, almost we’ve created the expectation that 
we will go out to almost everything that you phone up about. You know, where there’s 
kids playing football on a grassy area where there’s a sign that says, ‘No ball games’. 
How are we really going to resolve it? We haven’t put the sign up. Is there a bye-law? 
It might’ve just been a local council that’s put that up. We would’ve, back in the day, 
probably just said, ‘it’s not a police matter. Take it up with the council.’ Whereas no 
we have a tendency, although as I say now we’re trying to stop doing it, we have a 
tendency to just say, ‘alright. We’ll make our local neighbourhood team aware.’ So 
now they’ve made me aware or they’ve made my sergeants aware, what’s the 
expectation.  Well if they say they’ll make us aware, we feel as if we have to make 
some kind of contact now, whether it be a phone call or a visit or a walk down. Do we 
then generate an ASB non-crime number because we recognise the fact that someone 
is suffering from ASB or their interpretation of ASB. So you know, before we know it 
we’ve got non-crime numbers generated, we’re going to do a visit. But when you 
backtrack it all away, it’s some kids playing football on grass and the only reason it’s 
apparently not allowed is because someone, god knows when, put a sign up saying no 
ball games. So it’s that kind of… if we had gone in right from the beginning and said, 
‘sorry to hear that, but you’re going to have to contact the council because it’s council 
land’, or something of that nature. We’ve cut it dead. And then the ASB figures will 
play out in the national stats, and then all of a sudden the ASB figures go through the 
roof. Kids have always played football on grassy areas where a sign says no ball games, 
and they always will. Just because now we’re non-crime-ing it or whatever, and 
doesn’t actually mean there’s an increase in the problem or demand. But certainly, 
internally we’ve created our own demand. Do you know what I mean?  And again it 
comes back to, how do you want to record, how do you want to deal with things.  
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Me – Just wanted to talk about some of things that are happening in West Midlands at 
the moment. I don’t know how much it’s filtered through down to the LPU… 
I-1 – Are you talking about Accenture? 
Me – Yes, the ‘Blueprint’. I just wondered how those new policies are affecting things, 
or perhaps some of the challenges that those changes are bringing. 
I-1 – I think there’s a hell of a lot of expectation. More so than I’ve seen from any other 
initiative or project, you know, or what have you that’ve changed the way we do our 
work. I think really there’s a genuine expectation that things are really going to 
change. IT’s not just going to be all talk and blue sky thinking and lots of nice 
documents, but just essentially continue doing the same thing. I think from the chief 
down it’s been really marketed… not marketed. That makes it sound like it’s been 
manipulated. But the message has been quite clear that, you know, we will not look 
the way we do now within the next 5 years – the way that we do work etcetera. The 
challenge that comes from that though, unfortunately, is people being people, there’s 
sometimes a thing of, ‘well should I bother working on this project or shall I start 
investing time and effort in doing this piece of work when, it sounds like, within 5 
years I might not be doing this role?’ Or… well neighbourhood policing will still be about 
in 5 years. It won’t look anything like it does now… but because of that expectation, I 
think some people have just taken their foot off the gas, because they’re just thinking, 
‘well, do I really want to invest in that?’, because, you know, when the plan gets 
released in the next month or whatever, that might not be on the agenda. I think that’s 
one of the shifting sands of agendas, and what’s the political push at the moment, 
what am I expected to do or concentrate or focus on? And when you’ve got so much 
change programme going on, that then becomes difficult to keep people focused. And 
the simple message from me is this: ‘just keep doing the job that you’re doing. You do 
it well , 9 times out of 10. Keep doing that. And you know, when we get told what 
we’re going to do tomorrow, so to speak, you do that job and you do that as best as 
you can.’ At the end of the day I keep it really simple, you join the job to protect and 
look after people and stop the bad guys from doing what they do. That will ostensibly 
not change. The framework might change, but really when you walk out the door that’s 
really what you’re there to do. Reassure, help the good guys, stop the bad guys. It 
doesn’t really get more complicated than that. 
Me – Are there specific ways you’re expecting it to change? The structure of 
neighbourhood policing teams or the areas, the boundaries? 
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I-1 – Again, it hasn’t yet come out to us. I think the expectation is that boundaries have 
never meant much to the public to start with, and certainly don’t mean much to 
criminals. We’re the only ones who deal with boundaries and lines on maps. I think 
there’s becoming a stronger understanding either that those lines will reduce, 
diminish, or in fact fade away, and it will literally be… You’re working in generally a 
rough area, but you’ll go much further afield to service demand wherever it might be. 
So the lines on the map will become irrelevant. You’re just a resource nearest to the 
job, so therefore you’re gonna go to it. So that’s one thing that I think is almost 
accepted to a degree. Although that again brings, ‘well, where am I going to work 
from?’ Well, there’ll be stations, you’ve still got to work from somewhere, but the 
manner in which you go out – the area which you’re responsible for – will change. The 
other one would be, specific to neighbourhood policing with what the chief came out 
with fairly recently, is that a lot of people will read what they want to read. They see 
a whole paragraph, pick out one line and they hang their hat on it, and say, 
‘neighbourhood policing’s going’. Well, it’s not, but it won’t be – I don’t think in my 
humble opinion – it will not be teams as we have them. We won’t have as many 
sergeants or inspectors. I think if we’re lucky, in certain areas that demand 
demonstrates we need it, we’ll go back to a little bit like having a PBO, the same as 
20 years ago. They’ll still be that point of contact. And then you’ll have a team that’ll 
move around – it’ll be non-geographical – and it’ll just move to wherever the problem 
is. Problem-solve it for a set period of time. A bit like Safer Travel do. Safer travel go 
onto the networks. If there’s a peak demand somewhere, they’ll throw some resources 
at it, do whatever it is that they need to do to try and either reduce the demand, 
target harden, what have you, and then they’ll move on somewhere else. But they’re 
on the network of the force. You could argue BTP operate a bit like that. So really 
neighbourhood policing could be like a Safer Travel team – a safer neighbourhood team 
– they get parachuted into an area, intensely deal with it if they can hopefully, and 
then when the job’s done they come out and go somewhere else. I wouldn’t be 
surprised if it was something along those lines, personally. 
Me – what do you think that means for community intelligence, or really knowing the 
area and the people. I mean, you’ve said you expect there to be a least one person to 
deal with that… 
I-1 – Possibly. I mean, there’ll be certain areas that when you do your demand, if you’re 
going to do a RAG status – you know, red-amber-green – in a green area, shall we say, 
where there’s very little demand and/or a very low crime rate, I don’t think you’ll get 
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that. I think in the amber, certainly in the red, that’s where I think you’ll need some 
kind of beat officer – whatever terminology they end up with describing it, but 
essentially that kind of role – and you’re right, I think part of the problem is, and I 
have raised this with senior management, is because of… neighbourhood policing is not 
fully understood. There’s a lot of things that we do that don’t appear on corporate 
systems. It’s not captured anywhere. Things that come in directly to me, they won’t 
go to anybody else, I won’t tell anybody else – there’ll be a request, a demand, 
whatever you want to term it as – and I will deal with that. I’ll either deal immediately 
by bouncing it back on the email saying, ‘well, we’re not going to do x, y, z.’ OR it’ll 
go to the sergeant and say, ‘have a look. Assure me that there isn’t something for us, 
and then signpost the relevant agency.’ That won’t go to anyone else in the force, but 
it is demand that we’re dealing with. So one of the points I’ve raised is that because 
we do a reasonable amount of stuff that isn’t known effectively by the force, that 
when we start pulling that back from the community I think the community impact is 
going to be greater than anticipated in certain areas, and as you point out the 
community intelligence, certainly there’ll be a dip. We might recover it over time, but 
with any change programme you’ll always see performance will drop off first and then 
it’ll start to recover. I think we will… and every time we’ve done a reorganisation… I 
started on the sub divisions, then to OCU [??], now LPU. Community Intelligence has 
always been something that seemed to, you know, we’re not getting anything 
[indecipherable – ‘in it’?].  It’s like, you know, the people who used to work there now 
no longer work there and the new lot don’t know who to talk to. Being human, they’re 
still settling in and frankly couldn’t really care about what’s going on out there because 
they’re trying to sort out their own lives and, you know, all this kind of stuff. So we 
will suffer from an intelligence drought, initially anyway. 
Me: How about partner agencies, just to keep on that theme of change. Have you 
noticed the impact of the funding cuts on your other partnership agencies?. 
I-1: Yes. Bluntly, yes. I chair the Safer Estates group, or the Safer Communities group 
depending on who you talk to. And that is a multi-agency, around-the-table discuss a 
problem and try and sort it. I think there’s much more that Safer Estates Communities 
group can do, and under the ASB legislation there is some potential for that on the 
cards in relation to what the expectations are. I think that monthly meeting could be 
used more widely. We’ve got everyone around the table. We’ve got all the 
stakeholders, all the decision makers, effectively all the practitioners right there, right 
now. Why do we really need another meeting, you know, to discuss anything else? 
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We’ve got everybody there, let’s bring them to the table and let’s deal with it. What 
I’ve decided to start doing now is via those partners, so effectively trying to 
communicate it further afield, is explain to them the situation we’ve found ourselves 
in and the fact that certain things they might’ve expected us to do, not only the 
general public but partners, trying to give them a rationale as to why we won’t be 
doing that anymore. So that’s the first stage is to kind of explain that to them. The 
second bit is, in that discussion, that conversation, it’s become quite clear to me that 
they are going through exactly the same. One of the strongest proponents I saw of that 
argument was at a ward committee meeting. A councillor, [Name] I think is her name, 
she’s become mayor of Birmingham, and she was extremely straight with the public at 
the ward meeting. They were talking about rubbish, in essence, and she was just 
basically telling them, ‘you will not get the service that maybe you’ve been used to, 
and certainly what you asking, which is for an enhanced service in this area, you aren’t 
gonna get it.’ And  it was one of the most straight talking times I’ve ever seen some 
talking to the public. Just laying it on the line, just saying, ‘whether you like it, 
whether you don’t like it, whether you can live with it, is almost irrelevant. This is a 
cold hard fact; that service is gone or going.’ You know, that kind of approach. We 
haven’t – I certainly haven’t seen it anyway. We’re kind of getting there. The chief’s 
one [speech or meeting?] a few months ago was the closest I’ve seen so far. But we 
haven’t really, I don’t think, been that brutally honest. We’ve tried to do it in a soften-
the-blow kind of way. If I was going to be cynical, I would say that I’d say that’s kind 
of being left to myself, my colleagues and my sergeants to almost be the ones to deliver 
that message at the front end. Is that the right place for it? Maybe some of it, yeah, 
but... The expectations are really high, that’s the problem. So I think maybe if more 
top management, command team-wise, were maybe just a bit more blunt, then maybe 
when we made the call it’s not totally unexpected. But that’s not easy, and I 
appreciate that. 
ME: How about the working relationship between yourself or the neighbourhood 
policing teams with the agencies? Are there any tensions at the moment?  
I-1: No. I have to say. I always say that organisations don’t work very well together, 
but people do. IT’s all about partnership in relation to relationships, person to person. 
And because we’ve got very good relationships with the individuals, the housing 
officers or whatever, they haven’t been altered. I would say, in fact, maybe there’s a 
slight sense of camaraderie in relation to, ‘we know what you’re going through with 
the cuts, we’re going through them as well.’ And because there’s a bit of a joint 
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venture there, we understand each other’s pain to a degree. I don’t think that on a 
personal level it has affected it. What I’ve yet to see though, really, is a full 
understanding that because we won’t take primacy anymore in everything, because 
we’re not able to, that they’re going to have to pick up some extra work or figure out 
a creative way of dealing with it. Or in fact, of course, we’ve got to go with the 
resources that we do have and jointly. You know, the two-make-greater-than-the-
whole type approach, the synergy of it, if you will. That I’ve yet to really see 
happening. I think there’s an understanding that it’s coming, but I haven’t really seen 
it put into practice yet. I think everyone’s almost still trying to operate in the same 
way, and it’s just becoming very difficult. WE have to do something different, it’s as 
simple as that. 
Me: What about the public – what do you think about, generally the relationship 
between your NPTs and the public at the moment? Is that developing in any way? 
I-1:  Well, because the public are made up of a huge range of people, you’ll always get 
a huge range of reactions. You’ll get those that people who perhaps because they 
worked in the public sector themselves anyway, or still do, you have an understanding 
and know it isn’t through a particular choice that we have to work in different ways. 
All the way through to the other end of the spectrum where people, no matter really 
what you do or how you do it, if it doesn’t come out quite the way they want it, they’ll 
never be happy. So that’s the starting point from which we’re looking at. In relation 
to all the changes that are going on, rather than it going to a big bang – you know, one 
day we’re all there, the next day we’re not – I’ve told my sergeants to start already… 
not pulling back, that’s too harsh a term, but certain things that would be nice to do, 
you know, as opposed to the must dos, I’ve said with my backing just to start 
explaining, not just a straightforward ‘we’re not doing that’, but try and put it in some 
kind of context. My sergeants are very good at doing that. We’ve got got the other 
demands, the vulnerability demands of child sexual exploitation, ASB, domestic 
violence – that agenda – that is very important. It’s all about threat and harm risk. If 
we have to choose between, for example, attending the fete and doing some face-
painting, which would be nice to do – there’s a community feel to it – or we do our 
visits in relation to our CSE locations, or something of that nature, well guess which 
one’s going to win. It’s not going to be the fete. Some would say that that is, or their 
understanding was, ‘that’s why neighbourhood policing was invented, wasn’t it?’ That 
nice fluffy, come along and get to know your local bobby type thing. And that comes 
back to that point I made at the beginning that we’ve maybe taken on at times a bit 
291 
 
too much of that. To me, neighbourhood policing is actually a quite a gritty, in-your-
face kind of policing really, because it’s getting in to sort a problem that causing the 
community an issue. If you’re living next to the neighbour from hell, then that really, 
day in day out, is a quality of life problem that, you know, is really going to affect you. 
And to actually get that sorted sometimes, is really robust policing. It’s not just going 
round and having a coffee with Miggins and just, ‘oh that sounds terrible, I know’, and 
then going away. It is getting into their tenancy agreements, giving them ABC 
contracts, threatening them with legislation, doing warrants to disrupt. It really is, you 
know… it can be, depending on what legislation you use, quite draconian. You know, 
really getting into people’s lives with [indecipherable]. The new ASB act can close 
private residences down. That was unheard of before. So I think that the public… our 
relationship with the public, we’re trying to mangage, but I still think that when push 
comes shove there will be a finite period where it will be really noticeable. And I just 
think that a lot of people will really lament the loss of what they used to have, so 
much that they’ll trouble to accept it. And I think that’s where we’ll get our.. you 
know, we’ll have a dip in popularity. Our confidence; it will dip. But it’s nothing to do 
with actually doing…  we do things differently. We’re still there to protect you. If you 
still call us, we’ll still get there, but it’s the manner in which we’re doing it, and 
because people don’t like change as a general rule of thumb, they’ll see that as, we’ve 
pulled up the drawbridge and we’re no longer contactable, and we don’t know who 
does this and who does that. When you actually call us though, we’ll still get to you, 
it just might not be the face you’re used to who’s gonna get there. But yeah, that is 
going to be a difficult one to manage. We will a knock trust and confidence-wise. 
Me: How about your engagement methods? What kind of methods are you using at the 
moment to find out problems, priorities?  
I-1: Well, through the local delivery groups, the LDGs, and resident[?] associations, we 
start doing it through those on an ad-hoc.. we get a request coming in, ‘can you do x, 
y, z?’ And then maybe the neighbourhood sergeant says, ‘we can’t do x anymore, I’m 
afraid. We’ll try and do y, and we’ll still do z.’ And with a rationale as to why. I’ve 
steered away from social media because I think it can be massively misinterpreted. A 
message that you put out on a few – I don’t do a lot of social media – but a certain 
amount of characters isn’t enough to convey a complex message. So we steer away 
from that. So it’s more to do with face-to-face engagement, so really the NTGs, the 
Neighbourhood Tasking Groups, and resident associations. Like I said, via safer estates, 
going through partners to talk to their clients, who are invariably the same as ours, so 
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that the message can get kind of spread out, you know, it’s not just coming from the 
police. You know, ‘my housing officer also told us that.’ So therefore, it kind of lends 
a bit more credibility. A lot of the time we say something, and it’s like, ‘well, you 
would say that’, or you know, ‘you’re trying to protect your own’, or something of that 
nature. But definitely more to do with face-to-face if we can, and then it’s dealt with 
on an ad-hoc. Email can be quite a good way of doing it. If we get it via and email, if 
we don’t know who the person is then a decent email response back. If we know who 
it is then it’s a phone call to try and, you know… because we want to try and keep 
people on side as best you can because you’ve still got to work with them. In the 
intervening five years, whilst we’re trying to sell this message, we’ve still got to work 
with everybody. And again, some officers and PCSOs are saying understandably, again, 
‘I’m investing all this time and effort into this, which I know or is highly likely within 
5 years, you know, I’m going to be here to be doing it anyway.’ So yeah, it’s a fine 
balance. 
Me: When you say face-to-face engagement, are we still talking about meetings like 
PACT in other areas… 
I-1: Yeah it’s the same thing. For example where I work we’ve got a little conference 
room. They will come into the nick, the meeting will take place, their neighbourhood 
sergeant will be there. You know it’s those kinds of messages. So yeah, face-to-face 
would be lovely, but you can’t always. 
Me: Are you quite active in trying to engage particular groups, or is it more letting 
people come to you? 
I-1: I haven’t been hugely proactive. Yeah, so it’s more to do with when something is 
raised. I think it’s more to do with trying not to set hares running too early. We’ve only 
known about this ourselves for a relatively short period of time, and because I think 
we fully understand it because we physically haven’t seen any plans, if I jump too far 
ahead of it I’m going to make a lot of phone calls happen to senior management, and 
again I say, you know, give someone a paragraph and they’ll pick out the line that 
interests them out of context and that’ll be the nature of the phone call to the 
commander or something like that. One of my jobs is community cohesion and keeping 
people, not in the dark so that they’re feeling safe, but you know trust and confidence 
is one of my roles, part of my remit, and fear of crime, or trying to limit the fear of 
crime is part of my remit. Reducing crime and demand is part of my remit. So I think 
if I go too quickly and go proactive, there’ll be a lot of Chinese whispers, everyone will 
be thinking something different and I can’t control that. So at the minute it’s as it 
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comes in to us, we’re trying to manage it slowly back out. There will come a point 
when we understand it more, that we’ll probably start proactively calling 
neighbourhood meetings and saying, ‘right, okay, we now have a clearer picture of 
where we think it’s going to go – the journey.’ I want to give people correct information 
as soon as possible, at the minute though, I wouldn’t know how to describe to you, 
because I don’t know. In fact I don’t know if anyone does. I’m sure someone does 
somewhere, but it hasn’t yet been cascaded to us. So in the absence of it, I’m not 
inclined to proactively go out to people.  
 
---END--- 
 
